

**CARNEGIE EUROPE AND  
THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE**

**PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT, THE FEBRUARY  
ELECTIONS, RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES,  
GREATER REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS, AND THE CAMPAIGN  
IN AFGHANISTAN**

**REMARKS BY CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT SENIOR  
ASSOCIATES ASHLEY J. TELLIS AND FREDERIC GRARE**

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ALEXANDER NEILL: Ladies and gentleman, welcome to the second of RUSI's programme of Carnegie Europe presentations. I had the pleasure of presiding over the first in the series, I think in October last year. It was a fascinating insight into some of the realities of the security situation in Pakistan.

We have had a very revealing insight into the thoughts of the President [Musharraf] himself, but I think on this occasion we can really drill down into some of the realities and have a very frank and open debate. It's my absolute pleasure to welcome Carnegie Europe again here at the Institute and in particular to two pre-eminent experts in the region.

We have Dr Ashley Tellis: he is a leading South Asia and security expert specialised in international security and defence, and Asian strategic issues. He was recently on assignment to the U.S. Department of State, as senior advisor to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, during which time he was intimately involved in negotiating the civil nuclear agreement with India. He has also served on the National Security Council Staff as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Strategic Planning and South West Asia. He is also the author of numerous publications in the field and he is going to give us a presentation on the latest Carnegie Endowment publication *Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance*.

After Dr Tellis' presentation we are also going to hear from Dr Frederic Grare who is going to give some commentary and his own thoughts on some of the latest security developments in Pakistan. So without further ado, we have got until just after 6 o'clock, many of us do, being a Friday afternoon, many of us have to catch trains and so on, so will kick off straight away. Ashley, please, if you would like to take the rostrum.

ASHLEY TELLIS: Thank you Alex. It is a pleasure to be here this evening to share with you the basic substance of the most recent work we have put out. In fact, I think it became public just yesterday. It is an attempt to take stock of what Pakistan's contribution to the war on terror have been, because there is a persistent demand in the United States that Pakistan do more. You hear this from various public officials, that while Pakistan has made yeoman contributions to the war on terror, it is still insufficient, and so one of the things I wanted to do was in a sense understand the basis for this judgement. And do so analytically, before one makes any policy recommendations about what ought to be done next.

I am going to speak very briefly today because we have a small audience and I want to keep as much time as possible for the discussion that will follow. But let me give you the bottom line up front - Pakistan has made very important contributions to the global war on terror: that, I think, it is simply undeniable. But it is still a very selective contribution, and it is a selective contribution because that contribution is shaped by certain strategic imperatives, and that is what I really want to flesh out in the next few minutes.

And so when one looks at the whole issue of Pakistan's performance, and asks why the deficiencies that people point out to are really deficiencies, you come out with essentially two broad baskets of reasons. One set of reasons has to do with what can crudely be called the motivational deficiencies. And the other basket has to do with deficiencies that are routed in both limitations of capacity as well as operational

limitations, and limitations which have to do with a very complex operating environment. I am going to flag these very quickly. Let me start with the motivational deficiencies.

When Pakistan got into the war on terror, essentially after the tragic events of 9/11, it was confronted with an array of terrorist groups that it had to confront. And at that time there were essentially four terrorist groups that President Musharraf had to come face to face to. The first were the domestic sectarian groups that are operating within Pakistan, and in fact by 2001 there was a decade long record of murder and mayhem that they had established. That was the first group that really became relevant to the struggle. The second were all the Kashmiri groups that were aided by the Pakistan military and the ISID, going back to 1989. That was the second category. The third category was the Afghan Taliban that had just been defeated as a result of the Operation Enduring Freedom, and which moved across the border into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. And the fourth group was of course al-Qaeda, and by al-Qaeda I use this in the proper form which is the non-South Asian terrorists that had taken refuge in Afghanistan and had moved across. So in 2001 these were the four groups.

Now when you look at the Pakistani record going after these four groups, you find that the record is quite a segmented one. Musharraf went after the sectarian terrorists groups with a great deal of zeal and energy. But he went after those groups whose objectives were fundamentally out of sync with the Pakistani state. So if you were a sectarian group that was essentially targeting other Pakistanis, you felt the wrath of the state. If you were a sectarian group that was advancing Pakistan's national interest either with respect to Kashmir or in Afghanistan, you essentially got a pass.

With respect to the terrorist groups operating against India, the Kashmiri terrorist groups, Musharraf actually held back from going after these groups initially, and went after them only after US pressures increased during the 2001 - 2002 crisis. And even during that period what he did was essentially a tactical retreat: he didn't put these groups out of business; he just controlled the level of infiltration across the Line of Control. Because he didn't want relations with India to melt down, but he wanted to keep these as a strategic reserve in case relations with India became difficult over time. So they had a certain kind of immunity if one would use that phrase.

When you look at the third group, the Afghan Taliban that migrated across the frontier, again the policy was a policy of exceptionalism. The Pakistani state very deliberately declined to target the Kandahari leadership, especially the Shura that existed around Mullah Omar. And they refused to target them again because they had invested in this group for essentially a decade. So the early expectation was the hope that this group would somehow just fade away. This group was defeated; the Pakistani state did not want to add insult or injury by essentially going after them.

The fourth group, al-Qaeda, the Pakistanis went after al-Qaeda, and whatever the President said about the record with respect to al-Qaeda is absolutely right. They went after al-Qaeda with certain vigour, part because the United States was leaning heavily on Pakistan.

So when you look at the spectrum of terrorist groups you discover the policy with respect to counter-terrorism was not uniform. It was a mix and match kind of

solution, and it was a mix and match solution based on the importance and the relevance of that particular group to Pakistan's national interest.

Now by the time 2006 comes along, there is actually a fifth terrorist group that rose out, and that is the Pakistani -Taliban, which must be distinguished from the Afghan Taliban which came across the border. And this is a group of course that the Pakistanis have gone very hard after. These are characters like Baitullah Mehsud, from the Mehsud tribe, Mulgal-bash-Alfredi (ph) from the Kurram agency, Maulana Qazi Fazlullah from Swat, this is the Pakistani-Taliban. What has been the effect of the segmented strategy? The effect of the segmented strategy is that it has ended up undermining all the good that Pakistan actually did in the war against al-Qaeda. Because in effect this is what happened: the moment the Pakistanis decided that the Afghan-Taliban and especially the leadership, were to be given immunity from counter-terrorism operations, what happens was, you created a group of individuals in the FATA, who basically provided sanctuary and succour to the al-Qaeda elements who were their ideological cohorts. And in 2007, the US intelligence community finally concluded that al-Qaeda had regenerated, precisely because it enjoyed the sanctuary, protected as it were, in this mass of Taliban foot-soldiers, who were not eliminated as a result of the operations going back to 2001.

It also had other consequences. Taliban preservation in the FATA inevitable led to the regeneration of the Taliban inside Afghanistan itself and so the Afghan Taliban problem today in Pakistan actually has two halves. There's one half which consists of the Taliban that is still in the sense on the loose in the Federally Administrative Tribal Areas but there is now a resurgence of native Taliban elements who are operating in situ in Afghanistan itself. This is a problem that NATO has to deal with now on a day-to-day basis.

The third consequence has been that those sectarian groups that Musharraf did not target because their objectives were in sync with the objectives with the state, now turn out to be providers of manpower. For many of the Pakistan Taliban groups that have grown up in the interim and so the ill consequence of not targeting the sectarian groups comprehensively and decisively has now come back to haunt us, because even though some of these groups were formally banned but nothing really done with respect to in taking their manpower, this manpower is essentially now, kind of percolated to the Afghan-Taliban groups that are causing Mr Musharraf a great deal of trouble. Of course the Pakistan-Taliban has now developed a life of its own and will continue to remain a very serious thorn in Mr Musharraf's side including now deliberately targeting the Pakistan army and deliberately targeting the frontier core forces. This group sees itself in an ideological struggle with Pakistan that brokes no compromise.

So, when one takes stock eight years later, the only conclusion that one can draw about how we have reached to this impasse must be attributed at least in the first instance to what can be called motivational deficiencies, that is, the inability of the Pakistani state and the unwillingness of the Pakistani state to conduct a war on terrorism that is essentially was uniform across all terrorist groups across the border. The moment the strategy permitted some groups to enjoy sanctuary, what happened was that these groups essentially regenerated, multiplied, provided assistance to other ideological groups and then over time came back in a very venomous way to complicate the life of Pakistanis.

Now having said this about the motivation I want to say a few words about the other half of the walnut and the other half of the walnut are the capacity limitations. The capacity limitations of the Pakistanis and counter terrorism must not be underestimated. There is a lot of complaints about their unwillingness to do things that the international community requires them to do. But there are simply many things that they can't do. The war in the FATA and in the border areas is essentially being run by two major Pakistani military organisations. The first is Eleventh Core and the second is the Special Services Groups which is essentially the commando units.

The Eleventh Core is a conventional war fighting force, is essentially an infantry heavy core which serves as a strategic reserve for Pakistani military operations against India in the Punjab. It is designed primarily for combat operations against a conventional adversary. They have been pressed into the fight to do the counter terrorism which they don't know and don't understand. They do counter terrorism the way they would fight the Indian army which is sledge hammer tactics, massive uses of fire power, large scale employment of military force all of which ends up having counter productive outcomes. It alienates the tribes, it alienates the population in which a lot of these militants hide and it actually turns the people you are trying to influence against you. And this must be attributed really to the weaknesses of counter terrorism. That is one important element. The second important element to keep in mind is that the old Pakistani political institutions that existed in the FATA, which is essentially the centrality of the relationship between the political agent and the maliks, that relationship has basically melted down completely. This has an important consequence: the melting down of that relationship means that the key institution that Pakistan relied on for human intelligence on the FATA no longer exists. All of you who have given some thought to counterterrorism operations know that without good intelligence the operations is worthless. In fact, the absence of intelligence prepares you even further in the direction of using the sledge hammer tactics which then only makes things worse.

Because of the social deterioration in the FATA and because of Pakistan's technical limitations in the intelligence collections, we have ended up in a situation where the kind of targeted counter terrorism operations that are most effective, are things that we simply have not being able to do.

The third and the last element that I want to flag is that the political environment that surrounds counterterrorism operations today in the Pakistani frontier is very different from the environment in 2001. In 2001, the environment was still relatively pacific and the state was not seen as an intruder. Today the environment in the frontier is so roiling and so polluted where the first adversary is essentially the Pakistani state. In this kind of environment is very difficult to do effective counterterrorism. It is not helped by the fact that in Afghanistan, which is the other half of where the operations are conducted, the Karzai regime has not been very effective in the nation building exercise either. We are now in a very awkward position where both within Pakistan and outside of Pakistan the environment is not conducive to the success of counterterrorism.

I am going to end by just telling you what my one line policy solution. There are many arguments in the US today, given this record of less than effective performance: many arguments in the US which make the claim that the United States should turn the screws in Pakistan, in different ways. You could turn the screws politely and you could turn the screws in less than polite ways. My view is that adopting that kind of a strategy, whatever form it takes, is not going to deliver the gains that we want. Given the history that the President [Musharraf] repeated this evening about US - Pakistan relations, I think any efforts in turning the screws is only going to make the Pakistani military and

intelligence services even more recalcitrant. We are condemned in some sense to follow a strategy of continued engagement. I think there are things we can do, to make the engagement smarter than it currently is, but I don't think there is a realistically alternative to continued engagement at least for some, more time to come.  
Thank you.

ALEXANDER NEILL: Ashley, thank you very much [applause]. I think you really got to the crux of the issues and filled in some of the gaps that were missing from our earlier discussion today.

I'd like now to hand over to Dr Frederic Grare. He is a leading Pakistan expert and writer having served most recently in the French embassy in Pakistan and from 1999 to 2003 in New Delhi as Director of the Centre for Social Sciences and Humanities. He has written extensively on security issues, Islamic movements and sectarian conflicts in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Dr Grare's research focuses on the tension between stability and democratisation in Pakistan including challenges of sectarian conflict, Islamic political mobilisation and educational reform, all subjects which I think we need to look at in closer detail. So I am going to hand it over to you now. Thanks.

FREDERIC GRARE: Thank you very much Alex. It's been a long day so I will be brief. I will be brief also because General Musharraf has proved me totally wrong, because he explained just before everything was fine, the situation was controlled and, basically, due to one man who is so wrong that he almost destabilised the entire country by himself.

I intended initially to examine the question of security in Pakistan and, most specifically, the impact of the political crisis on some security issues. Most of what Ashley said just before is there too. But I would like to take a slightly different angle and see what the impact can be, because until I heard Musharraf I thought naively that the question was basically a question of legitimacy, that all the problems that we are facing now found their route in the original scene of the coup d'état of 1999 which repeated itself later in November 3rd, 2007. Because as every single military coup d'états [in Pakistan] before the one of General Musharraf, it just repeated the same pattern which is: you take over, then you have the Supreme Court legitimise your coup through constitutional clause, which is called the doctrine of state necessity, and then you try to get more a more compliant Supreme Court and so on and so forth.. If you don't get it then you push it out, and somebody will replace it and so on, and you just move on.

Except that this time, despite the constitutional amendment which had been introduced in 2004 through the LFO [Legal Framework Order]—I mean, even with that, there was a need to regain some legitimacy through the constitutional process. That was simply not possible. It was interesting to note for example that [former Pakistani Supreme Court Chief Justice] Iftikhar Chaudhury *was* all that bad: but there was also a purely constitutional aspect to it, which Musharraf didn't address. That is the core of the problem because, if you remember, there is what we call the "provisional constitutional order", which does allow him to stand before you today as President but which will have to be accepted one way or the other in order for him to stay there. Which either way is to tell you that we are in a very uncertain situation because this obviously will have an impact on the elections. If it has to go through the normal constitutional process it has to be approved by a two third majority in parliament. The

question is: how do you get a two third majority in parliament in the present circumstances?

Let me just get back to the chronology of the event. It all started in May [2008] with the suspension of a judge. Then we get the major event on May 12th and the massacre in Karachi. Then we got November 3<sup>rd</sup> of course, no need to speak about it, and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. And here we are with the elections coming on February the 18<sup>th</sup>.

What is the situation? It is very difficult to predict what is going to happen. The electoral process has been totally distorted, distorted by what we have seen with the judiciary, distorted by the duration of the campaign, because the campaign was very short, meaning that it was very difficult for the opposition to campaign but extremely easy for the Islamic parties to campaign all year long from the *madrashas* in March to just continue their whole thing. It started also by the assassination of Benazir, simply because the message was understood loud and clear. Even if, it was unintentional, I'm not accusing anybody in this business, this is muddy enough and I don't want to go into that; but, clearly, the message which has been understood by all the opposition in Pakistan is perhaps avoid campaigning and get too loud because that may happen to you as well.

So there we are. There are some predictions that are reasonable. It is reasonable to assume for example, that the PPP will carry Sindh with some parts controlled by the MQM [Muttahida Quami Movement] in Karachi of course, Hyderabad and so forth. It is quite clear that, given the situation Baluchistan, will likely to have again a PMLQ - MMA coalition of some sort because all the Baluch nationalist parties are boycotting the elections. It is not clear in the NWFP [North West Frontier Province] and I will not trace any predictions there, and it is clear that the big battle between the two sides of PML in Punjab is very much on. Because those two organisations are competing for basically the same electorate. The major problem within the leadership sort of the triangulation between Pervez Musharraf himself, the Chaudhry cousins, and Nawar Sharif: the major part of the battle is going to be there.

At the end of the day, what does it mean? It means that the only goal for regime is to maintain its serving power, meaning what? That any coalition is acceptable providing that it does support this outcome. Meaning what also? That any coalition that will emerge from the present political crisis is very likely to be very unstable whatever it is. Meaning what? Meaning that we will have governmental instability for some time to come with or with out Pervez Musharraf. This is something which is given; there are no alternative good or bad, against this situation.

What does it mean also in terms of, this time, direct consequences for security? The main question which is being asked is: how much will the outcome, whatever it is, no matter whether it is rigged or not, what will be the acceptability of the outcome of the elections for the people of Pakistan? What will be the situation if people go to take the street?

We can imagine different scenarios: from the most benign, where there is simply no agitation because the leadership comes into deal with the Pervez Musharraf; to the most extreme, where people really take the street, it requires the army to really move on, that takes units from the fight against terrorism to ensure law and order and so on and so forth. In between, you have got all different kinds of situations, including some which, in

a way, would favour the regime because it would simply mean agitation, but a divided agitation: so it would be easier to control and to play one element against another and so forth and so on in the good Pakistani tradition.

The second element is the risk of ethnic tension because we could very well have tension, not only between Baluchistan and the regime: this is already there. The tension between the Pashtun and the FATA and the central administration is already there. But we could also have tension between [the regions] Sindh and Punjab and the risk is that we end up with a *Punjabisation* of the electoral debate and the *Punjabisation* of the entire process with the repercussion that they can have in the rest of the federation.

I have already spoken about the provisional constitutional order so I will ignore it now.

What will be the long term consequences? Some of the long term consequences were already obvious in the “lawyers movement.” I mean, it was quite clear that whatever we may have sold off culturally of course but the lawyers movement as such, the movement of judiciary was that the liberal element of the society had to be silenced in order to let the regime continue as it was. What does it mean? It doesn't mean necessary a completely destabilisation of Pakistan. It doesn't mean doomsday tomorrow, but it means that the public space is more open to more radical voices, and this is something extremely important I believe.

Second, the usual risk that we always mention without any real evidence of it but that you cannot totally ignore: the potential Islamisation of the army. If you are afraid that the Pakistani society gets increasingly radicalised, then we may also be afraid that the army, which by and large reflects the rest of the society, becomes radicalised itself, at least some segments of it. There is no element or evidence of it so far, but this is an option that we cannot totally ignore.

Another thing: what about the risk of this disintegration of the army? Again this is a very improbable scenario and I simply do not believe it. But this is something that in the long term we have to consider, not necessary through a concrete break but a gradual erosion of the link, a gradual erosion of the professionalisation of the army, gradual erosion with increasing projection of the ethnic tension from the society within the army. It is nothing sufficient to ensure any major consequences by itself, but just small elements piling up and over the long term ending up in the situation which is quite scary.

But having said all of that, the risk of destabilisation of the country to me remains minimal. I believe we will have agitation but this agitation will remain limited and divided. And yet this is not something that we have to take lightly.

What I wanted to say through that, is that we are faced with one main question and one main question almost exclusively which is: What about the regime? And this is where I come back to Ashley's presentation before. The problem, the reason why a lot of us in the West are interested in Pakistan is precisely because of the question of terrorism, the question of what does Pakistan do, the question of why is Pakistan our best ally in the war on terror and so on and so forth. I believe that this tension between the willingness or unwillingness to do things, the capability or incapability to do things is absolutely central. But it is quite clear in a number of cases that the Pakistani regime seems only partially willing and definitely not capable and increasingly so to deliver on

this issue. I think that the question that was raised in the Q & A session with General Musharraf is absolutely central. This is an absolute prove of the ambivalence of the regime on the question of terrorism.

Let's look at the facts: not coming from the Pakistani press by the way, but coming from AFP, we do have a guy who is suspected to be the main organiser of the failed attempt of summer 2006 here in London. Okay, this guy is supposed to be extradited, he goes out on trial with two policemen only. His uncle sends a car to politely invite the two policemen and his nephew to come in his car back to the prison. They stop on the way to the local fast food and then they stop at the mosque and then suddenly the car disappears and they just ran away. I think that despite of what Mr. Musharraf says there are questions to be asked and serious questions to be asked because if they are not asked it means that there are no red lines. And if there are no red lines, then there is absolutely no reason to be in Afghanistan either. Because it is the reason why we all move there, to prevent the possible export of international terrorism in Europe, in the West, in the U.S., and so on and so forth, and in Pakistan itself.

That's the question with which I will leave you, with just a few remarks. What I just said clearly indicates that I don't believe that the fortune bargain with the Pakistani regime functions anymore. I'm not sure what the alternative is to be very clear, but the idea that we can just accept anything internally provided that they deliver on the terrorism side is no longer working because they don't deliver on the terrorism side.

I'm not saying that purely to attack the willingness. If you're in a situation where you never know or you only partly know whether you're in a situation and where your partner doesn't want or cannot but have no certainty on where the situation is exactly, you are in no position to elaborate a policy. It is fine to build up the capability if your partner is truly willing to cooperate. If this second element, the willingness, is not there, then you just increase the nuisance capability and I'm not sure. I fully agree with Ashley: there are both cases, the fact that these are both cases makes it only more difficult. So I think we are on for a period of prolonged governmental instability, prolonged uncertainty about a number of key issues as far as we're concerned.

Let me just finish by a slightly more optimistic note. The crisis that we are facing in Pakistan is, in my opinion, not a systemic one. This is not a radical alternative between the civilian and military, this is something else. The election is about the scope of the political space that the civilians would enjoy, good or bad. We all know the flaws of the previous civilian regimes: this is not the question here. But this political space which is so far non-existent could to some extent exist, and from there it will probably be possible to build up something.

The army will remain for the time being not only the main practical instrument in the war on terror, but also the strong political actor on the Pakistan political scene. So, in that situation, both the expectations that we have towards this regime and the fear that we have over having the same regime and the regime collapsing and that kind of thing are probably exaggerated. That is the most optimistic thing I can say tonight. Thank you very much.

ALEXANDER NEILL: Thank you very much, Frederic [applause]. We have seen two sides to the coin. On one side we have seen some of the realities of the fractious security situation on the ground, particularly in the FATA area. We have got the Taliban which

appears to have been segmented and you have got this ad-hoc approach, which I think I could characterise it as that. On the other side, from Frederic's discussion, we have got this, perhaps, the idea of a political hijacking going on and the core question of constitutional order. And President Musharraf earlier said the forthcoming elections is going to be free, fair and transparent but I'm not sure if they going to be peaceful. With that note I am going to open the floor to a short debate.

Lets take some questions. Dr. Khan, could you please identify yourself and your affiliation?

1<sup>st</sup> question from the floor:

Dr. NOSHAD KHAN: I am Dr. Noshad Khan, I am here at RUSI, I have arrived on the 14th of this month and I will be here in for one year. First of all I would like to comment on Dr Frederic Grare's speech. Sir, I think there is no state on this Earth without problems. Could you tell me a single state without problems? No. Yes, of course, we in Pakistan are facing problems but I'm sorry to say that you have just explained one side of Pakistan. You have totally ignored Pakistan's contribution to the war on terror and another matter as well. Where President Musharraf's legitimacy is concerned: you were talking about the provisional constitutional order. It was under this order that—the Chief Justice himself had taken oath under the third constitutional order and then it was through an amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan [that] President Musharraf was given five years term to serve as President of Pakistan. Then, again, it is the Parliament of Pakistan which has elected General Musharraf as President. I think democracy is the will of people. If the nation of the people, if they want an elected representative, if they want him as our President—why are you people objecting to this? I think it is out of question. Another question for Dr Ashley and you.

ALEXANDER NEILL: Dr [inaudible], can I stop you there? I think you have asked a question there, I am sorry.

No, I haven't asked the question. My question is: if 37 countries operating in Afghanistan under ISAF or NATO missions, including Afghanistan, 37, 38 in number, if they can't deliver on terrorism, can Pakistan alone deliver on terrorism? Only one thing I will say; we have deployed, I'm saying this for the last two days, we have deployed on the Pakistan - Afghan border, 120,000 military persons, over a thousand check posts and what is the contribution of 38 countries and Afghanistan? This is my question to you, thanks.

FREDERIC GRARE: The reason is obvious. I agree with you that even Switzerland has major problems, but Switzerland is not a problem of international security so far, so you know that makes a slight difference between Pakistan and Switzerland. Although there is an interesting comparison there because at the end of the last century was the centre of European subversion and we tend to forget that [laughs]

For the rest: a lot of the process that you have mentioned, I'm sorry to say, is just simply flawed. I mean the election in 2002 have been rigged, the presidential elections, the national elections and the provincial elections so on and so forth. This has been acknowledged by the international community. There were reports on it. This is even acknowledged within Pakistan itself. I don't mind being just called your whatever, but

there is a number of realities that is time to face. What I am saying here is the crisis of legitimacy and what I call the original scene is getting back to us and it is affecting your country, sir, in a more decisive manner. It is affecting your compatriots in a more decisive matter. When you say “well, he has been elected”, look at the last polls, whether they were Pakistani or conducted by foreign organisations, they all say the same thing: legitimacy is gone. So at this very minimal level we should at least agree.

2<sup>nd</sup> question from the floor

[inaudible] Greek Defence attaché office, Dr Tellis, if I may go back to the RL Fatah and so on and just tackle unwillingness or inability of the Pakistani forces to deliver. I understand it must be really tremendously difficult for them. First of all to haven't been trained for it at all. If I put or let aside the Eleventh Corps then we have frontier corps staff. They are local Pashtuns. How can they really work or fight against their own men in the tribes? That's going to my question. I also very share the idea that it is not possible to press so much: there must be some negotiation and definitely cooperation. But to do it, I don't think that's good and wise idea, for example today, sell 10 F-16 to Pakistani army from the budget that US gave them for the war on terror, because the frontier corps are not well equipped yet. And if I will exaggerate a bit, until last year they stood there wearing sandals in the snow. So would not be better to use this money to equip and train these corps? And then maybe, of course, it is between the states. But selling them F-16 would not probably be very useful on this field. What is your point? Thanks.

ASHLEY TELLIS: The F-16 is a very peculiar plan. It's is even more peculiar in the context of the US -Pakistan relations. I understand the point you're making. I think there is a reason why we are selling them F-16 and it has nothing to do with the operational requirements of the war on terror. It is a political form of compensation to give the Pakistani military something that it values, in order to gain a consent to their participation in what we really care about. So in that sense of this political recompense, I take your point completely that one of things that we have to do better are going beyond the F-16, is really equipping the forces that are engaged in the counterterrorism activity. I must confess though, that the record that is now becoming public of the resources that are given to the Pakistan for what are called coalition support operations, were not used wisely, with respect to equipping these forces and it is almost certain that the Congress of the United States is going to make some fundamental changes in the coming year to the way the United States provides coalition support monies. It is almost certain to actually direct the use of these monies towards certain investments because the previous practice of simply cutting Pakistan a cheque and hoping that they will buy the required equipment is not paying off.

ALEXANDER NEILL: So the bank for the bark, so to speak, and where this money is being directed, clearly there is an issue that was taken up earlier about the issue of training and combat troops well. Given your analysis of the tribe origins, I would imagine the training to tackle not only the roots of extremism but actually the militants there. And it is happening at the moment the fort in Saroga being overrun and so on.

3<sup>rd</sup> question from the floor:

Thank you, Jennifer Harbison from Control Risk Group. A couple of questions, one for each of our presenters. I am interested in the breakdown of the relationship between the political agent and the maliks in the tribal areas. I wonder if you can just talk us through

how it is that came about, because that does seem to be at the crux of the current sort of social dislocation there. And the second question is with regard to the comment or the phrase the *Punjabisation* of the election: could you perhaps take us through what you meant by that?

FREDERIC GRARE: *Punjabisation* of the election meant the following. It was quite clear from the very beginning that the PPP would carry Sindh or at least rural Sindh and part of urban Sindh. The big question in order for Benazir to be politically really meaningful was to gain part of Punjab. Now she's gone and part of the stake for the organisation left is to make sure that the PMLQ or the PMLN or both or in combination or whatever you can imagine, actually still control the heart of the problem. I remember a conversation with a PMLN person, not a PPP worker or activist or whatever who was, telling me after Karachi, when Benazir had escaped the assassination attempt: "this time was just a signal sent to her. Today she will prove that she can mobilise people in Punjab; then they will kill her". I don't know who he meant by 'they' and I don't want to argue about that, but the idea was very much there, you know controlling part of Punjab was a key issue. So regaining Punjab, along ethnic arguments is also worth campaigning there. This is just a risk, I have no evidence that is going too far, but this is something that I take seriously in the present context in Pakistan.

ALEXANDER NEILL: Yes, also not to forget that young Punjabis are turning up in Helmand province fighting British troops at the moment, so well not British troops but coalition troops.

ASHLEY TELLIS: To understand the centrality of the political agent and the malik, you got to recognise a political fact: the FATA is constitutionally not part of Pakistan. Its relationship with Pakistan is governed by treaty, not by common law. Historically, and this goes back to the days of the British Raj, that is complicated history here, but what the governments in Pakistan used was the mechanism of the political agent who was the representative of central authority, working with the tribes and the maliks of the tribal leaders. Now, the governments in Islamabad would provide the political agent with the resources required to keep the maliks in good humor. That was the essence of the relationship. And it worked wonderfully for both sides, because the political agent basically kept the maliks happy, the maliks provided the political agent for the information about what was happening in the area and so the equities of all the stakeholders were satisfied.

What happened over a period of time was that this relationship basically became an exemplar of what corrupt political order was. In the 1980s, this deterioration which occurred because of the perception of corruption, that the maliks could be bought over by political agents who were basically wealthy, using resources that are coming from Islamabad, this corruption was complicated by the Islamisation of the area as a result of the Afghan jihad. And for the first time you had a new centre of political authority that was competing with the political agent and the malik and that was the mulvi. Twenty years later, what has happened is that the mulvi has virtually replaced the political agent and the malik as being the point of authority legitimating and the malik looks at the whole issue of order through ideological lenses. And when he looks at it through ideological lenses he ends up with only one conclusion: the real villain of the peace is essentially the secular political regime, whether it is the secular political regime and the FATA or the circular regime and the Islamabad. And that is the heart of the problem

that explains the decay of all the human intelligence resources that traditionally would come through the malik agent relationship to Pakistan.

ALEXANDER NEILL: Yes, and back to the human angle, surely the infiltration into the Swat area and also the forts being overrun in South Waziristan: this should tell us that you know ISI intelligence or whatever intelligence network is running is simply not working.

4<sup>th</sup> question from the floor:

Dr Khan but not related but its probably tribally. I wasn't here at Musharraf's, Musharraf whatever you want to call him, his meeting [laughs]. But I'm very interested at Dr [inaudible] has said, don't think he's here.

ALEXANDER NEILL: He has left.

Dr. SAJID ALI KHAN: I can ask him this evening, but if you could first tell me what it was that went to the crux, it was actually he is also gone through the tracks of a number of things. If can you just tell me what that question was so important, can I ask.

FREDERIC GRARE: He just asked about what General Musharraf thought about the escape of Rashid Rauf and the underlying assumption was the involvement of the agency and so on.

DR. SAJID ALI KHAN: Okay it is really quite irrelevant. I wonder if you could look at this in a very slightly different way, in fact it is a massive different way and that is this: that by all accounts 100 per cent of the Pakistan population abhor this idea of this war. I'm not even going to call it war on, you might call it "war on dandruff", it is just ridiculous. So they are absolutely against it. Whether they are going to be able to put their voice on this thing is almost immaterial because the last time there was a good general election was between Nawar Shariff on Pakistan Muslim League and Benazir in PPP, Nawar Shariff actually had a landslide victory. And I for one thought: good, we will now have civilian control. But Musharraf didn't accept it. Contrary, quite different from General McCarthy: he was pushed out by Harry Truman but he accepted it. I just like to envisage, hypothetically, fence right across the border between Afghanistan, let them do what they like and we have a little Switzerland here with 170 million people. What would the United States do?

ALEXANDER NEILL: We're back to Switzerland again and another comparison. And also the prospect of getting our anti-dandruff shampoo out [laughs], do you have any response to that?

ASHLEY TELLIS: There's just an obvious answer that even if you were to isolate the problems in Afghanistan from the problems in Pakistan, American interest would still be engaged because the challenges of terrorism within Pakistan, in so far as they have a bearing on state stability, affect US national security and global security. The idea that Pakistan could become a victim to forces that are not sympathetic to the United States is not something that people feel comfortable about. It comes down very simply to that fact.

ALEXANDER NEILL: We have got three minutes left and what I will do is take a number of questions altogether, so if we could take in quick fire some last round of questions please.

5<sup>th</sup> question from the floor

I am Zahid, from BBC Pashtun service. First of all, the malik and political agent relation, there is one very important factor, the relation between the [inaudible], because the political agent he wanted replaced by the army and when the army went there, the army major doesn't know anything, how to contact her and how to talk and about the culture about the social favourites, so that's one thing.

And the other thing is: how can you expect a fair election in Pakistan? So far, there is no electioneers campaigning and even in [inaudible] yesterday, two politicians got killed. No major politician can come out from his home, all [inaudible] forces they're simply scared out there of their life.

6<sup>th</sup> question from the floor:

Paul Kay, RUSI member. It appears to me that the state actors have a fault-line running directly down through their problem and that fault-line being the border, which does not apply to the Pashtun. Do you not think that a better command control between ISAF and the Pakistani army working together in some form of unified joined headquarters somewhere would stop a lot of these problems? Thank you.

7<sup>th</sup> question from the floor:

Dr. NOSHAD KHAN: I'm here to rectify things, [laughs]. Looking at this name FATA the abbreviation of Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Now [inaudible] say it's in an integral part of Pakistan. When Pakistan came into being in 1947 all the Muliks from all agencies came to the governors house, and then they signed a treaty. So they have joined Pakistan, I think it is an integral part of Pakistan.

ASHLEY TELLIS: No, no. Your misunderstand me. I am not saying that is not [interruption]

Dr. NOSHAD KHAN: Constitutionally, it is a part and parcel of Pakistan, it is not something you will exclude from Pakistan.

ALEXANDER NEILL: So, we've got a final question about the outcome peaceful elections or not, I'm sceptical; should there be a joint headquarters? I think that's probably a good idea and a fundamental idea of what is the make up of FATA and what are the methods of control.

ASHLEY TELLIS: I can give a good crack at the last two [questions]. I think the idea for the joint headquarters is not a bad one. The problem though is that it won't solve what I think is the heart of the problem. The sanctuary to the Taliban leadership arises not in the FATA but inside Pakistan proper. And the best judgement of NATO commanders and American commanders is that the leadership Shuras of the Taliban are primarily operating around Quetta. This is far from the FATA, this is inside Pakistan. Dealing with these leadership Shuras and the regional Shuras that exist in Peshawar and

in Miran Shah (Miran Shah is the only Shura that is actually in the FATA) will require the domestic counterterrorism capabilities of the Pakistani state. So what the joint headquarters will do is deal with the transit problem across the border and I think that is certainly a core component that has to be addressed.

But there is still the other half of the problem: What do you do with the thinking piece which is operating within Pakistan? We do need a solution to that apart from what happens on the border.

On the question of the status of the FATA: I was not trying to excise the FATA from Pakistan. I was only making a simple point that the constitutional character of the FATA is different from the constitutional character of Pakistan because the relations between the FATA and Pakistan are regulated by treaty, by a treaty that go back to the formation of the Pakistani state. And the treaty is the guarantee that Pakistani national laws will not apply to the FATA, it will be tribal law, it will be the frontier crimes regulations and things like that. So, I'm not saying it is not part of the state in some conceptual sense, I'm just saying the relationship between the state and the FATA is between a coordinate entity and not a super and a subordinate entity. That of course is one of the problems that we have in the CT [counter-terror] relationship and which is likely to change.

FREDERIC GRARE: The question of will the election be peaceful or not. There is absolutely no way to know at this stage simply because we don't know what's going to happen, we don't have any elements that can indicate whether they will be stable or not. I just indicating that there is a risk that the result, whatever they may be, we can even imagine a scenario under which the election will be totally free and fair, and yet the result wouldn't be accepted by the population. And given the psyche of the moment, then there are reasons to be worried about. In this scenario, we don't know what can happen and this is certainly something we have to worry about. If things turn for the best, well, good. But we cannot exclude the possibility that things turn wrong as well. In between, you have all possible scenarios: limited agitation, larger agitation. I have no answer to that question basically.

ALEXANDER NEILL: Thanks Frederic. Ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of all of you I would like to thank Ashley and Frederic for some fascinating insights on the political side of things and the hard security side of things. I would encourage you to look at the new publication *Pakistan and the War on Terror*. It should be out on the Carnegie Endowment website very soon. They are always a good read and on behalf of RUSI I would like to thank both Carnegie Endowment and our two speakers today for a fascinating talk. Thank you very much.