

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

**EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY
INITIATIVE LAUNCH**

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ROBERT LEGVOLD: Good day and welcome to everyone here in Brussels, in Moscow, in Washington, and to those who are watching this on the Internet. I'm Robert Legvold, the director of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, the undertaking that today we are introducing to you and to the wider media. The Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, which has the utterly inappropriate acronym of EASI – (laughter) – actually draws together 25 prominent public figures, former policymakers, business executives, military leaders and policy analysts, under the leadership of Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, former foreign minister Igor Sergeyevich Ivanov and former senator Sam Nunn, who you see on the screens and in your locations.

Over the next 2 years, the commission will take a comprehensive look at the security challenges that face the wider Euro-Atlantic region from North America, through Europe and across Russia, and then make recommendations for adjusting and enhancing the existing security architecture in this vast and vital part of the world. The moving force behind the initiative is the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the first genuinely global public-policy organization, as this technology is a small manifestation.

And, as important advisors and staff for the undertaking, three of the key principals in the organization will participate – Dmitri Trenin, who is the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Ambassador James Collins, who is the director of the Russia-Eurasia program in Carnegie Washington, and Fabrice Pothier, who is the director of Carnegie Brussels. All are with us today, with the exception of Dmitri Trenin, and Sam Greene is standing in for him.

EASI, however – that is, the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative – is independent from any government and from any public or private organization, including the Carnegie Endowment, and the spirit of the commission is to meld diverse perspectives in ways that create a greater collective wisdom about what will be a large, complex and very difficult agenda. And I think there's no better representation of that spirit than the leadership within it. I turn now to Ambassador Ischinger for initial comments, and then you will hear from the other co-chairs as well, then we'll talk. Wolfgang?

WOLFGANG ISCHINGER: Thank you, thank you very much. I have to say that I am very excited about participating in this very important project. This is actually overdue. We need to start by rethinking the security needs. I believe that our discussion between Russia and the West has for too long focused on the way security was defined in the past, as security from each other. Now, we need to talk about security with each other.

Second, we have had, I believe, a significant lack of trust for a number of reasons. How can we rebuild trust across the board, between all of us, all the actors, in the trans-Atlantic and European theater? And lastly, I have been thinking for a long time that one of the real challenges of our way of thinking about security requires that we move from thinking in zero-sum terms to a way of thinking in win-win terms.

Now, these are great challenges, and they require a collective effort, and that is why I am extremely happy that this effort has been put together by the Carnegie Endowment and that such an impressive star-studded group of people have been willing to join us, Sam and Igor and I, and you, of course, about – to tackle these and a number of other issues that we are now looking at. Thank you.

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MR. LEGVOLD: Thank you very much, Wolfgang. We turn now to Moscow and to Igor Sergeyevich.

IGOR SERGEYEVICH IVANOV: Thank you. We are living in the world of borderless challenges – terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate changes, local conflicts – none can be solved by a single government acting alone. Conquering 21st century security threats and promoting stability and prosperity in the coming decades will require international cooperation and strengthening pillars of international security.

The aim of our project is ambitious and urgent: to launch a new reform effort for the Euro-Atlantic security system. We know that this work will not be easy, but time cannot wait. We are open for all contributions to this project. The aim of our work is to find substantial common ground, looking comprehensively at the full range of security challenges facing our countries, and elaborate recommendations of steps by which Euro-Atlantic space can be transformed into a real common security area. Thank you.

MR. LEGVOLD: Thank you very much, Igor. And now, Sen. Nunn.

SAMUEL NUNN: Thank you very much, Bob, and thank the Carnegie Endowment for coming up with this very, I think, important initiative, probably overdue by several years, from my perspective. I'm delighted and pleased to join with Wolfgang and with Igor, two individuals I have enormous respect for. They had tremendous accomplishments and great leaders, so to be part of that group and to join the other distinguished people on our panel is a true pleasure.

I would just emphasize a couple things that have already been said. I think Wolfgang's point about moving away from a zero-sum game, which has been the historical approach but cannot be the approach in the future, is absolutely on the mark, and I think Igor's point about cooperation and the fact that no one country can solve the serious challenges we face by itself is absolutely essential.

I've said many times, and repeat here today because I think it's absolutely true, that if you look at the fields of challenge that we have, whether it's nuclear weapons, whether it's biological weapons, whether it's infectious disease, whether it's energy, whether it's the environment, if you look in any of those serious problems we face, we are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe.

And the good news is, and I think this is good news, is that I don't think there's been in any time in history, certainly not in modern history, where the real essential interest, true interest, vital interest of the great powers, basically including Europe, U.S. and Russia but also including Japan, China and many other nations, where those interests have aligned as they do today. But as has been previously said, the lack of trust precludes us, in many cases, from thinking in that way, and we still do approach too many problems in a zero-sum fashion.

I think that the effort we're launching today reflects a very simple and basic truth: There can be no coherent, effective global-security strategy that does not take into account Russia, its strengths, its weaknesses, its aims and its ambitions. So it's remarkable and, I think, dangerous that the United States, Russia and Europe have not developed an answer to one of the most fundamental security questions we face: What is the long-term role for Russia in the Euro-Atlantic security arch? I think we have to address this.

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Whether it's been caused by the absence of vision, the lack of political will or nostalgia for the Cold War, the failure of all sides to forge a mutually beneficial and durable security relationship, as I view it, marks a collective failure of leadership in Washington, European capitals and Moscow. Winston Churchill once said, "however beautiful the strategy, you must occasionally look at the result", and I think that's what we're going to be doing, is looking at the result, looking at the trajectory, looking at the strategy and making suggestions to our governments who, in the long run, have to solve these problems, as to how we can go about creating truly a win-win strategy in terms – not only of security but in terms of economic security, environmental security and energy security, not simply military security.

So this is a big, broad program. As Bob Legvold said so well, it is not easy. We have a lot of good people working on it, though, Bob, and Jim Collins and your counterparts in Russia and your counterparts in Europe, I think over the next 2 years it'll be both interesting, stimulating and, I hope, very constructive in terms of the suggestions and the work that we undertake and the suggestions that we recommend to our governments. Thank you very much.

MR. LEGVOLD: Thank you, Sam. We're going to be brisk with this session and we're going to pass around the opportunity to ask questions. We're going to start in Washington, and then we will turn to Moscow and then Wolfgang and I here in Brussels to you people. So in Washington, Ambassador Collins, could you guide us?

JAMES COLLINS: Yes, thank you very much, Bob, and I want to be very quickly – very quickly here move on. So I'd like to turn the floor for a question to the co-chairs, to Jill Dougherty, who is a well-known CNN representative. Jill?

Q: Thank you, Ambassador Collins. Sen. Nunn, you mentioned one of the key questions is, what is the long-term role for Russia, and I would be very interested – I know it's the beginning of the process, it's a big initiative, but if that is the key issue, I would be interested in, Igor Sergeyevich, if you could in maybe brief terms, because it is a complex subject, explain or perhaps give your views on how Russia's voice can be heard in some of these structures and in – on the issues of security.

MR. NUNN: Well, we already have certain institutions where Russia is very much a part of it, the OSCE and also the NATO-Russia Council, but there has been a breakdown in communications in many respects. Just one example, Jill: At the time where we needed to maximize communications, that is, when Russia and Georgia got into that confrontation and it became a conflict, U.S.-Russia – the NATO-Russia Council decided not to meet. I find that bizarre. The purpose of having that kind of council is to make sure you avoid or mitigate conflict. So clearly, the present institutions are not working.

I don't exclude anything; I think we'll look at all the options. I know one thing, if you basically put it in the Russian's minds that everybody is eligible to be a part of a security approach except Russia, then obviously, Russia is going to view itself as isolated. I think that has not been the intent, but in too many cases, that's been the result. So I don't exclude any possible options. I think we'll explore a lot of them.

One of the main ingredients is what Russia itself sees. I think Russia is beginning to really speak out on this. President Medvedev has laid out his suggestions, I think that's something we

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ought to all take seriously and examine carefully. So I would approach it in an open mind and would not exclude a number of different possible approaches, but one of the main things here that I think is going to be interesting is to get to the vision the Russians themselves have.

MR. LEGVOLD: Igor Sergeyevich, do you have a word on this?

MR. IVANOV: I think that the problem is not the voice of Russia. It's easier to hear the Russian voice here, there or elsewhere. The problem is to create such conditions that the voice of big, small, medium countries can be heard and that all countries, big or small or medium, they sound confident and secure in this new architecture. That's why the project, which we start today, is not about Russia and the West.

It's about all countries who are living in this Euro-Atlantic space. That's why we shall work as one team with the same opportunities to express our thoughts about what the security, about our common interests. And we shall intend to elaborate such measures, comprehensive measures, that would be profitable for all of us, and that all countries feel secure on the Euro-Atlantic space. This is how I see our common work.

MR. LEGVOLD: Thank you very much. Sam, do you have a question in Moscow?

Q: Do we have a question here in Moscow? Somebody has a question here in Moscow.

MR. IVANOV: In Moscow, we have everything here – (inaudible, cross talk). (Laughter.)

MR. LEGVOLD: In Moscow, we have the questions. While you collect your thoughts, we'll turn here, and Fabrice, what kind of a question do we have in Brussels?

FABRICE POTHIER: I think we have a question from Marik Grylaw (sp) from the European Union Council, if you want.

Q: I'm Marik Grylaw in the European Council and former Polish ambassador to the European Union. It's very timely and important issue, no doubt. My question is about the specific topics commission should address first, some kinds of priorities, and I would be happy to hear from Ambassador Ischinger on that.

MR. LEGVOLD: Wolfgang?

MR. ISCHINGER: That's a large question, thank you very much for the question. I think what we will want to do is to explore very carefully what exactly security means in the 21st century. As Sam Nunn has just pointed out, it means a lot more than what it used to mean. It used to mean missiles, tanks, and we spent many years, some of us, in commercial arms control, an area where there is still a lot of unfinished business. But we need to go beyond that, we need to figure out ways to make sure that we optimize our opportunities to work together on energy security, on climate security and in a number of other areas.

So defining the subject matter in the broadest possible sense of security is the first step, and then we'll take a look at the existing organizations, rules, institutions which we have. And I totally agree with what was just said, that we should not close our minds to anything. We should address

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this with the help of our academic support, and I'm sure many others, including all of the members of the commission, we should go at this with a very open mind and be creative. But I think it would be a big mistake to start this project with a preconceived notion of how we're going to solve it. This is complex, it is not easy.

MR. LEGVOLD: Is there a question? Please.

Q: This is Eric Green from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Sen. Nunn, you mentioned Winston Churchill's statement about strategy and results. What do you anticipate the end result of this project being in terms of recommendations and how will they be formulated and advanced beyond the 2-year framework of the project?

MR. NUNN: Well, I think Wolfgang just made the key point here: We don't have preconceived notions about what the result may be. I participated in a number of commissions – and I know everybody on this commission has – and I've seen beautiful work that didn't involve a process that produced consensus – lie on the shelves without anybody paying much attention to it. I think the process itself – the discussions, the fact that we'll have Russians, Europeans and people from the United States discussing things together, I think that process itself will both inform and be very valuable because we'll hear what is really on other people's minds.

And Wolfgang mentioned about defining security. I think we have to really determine what kind of security we are talking about. I think the definition has got to be much, much broader than it has been before. So I'm not sure what the results are going to be, but that's one of the valuable parts of this. I don't think we start off with preconceived notions.

MR. LEGVOLD: Eric, let me amplify just a bit on what Sam has said, agreeing with everything that both Wolfgang and Sam have said. At the outset I noted this will be a 2-year project. And we are committed to producing a report that offers the constructive ideas that emerge from it in as coherent a form as we can make it available.

But, all along the way, we want this to be an iterative process. Sam stressed the notion of process. And throughout that we mean to be – we already are in touch with senior officials in major governments and with principal organizations including NATO, the OSCE, the European Union. And we will continue to maintain that dialogue, looking to keep the commission informed by what's happening because there is going to be a good deal occurring between now and the next two years – or over the next 2 years. And, in turn, if there are ideas that begin emerging within the commission, within perhaps its working groups or otherwise, we'll also share those with not only officials, but with the wider world.

We want this to be a much larger contribution than simply a commission that, at the end of the day, issues a report in the hopes that somebody will read it. Let's go back to Washington. Jim, is there a question there?

MR. COLLINS: Yes, I'd like to have Angela Stent give us a question. Angela is from Georgetown University.

Q: Thank you very much, Jim, and I think this is a – it's very important that you're doing all of this work. I wanted to come back to the question of existing institutions. Wolfgang, you talked

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about the existing institutions of European security, Euro-Atlantic security, of which there are many. Sometimes one hears both from Russians and from others that the existing institutions are broken.

If you look at President Medvedev's proposal that was his draft for a European security treaty, it also implies that one needs a new institution. Do you start off with an a priori idea about whether one does need new institutions? I guess that's for anyone who wants to take it.

MR. LEGVOLD: I am going to have Wolfgang answer that.

MR. ISCHINGER: Well, Angela, great to see you across the Atlantic. (Laughter.) I would agree with those who argue – and I think Sam made the point earlier – that our current institutions unfortunately have not done a very good job. That is certainly true for the NATO-Russia Council.

I was part of the group that negotiated the creation of these arrangements in '97 and there were major hopes associated with it at the time. Most of these hopes have unfortunately not materialized. I am not going to talk about who is responsible or why it didn't – why not more came out of it. But obviously it's not good enough.

So whether we can do a repair job institution-wise or whether we need better rules how institutions work together or whether we need to look at the membership – as Sen. Nunn has pointed out. We had a debate in the mid-'90s, remember, whether, you know, in the conditions of early post-Soviet Union, whether Russia might have an interest or should be invited to join NATO.

Sometimes I get the impression we had been further down the road then than we have been in recent months and years. So I think these questions will need to be addressed with an open mind. And if we come to a conclusion collectively – Russians, Europeans, Americans – in this commission that something else needs to be created, I'll be all for it. I don't think we should have a closed mind to that.

MR. LEGVOLD: This is a good question. So Igor or Sam, do you have thoughts on this?

MR. IVANOV: I want to say that nobody speaks about – to destroy any institution existing now in Euro-Atlantic. (Inaudible) – what we say that we need, first of all, evaluate threats and challenges. I think that it will be not so difficult to find common language about threats and challenges. The second step, we have to analyze how efficient those institutions are – existing institutions – and if they can do the job.

If they can, okay, if we need something to change in those institutions or to invent something. Maybe we can think about this. That's why I am totally against saying that we have to destroy everything and start from zero – impossible. We have to use all of our previous experience to take everything positive which we have what we have and to use it – (inaudible).

But if it's necessary to create something new, why not? Why we cannot think about – it was as worked about Helsinki process. We started from zero. We created new structures. Why we cannot do it in 21st century?

MR. LEGVOLD: Sam?

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MR. NUNN: Well, let me just give you one example. I think there has been discussion in the last year or two starting in the Bush administration with the United States and NATO and Russia about working together on missile defenses. The U.S. and Russia joined together in years past to outlaw one type of missile, the intermediate missile. And now a lot of other countries have those missiles but we don't.

The Russian president has offered Russian territory for possible parts of a missile defense system. We have just seen the Obama administration take another whole look at deployments in Poland and Czech Republic and re-mold a different type program looking at the more present and clear threat rather than a possible long-term threat.

We have got a chance, possibly, to work together with Russia – NATO and Russia – on missile defense, perhaps starting with intermediate missile defense and offering other countries the opportunity to abolish their own intermediate weapons. And then, if they do not, perhaps we can work together.

Now, if we start working together on something like that, as fundamental and as important as it is, this might lead to reexamination of a lot of other things, particularly, why should we still have missiles on short warning and why should we have such short warning time when the Cold War has been over 20 years?

There are some fundamental security things that we could begin to work together on that might change the whole psychology of NATO, Russian and U.S. relationships. So that's just one example, but I think it's an example where the opportunity and the dangers are pretty clear, as we speak.

MR. LEGVOLD: Thank you. Is there a last question in Brussels? Please.

Q: Thank you very much. I'm Jasper Vin (ph) from the German delegation to NATO. And, mainly, I first of all welcome this fascinating initiative in its scope, think out of the box. It seems to me a very challenging, also in its inclusiveness to have Europeans, Americans and Russian on board.

The question I would have is how this initiative ties in with other initiatives already on track. If you speak about joint analysis of common threats and challenges, that is exactly the tasking that the ministers one week ago working into the NATO-Russia Council – and – (inaudible) – that starts soon – and, where I understand – (inaudible) – that is exactly also a part of your mandate. And then we have the Medvedev initiative, the Corfu process within the OSCE where also the draft of a European security treaty will be entreated and will keep our colleagues there very busy during the next months and even beyond.

And then we have within NATO the deliberation of a new Strategic Concept where similar questions are also put to and Russia will be invited to the next seminar on this new Strategic Concept in Oslo in January. So my question would be how your initiative ties in with the other initiatives. Do you think that there would be input of your initiative to the others or a dialogue so that it could be mutually fruitful?

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MR. LEGVOLD: If my colleagues, the co-chairs, will permit me, that is one of the reasons for the stress I put on coordination with both the organizations and with major governments. I would add to your list the exercise that Madeleine Albright is conducting at the behest of Sec.-Gen. Rasmussen on the Strategic Concept.

We want to be informed of what is happening. We want to coordinate at each step with all of these activities. That's one of the reasons why we've been in touch with senior leadership in each of the areas that you noted. But I think that there is a strong feeling that a nonofficial group like this can – Ken, your phrase was “think outside the box” or come at these questions in a somewhat different way – and perhaps, above all else, as you've been hearing from the co-chair, bring issues together in a way that they will not be brought together in these separate initiatives.

The Strategic Concept for NATO is a strategic concept for NATO. It will touch on the issue of threats. And the instruction that you referred to to do the joint threat analysis within the NATO-Russia Council Sec.-Gen. Rasmussen first proposed in the September 18th speech is certainly relevant. But there is no reason why this commission won't go about that task in a different, more comprehensive and even more coherent fashion.

We have promised people that we would do this within 30 minutes. We are now at the end. And the only thing I would add is, we will continue to provide information to the outside and to the inside of what is happening. There are flyers that you will be receiving today that will give the full list of commission members so you can see who is participating in this. There will be an Internet site which we will be happy to share that will collect a lot of information around this in the future.

So we want the exercise not only to be well-coordinated, as I've been suggesting, but we also want it to be very transparent. And we will do everything that we can to maintain that kind of communication. But we thank you very much for coming and we wish you luck with your work as we go about ours. Thank you, people.

MR. COLLINS: Thank you, everybody.

(END)