

**CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

THE PAKISTANI ARMY AND POST ELECTION SCENARIOS

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ASHLEY TELLIS: Well, good morning, everyone, and thank you for coming to this event today, which focuses on the Pakistani army, but especially in the context of Pakistan's domestic politics, in particular, the elections that are literally around the corner. I must congratulate all of you for having made it through what appears to be terribly inclement weather and I am certain the panel will repay your troubles quite abundantly because of the expertise that is really present at the table this morning.

We have two very distinguished speakers. Shuja Nawaz, who started his career as a journalist and has focused quite extensively on both the developmental issues as well as military issues and is actually the author of a forthcoming book, "Cross Sword," that looks particularly at the Pakistani army and the challenges facing the Pakistani state. I am going to ask Shuja to start off the morning's events with the presentation and he will be followed by Ayesha Siddiqi, an old friend of mine whom I have known now for many, many years who, as you all know, is a very distinguished student of the Pakistani military.

She did her first book, actually, on Pakistani arms procurement in the context of its national strategy and has very recently published a second book which has turned out to be, in the best sense of the word, controversial because she looks at the Pakistan military's economic interests in Pakistani society. So there is, without any doubt, you have two individuals here with us who can speak with authority on the challenges facing Pakistan today. And the subject that we are going to explore this morning is the changes that are taking place within Pakistan, particularly in its political fortunes, and the role that we expect the Pakistani military to play.

For those of you who follow Pakistan, you know clearly that the military is probably the most important institution in Pakistani society because it has been the most organized institution, the most stable institution for many years. And that is both a source of strength and weakness. It's a source of strength because it holds the country together in uncertain times and makes the military a particularly attractive partner for foreign nations, especially the United States. But it's also a source of weakness because an overly strong military can, in a sense, choke out civilian institutions that require space to flourish. And we are at a moment in Pakistan's history where the Pakistan military really has to make some fundamental choices about its own role in the state and its willingness to allow the state to, in a sense, function as we expect modern states to.

The jury is still out on whether the Pakistan military will, in a sense, choose what the international community expects of it. But those are the issues that we will explore in some detail this morning. So let me first welcome both the panelists here to the Carnegie Endowment. Welcome, all of you, again. And without further ado, I will turn the podium onto Shuja. Thank you.

SHUJA NAWAZ: Thank you, Ashley. I know it's a very hazardous occupation to make any predictions about elections, particularly in Pakistan, but we are five days short of the elections in an electoral season that's been marked by turmoil and violence. And there's been a rising trajectory of terrorist violence against both civilian targets and, more recently, against the Pakistan army. And, as a result, uncertainty prevails.

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There are fears that the elections will be marred by violence and rigging and that the electorate will stay away and that the turnout could be even lower than in previous elections and that the pre-rigging may produce one of two broad outcomes. This is the pre-rigging: One, win for the Pakistan Muslim League (Q), the so-called King's party that was favoring President Pervez Musharraf and was his partner all of these years and, two, a hung parliament in which no single party has a large enough block of seats to be able to form a viable government. This would give the president free reign for political engineering.

The charges of pre-rigging are based on the presence of nazims or district administrators who are already in place and who were elected earlier and who largely support the government and its favorite party. Further, it is alleged that the election returning officers, who are appointed by the judiciary, which has been tamed following the replacement of judges who were seen to be against Musharraf. And this occurred after the so-called second coupe of President Musharraf in November 2007.

A recent report from PILDAT, which is the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, based on visits to two key districts in the Punjab, seems to bolster these fears. While the mechanism for rigging are many, a major one that involves changes in the counts from the time an election is concluded at a polling station and the results are announced centrally by the election commission, appears to have been removed. Under new rules, the results will now be announced when they are counted locally and not after a delay. But other means are still available to stuff the ballots or, for female voters, to vote at different stations using borrowed ID cards that do not carry the photographs of the person to whom they have been issued.

Now, where does the army fit into this scenario? First, despite some confusion emanating from comments by different government officials, the Pakistan army is not helping conduct these elections. The new army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, has announced unequivocally that the army will not be undertaking any of the election-day functions that are properly the role of the civil administration and the judiciary.

The key element here – but the key point is that, if asked, and the army has been requisitioned for this purpose by provincial authorities, the army will help in maintaining law and order during the election process. So the country has been divided into critical areas and non-critical areas. And, in the critical areas, as of today, large numbers of the military, the rangers and police force, have been deployed to ensure that there is no violence or no untoward incidents.

A key issue here is whether the army's presence in these areas is seen or is presented by some as affecting the voters to go one way or the other. Again, the army chief has clarified that the army will not involve itself in politics and has even imposed a ban on military officers meeting politicians including the president who, having now retired from the army, is seen as a civilian. But there are always underlying fears that the army's influence will be felt at the ballot box. And various parties and candidates have attempted to show their alliance with the army and the men in khaki by one way or the other. And what means that their disposal is to bring on board into their parties retired, senior military officers so that they can be seen as having some kind of a link to the army and to GHQ.

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Even the opposition, Pakistan Peoples Party, very proudly announced the fact that General Tokir Ziar (ph) was one of the inner circle of President Musharraf when he took over in 1999, has joined the Pakistan Peoples Party. And, if you read Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's posthumously released book "Reconciliation," she mentions that the former vice chief of army staff, General Ahsan Saleem Hayat, who was the predecessor of General Kayani in that post, was apparently in charge of security for her procession when it left the airport on her arrival in Karachi. And she was taken away in his car to Bilabel House (ph). And she mentions that he was wounded. So there are these subtle alliances that are used for optics.

And then, of course, there are the memories of history of the military's involvement. And it's probably worth recounting briefly some of these because, frequently, in the past governments, they've used the military or the inter-services intelligence to help monitor or to affect the results of elections and even to set up opposition parties to the governments or impending governments of persons whom they considered less than desirable. And this was done either directly or through surrogates. So in the 1970 polls conducted under the martial-law regime of General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, which is considered by many among the freest in the history of Pakistan.

According to the head of the inter-services public relations director at Brigadier Sadiki (ph), a member of President Yahya's inner circle, General Omar, was doling out funds to the Pium (ph) Muslim League. The idea was that they were hoping for a hung parliament so that neither the Peoples Party of Bhutto or the Awami League of Sheikh Mujib would gain a huge majority. The subsequent Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report on the 1971 war confirmed this. In 1988, after the death of General Zia ul Haq, the opposition alliance, the Islami Jamhuri Ittehad or the IJI, was formed by the intelligence chief, General Hamid Gul with assistance from various individuals including senior journalists who favored Nawaz Sharif. And they were under the instructions of the army chief, General Mirza Aslam Beg, at that time to do this work. The aim was to block the Peoples Party victory, but they failed to do so, but, in the process, created an alliance that managed to hold the Punjab and, as a result, prevented Bhutto from ruling effectively at the center.

In the 1993 polls, the results were reportedly filtered through headquarters under the election commission, the army headquarters, that is, under an election cell that was said to be headed by – General Faruq (ph), the chief of general staff. This time, the army wanted the Peoples Party to win, but it also wished to have certain powerful individuals in the opposition to keep a check on the Peoples Party. And then, in the 2002 polls, according to a member of the inner circle of the current ruling establishment, there was a hands-on involvement via the army's nine core commanders first in the preceding 2001 local-bodies election, which was rarely selections, where they helped identify the individuals who would become the district nazims or administrators and then, later, through the intelligence services in the actual election of 2002.

It is alleged that the army intelligence played a role in the selection of candidates and then, post-poll, in changing some of the results overnight between the ending of the polling and the announcement of the results. And so you had a number of key individuals who went to bed thinking they had lost the election woke up and were congratulated because,

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suddenly, they had won. In addition, there's been a kind of tradition or what in Pakistani politics could be called a normal role of the army in politics. This is what people have sort of come to expect. And in 1977, for example, then prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, used the intelligence agencies, including the ISI, to liaise with his election cell directly and to provide assessments and reports on the election prospects. In 1990, also there was an election cell set up under the president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and headed by a retired general, Sayid Refakit (ph), his chief of staff whose aim was to monitor and to try and affect the results of the election.

In 1997, there was again indirect involvement with a view to helping Nawaz Sharif win. But from all of the counts, based on the statements made by the army chief, the army is not going to be involved in any of these activities this time. If the president wishes to use his direct access to the ISI to obtain its assessment, especially since the ISI head is his own appointee, a person whom he appointed just before he took off his uniform as army chief, then there's not much that General Kayani will be able to do to stop that.

But it appears highly unlikely that the army chief will countenance the involvement of the ISI and especially of the military intelligence which comes directly under him. Even the person who heads military intelligence at army headquarters is an appointee of General Musharraf, again, just before he left office as chief of army staff and was reportedly a relative of General Musharraf.

So then what should we expect after the elections? Pakistan, I would say, still remains in a deep crisis with a huge cloud of terror hanging over it. Its politics are bitterly divided and filled with threats of retribution. The unsolved assassination of Prime Minister Bhutto looms large over this political landscape. The distrust of the government pervades public discourse and political statements. And whatever the results, there will be suspicions that the presidency and the so-called establishment will try to affect the outcomes. Therefore, the possibility of greater tumult remains.

Politically, I offer some brief scenarios. First, the King's Party, the PML(Q) uses its local ties and links to the caretaker government to win big in the Punjab and garners enough support in other provinces or makes alliances with groups such as the Muttahida Qaumi, known as the MQM, and even the – (in foreign language) – of Malana Fuzlidramad (ph) at the center and perhaps in the provinces. Given no other options, the only course of action then for the Pakistan Muslim League (N) of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Peoples Party would then be to come out into the streets. A compliant judiciary under Musharraf's chosen justices and extraordinary controls over the mass media through the electronic media in particular through PEMRA would offer little choice of non-disruptive challenges or public protests to the aggrieved parties.

The second option or possibility – the Peoples Party wins big in Sindh, carries a sizeable number of seats in the Punjab that allows it to form a government at the center and in Sindh and possibly in Punjab with a coalition involving, among others, the PML Nawaz Sharif. And if yesterday's meeting of Asif Zadari and Nawaz Sharif is any indication, they are already talking in terms of some kind of a loose alliance. It must be understood that whatever alliance takes place will probably be short lived because there are very different goals and aspirations of these two parties.

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In this scenario, it is highly unlikely that the King's Party, the PML(Q) will take to the streets. It may not have the wherewithal to do it, but then – and this is key – it would use its current hold over the senate, which doesn't come up for elections until next year, 2009, when half of the senate will be reelected. It will use that in order to prevent the central government of either the Peoples Party or the coalition involving the Peoples Party from being effective at the center because it won't be able to pass legislation. This has happened once before when Prime Minister Bhutto was the prime minister and the opposition, IJI, controlled the senate and she was totally stymied.

Another possibility is that the PML(N) carries a large enough segment of the Punjab and, through its own base and through last-minute massive defections, which is something that is not unheard of in Pakistani politics, and it forms a government in the Punjab. It could then play a very key role in blocking any legislative actions or operations of the central government, the Punjab being the largest and the most powerful province.

Another option is that no party wins a big enough share in the center and so, in effect, you have a hung parliament. And as I said earlier, this would allow President Musharraf a grand opportunity to engineer a government to his likings and that the parties that failed to benefit from his largesse would then have no option either of going along or cutting out onto the streets.

And then, finally, there is the option under which the PML(N) and the Peoples Party win large enough votes in the provinces and the center and form a coalition of convenience in Islamabad and then cobble together a coalition with others to get a two-thirds majority which would then allow them to go into direct confrontation with President Musharraf and up-end many of his so-called extra-constitutional measures that he has put in place. And in that is a major demand of the PML(N) in which Nawaz Sharif has been very consistent in saying that, no matter what, he will seek to restore the judiciary. The Peoples Party has been hedging on that issue, but I am sure that if they got an opportunity, that that is one possibility, that they would immediately win back the judiciary and allow the judiciary to rule on all the debatable issues including the imposition of the state of emergency by General Musharraf – then-general Musharraf – in his role as the chief of army staff because the constitution of Pakistan does not have any such provision allowing the chief of army staff to impose a state of emergency.

Now, where would the army come out into these scenarios? None of the current parties, in my view, can be seen by the army as being extremist enough to warrant any direct or indirect intervention. Despite their rhetoric, all of the parties will want to settle their differences with the army in order to craft a stable base for themselves. After all, if it's not the Q, all of the other parties have been out of power for some time and they need to reestablish their links and reestablish their ability to buy support in the provinces and at the local-administrator level.

Even the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz may want to take a breather before it contemplates making any attempts to bring the army under heady civilian control or to bring the president back into the orbit of the '73 constitution where parliament has the upper hand. However, the use of large in-street demonstrations to protest blatant rigging may

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force the government to bring the army out in aid of civil power. And when that happens, especially if it involves the use of the military in the streets of the Punjab, the outcomes are highly unpredictable.

Recall that in 1977, three brigadiers posted in Lahore refused to send out their troops to quell the disturbances that were led by the Islamic groups in the streets and that were – that comprised of women and children, in particular. And, as a result, those three brigadiers were fired and the army became very deeply involved. And within a matter of months, there was a coupe against President Bhutto. If things get out of hand again, the army may well be forced to push for a change.

But the new army chief is constrained because, as I said earlier, General Musharraf has the chief of army staff and before he took his uniform had made all of his senior appointments including the key intelligence heads. And the new army chief has yet to make changes at the highest level of the corps commanders of the new regional commanders. Even the core in Lahore is headed by a former military secretary of General Musharraf. And so until that point when General Kayani can make his own appointments, he is not going to be able to be in a position where he can feel confident about any move against President Musharraf.

Another possibility does exist. During and after the elections, if the terrorist network continue and intensify their attacks on the army directly and use it as a surrogate target for hitting President Musharraf then there's a possibility that the army rank and file will feel that it is being targeted because of the lightning rod that President Musharraf offers. And their unhappiness with the current president will bubble up through the ranks. And the army does have weekly durbars where, at the regiment level, the soldiers and the JCOs and the NCOs talk about what concerns them, feeds up through the brigade and div and corps headquarters to the army headquarters. And if this disaffection with the president continues, there is a possibility that the army may want to distance itself from him.

Today – and I'm sure Ayesha will dwell at this – the army sees itself as a corporate entity. It protects its own interests and if it sees any individual or any group threatening that entity, it will cut its losses and distance itself. President Musharraf knows this and he will do his best to forestall such a situation. He also knows that he does not have direct command of the army. And it is conceivable that he would depart quietly if the corps commanders through the army chief said that it was time for him to go.

And what after that? In my view, and now I'm getting into the dangerous ground of predicting, I don't think that the mood within the Pakistan army today, especially among the rank and file is for direct rule. There is tremendous unhappiness with the fact that the army is the target of public outrage and terrorist attacks. It reminds me of the situation in the waning days of General Zia ul Haq when army officers voluntarily refused to go out into the public in uniform because they did not feel that they were getting the respect that they deserved. In fact, they were getting abuse. Today, of course, army officers are under orders not to go out in uniform in civilian areas to avoid that kind of a situation.

And so, in my view, at best, the army, if it does intervene in forcing a change in the presidency, would want to revert to a reelection or a caretaker government to give a respite

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to the political system so that it can recover its stability. But history tells us that circumstances change and they change the man that's at the center. And if the threats are seen to be big and entrenched, even General Kayani may feel that he has to take direct control. Given the stunting of democratic institutions that Ashley referred to in his opening comments, as a result of prolonged military and quasi-military rule in Pakistan, the army may then feel it's the only institution that has the wherewithal to stop the RAW.

For now, it appears that the elections presage more turmoil and internal conflict. And only after another possible election, maybe in 2009, will Pakistan be able to regain its footing. For its own sake and for the sake of peace in the region, I hope it succeeds in that endeavor. But the battle against the internal foes will sap the energies and weak the ability of the army to resolve issues that are, at heart, political and social and economic.

Only the noise of democracy and the consent of the people to be governed in a particular fashion can help Pakistan retain its unity and solidarity as a federation. In brief, Pakistan in 2008 will lightly remain in turmoil and upheaval. Amidst all of this, the army is trying to restore its professional balance. The recent statements from army headquarters all go well for a return to professional pursuits, but much remains for the army to reform itself and its relationship with the polity and economic of Pakistan. If General Kayani can keep the army out of politics, he may well be able to effect or to facilitate other changes that would restore balance to the civil-military relationship. Otherwise, it will be déjà vu all over again. Thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. TELLIS: Thank you, Shuja, for that truly comprehensive and yet sobering assessment of where Pakistan stands. Why don't I invite Ayesha to take the floor and continue?

AYESHA SIDDIQA: Right. Shuja, I really thank you for this excellent presentation. It made at least my job very easy. Now I don't have to kind of spend time on the details.

Shuja was talking about, he mentioned the possibility of election rigging. One of the very interesting things which has happened two days ago or maybe yesterday is that government has disallowed the media to announce election results on a piecemeal basis and that is where the threat of the ghost of polling stations comes in. If the media – because if you remember what Shuja was talking about, he mentioned that, you know, some of the candidates, they thought they had lost elections, but, next morning, they were woken up and congratulated. And how does that happen? That happens through – by the presence of ghost (?) schools. You know, it's a very sophisticated operation. The operation, not that, you know, and necessarily stuff votes in the ballot box. It's a much more sophisticated operation. And there is evidence that the government has begun to move towards that.

It's very interesting to comment on Pakistan elections and what the military will do. And before I make those comments, let me say that it's very interesting to see the two dominant perceptions of the moment. And the dominant perceptions, especially after Benazir Bhutto's death, is that yes, PPP will win and that the government will try to stall it.

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And I think these two perceptions need to be analyzed much more critically as well, especially from the perspective of pre-poll rigging because what had happened immediately after Benazir Bhutto's death, a lot of excitement, people getting very nervous, people getting very unhappy in parts of Punjab.

People are still unhappy. You have, I mean, south Punjab, which is considered critical in kind of deciding where will elections go in Punjab in particular. South Punjab is critical, PPP or PML(Q)? There, you have constituencies where people are very unhappy with Benazir Bhutto's death, extremely unhappy with Musharraf, but will vote for the Q candidate because that is the patron that they have seen. And that is the patron they believe are going to deliver them the goods at the end of the day. So one needs to bring in a much more sophisticated debate of what the election – I mean, if you were to assume that the elections were free and fair, what would happen?

Let me now start with what the army will do, what will General Kayani do? In the past one month, I have seen – sat through articles after articles, Christian Science Monitor, New York Times, Washington Post – everybody seems to be writing to somebody to do a story on General Kayani. I find it very interesting; I call this the Cinderella syndrome of the West. There has to be that face, that particular face, to change things in Pakistan, you know, the knight in shining armor. Once upon a time, that knight in shining armor used to be General Pervez Musharraf; now it is General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.

But I think the question that needs to be asked is that what changes would the world want to see? Short term that there is stability or long term that the political process actually takes off? And if the objective is that Pakistan becomes much more normal not just in the short term, but short to long term as well, then the question that one needs to ask is does General Kayani, does our knight in shining armor have all the answers to that problem, because don't forget he is here for three years' tenure. As a good general, he will retire, and there is no tradition which says that the military after having – after even having a series of very professional officers, would not throw up a praetorian – a predatory general. Look at the history: we had a series, General Asif Nawaz Janjua, Wahid Kakar, Jehangir Karamat, and then finally you have General Musharraf.

So the question – and what is very important as well is that military's character has also changed at certain levels very dramatically during Musharraf's regime. Yes, it's a professional military, but then the expectation of the office again at different levels has also changed. What we do not hear in Washington, for example, is that the anecdotal evidence which kind of trickles in about how even junior officers have begun to behave with the civilians. And you get incidents on a daily basis. Just a couple of days ago, there was this young woman who had an altercation with a naval officer in Islamabad, the capital city. And the naval complex is, well, it's technically a restricted area, but you have what the navy has done, put one of the most lucrative and attractive markets inside the restricted area, opened a private university in the restricted area. So constantly there is a flow of civilians outside the naval complex.

So she had an altercation, this young woman, and altercation with a naval officer. And he actually pulled out a gun and pointed a gun at her and her 10-year-old daughter. At one level, you have military officers, younger officers, who have had this sense of

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empowerment of what they can achieve as a military and as military officers. There is this greater resentment and looking down upon the civilians. So that has become stronger under Musharraf. And the question is, how much of that will Kayani be able to change, considering that he's here for three years?

Two issues here: tactically, firstly what he needs to do is strengthen himself, you know, probably have his own confidantes planted in the GHQ, replace people who were favored by Musharraf so that a confrontation does not start within the army itself. So that takes time. The assessment is that will probably take him six months to a year to kind of be more confident of himself and take on political issues. The other thing, which is more strategic, is that would General Kayani, assuming that there is rigging and something happens, would General Kayani want to do it now, because on the one hand, I mean, it's like God between the devil and the deep blue sea. I mean, I do not envy the man at all because on the one hand, there is this expectation from everyone, the West, foreign or domestic, people have begun to again look up at General Kayani, a military general, and say, please, can you make these changes? Can you please intervene on our behalf and drive some sense into General Musharraf? That has happened.

But on the other hand, he has a larger problem of improving the military's image. The military's political involvement has brought it a very bad image, a very bad reputation. And if it intervenes in politics prematurely, any side would start playing around at the image issue. It could be the Q as well. If Q sees that it's slighted, right, and don't forget that Q is partnering with General Musharraf. So would he want to intervene in the elections? Of course, the possibility is there, but that possibility depends on the boiling point in the society and in politics. If it becomes too hot, too unbearably hot and everybody is screaming murder and save us, then yes, there would be that logic. But the interesting question is that, is it likely to happen soon after elections or within the six months? Perhaps not.

Now, what are the options for General Kayani? I think what one of the best options, the better options, for him right now is to distance himself and the organization from politics and from General Musharraf. Now, when we say distancing ourselves, what does that mean? That basically means that General Musharraf is on his own, which may not necessarily discourage him from planning something hysterical with his new partners, the King's party. It may not stop him, but what it means is that he has to probably deal with the consequences; the battle is on.

Shuja was talking about scenarios. Very quickly, there could be three possible scenarios: one is clear-cut majority. Definitely what is going to happen, there should be, which is beyond doubt, is there is, you know, we are looking at rigged elections. And if I were to believe the former director general of ISI, General Asad Durrani, there will be massive rigging. Would that, the question is, would that change effectively after Benazir Bhutto's death? They'll have to be a little more careful, but I don't think that's likely to happen. There will still be massive rigging and all the systems have been put in place, I mean, the new set of rules for election observers. For example, election observers have been told that they cannot go and do a random check. They have to inform – there are certain polling stations, certain constituencies which are cleared for election observers. A new set of rules have been defined for them.

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Of course, when you have PML(Q) in the center, two possibilities, either that we don't have rigging and we have rigging and there is PLM(Q), which throws Pakistan into another cycle of instability. One is not certain that that government would last a long time. The other possibility is PPP. I would not be comfortable saying that PPP could have that majority. As I said, one needs to be very careful in assessing how does PPP perform in elections. Yes, it has got an advantage, you know, the sympathy vote, but there is also the factor of pre-poll rigging with the government putting pressure on people. You might even have lesser turnout. And in certain constituencies where people understand, where the people are very sensitive and feel that results will probably be pre-decided in many ways, you will have a low turnout. Sindh, definitely PPP has completed – and when we say Sindh, I'm talking about Sindh rule, let's see how they do in Sindharban (ph) because Sindharban, again, has MQM, which are partners of Pervez Musharraf.

There are two possibilities here: one is a hung parliament seems to be, still seems to be a more likely option. And the other is post-election violence. And I'd like to finish with a thought that there might be – there's definitely a discomfort in the manner in which General Musharraf has played out his politics, but what might further drive friction within the army? Is the manner in which Musharraf would probably choose to use his MQM? There is that; one hears of that discomfort between the MQM and the army. And I'm not trying to say that, you know, make an argument for a Punjab-dominated army kind of a thing, but definitely there is that discomfort and how he has aligned himself with the MQM, with the Muhajirs, the migrant community, and the manner in which he has pushed it around.

Although a lot of senior generals at the moment barring General Kayani, who is the army chief, are from the migrant community, but that underlying tension is there. And some people who are keen observers of Pakistani politics and Pakistani military argue that that division might emerge within the army on those ethnic lines. And also, so, you know, there is food for thought there. And that is perhaps one of the core, one of the main, one of the important issues that Kayani might consider when he takes, when he does decide at some point to take any action against Musharraf. But the six months, the coming six months would probably be greater instability and the status quo. And that instability is what makes everybody inside and outside Pakistan very nervous. Thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. TELLIS: Thank you. I'm going to open the floor for comments and questions. I just want to preface by saying that we've had two very good presentations that have looked at the Pakistan army in the context of, of course, the inactions and different scenarios that are possible in these prospective inactions. To a lesser degree, we've also reflected on the question of the role of the Pakistan army and larger issues relating to governance, the role it's likely to play directly under General Kayani.

I would suggest that there are three other issues that we've touched on in passing but maybe worth reflecting on in the discussion that follows. First, the whole question of the Pakistan army and the issue of counterterrorism; this is an issue that is obviously very important to the United States, and so I would encourage both our speakers and the Q&A to try to offer some thoughts on what we might be likely to see. The second is the whole

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question of the transformation of Pakistan civil society, the challenge of creating essentially a strong and moderate center, and the role that the Pakistan army could or would play in this effort.

And the third area that I think is also worth paying some attention to, particularly from the perspective of the long term is, what are the changes that are occurring within the Pakistani army itself? I mean, does one see changes in either social composition or patterns of recruitment or in terms of its organizational ethos that would have long-term consequences, both within Pakistan as well as outside of Pakistan. But that's my two pennies' worth before I open the floor for discussion questions. I would just urge you to, of course, raise your hands so that I can see who you are. But when you are called upon, just identify yourself so that our speakers have a sense of who you are. Yes, sir?

Q: Arnaud de Borchgrave, CSIS. When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 and the U.S. began imposing all manner of sanctions against Pakistan, was this the moment that bred a new culture of anti-American feeling in ISI and in the officer corps? And are those junior officers today one or two-star generals and perhaps responsible for not wanting to do more in the federally administered tribal areas?

MR. NAWAZ: Yes, there was a change. I don't think it began that process, but if you look at U.S.-Pakistan relations, the sense that Pakistan had been abandoned a number of times by the United States as an ally after it had served its purpose goes back even further to the 1965 India-Pakistan War when Ayub Khan was under the very strong impression given by later from Ambassador McConaughy to him saying that regardless of who attacked Pakistan that the United States would come and defend it. And Ayub Khan thought that that had not been the case.

Also, in 1971 that letter was brought up, but it's very interesting looking at the transcripts of the Kissinger-Nixon conversations at the White House, Kissinger telling Nixon, they tell me that there's some kind of a letter, but State is looking for it. So it appears that memories in the United States are very short and in Pakistan they're very long. And that's the difference and it affects not just the army; it affects the population at large.

In terms of the composition of the senior brass, yes, most of the people, and I've done a fairly detailed study of it and I'm doing a much more detailed study of the demographics of the Pakistan army and its recruitment. Most of the officers that are now at the three-star level – and there are only two four-stars – are those who were in their formative years in that period after the sanctions. And so during that period, and particularly under the Islamic ethos of General Zia-ul-Haq, they were all subjected to a very closed atmosphere and this has affected their world view.

Kayani having been commissioned just before the '71 war and having seen action in '71, got in early enough so that he managed to get to the United States to Fort Leavenworth for a staff college, and so his world view is somewhat different from the officers that are below him. And I think of necessity, there is a difference in the way they view the world. It's a much more restricted view and in that, the United States is viewed with deep distrust. And this is a distrust which pervades the mutual exchange between the United States and Pakistan.

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And one very good example of that, which has now hit the public eye in particular thank to the details provided by Alan Kronstadt to Joby Warrick and my own conversations with Joby of The Washington Post, was this issue of the night vision devices used to patrol the border, which the U.S. insists be collected regularly so that they can be checked to make sure that they haven't been sent to the Indian border. So despite all the public talk of sweetness and light, there is an underlying distrust which needs to be overcome by both sides.

MS. SIDDIQA: Just a quick point: I think whenever we focus on the distrust between the United States and Pakistan, we always forget the dimension that there is a very strong pro-U.S. lobby within the army as well. We look at the religious factor fair enough, but a question which I definitely ask myself sometimes is that, what – how would Zia have reacted had 9/11 taken place in 1981 and not in 2001? Believe me, he would have done the same. And that relationship continues, but of course, what underlies that relationship, even that pro-U.S. lobby is that distrust. It will abandon; it does not have a plan.

And much more strategically, you have an entire period, which is not just Zia-ul-Haq, it's 1990s as well. In fact, until 2002, 2003, there was no clear-cut policy to turn around, at least, and turn away from some of the militancy and abandon some of it. Some of it is still there. But some of it the military has turned around from. And so of course, through those contacts, through the nature of the beast as such when you interact with militancy and militants, that it does allow you to understand or acquire some of that color which depends the distrust.

Q: Hasan Askari from SAIS. The two presentations make two points very clear, that the political situation is uncertain and it will continue to be uncertain in the future. Second, I think a point that came out very clearly from the presentation from the first speaker, that is that in the past the army distrusted PPP and from time to time it helped the PPP adversaries to counter PPP. Now, this raises two questions that I want the panelists to address. One, has the army's attitude changed towards the PPP now especially when there is a possibility that the PPP may become the lead party in Pakistan? And the second question is, can the army use the pro-Musharraf PML(Q) in Punjab, in the province of Punjab, especially at the provincial level, to counter the PPP-dominated government at the federal level which is the possibility in Pakistan?

MR. TELLIS: Thank you, that's a very interesting question.

MR. NAWAZ: I think in terms of what the army view is, I'm afraid I can't speak for the army unless I talk to the corps commanders, which I haven't. But I think the army would probably, given the circumstances and the fact that it's trying to distance itself from taking direct part in these elections and in the political sphere, it's probably willing to accept whatever the election throws out. That should be one thing, so long as it's not disruptive.

Secondly, in terms of the army somehow collaborating with Q and giving Q the upper hand, again, because of the fact that the army is not directly involved in the elections and Kayani has said that he will not allow the army officers to deal with politicians, we have to believe what he says. So the chance of some kind of collusion is unlikely. I'm told, and

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since the officer wasn't identified, but I can only guess that it was the core commander in Lahore who had had some contacts with some politicians. And if that was the case, then that was former military secretary of General Musharraf, General Shafaatullah who was given a dressing down apparently by Kayani for having made the contact with the politicians in the Punjab.

And so that would indicate that there isn't this attempt being made. Of course, the distrust of the People's Party that is, there are some anecdotal references to that within the military going back to the time when Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was alleged to have given lists to India of Sikh militants who were then removed from the scene by Indian intelligence. That kind of story persists, but I am not sure that there is any serious issue with any of the parties currently, and if any one of them wins, it's likely that the army will, so long as there isn't a reason for disruption, that they will be able to live with them.

MS. SIDDIQA: Again, see it's very interesting what Shuja said here, but I still think that army has a perception about, a very clear-cut perception, about political parties, especially the PPP which is seen as a feudal-dominated party. What has also happened in the past seven to eight years is that the military has begun to see itself as part of the progressive middle class, which knows how to bring economic progress. It believes in economic progress. It believes in strengthening of – (inaudible) – democracy in the country and making new institutions, new systems. So yes, there is that perception, negative perception about the PPP.

But then there is a negative perception about most politicians. They're corrupt, that they cannot be depended upon. But going back to – (inaudible) - question, I think right now the greatest challenge for Kayani is to keep his distance. He – I'm sure he would be keeping his links, but you know, because very recently, I wonder if you've seen the piece of news in which General Kayani called for very senior journalists and had dinner with them and a long conversation. So it's not that he has extracted himself completely out of politics. It's just that because of for protecting or guarding the military or improving the military's image. I mean, he cannot fundamentally do anything, even intervene in politics, if the image does not improve. So in the short to medium term, he has to play this game.

And yeah, some very brief contacts with Q if eventually PPP does make it to the center, but right now it's a big question itself of how PPP makes it to the center is does it emerge as the most powerful force?

MR. NAWAZ: I just wanted to add something because I think it's important to see and maybe give some credence to what Kayani is trying to do. Although it is an issue of image, I think it's much more important for him to actually bring the army back to its professional roots, because eight years of military or quasi military rule has sapped the military of its professionalism. The involvement with the civil sector, large-scale induction of retired and serving army officers in the civil sector has had a blowback which is very detrimental to the professional capabilities of the military and to the culture of the military. It's no longer the professional institution that we assumed it was, so it's going to be much more than an image-building exercise.

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And the fact that he's now withdrawn over 300 military officers from civilian positions is a good sign. It says to his senior staff, you're not here for an easy ride. If you want to serve in the army, you've got to come back and do the business of the army. That's critical because the internal wars that Pakistan is going to be confronted with – and this is where I think the issue that Ashley raised – maybe we can come back to it – are going to be critical. It's the transformation of the conventional army which is not going to be able to fight these large-scale – set these battles against an adversary like India, but is going to be fighting terrorists and insurgencies often within its own borders. That is going to be the key to his success.

And, yes, I agree with Ayesha. Three years is too short a time to make the transformation, but three years is enough time to lay the groundwork. And that's – if he succeeds in that, then he'll be very successful.

MR. TELLIS: Could I ask both of you to answer also the second question that Tasan (ph) raised, which is the prospect of a PPP-dominated center, and the possibly PML(Q)-dominated Punjab, and the intersections of the two.

MR. NAWAZ: That was one of the options that I mentioned, one of the scenarios. And it's eminently possible because I agree with Ayesha's assessment. She is from Southern Punjab so she knows that part of the country well. Actually, even in other parts of the country, most of the rural voters, in particular, go to where the power is. They go to the person who has giving them electricity, has given them the roads. They go to the person who can retrieve their stolen goods, who can make sure that the Tanidar (ph), the local police captain treats them well or doesn't mistreat them, or if they get caught, they get pulled out of jail.

And so a lot of them vote on very rational grounds. They vote for the person who delivers the goods. And the Q whether rightly or wrongly did use a lot of state resources in winning those votes. And if you look at some of the reports of PILDAT, the organization that I referred to, in these two key constituencies. Within the last few months of the Q's tenure, before the end of the assembly, they pulled in millions of rupees into those constituencies. They even gave grants to teachers and – (inaudible) – of rupees, and that will buy a vote, and those votes have been bought. And I think it will probably mean that Q will likely be a player. Now, the question is, if they take the Punjab, then you have this tussle between the center and the province, which is a repeat of what happened with Ms. Bhutto. And that will create further political turmoil. It won't create stability.

MR. TELLIS: (Off mike.)

Q: Hello, my name is Ayshia Singh (ph) from the National War College. I want to come back to this question of terrorism and the Army. Recent polls show that about 89 percent of the Pakistanis do not support the U.S. war on terrorism. And then the question comes up, how is the army going to deal with it, or if the civilians come to power, how are they going to deal with. In particular, I want to know whether the long-term goals which the Pakistani army has held, that of continuing to want to control Afghanistan on one hand, through the very groups that it wants to challenge internally and perhaps even to use,

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continually use them for Kashmir creates a dilemma because if the Pakistan army really wants the support of these very groups that it wants to fight against, then the question comes up as to whether it's going to be successful, or will want to be successful, or whether even the carders (ph) of the jivans (ph) will want to do it, leading to further alienation of the army itself. I just wanted you to address some of these intersection between the politics army and the war on terror.

MS. SIDDIQA: Actually, it's a professional army – I mean the two things, issues here. And historically, it has also come and fought whatever wars, whether it believed in it or not ideologically, I mean, starting from the times when the British were here and they used use this army.

It is – I mean, those ethos are still there. It would go and fight. The question is that then what kind of machine would it be? I mean, as a general, you would want to be 100-percent sure of the machine you're fighting with. Yes, on the one hand there is that resentment against not fighting your own war. I mean, despite the attacks on the army itself, I mean, if you noticed – if you looked at the pattern of attacks, it's – the Taliban, the local Taliban chose specific targets. They are in fact those nits of the ISI, which were directly dealing with them. And there was a sense of abandonment. The red-mosque crises is fundamental, not because of anything else but because it sent a signal to at least some militants that they could be abandoned by the state, and therefore you see the reaction, you see the pushback.

But that does not necessarily mean that at least some segments of the militants are still not – they're still considered as assets. That dichotomy continues. I mean, some people argue there is this division within the army. I say these are problems created because of, you know, the difference between, you know, the problems of the strategy itself – yes, you require those assets to be there, at least for the medium to long term, yet those assets are problematic assets. And there isn't that – the whole strategy has still not been talked through. So those will occur. I mean, I definitely want to give full marks for General Kayani for trying to change the tone of the military, of trying to make it more professional. Of course that will happen.

But it's also important to notice that he was very much there as head of the ISI, as part of the military when all of these operations were taking place. So on the one hand, he knows what the problems are, but then he could continue to persist with a persist with a particular strategy. One needs to look at it very objectively.

MR. NAWAZ: Let me just add that I had an opportunity to interview General Kayani when he was head of the ISI. And I was struck by the fact that he understood that the issues on the borderland between Pakistan and Afghanistan were at heart not military issues, that for the long term, which – the solution you're looking at, if we're looking to the long term, you really need to do something at the political level and at the economic level for those areas in order to remove the terrorist networks. And the military can only help in that regard. It is not the solution.

Secondly, the question of the involvement with those groups that the military might consider to be potential surrogates, either in Afghanistan for a Pashtun-dominated

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government or in Kashmir. There, policy is made by the central government, not by the army. And once the policy once made by General Musharraf, for instance, to ease up on Kashmir, you saw a diminution of any kind of cross-border activity that was even acknowledged by Indian political leaders. And I think that is the trend that we are likely to see continue.

It is possible that we may see a maturity in the approach to Afghanistan also so that it's not seen as a potential client state because the war now is no longer America's war. I think the army is seeing increasingly that it is now a Pakistani war and it is a war within Pakistan. And it's not just the targeting of the ISI, but the targeting of doctors, for instance, going to the GHQ, which is the most recent attack in Pindi. It shows that it was now being conducted not just by people from the Frontier Province but by surrogates of theirs or franchises of theirs linked to the Jaish-e-Mohammed that once used to be a surrogate for the ISI in Kashmir.

So there is a whole new complexion to the internal terrorist activity, which the army is probably aware of and needs to confront. This is no longer an American war. It has to be in Pakistan's interest, and if it is in Pakistan's interest, I think the Army will act appropriately.

MS. SIDDIQA: Just very quickly, I was very nervous with this distinction between decisions being made by the central government and not by the army. I mean, I thought for so many years that army was essentially part of the central government and it had control. Now, the reason there is a shift in their policy and the government seems to be making these changes is not because Musharraf at the center of policy is better controlled and the army will not challenge it; it's because the army sees that it is a war which cannot be won, and therefore you had them there, agreeing to kind of reduce the temperature there.

But reducing the temperature does not mean that the perception of India as an enemy has changed. I find that it has in fact in many ways intensified. So, you know, one needs to be careful on, you know, kind of arguing that there is actually a division between the central government and the army and they operate differently.

About Jaish-e-Mohammed, again – see, unfortunately I'm from south Punjab. That is also the base – the Bahawalpur is also the base of Jaish-e-Mohammed. Now, if even the children in Bahawalpur can tell – can guide you exactly where Maulana Masood Azhar, the head of Jaish-e-Mohammad lives, then I'm sure the ISI would know where he is. Why hasn't he been picked up in so many years? Why isn't any move made against Lashkeritaba (ph). My understanding is that there are certain assets which continue to be kept, and that dichotomy would continue to put pressure on the Pakistan army. Whether this violence would allow it – would force it to change its perception, that's the million-dollar question.

MR. TELLIS: Ambassador.

Q: You and Dr. Siddiq have talked about the distrust on the part of the Pakistani army of the United States, which goes way, way back, certainly exacerbated in the 1990s. But what about the U.S. Pakistani military-to-military role in the context of the elections and particularly the possibility of action by the U.S. Congress to make drastic cuts in our assistance program if they feel that the elections are rigged?

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MR. NAWAZ: I think this really comes to the heart of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, and that is whether the U.S. relationship is either with an individual, which is General Musharraf before, and now as Ayesha also noted with all of these glowing profiles of General Kayani, whether the U.S. now has a second telephone number in Islamabad. And that is the wrong emphasis. The congressional influence on this relationship is a very welcome one because it keeps it an honest relationship. And I think it also separates the U.S. relationships between those of the White House and that of Congress so that it is a relationship that is important if it is with the people of Pakistan. And if the people of Pakistan and their aspirations are met through fair and free and trouble-free elections, then that's what needs to be supported.

And it does – it is remarkable that when the U.S., either as the administration or Congress acts in a manner that supports the people of Pakistan, it wins tremendous support in the population. You just have to go back a couple of years to the time of the earthquake in northern Pakistan when there was an outpouring of relief efforts from the United States officially and also from the Pakistani diaspora in the U.S., and that completely changed the views about the United States. And if at that time when all of the polls were conducted, the U.S. was seen as a great friend. So it's a question of building – rebuilding that confidence and having the relationship, not a male-to-male relationship, only – or a relationship with a man, but a relationship with the country.

MR. TELLIS: This is an issue that is obviously going to pose some real dilemmas if the election is seen as unacceptable to the Pakistani people because the kinds of things that Congress might do in response to that would certainly strengthen the objective of building bonds with Pakistan in its entirety but would put at risk a very important relationship that we have with the Pakistani military. And so trading off between these two goods, both of which are important in different ways I think is going to tax the wisdom of those who have to make these decisions.

Ambassador Lunstead, please. Microphone.

Q: Thank you. Jeff Lunstead from American University. In that very detailed and useful list of scenarios, one item which was dealt with only peripherally was turnout. And what if there's a very, very lower turnout because of either disaffection, fear, or intimidation, or a combination of all three that could have two effects. One, it of course magnifies the effect of pre-poll rigging, because there are fewer votes to overcome, and it just raises the question of legitimacy in a general sense. Is that a plausible scenario, a very low turnout, you know, 25, 30 percent, and if so, what's the result, what are the implications, what happens then? Everybody's unhappy I assume.

MS. SIDDIQA: If I were to take the question, I don't think that that is a very, very low turnout as a possibility. We're not looking at that and doesn't seem likely. And also, you know where – what are we talking about in – (inaudible) – definitely. There will be certain constituencies where people will be eager to go and vote. I don't see that – a very low turnout as a possibility.

MR. TELLIS: John.

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Q: Going back to – John – (off mike) – National Intelligence Council. Going back to the question of Pakistan's internal wars and the comment that was made about General Kayani recognizing that the political aspects of settling the problem in border areas, can we see anything in the leadership coalitions that are likely to emerge from this election that would make Pakistani application of the civilian instruments of power articulation of a rationale for fighting, making the political accommodations that are necessary, directing civilian law enforcement and reconstruction resources in ways that support the military effort? Are there any leadership coalitions that can emerge that will make those applications of civilian power more effective for Pakistan's counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism efforts?

MR. NAWAZ: I think of any of the coalitions that I mentioned will probably work very with the military in this, and it's going to be a two-way street. It's not simply in supporting the military's action, but it will be the military helping the civilian government in putting into effect policies that will change the situation on the ground, particularly in FATA. I mean, a critical issue that has been confronting Pakistani governments for the past 50 years is why this area is treated as separate from the rest of Pakistan, why the Political Party's Act doesn't apply to FATA, why it has its own Frontier crimes regulations and it doesn't come into the Pakistan penal code.

And as a result of that, various other cascading effects that prevent the people of FATA from being considered as 100 percent Pakistani. It's almost like a reservation for Native Americans in the United States, that they have their own kind of system, and they feel separate. Why not integrate them and have them behave the same way that the central Pashtuns or Baloch are behaving. So that will be a huge challenge.

Now, in order to change that situation on the ground, whatever civilian coalition or central government occurs will need the support of the military at least initially to ensure some safety and security. Unless you provide that security and that confidence, people are going to rely for justice, they're going to rely for services on these neo-Talibans, I call them, who have basically taken over areas and are administering justice and administering providing services mainly because the government has failed. And so you have to reverse that. And it means the partnership between the military and whichever civilian coalition comes to power.

MR. TELLIS: Before – Ayesha, I know you want to intervene on this. Can I ask the question in a different way? Do you have a sense that among the principal Pakistani political parties, the PPP, the PML(Q) that there is a conviction that this war is now Pakistan's war, or are we still operating in a sense under the old understanding, which is really this is something that they are doing under American pressure in response to American entreaties.

MR. NAWAZ: I think one has to separate the public rhetoric from what they will confront when they enter the corridors of power in Islamabad because Nawaz Sharif has been in government twice, and his people have been in government. The People's Party has been in government twice. They realize how difficult it is to govern when large areas of your borderlands and now increasingly the settled areas of the North-West Frontier Province are being taken over by groups that are challenging the writ of the government.

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And so if they are continuously going to be challenged, they will have to resolve these issues, and it's not going to be because President X or Y in the White House is running it; it's because it's in their own interests. So one has to separate the public rhetoric from the reality that they will face.

MS. SIDDIQA: But again, you know, going back to this issue of how civilians will look at it, different political parties, you know, it's an issue of how they perceive this threat really. Yeah, at a pragmatic level, nobody is going to intervene and say that, all right, the military doesn't do this; the military doesn't go and shoot at the Taliban, eliminate that threat. But the issue of how will they kind of come into replace really also depends on how they perceived threat – one, two – their own reactions to the threat at another level.

Yesterday, I was looking at the Pakistani papers, and my eyes caught this news, which I thought was very interesting. It was that Chaudhry Shujaat, who heads the PML(Q) had gone to see Maulana Abdul Aziz. He's one of the two brothers who were part of the Red Mosque crises shooting at the military and shooting at whoever. And he's been struggling and negotiating with the government and I'm sure the military as well to get the Maulana out of the jail.

And of the question which of course comes to mind is what is happening here. These are partners of General Musharraf and is – does Musharraf approve of this? What is the game plan? Is there something else there which I'm not – which I don't know about. So, you know, the policy that way is very fuzzy. In Frontier, there is one is expecting some change. The MMA's influence is going to – is going to definitely reduce, and the ANP, which is going to come in.

But you know, it's not just – just a quick note – it's not just an option for the civilians and how they'll cooperate; it's an option – it's a matter for the military to also think about what kind of partners it chooses because on the one hand, you have the MMA, which is ideological – religious ideological, but on the other hand, you also have (A and P ?), which means do you then bring back the nationalist discourse? And, you know, that is a question that the military would need to ask itself. What discourse would it encourage; what would it prefer. What kind of partners would it have?

MR. NAWAZ: Let me just add one thing. Looking at the manifestos of all of the parties, it's very interesting that this issue is not directly addressed in any of the manifestos. There is an indirect reference in the Peoples Party, the PPP, as it – no, four P – parliamentarians – which says that Pakistan shall not allow its territory to be used against any neighboring country. Sorry this is the Qs, not the PPP, the Q, and that Q feels that the country's foreign policy should be geared towards strengthening Pakistan's security and stability with the first priority being peace in the region. So there is still this kind of vague approach without addressing this issue directly, which is very critical, not just for the future of civilian suppressing in Pakistan's government, but for Pakistan's future as a whole that it has to be confronted.

MR. TELLIS: (Off mike).

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Q: This is – (unintelligible). I'm at the Center for Defense Information. My question to you, Dr. Siddiqa is you said that the Army, the Pakistani's army enmity towards India has just intensified in some aspects. Can you elaborate on that? And I would like to know what would be the – what would be the scenario that dialogue and the peace process following the election between India and Pakistan? Thank you.

MS. SIDDIQA: Sorry, I didn't get the first part of your question.

Q: Yeah, the first part of your question was I just wanted to know – you noted earlier in the Q&A that in some aspects, the Pakistani's army, Pakistani's enmity towards India has just intensified in some way. In what aspects? Can you please elaborate? And can you please also tell me what exactly what happened once the elections take place, and the post-election scenario as part of the Indo-Pak peace dialogue is concerned? Thank you.

MS. SIDDIQA: I would say let's separate the tactical from the emotional. Emotionally yes, India has remained and will be the enemy. In fact, the overall establishment – I mean, if you look at some of the news reports, which actually suggest that, you know Betula Mesud himself is being funded by India RAW. So, you know, there is constantly the play of accusing India of everything which goes on there, including Balochistan. I'm not suggesting that India is completely innocent, but I wouldn't kind of put everything in this basket there.

How would it play out after elections? I think what we need to understand is that the shift in India Pakistan – the plate has shifted, right, but the plate has shifted primarily because of an understanding or appreciation within the military of what it can achieve. Post 1998, it's a different region. This is a nuclear weapon-armed South Asia. It has to have a different appreciation of strategic issues and how it plays out. Kashmir is a territorial issue; more than that Kashmir is an existential issue.

My understanding is that India and Pakistan will not have a conflict on existential issues, but it doesn't mean that they do not continue with the cold war, and that is probably what we're going to have, you know, even if we have elections, you know, we have free-and-fair elections or we don't have free-and-fair elections. I mean, I find the attitude in Delhi very interesting, which at this point in time, you know, chooses to kind of ignore the developments in Pakistan.

I'm sure there is a fair amount of nervousness and what would happen. But as long as they have those guarantees, the entire establishment – what is more than Musharraf – when we say establishment, it's more than just General Musharraf; it's also more than the Army. It has on board a lot of people. I wonder if you have noticed it at all. But one of the first statements that Asif Ali Zardari made once he returned and took over the PPP, was that, yes, PPP believed in improved relations with India.

I think at this point in time, politicians definitely do not want an escalation. The military does not want an escalation. If that animosity has to be played out, it has to be played out differently. Afghanistan still remains as a very interesting battleground, so that's how it will play out.

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MR. TELLIS: Yes, take the microphone.

Q: My name is Aaron Zisser (ph); I'm with Human Rights First. We're particularly interested in Musharraf's assault on judicial independence. And there was some mention of that in the discussion earlier. But I just wanted to ask two related questions. One: Mr. Nawaz, you mentioned that a two-thirds majority would be necessary to overturn the constitutional amendments that Musharraf issued. We've heard various opinions about that. Historically, our understanding is that historically two-thirds was required to affirm constitutional amendments issued under martial law. So we're wondering if there are – I'm wondering if there are other scenarios for undoing that damage to the constitution and the judiciary.

And related to that, you spoke about the need for or the risk of army intervention in politics if the institutions in society are weak. And I'm wondering, how important is the judiciary specifically – a strong judiciary specifically – to keeping the army to its assigned role? And how much patience should the army have in sort of waiting out the building up, the restoration of those institutions, in particular the judiciary? Thanks.

MR. NAWAZ: First, on the two-thirds, I think establishing a two-thirds majority in the national assembly under the current situation will give any party or any coalition the clout it needs to effect a change. The biggest change that they would want to see is the removal of Article 58-2(b), which allows the president of Pakistan to remove whichever government he wants to at will. And that is a huge issue. And this is basically going back to the power that General Zia ul Haq had. And that had once been removed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif when this was done to remove this power when Farooq Leghari was the president. So that is going to be critical.

Nawaz Sharif has definitely pledged that he wants to restore the judiciary. In order to restore the judiciary, there may well be some constitutional issues that will occur because there is a huge debate about whether the actions that General Pervez Musharraf as chief of army staff took in November 2007 were legal or not. And by removing the judiciary, appointing new judges, by putting in what's known as a provisional constitutional order, whether that has legal status. Is that going to be reopened? You will need that two-thirds.

But then go back to what I said earlier, which was that you also need a majority in the Senate. And that's going to be problematical unless, of course, people start crossing party lines. And that's always possible once you get the momentum. If the momentum in the national assembly builds up, you're likely to have a change.

As far as the army's acceptance, I think the army, if it sees the role of the judiciary as being a key stabilizing factor, then I'm sure that the army would accept it. If it sees the judiciary getting into areas that directly threaten the military's internal corporate interests, I'm sure it will find a way to counter them. That's been the history and that's the reality of Pakistan today.

MR. TELLIS: Yes ma'am.

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Q: My question relates to Dr. Siddiq's recent book. In the proliferation of articles that you mentioned in Western press recently on Kayani, I saw something that he was making at least what sounded like the right noises about trying to remove some of the army's equities in the economy. And I'm wondering what both speakers think the prospects for him doing that are in light of, one, the fact that he has such a limited timeframe to work in, and then secondly, the issues you mentioned of sort of a growing sense of entitlement in the military and their historic desire to kind of protect their equities.

MS. SIDDIQA: He's not necessarily removing all equities. In fact, you know, when he declared 2008 as the year of the soldier, that would create additional equities in a different form. Since what I wrote about in my book was an economy, which primarily benefits the military elite – and what General Kayani has tried to do or he's announced to do is push some of the benefits downstream to the soldiers as well.

From a civil society perspective, I find it problematic. At an organizational level, it's something to be applauded. But from a civil society level – because here is a civil society, which is still very weak – continues to be so. And if you bring in people from the downstream of the military as well and make them shareholders, then their sense of they become part of that corporate power, which is enjoyed currently by the elite, by the military elite.

Now, what Kayani has done is he had sent back – he is ordered the serving military officers who were running some of the government departments, corporations, to go back, to report back to duty. Yes, the message which he has sent to the military is that look, this is – I mean, I think fundamentally it's an important argument he is making that, look, these things are not military function. You return to what you're supposed to be doing.

Now, this does not necessarily mean that the retired generals have been pulled back. They're still there. But I think what I tried to raise – the issue that I tried to raise in my presentation is that we may absolutely love the way this one individual is doing things. But does it necessarily change the tradition in the military? It might then be a phase. Would the next generals then kind of share that ethos?

You know, when General Musharraf was there in the army, who guessed – not I'm sure, not even his seniors – he served as director general of military operations. He was under Jehangir Karamat. I'm sure General Jehangir Karamat didn't guess that this guy had those predatory instincts. So you know, how does one tell that this general is different from the other?

The thing is that institutionally, the changes have to be brought institutionally. As long as – and you know, it's a million-dollar question that how does one inculcate that sense in the Pakistani military that come what may, it needn't get involved in politics, and it needs to keep itself away from the economy, from getting to engaged in the society and, you know, back to its professional work. So I think that is a question, which would remain unanswered.

MR. NAWAZ: If I could just add – in addition to the measures that the questioner and Ayesha mentioned, General Kayani has also spoken or rather announced divesting the military's interests – commercial interests – in organizations such as the Frontier works

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organization and the national logistics cell. This is just the beginning. The military-industrial complex, as it is, is much larger. And it would probably create much more unhappiness within the people that benefit from that if he were to concentrate on a wholesale divestiture of this, apart from creating tremendous turmoil in the marketplace because they command a fairly substantial proportion of the commercial enterprises in the country. So that's the reality he faces.

The other reality is this that the culture of entitlement that the army belongs to is one that the civil society also belongs to. And this has been ingrained in Pakistani politics ever since Ayub Khan's period. And it's gradually been increasing where state resources are seen as accessible to whoever is in power, whether it's the civil or the military. And changing that culture will take time.

I'll give you a very personal anecdote. When my later elder brother took over the army as the army chief in '91, I talked with him about his draft of the order of the day that he was supposed to issue to his troops. And I suggested in that because I was then editor of finance and development – and so I had an economic interest – I said, you should attack the issue of corruption in the military. And he said, yes, I have inherited an extremely corrupt institution. He acknowledged it. But he said, if I make that the focus of my attention, I have only three years. I will not have time to transform the army professionally. And that is going to be the key issue, the balancing act. Kayani will do some things; I think he is going to have to leave the others to his successor. The key is going to be a normal transition from this chief of army staff to the next, and then maybe the next. And that's really in Pakistan's interest, to have this normalcy of transition rather than some kind of disruptive change that can come about and that would create unhappiness within the military.

MS. SIDDIQA: Just very quickly. I think there are three things, which need to go side by side for Pakistani politics to change. One is, of course, that the military – you have a series of army chiefs who are dedicated to professionalism. The other is strengthening of the civil society alternative institutions, strengthening of judiciary, et cetera. But I think a third thing, which we do not often talk about, is melting down of a very colonial bureaucratic state system, which in fact goes and strengthens all centers of authoritarian politics.

In a daily routine, a villager or somebody from a city urban center goes and comes, interacts with the revenue officer, with the police constable, with the police. And these are institutions, which are highly bureaucratic. We talk about devolution of democracy; we talk about governance. But nobody ever talks about making that bureaucracy more responsive to the people of Pakistan because unless those systems stay the way they are, nothing else will change.

MR. TELLIS: We are 15 minutes away from concluding, so what I want to do is take two or three interventions so that we can bundle up some of the questions in the hope that I can give you all a chance to be heard. Why don't we start with the lady right here?

Q: My name is Ghazia Aslam and I am a graduate student here. My question is for Dr. Siddiqa. You said that because of patronage, PML(Q) has a very good chance of winning in Punjab. Patronage plays a very important role, but don't you think that role is

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more important in the local level rather than the general elections because there are different layers of patronage by the time you get to the province or to the national assembly. And even in the local elections, there is a very significant percentage of the Usi (ph) nazims and the district nazims who affiliate themselves with the non-PML(Q).

And the second thing is that you have seen – there have been some recent polls about the popularity of different political parties, and PML(Q) is not scoring very well in any of the provinces. So do you still think that patronage would play that important role that PML(Q) can actually get a majority in Punjab?

MR. TELLIS: Okay, hold that thought. The lady next to her, right there.

Q: My name is Marina Shah (ph) and I am a concerned citizen. My question is to Dr. Siddiqa. You just mentioned that you don't see a problem in the turnout. I just need to say that, I can talk about the Frontier. I am from the Frontier. And even though the people are really dissatisfied with MMA, the problem is that I am from Charsatta (ph), and we always vote for ANP. But here again, ANP was targeted and 24 people died just recently. And it is said that it's going to happen on election day also. So a lot of people are not going to turn out, so I just wanted to say, what do you think about that?

MR. TELLIS: Anit?

Q: I am Anit Mukherjee; I'm from SAIS. Firstly, I wanted to ask about the old debate about the amount of influence that America and other states – you know, EU, Saudi Arabia – has on the ability to influence events inside Islamabad, especially the discourse within the armed forces. And the other was, in case anyone has not been asleep, there is an election inside America at the end of the year. What would you want to see with a new administration inside Washington, D.C.? Thank you.

MR. TELLIS: Why don't I give you all a chance to take a crack at those, and we'll come back for the last set of questions?

MR. NAWAZ: Ayesha starts.

MR. TELLIS: Yeah, do you want to start, Ayesha, on the patronage question? There is a patronage and turnout question, which I think were directed to you.

MS. SIDDIQA: You asked about patronage whether I think that it will have an impact on election results, especially national elections. See the system of patronage operates beyond just local elections. In fact, this whole devolution of democracy, this wonderful thing, is going to feed right into national elections. Now, once we say patronage will not – will have an effect – will not make those – because of patronage, we are not going to have a major shift even after Benazir's death, we have to specify what are we talking about, since of course there is going to be a much greater shift towards the PPP.

Again, there is no doubt about it that the opinion has shifted towards the PPP. Now, whether it really translates into an election victory is a different question. One issue is rigging. But the other is the whole system of patronage. You go and talk to people and, you

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know, I talk about South Punjab. You go and talk to people, they are very supportive of Benazir; they're extremely hurt. I've even known of candidates who kind of tore off their own banners soon after Benazir's death. They're so fearful that people will get very angry and react to see Q stickers on their cars or Q banners.

But after postponement of elections now, the same system of patronage has also kicked in. So what I'm arguing is that let's be very careful about arguing that there would be a general sweep by the PPP in elections. That system of patronage is intact and it will play out. People will go to vote for some Q candidates as well, despite they hate Musharraf, despite their dislike what has happened with Benazir Bhutto because that's what they need.

And the state system is such that it deepens patronage. It encourages it; it flourishes it. It doesn't reduce it at all.

Your question about Charsatta and turnout, my apologies again. When we look at Pakistan today, what is very important – of course, it was always relevant but now more so than ever – we have to specify what area we're talking about. Perhaps what I had more in mind is what's going to be the turnout like in Punjab or Sindh. Yes, the recent bombing of ANP, it would have an effect. But one hopes that people will show up. There is that very tricky politics between MMA and ANP now which might affect voter turnout in the Frontier Province. But the question is, to what, how much, to what extent would it be affected.

American influence – you see, American influences and foreign influences is always a very interesting question. The armed forces have the perception – even the civil society has this perception about the United States. It is a very – I would say, it's a very tricky relationship. On the one hand, even when it comes to Pakistani civil society, there is a lot of anger. Yet, there is a lot of dependency as well. We completely dislike the way America manipulates. But every time there is trouble, every time a journalist is caught, every time some political problems happen, we all pretend to look at United States wanting it to come and intervene.

That kind of bittersweet relationship continues between the army, the military, and the United States as well. Just look at a very small issue of the F-16s. There has been that shift in the armed forces, especially the air force, that yes, F-16s, yes, politically it's good. Yes, American F-16s are important and gives the qualitative edge, et cetera, et cetera. But what has happened, especially after the 1980s is military begun to look at other options. And it is looking at those technological options much more critically than it used to during the '70s or the '60s.

This does not necessarily mean that once they find that technological alternative that United States relationship would be dumped. That relationship will continue. But the flavor of that relationship, I would say, would remain – always remain that mix of bittersweet. It would continue.

Yes, there are those changes. American elections are around the corner. Possibility is that there will be a change. But I found General Musharraf's statement very interesting. I mean, he said – somebody asked him what if there is a change of regime in the United States? How do you react to that? And his answer was, once they come to power and they

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realize how critical it is to work with Pakistan, then probably things will ease off. That is probably the assessment which he is making that once Democrats are there and once Afghanistan – I mean, as long as they're not willing to push out of Afghanistan, they will continue to talk with the GHQ. And for Musharraf, the issue is how to remain a darling, or how to pose himself as this man who would be the necessary link between the GHQ and the United States. And as long as he can do it effectively, I do not think that there would be a major shift.

MR. TELLIS: I just hope General Musharraf is not assuming that the Democrats will be inevitably in office in November, but time will tell.

MR. NAWAZ: Let me just add on this final point that when push comes to shove, the Pakistan army will act in the interest of Pakistan and not in the interest of the United States. And that historically has been proven.

The other issue, just to shed a little more light on this up-and-down roller-coaster relationship, I wrote a piece on this for Huffington's not long ago, and you can get the details there. But I reported based on sources inside the GHQ that military intelligence in Pakistan had sat and charted the U.S.-Pakistan relationship historically. And they saw it as a cyclical relationship and had come to the conclusion that by the end of 2007, there might be a cooling-off. And I think they were probably right. And that cooling-off would mean eventually that at some point, the U.S. will exit Afghanistan. And so, it was in Pakistan's interest to be prepared to deal with whatever resulted from that move. So there is a very pragmatic approach to these relationships on both sides.

MR. TELLIS: I'm going to adjourn the meeting because we had promised you that we would get you out of here at 12:00 noon and we are almost there. I just want to end by making two points, which I distilled from the discussion, which I thought was absolutely superb.

And the two points, which should give us some cause for concern in the weeks ahead are the following: Both speakers, I think, made a very compelling case that Pakistani politics is going to remain uncertain and possibly unsettled irrespective of how these elections come out. And if that is the case - and I believe that to be true – then I think General Kayani is going to be faced with some very interesting dilemmas, which is to what degree can he implement his vision for a gradual Pakistani military disengagement from matters of governance and matters of state because the argument has always been that the incentives for the military to intervene are either formally or informally in Pakistani politics always rise with the degree of confusion or the degree of excessive competition. And so, this is one thought that I think is worth pondering.

The second is that there also seems to be a general sense that Pakistan is – at least, the Pakistani people seem to be tiring of the counterterrorism operations that are currently underway. And this is obviously a complex business and whether they believe that this is Pakistan's war is still, in a sense, an open question. And again, I think this points to a second set of dilemmas. That is, at a time when the U.S. is leaning hard on the Pakistan army and particularly General Kayani to do more as the phrase often goes, how does General Kayani navigate between these competing pressures of exhaustion, tiredness, a desire for

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disengagement from within and continuing pressures from above? I suspect these will be the issues on which we will have many more opportunities to reflect, particularly after the election results are out.

But let me take the opportunity to thank both our speakers for taking the trouble to share some time with us – (applause) – and to all of you for braving the weather and coming. Thank you.

(END)