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**“BEHIND THE BAMBOO CURTAIN: CHINESE
LEADERSHIP, POLITICS AND POLICY”**

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**SPEAKER:
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“WHY LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS COUNTS”

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DAVID GRIES: Could you please take your seats? We are about to start. That is, we would like to start. If you would take your seats, please.

So my job is to introduce Professor Roderick MacFarquhar, and that is a problem because he doesn't need an introduction. So what do you do when you are introducing somebody who doesn't need an introduction? I think what you try to do is find some focus and then fill in the details. In this case it is easy. Roderick MacFarquhar was the pioneer of leadership analysis. If you're having an unpleasant day, blame him. (Laughter.) But if you are learning something and finding this useful, praise him because he really started it. And his book, "The Origins of the Cultural Revolution," is the textbook in this field. And I don't personally think anything has ever been done that is better.

Not satisfied with pioneering the field, he founded China Quarterly, which for many, many years was the leading journal in the field. And he also did lots of other things like being a member of parliament and a journalist, and it sounds like he can't keep a job, but I understand – (laughter) – he has been at Harvard for a long time. He there has a named professorship, obviously Leroy B. Williams Professor of History and Political Science. He is also director of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research.

And from those two jobs he has come to be known as a teacher of teachers, which I think is as high an honor as an academic can receive. There are probably a few teachers in this audience or on our panels that were his students, and there are dozens of them in American universities teaching aspects of China's politics and history.

While doing all of that he had time to write a few books. One, the first I think, that I know of, was the "Hundred Flowers Campaign and Chinese Intellectuals." He wrote on "The Sino-Soviet Dispute," he wrote on "China under Mao," he wrote "Sino-American Relations, 1949-1971," he wrote "The Forbidden City," which I didn't know, Rod, until I looked on the web last night.

RODERICK MACFARQUHAR: It's a coffee-table book; forget about it.

MR. GRIES: I love those. (Laughter.) And of course "The Origins of the Cultural Revolution." And very, very impressively, he was asked with deceased Professor John Fairbanks to edit the final two volumes of the "Cambridge History China," and I think we know the quality of that, and most of us are not going to be asked to edit it. (Scattered laughter.) So please welcome Roderick MacFarquhar.

(Applause.)

MR. MACFARQUHAR: Thank you for that wonderful introduction, David. It would be even more wonderful except I knew you had to keep going in order to let everyone come back from lunch. (Laughter.)

I have got a lot of notes from this morning's excellent panels, which I learned a lot. To judge by what Lyman said about the old frameworks, I think I truly am the ghost of all frameworks past – (laughter) – because of what Dave has just said. And I was thinking that despite having studied leadership for quite a long time, the fact is that one has met very few leaders. There are probably many people in this room who have met more Chinese leaders than I have. So I was trying to think what ones I had met. I once asked Chou En-Lai a question at a press conference in New Delhi, which went into Peking Review. I shook his hand a decade later. I sat in conversations with Hua Guofeng – remember him – (laughter) – and Deng Xiaoping a decade later still.

And then the one real contact I had – and this is sort of somewhat different to what Susan Lawrence was saying about her experience with Jiang Zemin. And my late wife used also to go to those incredible occasions, which I learned about with great envy, which Susan participated in when Jiang Zemin was at his relaxed best.

My one meeting was a little bit more significant I think in the sense that I was, again, part of an entourage that went with Larry Summers to Beijing for a couple of Harvard occasions a few years ago, and it was just before the Party Congress. And being the president of Harvard, he was invited to meet Jiang Zemin. And we all trooped along with him, and we sat silence as always, and the two people – the two principals sat among the antimacassars – and they chatted and we listened.

And then unusually Jiang Zemin said, maybe some of your colleagues would like to ask me a question. (Laughter.) So I didn't want to embarrass the president of China and I certainly didn't want to embarrass the president of Harvard, so I asked him – ask Jiang Zemin the most dolly question I could possibly think of: What are your expectations for the Party Congress? (Claps hands, laughter.) Answer: You will see. (Laughter.) So I sat back humble and humiliated, and the questions went round – all expert questions asked by my colleagues.

And then finally he pointed at me. And I said, Mr. President, I asked my question; you didn't answer it. And he said, of course I didn't answer it; you want to know if I am going to retire. (Laughter.) And actually all I wanted to know was what was on his mind and I found out. And it was quite clear to me that Jiang Zemin at that point – somewhere in the spring of '02 I suppose – had not made up his mind what he was doing and that this was pressing on him.

So I think – I realized then how much all of us who study the leadership of China – how much we miss by not being able, as successive heads of states of Asian and African countries were able, to sit down and chat with Mao, when Mao said all sorts of things he would never say to a Chinese audience, and we don't really have that possibility. They tend to not tell us those things.

But I am not really here to talk about my experiences of leadership because we have had this tremendous morning set of panels and we will have another one after me. I think that what I want to talk about is why one should study leadership, because most of us in this room – looking at gray hairs – most of us in this room, or many of us were brought up with the idea that the era of great leaders and leaders being decisive has passed, and that the great tides of history, of economics, of social movements, of cultural change – these were the things that people ought to study. And even not just the great movements but the field of studies which became known as subaltern studies, where you study the people who are much lower down the hierarchy, because their lives of course are also important.

And yet, when I was thinking about a title for the second edition of the book on Chinese politics, which the original edition was Chinese Politics, 1949 to '89 -- the second edition had to cover a longer period. It occurred to me without any hesitation – and the Cambridge University Press accepted – second edition – “The Eras of Mao and Deng,” because it was quite clear that those two men put their stamp upon those years.

And if we look back at the 20th century, and all of the massive developments in that blood-soaked hundred years, I can only think of – I'm questioner will think of a fourth – I can only think of three or maybe two-and-a-half events, which we can't actually link to a single individual. I think that the Chinese revolution of 1911 – that is the half because – Sun Yat-sen maybe; he played a big role but without him there might still have been some kind of revolution.

World War I – the Brits used to blame the Kaiser for World War I, but I think we all know that the causes of that were far more diffuse, and that no one single person could be blamed for that either. And then the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and later of China – that also, people said – we must put the blame with Hirohito; we must put the blame with Tojo, whoever.

But I think most of us feel that that was much more a collective decisionmaking process and that both the rise of Germany and the rise of Japan, which of course are always in recent years being contrasted or compared with the possible rise of China, that in both of these cases these were not individuals who had led them.

But if we look at the other major events, can one really imagine the Bolshevik Revolution, which transformed the face of the 20th century, without Lenin when most of his colleagues did not want to go for the coup in 1917? I don't think we can. Can we imagine the Soviet Union without collectivization which killed millions and devastated Russian agriculture for several generations without Stalin? Can we imagine the Gulag without Stalin? Can we imagine the purging of all of the military officers without Stalin, a purge, which resulted in Russia being totally unprepared for the attack by the Nazis in 1940?

Can we imagine any of these without Stalin? We know from Volkogonov's biography that Lenin was no shrinking violet when it came to violence. But Stalin's reason for violence was that he was the least considered of the Soviet leadership, and so he had to get rid of Bukharin, and he had to get rid of Zinoviev, Trotsky, Kamenev and all of the others because they had been much bigger figures than him. And he kept on in a paranoid way purging and forging a society of such terror that it will never be forgotten. So Stalin was someone who shaped his country and an era as well – the Cold War.

And of course there are others who have been equally important in shaping the past century. Chairman Mao – can one imagine what it would be like if he had died earlier? Chen Yun is said to have speculated what it would have been like for Chairman Mao's reputation for China if he had died in 1956 before the Hundred Flowers, before the Great Leap, before the Cultural Revolution, before – above all, the famine that killed so many tens of millions of people. So Mao put his stamp upon China and the 20th century.

And Deng Xiaoping – I mean, if China had emerged from the cultural revolution, and Deng Xiaoping had died like Zhou Enlai died earlier, was there somebody who would have had his prestige, his courage, determination to do what he did, to push along a much more conservative leadership with people like Chen Yun in it towards reform and opening up? You might say it would have happened; it would have had to have happened – maybe. I think that is more of a possibility. But Deng Xiaoping definitely was a major factor.

And let us think about the fall of Soviet Union. How did that take place? I think that Jessica Matthews mentioned Chernobyl earlier today, and obviously that was one of the factors which affected the Soviet leadership. But in fact, what Gorbachev thought he was doing when he ascended to the leadership was to modernize it and to transform the Soviet Union because he believed in communism. And what in fact he did was to unleash a miniature cultural revolution, a non-violent one against the forces of conservatism and bureaucracy as he saw it.

And gradually he wore them down and then there was the abortive coup and then Yeltsin, whom he had allowed to take power in the Russian Federation by a free election, pushed him aside. And before you know it, on Christmas day 1991, Gorbachev had to say the party is over, and it was. I mean, these are people who have massively affected the way we will look back at the 20th century in the years ahead. Of course the currents of technology, of course the currents of economic change – all of these are important things. But I think what all of us who were on the panels talking to you today and I hope many of you in the audience – because that is why you came to hear us – I think what we have to insist on is that leadership is critically important. Even at a minor level. Reagan and “morning in America,” Margaret Thatcher to transform the way that the Brits looked at how they should run their economy and their society, de Gaulle bringing France back into a sense of pride after the disgrace of World War II, Pol Pot and the disaster for Cambodia, even someone like Evita Peron who to this day is a living symbol in Argentina so that the two wives of one president and one ex-president who competed for

a senate in Buenos Aires in the last few days both tried to evoke the ghost of Eva Peron with themselves as her rebirth. So leaders do count. And we must really accept that if we are to continue with our studies, and we will.

But then we come back to the 21st century and to China today. And as you have heard already and as you will know anyway from your own knowledge, it is a much more arid scene; it doesn't look as exciting. Most Chinese are probably glad about that – (laughter) – they do not have to worry about what does Chairman Mao think, what does Deng Xiaoping think.

It is better, as I keep telling Chinese friends, for them to join the human race and be led by second- or even third-rate people than some first-rate person who is going to lead you into the valley of death. It is difficult to get Chinese always to accept that, but I think most Chinese today are probably glad that they have a leadership that is unimpressive, uncharismatic, not given to massive demonstrations of how they can lead China into a new world very, very fast.

And I think that puts a problem before us because it means that it is much more hard work and not exciting. You know, Mao was never dull; Deng Xiaoping was never dull. Whatever else they were, they weren't dull. And these people are dull. (Laughter.) But that doesn't mean, we haven't got to study them, first and foremost because China is still – as someone reminded us this morning – China is still a communist country; it's a Leninist system. The Leninist system is leader friendly. That means, as I think it was Joe Fewsmith who said, you still have to read the *People's Daily* and try and get what the leadership's views are at any one particular moment. It is still a leader-friendly country.

Secondly, although basically the course has been set by Deng, opening up and reform, we don't know what the principles are that are guiding the individual leaders who are there today: Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, Zeng Qinghong, – we don't know what their principles are so we have to examine them very carefully to try and find out what they are. Cheng Li told us about some of the aspects that we would have to consider. That was very useful, but we really have to dig deep to try and find out what these people are because they are very cautious in their dullness.

But the third reason we have to keep studying is because of the massive problems which this country faces to this day. I mean, the economic miracle is an economic miracle; no question. But it has brought, as I hardly need to tell this audience, such a massive problems with it, the problems of economic division, which was mentioned this morning between the inland and the coastal areas, the problem of urban migration, the problem of declining party control over the society.

And, as we will hear from Pei Minxin I think this afternoon, about the increasing mafiosa-like state at the bottom of the heap, which has led to the famous figure that we all cite now – 74,000 demonstrations, riots, or whatever in the course of 2004. I mean, the fact that they are giving out those figures is a tribute to greater openness today. The fact that there is that figure is a tribute to lack of control over the society, so that all sorts

of things could go wrong, and that is why I find actually – forgive me Cheng Li – I find the idea that there is going to be stability for 10 or 15 years as a prediction is a very dangerous one to make. It may be true; it may happen that way. Let's hope, for the Chinese people have had too much instability in their lives, that it is.

But I just think there are too many vast problems in a very fragile political system, where you have no maximum leader, you have no glue of Marxism-Leninism to which everyone can adhere, and you have a party, 70 million strong or weak, which is very powerful in some ways but where most of the members no longer have the kind of commitment of serving the people, which in the good old days as Lyman used to call them of the '50s, I think the great majority did.

So this is a country which has a – as I say, an arid-looking leadership landscape, but nevertheless one which we have to study because that is how we are going to find out what may or may not happen in China.

And I want to add a little pet obsession of my own, but which was mentioned this morning – maybe it will also be mentioned this afternoon – and that is the issue of succession. One thing that we know is that there is no succession procedure. You might well say that the fact that there was a so-called succession procedure under Mao didn't help his successors – his chosen successors until the last one who didn't last long anyway after Mao died – and the fact that Deng Xiaoping tried to have a different system but it didn't really work out. So why worry about the lack of a succession procedure?

Well, let me just remind you of what happened in the Soviet Union when the fateful choice was made that Gorbachev should take over and not Romanov who was the more conservative figure at the time. How it happened we know from the memoirs of Ligachev who was the head of organization at the time, later was a close colleague and then an opponent of Gorbachev. What happened was that the night before the meeting in which the decision was to be made, Gromyko, grand old man, still in the Politburo called up Ligachev and said I would like to see Gorbachev's file.

So of course it was sent over immediately, and he studied it. And the following morning at the Politburo meeting, we are told by Ligachev, Gromyko stood up, extolled Gorbachev, and said, I propose Gorbachev. That was it. No more discussion. No voices raised in favor of Romanov, no questions raised about Gorbachev's competence – totally unlike a procedure in the Senate interviewing a candidate for the Supreme Court. (Laughter.)

And the point is that that is how both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were chosen, they were chosen by elders. Jiang Zemin I think we know from the documents was chosen as part of a bargain and accepted by Deng Xiaoping; it wasn't his original proposal.

In the case of Hu Jintao, Deng Xiaoping chose him, too. Cheng Li and I have argued about this because he thinks he was eventually laundered again by Jiang Zemin,

but I don't quite see it that way. But whatever it is, it's how is that leader going to be chosen. Is the majority of the politburo – if it remains the majority of the politburo, if it is the Shanghai faction that Li Cheng described to us so well, are they are going to accept Hu Jintao choosing one of his people? We don't know. And that is an enormous source of instability in leadership – the time of succession is the midnight of the state; it is when power passes from one pair of hands to another pair of hands, and if they can't get that right, then with all of these myriad crises, the system could be threatened. So study succession is what I say. Despite the aridity of the leadership landscape, it is still important to study leadership and study succession.

Let me end with an anecdote about aridity. Many, many years ago, long before e-mail, a report came into the food and agricultural organization (FAO) in Rome that there was going to be a plague of locusts of unprecedented size in North Africa. So they immediately got hold of the best locust expert in the world and sent him off to North Africa, a very arid landscape.

And he sat there for six weeks and no locusts appeared, and he sent off a telegram – see how old this story is – sent off a telegram to headquarters and said, “No locusts. Stop. Suggest return home. Stop.” And the telegram came back: “Stay there. Stop. Study locusts.” (Laughter.) So he stayed for another six weeks and even though jis per diem was generous, he was really bored, and he sent another telegram saying, “No locusts. Stop. Very bored. Stop. (Laughter.) Suggest return. Stop.” And the reply came back: “Stay there. Stop. Study locusts. Stop.”

And then suddenly the locusts appeared, not hundreds, not thousands, but millions – tens of millions of locusts – never been seen before; exactly like the prediction. And this locust expert got obviously very excited. He was a real genuine locust expert, and especially when he realized he was witnessing something which no locust expert had ever witnessed before. The locusts were mating. And he sent an immediate telegram back to headquarters – said, “Locusts arrived. Stop. Fornicating. Stop. (Laughter.)” The message came back, “Stop fornicating! Study locusts!” (Laughter.)

So my message to you today is the landscape is arid – (scattered laughter) – but there will be compensations. Study locusts! (Laughter.)

(Applause.)

I am taking this chair because I am supposed to answer questions, but not about locusts.

MR. GRIES: Any questions? Raise your hand and please make for the microphone. This one here. We are all studying locusts.

MR. MACFARQUHAR: They haven't heard the word, “fornicating,” in a long time. (Laughter.)

Q: This is a very polite audience. I want to continue your discussion of the succession issue because I think one of the potential destabilizing factors for the next four or five years is the issue of succession. Do you believe that – for the next – because the next Party Congress is two years from now, do you expect a clear successor to be identified by that time? And if, as Li Cheng says, he expects two or three to emerge, what will say about the supposed institutionalization of power transfer in China? Will that suggest it's a failure, it's still a work in progress, or it's something that has already been accomplished?

MR. MACFARQUHAR: Well, as I would expect, a very good question, and the kind of question which I think should be directed at this afternoon's panel of which you are member – (laughter) – because I am still lost in the cultural revolution. I haven't made the transition to the modern world. I think that the succession system has not been settled. I think it's highly unlikely that a successor or some successors will emerge in the next two years before the Party Congress. I think that if I am wrong and one or two people come out so that we can all say, ah, ha, these have been selected as successors, then I think it will mean that institutionalization has not been quite as thorough as Lyman was telling us. Obviously most of the stuff that he told us was absolutely on point.

I think this is a key issue in any authoritarian system. Now, in the old monarchies, you know, the system. The king is dead; long live the king. You knew in advance who was going to succeed. And the importance of that was they knew that they wanted to avoid any long transition during which power was not clearly in anyone's hands. And we don't have that in China. And we don't have a Gromyko in the Chinese politburo who can stand up like Bo Yibo apparently said when Jiang Zemin was forced to say, oh, very well, I will resign. Bo said no you won't resign; you are the core of the leadership; you won't resign. We don't have a Bo Yibo in the current leadership who can make that kind of Gromyko type of determination as to who should be the next leader.

I don't know how the politburo would discuss this. If, as Li Cheng says – and I have no reason to doubt him – that Hu Jintao has a minority of the politburo but a majority in the central committee – does he pull the kind of stunt that Khrushchev pulled in 1957 when he was outvoted in the Politburo but insisted on being voted on by the central committee, and could Hu do that? So how is it going to be decided? Is the politburo standing committee going to have a retreat and discuss how they should decide on selecting the next person? I don't know.

So I think – I can only go back to what I said before, this is a very serious issue, which no communist system has really solved. We don't know who is going to follow Castro; we think it's probably going to be his brother but there may be others who don't agree with that. So this is a very serious problem in any communist system, which they have never solved in 80, 90 years of communism.

Q: Albert Keidel in the China program at Carnegie. Professor MacFarquhar, I sensed actually more than hesitation when you mentioned technology and economics as a factor in the decisionmaking process when you said, well, it may have been that

economics and technology would have had things happen anyway without Deng. And you also repeat things – I have heard you say before about the fragility of the government, and it didn't have the glue of Marxism-Leninism.

MR. MACFARQUHAR: I'm glad I'm consistent.

Q: I was going to say some glue. But there is a glue of developing China so that it's military is capable of defending the country, and that it has an economy that can support that. And the lessons since the early-1970s at least are clear that it has got to be one of them – their modern market economies or else it is not going to work. And so that is just already decided, that that is what they need, and that instability around succession would not serve anybody's purposes, so that there is a particularly – the military's purposes.

So there is a strong incentive on the side of behind-the-scenes actors to settle the succession issue really rather early, and that the same forces that are creating a consensus in the economic area that allows a great deal of experimentation, mistakes, corrections, in fact is operating in the broader political spectrum, particularly in leadership succession, that there is a high degree of consensus about what their goals are and that individual power plays will be not allowed. Could you comment on that perspective from the economists?

MR. MACFARQUHAR: I went with you all the way till your last few words: Individual power plays will not be allowed – not be allowed by whom? That is the whole point. As Lenin said, "Who? Who m?" You are leaving out the fact of human ambition. You could have a totally united cabinet, politburo, whatever group you have but someone wants to lead. Someone thinks that they can do it better than the guy in the job or the other guy who might get the job.

And while that is the case, and while there is no agreed system, whether it's an electoral system, whether it's a cabinet majority system – whatever it is, while there is no system, I think that instability is really very important. Of course you can agree on all of the goals. You had New Labor in Britain – just to take one country I know something about – and all agreed on the goals, and you had the two top people in it: Tony Blair and Gordon Brown – totally agreed on the goals.

But the British press has been writing almost since the beginning of New Labor in '97 with the reports of Brown's jealousy of Blair and when is Blair going to move over and let him take over? It is not that they disagree on the economic aims of the country, or indeed on most of the aims. It's just that one man wants power, and I don't think Chinese should be seen as somehow purer than the rest of us on this issue.

MR. GRIES: Yes, way in the back.

Q: I am Jianhua from the Chinese Embassy. I have some comments, no question. I happened to work for the State Council before I came here. I came to the embassy about 10 years.

MR. MACFARQUHAR: I hope you are going to tell us some secrets.
(Laughter.)

Q: So I got some chances to work for some of the top leaders. I think when we are trying to give assessment of top leadership in China, I think it is better to understand the history of China. China has been invaded by foreign countries during the last 300 years, in 19th centuries, also 20th century. So whoever came to power in China, they got very strong sense of mission to bring China toward – as a great power. I think that such kind of idea of value has been shared by most of the people in China. So you have to understand Chinese leaders. They have a very, very strong mission; have very, very strong sense of responsibility for the people in the country.

The second point I want to make: Don't try to underestimate the moral standard of the top leaders in China. I think most of them are ready to sacrifice themselves for the interest of the country. Also, they devote themselves to the interest of the country and the people. That is one of the major reasons why Chinese economy can achieve such high growth rate. That is my observation.

Personally, I believe some of my colleagues in Beijing, they also share with me that we personally pay respects to our top leaders, like Premier Zhu Rongji, Premier Wen Jiabao, President Hu Jintao – they are ordinary people. They understand the sufferings of Chinese people. They care about people. They are just like most of us. They are from the humble family. They want work for the country and the people. They don't try to underestimate the leadership of China. That is only my personal view. Thank you.

MR. MACFARQUHAR: Thank you for your comment.

Q: David Laux, an old China hand. I was director of Asian affairs on the National Security Council for five years under President Reagan, and then chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan. I wonder if you would speculate for a few minutes for us on the next 40 years – (chuckles) – in our relations with China. (Laughter.) And I know there are so many uncertainties.

But it seems to me that if you look at the megatrends, in a sense it's not unlike what it must have been for Great Britain from the years of 1900 to 1930, or late-'30s with respect to the United States. They were the world power; they had more influence on the globe than anyone. They in my view handled that responsibility very well, and yet across the ocean here was this upstart with steel mills booming and the economy roaring and building up, and they must have seen down the pike that the raw power in terms of economy was going to eventually eclipse the British. And it seems to me if everything goes right in China, that is a potential scenario for us and the Chinese. But of course I know there are so many things that could go wrong in China.

But with all of your wisdom and experience, would you take a few moments and just speculate on where things might go or might not go?

MR. MACFARQUHAR: With all of my wisdom and experience I don't speculate on the future 40 years down the pike – (laughter) – I mean, I have already teased Li Cheng about doing it for five and to 15 years, yet you want me to do it for 40 years. But you have a right to an answer. As Albert emphasized – because he has heard me before – I do feel that this is a fragile system. The political system is fragile.

I don't doubt for the moment that what the gentleman from the Chinese Embassy has just told us, namely that there are shared goals, which was not the case always under Chairman Mao, that is for sure. But these have been shared goals and they have been shared goals since Deng Xiaoping took over, though people have emphasized different course of action.

But it is a fragile system, and the Chinese leadership, however committed they may be to the future of China are also people committed to their own ambitions, which is not an unrespectable thing to be committed to if you think you can do the job better than someone else.

So I think that without a settlement of key institutional issues – I mean, Lyman told us a whole range of things where he thought the institutionalization will take place. But in one key institution: the politburo standing committee and the politburo, they have not settled succession. That is the most important piece of institutionalization that really any political system should have.

Forty years! I mean, you need to ask Albert where the economy will be in 40 years. But he would need to know whether or not there was going to be a political upheaval, sort of like Jessica Matthews said, a Chernobyl equivalent in China. I can't predict. What I say to people when I give a political analysis of the Chinese situation, is that there is a San Andreas Fault going through the Chinese political system.

But like seismologists who say that there is this fault and one day it will blow, they never say when it's going to blow. And I don't know whether or even if it is going to blow. But I think that with all of the problems which have been raised earlier this morning – I touched on them very briefly, the possibility for things going wrong are very great. And the momentum of China may be such that a new leadership could be patched up very quickly and they will keep on going.

There are a lot of reasons, as the embassy attaché indicated, why Chinese leaders would want to keep the system going. But my own feeling is that political change will take place. It was I think either in this room or somewhere in the Carnegie Endowment that we had a discussion under Michael Swaine's chairmanship. And I elaborated some of these views at greater length than I have today. And he said, so you believe there is going to be a big bang because I said we have been waiting for democratization for now

25 years, and we're like waiting for Godot; he doesn't ever arrive. And I said, well, I suppose I do believe in that.

And Bruce Dickson has written a very interesting study on the two-Leninist parties on Taiwan and on the mainland. And if I remember correctly, Bruce correct me if I am wrong, he concluded that there was a very good reason why it was possible to transform a Leninist party system in Taiwan peacefully and why it would not be possible on the mainland.

And I think that if you had – to go back to leadership – if you had an undisputed leader, a Deng Xiaoping-type leader, maybe a Hu Jintao who has finally cleared out the Shanghai gang, put all of his people whom he trusts into the politburo standing committee and the politburo, and also dominates the central committee, then he might start to do something, which would move China towards a more pluralist direction. But the process of getting that kind of majority would itself be destabilizing.

So I think there are more problems – political problems ahead for China, and we must just all hope that it doesn't derail the magnificent economic performance people that the Chinese people have put up over the last 25 years.

MR. GRIES: I think we are out of time for questions. The third panel is ready. And thank you, Professor MacFarquhar.

(Applause.)

(END)