



C A R N E G I E E N D O W M E N T  
*for International Peace*

**“UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE:  
A STRATEGY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY”**

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JESSICA MATHEWS: I'm Jessica Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment. It's a great pleasure to welcome you here today – a real personal pleasure to see so many friends and collaborators and colleagues here in the room. Nearly two years ago, the five of us who you see up here had been having a number of conversations that were increasingly coming to the conclusion that we all shared a sense that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime needed fixing, not mandates but systemic change. The reasons were many. We had had the crossing of the nuclear threshold by India and Pakistan in '98 and their ongoing nuclear programs. We'd had the events of 9/11 highlighting the linkage – the potential linkage between terrorism and nuclear weapons. We had had the emergence, the coming to light, of the enormously damaging AQ Khan corporate network. And we had, in all these cases, the fact that India and Pakistan had broken no covenant in doing what they were doing, that many of the activities of the Khan Network had broken no laws, and clearly that the regime had not been built for non-state threats, either corporate or terrorist, and that it could do little to bring nonmember states back into its tent.

At the same time we had the events in Iraq, Iran and North Korea, which highlighted what had long been recognized as the Achilles' Heel of the Nonproliferation

Treaty, namely the access – the legal access that it provided to fissile material in a way that, increasingly I think, made it evident that it could not be safeguarded.

And finally, we were already picking up two years ago a feeling that is much more evident and much more deeply felt today, and that is the increasing sense of frustration and dissatisfaction by the non-nuclear states, a sense that now, 15 years after the end of the Cold War, that perhaps the nuclear states never intended to uphold their end of the NPT bargain, the Article VI commitment.

In our view, then, the system, as it was, was only questionably sustainable, and yet it also clearly needed strengthening, and in many respects new thinking. It was clear also that the old way of thinking about nuclear issues – that is, with vertical proliferation, the U.S., Soviet and then Russian strategic weapons and arms control issues in one policy drawer and horizontal proliferation in a completely separate policy drawer had to be abandoned once and for all because of the direct linkage between the two that is at the heart of the NPT bargain. Fine, but could any small group of people take on something this big without being guilty of hubris?

We realize, looking around the room, that the five of us had more than 100 years experience working on these issues, and that between us we had regional expertise in all the key regions and all the key countries: Iraq, Iran, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Russia, and others. But we also recognized that we couldn't do it ourselves, and we realized as we planned an approach to this that we wouldn't try to do it ourselves; that is, that we would explicitly go out and try to build on the shoulders of all the work that was being done by individuals and other groups in this field, and try to incorporate and acknowledge good ideas from every corner of the ideological spectrum that we could find – liberal, conservative, right, left, Republican, Democrat. We went after what seemed to us the best ideas. And in addition to drawing on ideas, we have made abundant use of the very generous time of a whole number of people in this room and elsewhere in criticizing, really, I can't count them, drafts of this document.

There's one other respect in which what you have before you today is unusual, I would say maybe even unique in its approach, and that is the degree to which it incorporates international views. Our premise going in was, what I think is now pretty obvious, the recognition that the U.S. cannot possibly solve the nonproliferation challenge alone, and therefore that the strategy that stands the greatest chance of success is going to be the one that can garner the greatest degree of international support.

That led us to follow a rather unusual process. We did the best we could do with lots of input around the United States, and we published last June a document that looks like this. It was a semi-finished piece of work, but as you can see, it said very aggressively that it was a draft. The five of us then took this document to – I think it's 22 countries around the world, across Europe, across – well, China, Japan, North Korea, around the Middle East, everywhere the key countries that we could get to. And we consulted with and we listened to government officials, experts, and geo-advocates in all

those places, and then we sat down and we rewrote it and produced the document that you have before you today.

We did not take all the criticisms we received and all the suggestions that we heard. This is a strategy written by Americans that addresses – it principally tries to advocate an American strategy but one that is also a good deal broader. But it is a plan that incorporates much more of international opinion than would have been possible in any other way that I know of or that I've ever participated in.

One final word before I turn this over to my colleagues, and that is that for all the consultation we've done, all the listening here and abroad, this is by no means a consensus document; it is not a middle-of-the-road prescription. It will be immediately evident to you as you listen and read that it is a very bold prescription. What we're urging here is not easily done; we know that. It is not incremental change and it will not come for a low political cost. It is very simply a strategy that recognizes that nuclear proliferation is the greatest security threat the world faces, and which asks and expects the United States government and other governments, nuclear and non-nuclear, to act as though that were indeed true. President Bush has said that we must, in his words, do everything we can to control the spread of nuclear weapons. This is an everything-we-can strategy.

Let me just take a moment to introduce my colleagues. On my far left, John Wolfsthal -- before coming to Carnegie, where he's deputy director of the nonproliferation program, he served in the Department of Energy in the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation. He worked at DOE and since, particularly focusing on North Korea as well in this report as the fuel cycle issues.

Joe Cirincione, next to him, is director of the proliferation program here at Carnegie. I think everybody in the room knows of his work. He also served before that for nine years on the House Armed Services Committee and the House Governmental Operations Committee. He's the chief author of "Deadly Arsenals," a major volume in his field; "Repairing the Regime," and many other papers and studies.

George Perkovich is vice president for studies here at Carnegie. He is well known as the author of the definitive, award-winning book on India's nuclear trajectory and policies, a book called "India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation." He is a widely known expert on India, Pakistan, Iran and the Middle East in this field.

Rose Gottemoeller is former deputy undersecretary and acting deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation at the Department of Energy. She also served as assistant secretary for nonproliferation and national security director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Affairs on the National Security Council.

I've been working on these issues since the early '70s, first on nuclear energy in the domestic context, on the staff of the House Interior Committee, later as director of the Office of Global Issues on the National Security Council and have worked on and written

about proliferation and nuclear energy issues ever since. Most recently I've been concentrating on Iraq issues and led our work on developing the coercive inspection plan as an alternative to war in Iraq, and our subsequent publications in that field.

We will try now to give you a very quick overview and some of the highlights of this work – Joe, George and Rose – and we will save close to an hour for discussion with you.

JOSEPH CIRINCIONE: Thank you very much, Jessica. If I could ask Dan to dim the lights we have a few slides we're going to use to present a summary of the Universal Compliance Strategy. So if I could ask some of my staff to find Dan, he knows where the light switch is.

For those of you who are listening on the Web, we've put up these slides as a PDF on the Web and I'd like to welcome all of you who are at your computers at home or at work, listening to this "Live at Carnegie" event.

What I'm going to do is quickly walk through where we started and how we got to the 20 key recommendations. We began with the threat assessment. And for those of you who have studied the first draft you will notice some changes in this second draft, and as we talked around the world we understood that people see the threats very differently. Those of us in the United States and for the authors of this study, we do see nuclear terrorism as the number-one threat, particularly the possibility that terrorists could acquire nuclear materials from some of the insecure stockpiles in Russia or in Pakistan, or indeed in some of the 46 nations that have highly enriched uranium in their civilian research reactors.

Not all countries agreed that nuclear terrorism was the number-one threat. For some it was the danger of new states emerging: a nuclear North Korea, a nuclear Iran. Also of course there's the danger of the recently emerged nuclear weapons states. The conflict between India and Pakistan and China could still go nuclear. The possibility always exists that a conflict involving the United States and China over the Taiwan issue could also go nuclear.

There is – and this is an area we often overlook – the danger from existing arsenals, and we particularly are thankful to Senator Sam Nunn for highlighting the continued dangers from thousands of nuclear weapons in these arsenals of the United States and Russia that are still on hair-trigger alert. The push by some to develop new weapons and possibly to break the international moratorium on nuclear tests is a danger that could send a dangerous example around the world. Some countries with nuclear weapons continue to threaten others with those weapons, even if some of those countries do not have nuclear weapons themselves, and of course there is the example of some of the most powerful countries in the world relying on nuclear weapons as what they call a key to their national security.

Finally, there is the danger of the breakdown of the nonproliferation regime, the danger of nuclear -- plants that are used to make nuclear fuel for reactors could be used, of course, to make fuel for nuclear weapons as well. The existing and unresolved problem of the three nations who remain outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty – India, Pakistan and Israel – the end of the negotiated reduction process between the United States and Russia leaves the future status of those arsenals in doubt, and all this could culminate in the collapse of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

These dangers, we could categorize them in these four different, distinct categories, but of course, changes in one of these boxes affects changes in some of the other categories. So for example, if Iran would decide to get nuclear weapons, that would not just be a threat of a nuclear-armed Iran; that would be an example to other nations in the region. It could cause Saudi Arabia or Turkey or even the new government of Iraq to rethink their nuclear strategies. It could have a ripple affect that would go around the world, causing many countries to decide that the Nonproliferation Treaty and those restrictions were no longer in their interest. And of course this would then increase the worldwide supply of weapons and stockpiles, increasing the terrorist danger.

So when we looked at all this and talked to people, we came up with a series of recommendations that we've summarized as the six obligations. These were an interlocking, interconnected series of principles, of obligations that we believe all the nations of the world, and in fact individuals and corporations, need to establish to put in place an integrated defense, a defense in depth against these proliferation dangers. The very first of them is to make nonproliferation irreversible. Some may talk about how to accommodate a nuclear Iran or a nuclear North Korea; we do not accept that possibility. For us, the proliferation of nuclear weapons has to stop here. It is intolerable for us to accept a new nuclear state in the world.

As I go down these recommendations and these obligations, you can follow along with the brochure that we've provided there, what we call our action plan, that has taken the 20 most important obligations and summarized them for you.

The second principle that we have established, a second obligation, is to devalue nuclear weapons to lessen their political and military role around the world to make them less attractive to other nations. Integral to this is the plan to secure all nuclear materials, to lock up weapons and materials at the highest standard possible, what Graham Allison calls the "Fort Knox standard." We have to start treating nuclear materials – highly enriched uranium and plutonium – as if they were weapons because if we do not, they could become weapons.

We want to stop the illegal transfers of materials, expertise and technologies around the world, and the administration has made a number of major steps to increase our ability to stop these kinds of transfers. We believe that the nuclear nations in particular have an obligation to commit to conflict resolution. You cannot solve this problem by nonproliferation measures alone; you have to address the underlying political, economic, territorial conflicts that give rise to these nuclear ambitions around the world.

And now sixth, our distinct obligation is to resolve the three-state problem. We cannot continue to exist in a world where there's one set of countries in the NPT, albeit with their categorical distinctions, and three nations with nuclear weapons outside the NPT.

Here's the way we break down some of the six specific recommendations under these obligations. So the first, make nonproliferation irreversible: no new enrichment facilities. We believe that there needs to be an end to national acquisition of the ability to enrich uranium where we process plutonium. No new state should be allowed to get these facilities. In return, those countries with these facilities would provide an international guarantee of fuel so these countries can meet their energy supplies. We call for the end, worldwide, of the production of highly enriched uranium. The United States, of course, ended this process many years ago. We believe that should be a global standard and we call for a temporary pause in the separation of plutonium. We believe we need to pass a new U.N. security resolution making a state that withdraws from the NPT still responsible for any violations it has committed while a member of that treaty, and, number five, that we should establish the standard that states that have acquired nuclear technology for peaceful uses while a member of the treaty cannot continue to use those facilities if they should withdraw from the treaty. This would provide a contractual, a legal, a diplomatic ground for forcing those states to either return those facilities and equipment or establish the basis for other countries to go in and disable those facilities. Finally, we should suspend nuclear cooperation with countries that the IAEA cannot certify are in full compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

The second obligation: devalue weapons. By that we mean there should be no new weapons developed by any country. The nuclear weapons states should reaffirm the moratorium on nuclear testing and move towards the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Ban Treaty. We believe that greater steps can be taken to de-alert a far larger percentage of our existing nuclear weapons than the steps that have been taken so far, that in the negotiation for reducing nuclear weapons, these should be what I just called one-way reductions: nuclear weapons reductions have to be made irreversible. We should not have the ability of countries to reverse their reductions by increasing their stockpiles to some undetermined point in the future. And finally, our 10<sup>th</sup> is to produce a detailed roadmap of the steps that would be necessary to verifiably eliminate nuclear arsenals. The United Kingdom has made an effort in this regard, producing such a white paper. We believe all the nuclear weapons states should undertake a similar exercise.

The third obligation is secure nuclear materials. We recommend that we convene a high-level contact group to prevent nuclear terrorism, to establish a global standard for protecting weapons, materials and facilities. We should accelerate the existing efforts to secure these materials in Russia, and the summit between President Bush and President Putin is very encouraging in this regard, and accelerate the global clean out, what the U.S. calls the global threat reduction initiative to secure highly enriched uranium and return that to the countries of origin, either the United States or Russia, within the next four years.

Obligation number four: stop illegal transfers. States must establish enforceable prohibitions against efforts by individuals, corporations or states who are assisting others in the illegal acquisition of these technologies. Resolution 1540 was an excellent effort by the administration. Now it's our job to enforce that, for example, by drafting model export control mechanisms, by aiding some of the less developed states in implementing and financing some of the steps called for in 1540.

We believe, as President Bush has suggested, and as Mohamed ElBaradei, director of the IAEA, suggested, that the additional protocol should become the standard that all countries should adopt, making it, in effect, mandatory.

Recommendation 15, we have to increase export transparencies by expanding the voluntary data sharing between members of the nuclear suppliers group.

We have a major section in the book that we think breaks new ground, calling for voluntary actions by corporations to establish nonproliferation as the condition of their loans, for example, or their condition of their contracts with other nations, similar to the way that corporations now establish environmental standards as a condition of doing business.

The Proliferation Security Initiative makes our 17<sup>th</sup> recommendation, an excellent effort by the administration. We now have to ground that in international law and expand it to cover international waterways and airspace.

Resolution number five is just one recommendation here but it is sweeping: commit to the conflict resolution that underlies some of this competition in the Middle East in the Korean Peninsula and in South Asia. These are efforts that of course have to start at the top. This cannot be delegated to an assistant secretary. It requires presidential, ministerial attention.

Finally, resolve the three-states problem. We believe that it's time for the international community to abandon the unrealistic demand that Israel, India and Pakistan give up their nuclear weapons and join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. But we should replace that with the demand that they assume the obligations of the nuclear weapons states: for example, to put all their civilian power reactors under IAEA safeguards, to adopt rigorous export control laws. In return, the nuclear weapons states would help those nations with nuclear safety issues, but we draw the line at providing those nations trade and new reactors.

That, in summary, is our top-20 list. There are some 100 recommendations here that we offer up to you for your consideration. For our part, this is really the midpoint or our campaign. We are going to go back to many of the people who consulted with us. We are going to be working these issues through the Nonproliferation Treaty and Review conference in May 2005. We are going to make these efforts a major part of our international nonproliferation conference in November 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup>. We will be reporting back to you on what we found on how many of these proposals have been adopted and

implemented. There are several key websites that you can use to track our progress: the Carnegie Endowment website, the Proliferation News website, and a new joint effort that the Carnegie Endowment has started with the Arms Control Association on the Nonproliferation Treaty conference.

Thank you.

MS. MATHEWS: Thank you, Joe. Next, George.

GEORGE PERKOVICH: Thanks, Joe, and welcome to all of you. What I thought I would do is in a way step back but also describe the thrust of what I think we heard in many of our forays that Jessica mentioned; in other words, between June when we released the draft and we traveled and engaged with officials and others in many countries, including all the states that possessed nuclear weapons and many of the non-nuclear weapons states, conference on disarmament in Geneva. So we had a fairly good range of interlocutors. So I wanted to say in essence what we heard and how that's reflected in this final version.

The thrust of the – or the ambition of the strategy, as Joe laid it out, and the understanding of the word “universal” suggests the challenge that we've taken on. In other words, the nonproliferation regime, as it was created in 1968, focused on states first of all, and states that voluntarily joined. We are now confronted with a situation where the danger comes not only from the states that voluntarily joined the NPT; it comes from all states, and it also come from individuals and corporations. In one sense the AQ Kahn network is emblematic of all of that. He operated from Genghis' original perch in a state that's not a member of the NPT. That network then operated using corporations' machine-tool plants in many countries of the world, including Europe. And then fundamentally it was also an individual operation.

And so the existing framework that we have that's based on states that voluntarily join the treaty doesn't come close to solving or addressing the actual nature of the problem. So we've tried to design a more all-encompassing universal approach to this, and it highlights enforcement. So you have to create additional norms and rules beyond those that existed before but you also have to exert much greater power to enforce those.

Now, what happened when we went out with this recommendation, this framework, is that we found that the emphasis on compliance engenders a great deal of controversy, especially when it's coming from Americans these days. Compliance – it became clear to us in Europe but also in developing countries – compliance evokes images of the United States acting as a rogue cop, knocking down the walls of national sovereignty. And what you started to hear in these discussions made you wonder and come to the conclusion that many people seem to fear the exertion of U.S. power more than they did the failure of the nonproliferation regime due to lack of enforcement. That then poses – American officials, others may not like that, but if that's the reality that you're confronting, you have to figure out then how to overcome that kind of resistance

and mobilize the international community to welcome and participate in stronger enforcement.

This is obviously because, as destructive technologies evolve and the reach of non-state actors grow, the balance between national sovereignty and international security imperatives has to evolve. So the system that we have and the mindset that we have that started in 1648 and it took form with the U.N. in 1945, sovereign equality of states, territorial boundaries, impregnable – you have to respect that kind of equality – we’re outgrowing that, and you see that in issues of genocide, humanitarian intervention, but also in the issue of proliferation, again, as seen most clearly in what was sold, in essence, to Libya, Iran and so forth, that you need to evolve the international system to do this.

So the challenge is to reassure states that the rules and their enforcement, as you evolve them, are going to be judicious, fair and balanced, and that this isn’t a new form of colonialism, and that the United States bears the greatest challenge in that regard because it has the most power, and it is seen as having the most power. Thus, the United States has to take special care to persuade others that it is acting fairly and judiciously, and very importantly, that enforcement of the rules also applies to the United States. We’re not the cop catching everybody for speeding and then your kid goes by or your wife goes by and you don’t write the ticket. That is a way to break down, in essence, respect for the very kind of system we’re trying to create.

Now, it’s compounded because not only is the U.S. in this difficult position, but the ultimate enforcement body that much of the world respects is the U.N. Security Council. But lo and behold, when you’re talking about nuclear nonproliferation, the Security Council has its own legitimacy crisis, its own conflict of interest because the five veto powers also happen to be the five states that by treaty are acknowledged to possess nuclear weapons. So we run into a similar conflict there. The P5 are seen as the chief enforcers and the most advantaged beneficiaries of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

So our conclusion was that to sustain, much less strengthen the regime, this advantaged minority must ensure that the majority sees it as beneficial and fair, and the only way to do that, in our opinion, is to enforce compliance universally, not selectively, and this must include the obligations that the nuclear weapons states have taken on. What we’re then talking about is in essence devising a new balance of obligations.

What we’re then talking about is in essence devising a new balance of obligations amongst the different categories of states, the states that are acknowledged to have nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear weapons states. And then we have tried to figure out how to bring in the possessors of nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, and Israel. Each of the obligations that Joe described – when you look down those columns, you actually see that there is a balance in each of those categories, a balance in what each category of state is basically required to do in those areas.

Let me just talk – I’m going to go into them, but just highlight three that I think are emblematic. The approach to the three-state problem – India, Pakistan, and Israel – it’s detailed in the book. But basically what we’ve recognized – we’re kind of stuck with the existing framework that has been there where parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty go and bang on these three countries and say you have to give up your nuclear weapons, you have to sign the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states, otherwise we can’t talk with you, we can’t interact with you – there is no discussion for us to have with you about responsible stewardship of nuclear capability, about export controls, about any number of issues.

Our view is that actually it is neither succeeding nor is it solving any of the emergent problems that we have to deal with. But to change it requires movement on both sides, in a sense that we have – there is much to require as responsible action by those three states but also they are going to want things from the rest of the world to bring this convergence together. And so we have tried to fashion what we think – it would be a new balance of obligations that would deal with this problem.

Second area you see is in Iran. We talk about – there is a section in Iran that is fairly straightforward, but what you see today is the negotiation between the EU-3 and Iran that is pivoting on this question that is in the agreed text of defining “objective guarantees” – that’s the phrase – objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear technology and activities will be only for peaceful purposes.

So there is a struggle to define what is an objective guarantee. But we already know that however that gets defined there is going to have to be a similar provision of objective guarantees for fuel services to Iran. In other words, there is going to have to be a balance of obligations that is going to be relatively new in the system in order to solve this problem. We point to it in the document but it reflects the basic approach that we have taken in the whole strategy.

Finally, in our travels, we heard a great deal about something that I would venture that 99.99999999 percent of Americans have never heard about: the 13 steps – not a 12-step program – 13 steps. And we heard this everywhere we went and of course it’s a reference to what was agreed at the last NPT Review Conference in terms of commitments by the nuclear weapons states – political commitments by the nuclear weapon states towards fulfilling their Article 6 obligations.

We also heard in the nuclear weapons states, a fair and reasonable argument that, look, times have changed and as times and situations change, one would not be fetishistic about commitments that were made previously. You should evolve what is you’re required to do to comport with the circumstance that you find yourself in. But what’s missing in that argument by the nuclear weapons states – and it’s not just the United States, by the way – what is missing in that argument is any recognition – fine, if you want to suggest a change in the terms, you have to offer a commensurate corresponding obligation or step that you are prepared to take – if not this step then the following step.

And what we're doing instead is saying, the 13 steps are rubbish; that's old thinking; it's an old problem, and then everybody waits. And then we say, okay, can we move on to Iran or North Korea or a real proliferation problem. It's clear to us from our travels that that is not going to be sufficient to mobilize the rest of the world who we need to strengthen enforcement.

Last anecdote on this – I was in a nuclear weapons state that will be unnamed recently and making this point. And this diplomat, a very responsible official, said, well, you know, when we have our bilateral meetings with Brazil or South Africa, they never bring up our nuclear weapons. They don't care about our nuclear weapons; our nuclear weapons aren't a threat to them. So who really cares about the 13 steps? Why is this relevant?

And I think it is a fair enough proposition – and that view reflects actually the views of probably all of the nuclear weapons states – and the answer it seems to me actually speaks to itself because this same official's government is trying very hard to persuade Iran – to isolate Iran and corner Iran, and it turns out that Brazil and South Africa are the most reluctant in the IAEA to press tough terms on Iran and to join with the EU-3 and the U.S. on Iran -- the point being that there is a certain cost if others perceive a system to be unfair – that it's fundamentally unfair, they will not exert themselves, will not spend resources, go to the wall in defense of you if what they think they're defending is a fundamentally unfair proposition.

And so these 13 steps may be the symbol of whether people feel they are actually getting a fair deal in this regime, and it comes full circle back to where I started, which was the challenges enforcement of compliance, and if the U.S. feels that and wants to lead that, we're going to have to attend to this overall question of balance of benefit and cost in the regime.

With that, let me turn to my colleague, Rose, who is going to talk about another we heard a lot about on our travels, which was what about U.S nuclear posture and policy.

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you very much, George, and again, thank you to all of you for coming today. It's great to see so many friends and colleagues of longstanding in the audience.

I will drill down on some of the questions of universal compliance by focusing on U.S. nuclear weapons policy. I wanted to start by just noting that I'm often asked how the Bush administration is reacting to our strategy because I have been briefing a lot of officials in the administration over the past six months as we've been working on the draft of the strategy.

I'll tell you that certain aspects of the strategy they like very much. They like very much our emphasis on strengthening enforcement. They like the notion of expanding the reach of the proliferation security initiative, which is one of our key

recommendations Joe has already mentioned -- also, it's establishing and enhancing national legislation to implement UNC Resolution 1540; and making the IAEA additional protocol a condition of supply for nuclear related technologies; finally, our emphasis on at least considering with open eyes use of force options in a counter-proliferation and preemption arenas. So I would say that in certain areas, there is plenty of interest in the administration and overall willingness to look further at it.

It is no surprise I think to anyone in this room, however, that they are less enthusiastic about our emphasis on actions that the nuclear weapons states -- the United States and the Russian Federation, particularly, as the largest nuclear weapons states -- can undertake to devalue the military and political currency of nuclear weapons. By the way, I just wanted to express at this moment my appreciation for Russian colleagues. I had three different sessions at our Carnegie Moscow Center in Moscow with eminent Russian experts -- two different versions of the draft, both a very early draft and then our June draft were translated into Russian, and we received many very good comments and criticisms back from Russian counterparts.

Let me go back to the report. You know, today, when nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists are a greater threat than the threat of a nuclear force exchange with the Russian Federation, it's our view that the United States has an overriding interest in ensuring that all future conflicts and all future adversaries, whether state actors or non-state actors -- that nuclear weapons do not fall into their hands. Thus, our key theme is that nonproliferation objectives must drive U.S. nuclear weapons policy.

Some of the steps that we recommend to achieve that objective are not favored by the Bush administration, and Joe Cirincione has already mentioned several of them: disavowing the development of new types of nuclear weapons, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and making nuclear reductions -- such as those called for in the 2002 Moscow Treaty -- irreversible and verifiable.

However, even in this nuclear policy arena, I would say that some of the steps we recommend are quite of interest to the Bush administration -- and in particular, lengthening the time the decision makers would have before deciding to launch nuclear weapons -- that is, removing them from hair trigger alert status. These are nuclear risk reduction measures; we've been hearing about them from some eminent people around town -- Senator Sam Nunn -- again, Joe mentioned him; he's been talking quite a bit about this but I do think that this nuclear reduction -- risk reduction area is one in which we have much potential for good work.

Our important new proposal in the study is a practical one: how can the nuclear weapon states go about fulfilling their commitment under Article 6 of the Nonproliferation Treaty to eventually achieve nuclear disarmament? And how can the other states that possess nuclear weapons -- India, Pakistan, and Israel -- also go about eventually achieving nuclear disarmament? Again, focus on the notion of universal obligations, universal commitment, and universal compliance for all states throughout the world and all states possessing nuclear weapons.

We propose that all states with nuclear arsenals should undertake a detailed roadmap of the steps that would be necessary to verifiably eliminate their nuclear arsenals. In this way, the world community would get a practical view for discussion and debate of the very real difficulties and the very real technical and policy issues that would have to be confronted to achieve this disarmament goal.

Although this is we think an important new proposal for all of the nuclear weapon states and other states possessing nuclear weapons, I want to stress again, as Joe mentioned, that this is not a unique idea. The U.K. in 2003 in the course of the preparatory committee meeting for the Review Conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty turned out a very interesting white paper – and I recommend it to you; it’s referenced in the study – that made an attempt at this very white paper. And so I think it something that is quite practical and should be considered.

In conclusion, I want to again emphasize a key point. In an era of nuclear terrorism and asymmetric warfare, we must embrace the nonproliferation imperative. Keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of all of our potential adversaries – that necessity must drive U.S. nuclear weapons policy, and that means devaluing the currency of nuclear weapons in our own policy to achieve this goal. Thank you very much.

MS. MATHEWS: Well, what I hope you have heard is a very quick look inside of a very large set of recommendations where we think we’ve come up with some new ideas that get around to what are sterile debates going nowhere in the international community – you’ve heard about several of them -- and where we have proposed some ideas that we think can move things ahead. For those of you who are part of the – not part of the .001 percent who know what the 13 steps are, the document is on page 151 in the book. (Laughter.)

We now have four microphones around the room and we would like to turn the floor over to all of you. We can talk more if you don’t want to. (Laughter.) Way in the back.

Q: Thank you. I was just wondering if you could –

MS. MATHEWS: Would you mind introducing yourself, everybody?

Q: Sorry. I’m Ed Lacy from the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State.

And I was intrigued, Joe, by your description on solving the three-state problem. But I was wondering if you could elaborate on how this actually differs from inviting the three states to be nuclear weapons states within the NPT. Thank you.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Sure, I’m happy to do that, and I have a very good answer for that but I think I’ll ask George to do that instead. (Laughter.)

MR. PERKOVICH: Because it doesn't – well, first of all, it doesn't provide them access to the full range of nuclear cooperation that is limited by the NSG to states that accept full-scope safeguards, so much of what they want – particularly India – would still not be available. Secondly, it doesn't explicitly or in any way juridically alter their status under the NPT; it's a political understanding and it is pegged on also their commitment to disarm, all right – so to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, it's just acknowledging that that's not going to happen in the absence of regional security and real progress towards disarmament by the existing nuclear weapon states.

So signing the NPT as nuclear weapons states gives them fewer obligations, less specific requirements, and more benefits than what it is we're talking about. We're talking about a – (audio break, tape change) – where they would accept the obligations of responsible stewardship and in return would get an end of the empty gesturing first of all, but secondly would get access to cooperation on material accounting, physical protection of nuclear materials, other things that they're denied currently by the U.S. and others that we would think are in our interest actually.

MS. MATHEWS: I just want to add one other thought, which is that for a great many countries around the world, membership by the three states as nuclear weapon states in the NPT regime dramatically devalues their own non-nuclear commitment, and is therefore really anathema. And we think this is a different way to crack that – to untie that knot. Yes, right here? Wait, wait for the new mike.

Q: (Inaudible) -- University. Rose, apparently President Putin and his government are very concerned about the bunker-busters and I wonder if since we met here last fall, you have anything more to add to the direction, which the Russian Federation may go or what may come of the efforts being made here as you have tried to do with our administration?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Well, I mentioned all these discussions in Moscow and, I have to say, Bill is very astute in pointing to an essential difference in U.S. and Russian views of this problem at the moment. The Russians feel quite acutely that there is a certain superiority that they are facing in U.S. both nuclear and conventional forces and they seem to feel that that is still a direct threat to their own security, in the context of even a potential NATO attack against Russian territory.

So we had many, many long discussions about the nature of the current threat to their country and also about the role that nuclear weapons can play in responding to that threat. I spent a lot of time hearing from them about how nuclear weapons are, in essence, for them a security policy at this moment, a strategic weakness for the Russian Federation. But I did underscore for them that, in essence, the way to fix this problem is to work very closely in cooperation with organizations that are in fact not a threat to them any longer, and I make note in the study of the way, by fits and starts, that Russia is developing a security relationship with the NATO alliance. That's the direction to proceed, not by really worrying so much about what the nuclear capabilities are of the

United States of America. But, in that context, I do stress that the United States and Russia must continue to emphasize nuclear reductions – verifiable, irreversible reductions.

Now as to the question of modernization on the Russian side, which I think your question gets to, Bill. There has been some emphasis – Putin has made some very public statements about the restoration of certain nuclear weapons programs, including a boost-glide vehicle that was first developed in the 1980's. But that is more a response, as I perceive it, to the National Missile Defense Program – to the notion of missile defense as it was first developed in the '80s, as a response to the Strategic Defense Initiative. But I almost see it as a symbolic measure to satisfy some political concerns within the armed forces and within the political elites. I frankly do not see it as an important military strategic capability for the Russian Federation.

Q: Thank you. Daryl Kimball with the Arms Control Association. I want to congratulate you all on a very complete and comprehensive report. I think it's a great job and I wanted to ask you about one recommendation in here, which is not such a modest proposal and I think it is an important one and I wanted you to elaborate on it. On page 84, ending the production of weapons-usable materials, which has taken up a lot of time and attention in the international arena – the director general's expert advisory group just came out with a report on options in this area. So maybe this is for Jon Wolfsthal, maybe some one else, but could you just elaborate a little bit further on your proposal here, and also explain how this might be achieved politically, since it is one of these new ideas that would require new limitations and sacrifices on the part of a lot of nations, and how might this be achieved – what the U.S. would need to do to help accomplish this.

JON WOLFSTHAL: Thank you, Daryl. This was definitely one of the more difficult issues that we wrestled with within the effort and I think it's also an example of how fluid the situation is. When we began our effort, the initial reaction when I started talking to people about these issues was “You know, before you were born, Jon, we tried to deal with some of these and they were miserable failures. Why would you want to put yourself through that misery?” Things related to the international fuel cycle evaluation in the late '70s, early '80s, and the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Conference.

Since that time, these issues have been taken up by the U.N. High-Level Panel, the director general of the IAEA, and the president all have made initiatives along these lines, and I think it shows that things can move very quickly – and I think they're even accelerating, in terms of the willingness of people to at least re-think through some of the assumptions within the nuclear commerce arena. The two halves of the problem were obviously distinct, in our view, because it's easier to approach the HEU question – the uranium question and the plutonium question – there is really no need for the continued production of HEU.

There are very, very few areas where HEU is the only material that can be used to fulfill a purpose and those are rapidly diminishing in medical isotope production. And we have a lot of the material, whether it's in Russian Federation, the U.S. stockpile,

which is still very, very large. And so we have an ability to continue to eliminate the civilian uses on that side.

On the plutonium side, it's obviously more complicated; it always has been more complicated. But given the large amount of material that already exists, what we have thought about is an effort to draw down those existing stocks, because they present, as the National Academy said back in 1994, a clear and present danger, and yet we're still dealing with those same stockpiles. So draw down the stockpiles as they exist through a pause. And at the same time, even more than we have been doing, accelerate the development of new alternative fuel-cycle technologies and use that as a carrot for states to abide by the pause, so that they can then engage in the development of this new technology with the United States.

And we recognize and we've already begun receiving comments since the final has gone online, saying why are you pushing something that won't succeed? The Japanese have just said that they oppose the director general's initiative on a five-year moratorium and I think the point is that there is some movement. We've had several years of engagement with the Russian Federation. They may be interested in a moratorium. And I think that what's clear to us is that if you don't propose it and you don't push it, you clearly won't achieve it. And unless we actually put some more power behind the president's proposals and support the director general's proposals, we don't know what's achievable.

MS. MATHEWS: This is one of the issues that we spent the most ink on in this report. There are 20 pages of discussion that begins on page 91. Roger?

Q: Roger Molander from RAND. I admire your ambition with this effort. I think everyone would agree with your assessment about the importance of the United States as a leader here, and I was wondering about – in addition to your efforts in international politics – what thinking you've done about internal U.S. political support for this kind of effort. This is a very political administration and I think without mobilization within this country, an effort like yours is probably doomed to failure.

The Department of Homeland Security has identified 23 major metropolitan areas as prime terrorist targets, and I might say, perhaps you should think about, in addition to your visits to 22 countries, that you might find a way to approach those 23 areas, in order to build the political support that you're going to need in this country for an effort of this character. Otherwise, it's going to look like another expert solution coming out of Washington that doesn't have the internal political support in this country that's going to be necessary.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Let me start. I think there is a lot of political support for many of the suggestions in this report. President Bush's recent trip to Europe is a case in point. Clearly, the president felt potential vulnerabilities if he did not do more to stem the threat of nuclear terrorism. You can see that in the haste by which the president's staff began discussions with the Russians, just weeks before the scheduled meeting with

President Putin. We know that in the White House there is concern that Senator Kerry was making headway on this issue during the campaign and that no politician wants to be responsible for not doing all that we could have done to prevent a nuclear terrorist incident that then occurs. There is a lot of political payoff to securing nuclear materials and I believe the president feels that and members of Congress feel that. Senator Lugar is going full-steam on this as he always has, but more cars are joining his train as it moves down the track.

On the issue of engagement with Iran, which we recommend in this report, again you can see the movement just in the past week – a shift in administration position from before the president went to Europe to after the president went to Europe. And why is that shift? I think it's because he felt some of the balance that we're talking about. He came there and we know, from his remarks and the senior administration remarks, that he sensed there a greater firmness on the part of the Europeans, a greater willingness to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, and that allowed him to consider more flexibility in engaging Iran and offering incentives in Iran – something that had been ruled out prior to the trip. So you can see – and once you get that kind of political opening and you start getting value for this – you start getting rewards for this – a whole lot can happen. I'm reminded of President Kennedy's remarks after he went out after the Limited Test-Ban Treaty, and he was greeted by tumultuous applause at his campaign stops. And he said, if I knew it was so popular, I would have done it a long time ago. I believe this president might learn a similar lesson.

MS. MATHEWS: Anybody want to add anything? Dennis?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: I just wanted to say that we actually are also planning to get out and engage and get around to as many cities as possible. But to be honest, I think the experience of a lot of people in this room, including you Roger, on this issue would be very useful as we engage domestically, and so I'd like to come and talk to you.

MS. MATHEWS: All right, Tom? Well, it's behind you.

Q: Tom Cochran with NRDC. In U.S. criminal law, often time the issue of intent is addressed in court proceedings. Do you believe the IAEA should consider intent of a state such as Iran, North Korea, or another state in assessing whether they are in violation of the non-proliferation treaty, or do you think you have to have a smoking gun?

MR. PERKOVICH: My own view is no because it's hard to – I mean, it's not a court proceeding, it would be hard to prove. But you also should just clarify where the burden of proof lies. In other words, right now it's you have to prove that Iran is seeking a capability for military purposes. I would shift the burden and say, prove that it's entirely for peaceful purposes and then cite all of the circumstantial evidence going back from 1985 that the IAEA has documented and shift the burden. I mean, I don't know how you get it – if you get into a discussion of intent you say, well deterrence, we say deterrence is peaceful. That is why we have nuclear weapons is to keep the peace so our

intention is entirely peaceful. But I think it's a consistency of the data, in terms of saying that there has to be 100 percent confidence that it's compliant with Article II.

MS. MATHEWS: We've tried to shift it by turning it into a positive that the IAEA cannot certify rather than getting into the nest of political choices in the Board of Governors.

Yes?

Q: Thank you so much. My name is Ota (ph), with Japanese Kyoto News. Thank you so much for very comprehensive and interesting report. I have two questions. Opening statement by Dr. Mathews – you say there are 22 countries consulted by your members and you picked out Japan, China, and also you say that North Korea –

MS. MATHEWS: South Korea.

Q: Is it South Korea? So no discussion with North Korea. That is my first question. And also, Japan and the South Korean's case especially, and also maybe Germany, on the issue about the expanding and extending the deterrence of nuclear umbrella issue. This is always kind of a serious issue for allies of the United States, who are enjoying in the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States military forces. So this report is saying that the significance of the debated issue of the nuclear role – role of the nuclear weapons – so how you can balance the argument about how we can provide the good deterrence to the allies and also strengthen the universal compliance of NPT. So how you can maintain this balance in the future? That's my question.

MS. MATHEWS: Thank you.

Rose, do you want to try?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: I'll start on that, thank you for your question, Mr. Ota. I'd just like to underscore three points. First of all that the security relationship with the United States with our key allies – with Japan, South Korea, and Europe – is by no means only dependant on the nuclear umbrella. Very important, of course, is the reach and strength of U.S. conventional forces, and I think we need to keep that fact before us.

The second point I'd make is the point that is made in the study, which is that there has already been considerable action taken to remove U.S. nuclear forces from forward deployment – the removal of the weapons from South Korea as a primary example. And we emphasize that in this day and age, it is perhaps time to consider this question for NATO Europe as well, as to whether these weapons could not come back to the United States, maintaining, of course, the capability to return them to theatre if necessary.

But the third point, I think, is one that I would like to reiterate as strongly as my first point and that is, the U.S. security relationship, security umbrella with all of these

countries that are our allies, depends very much on the strength of U.S. military forces overall and its strong commitment to the defense of its allies and I do not believe that that is in question in any of these cases. So I think of course we have to consider such steps in very, very close consultation with all of our allies. It's not a step that can or should be taken unilaterally, but we do believe that it is – the time is ripe to consider the notion of forward deployment of nuclear weapons. Thank you.

MS. MATHEWS: Here, it's in front of you.

Q: Andrew Pierre, Georgetown University. While President Bush was in Europe, I was in Laos and Thailand so I may have missed the nuance. But I had the impression that Bush said, Joe, that nuclear weapons for Iran were simply – he said that the Europeans agreed individually that nuclear weapons for Iran were quote unacceptable – something of that sort – and my question is, is there some risk in making that kind of a statement, because then that leads to sort of further action, presumably of a military nature, if the political dimensions of this don't work. And won't – if I can move on from there – suppose North Korea and Iran become – are accepted as nuclear weapon states in three years time, five years time, in the same way that India and Pakistan evolved into now more-or-less accepted nuclear states. Does this, in your collective judgments, mean the collapse of the NPT regime or simply one more albatross that the NPT regime needs to have as it continues in world affairs. Sorry to ask such a negative question, but I think if you look into it –

MS. MATHEWS: Just let me point out before my colleagues answer that we tested ourselves by applying this strategy to the hard cases, and those discussions are in chapter six of the report. I mean, you've already heard about the three state issue, but we have addressed in particular several of the cases that Andrew just mentioned, so who wants to leap in. George?

MR. CIRINCIONE: Let me start.

MS. MATHEWS: Joe?

MR. CIRINCIONE: On the risk, there is absolutely a risk to making the statement that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons is unacceptable, because if Iran then goes ahead, clearly your policy has failed. Clearly you have drawn a red line, Iran will have crossed that red line, and you are then obligated to either eliminate those weapons – do take an action to stop those weapons – or demonstrate your weakness. So yes there's a risk.

I happen to believe that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons is unacceptable so I'm glad to hear the Europeans and the United States make that statement. I also believe that there's nothing inevitable about Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons. I believe this is something that can be reversed. I believe there's a number of studies out there that have advocated strategies including the Council on Foreign Relations' Task Force that called for selective engagement with Iran and our section on this here and George

Perkovich's excellent policy brief that you can pick up outside. By the way, George and I are going to Teheran tonight for a conference on some of these issues. So we'll report more when we get back.

The risk of Iran getting a nuclear weapon is not that Iran is then going to attack the United States' troops or our allies with the nuclear weapon, no. Deterrence is alive and well. Every state with a nuclear weapon understands the massive and certain retaliation that would follow any first-strike with a nuclear weapon. Rather, the danger is what happens next in the region. If Iran gets a nuclear weapon, there will be tremendous pressure upon Iran's regional rivals – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, who once had a nuclear program, perhaps Turkey, perhaps the new government of Iraq – to match that nuclear capability. They, for their own regional reasons, could not allow Iran to gain status or prestige or military leverage by its acquisition of a nuclear weapon.

So then you could quickly go from a Middle East where there is one nuclear state to a Middle East where there are two, three, or four nuclear states with the unresolved territorial, political, and ethnic disputes in that region. That is a recipe for disaster. That is why it must be prevented and it would not stop there. That nuclear reaction chain would ripple around the world and many other states would then reconsider their obligations, their own nuclear ambitions. This is why we say we are at a tipping point. The decisions we make in the next two years, on issues like North Korea and Iran and the other issues here, will decide whether we continue the progress we've made on non-proliferation, fewer nuclear weapons in the world, fewer nuclear weapon states, fewer state programs, or whether it will tip the other way and we will enter that nightmare world that John F. Kennedy warned about in 1960, of 15, 20, or 25 nations. Those are the stakes, they couldn't be higher.

MS. MATHEWS: George, you want to add something?

MR. PERKOVICH: I would just – I think to your question – obviously, it depends. You know, would it lead to the collapse of the NPT, I mean, you can imagine a lot of ways in which it's managed. But I think the risks are much higher, because you mentioned India, Pakistan, Israel. They never signed the NPT, so in a sense the accommodation to the reality there is easier and has less international repercussions because they're in a different category.

With Iran and North Korea, but I would say Iran is the most acute case, they've been caught violating – they've been caught in non-compliance with their obligations under the treaty. And so now if they get away with it, having been caught with the flashlight shining on them and the gun pulled and then they laugh and walk away and nothing happens, then the implications are severe. To compound it, I think the other big variable is how will the U.S. and Europe manage this together. It's a trans-Atlantic issue. So we're two cops and we each – does one of us walk away and say, I just let them go, Joe – and the guy goes, or are we together on this? And I think that will determine in many ways, in three years in your scenario, how it plays out. So a lot of independent variables, I think, still –

MS. MATHEWS: Do you want to add something?

MR. WOLFSTHAL: Just very briefly on the North Korean piece, because we have a similar piece of rhetoric on North Korea, where the President has said that he would not accept, will not tolerate North Korea having nuclear weapons and we still have that very real possibility staring us in the face – not the least of which coming from the North Koreans publicly. And so there's already a challenge to U.S. objectives and U.S. commitment to the non-proliferation goal and Iran is watching that very carefully. You know there's a dynamic here between the two states and if they do succeed in playing or gaming the system in different ways, then that sets a model that's just as damaging – and I would say even more damaging – than some of the models the administration is trying to avoid in terms of rewarding bad actors or paying blackmail or incentivizing some of the negative things they've done.

MS. MATHEWS: Let me say one final thing to this point. We have to address Iran and North Korea, because they are genuine crises ongoing. But the core of what we're arguing for here is that while we have to do that, it's not enough. And a strategy that amounts to crisis after crisis after crisis is absolutely destined to fail. Partially because each resolution on what the next guy asks. And that's why we began the report with this quote from George Tenet – spoken in a different context but which is absolutely apt. We have to do more than think through a crisis-driven strategy here if we need a systemic change. And that is also hold out the best hope for individual resolutions. Our chances of getting Iran to accept abandoning enrichment and reprocessing are greatest if it is being posed as the first step in what will be a global regime, rather than a one-off case. I promised I'll come back to the front, but I also need to get to the middle and the back.

Q: James Kitfield from National Journal Magazine. Can you address – I mean, when you talked to the Bush administration senior officials – and you mentioned it in your story, that basically they have adopted a values-based foreign policy: it's not who has weapons, it's the rogue states that have weapons. Is that compatible with what you're suggesting here? It strikes me that it is not, because you're asking for them to also be tough not only on our own commitments but on people who – I mean, there are arguments – we don't worry about France's nuclear arsenal, et cetera. So I'm just curious whether you think that that fundamental belief about how they approach foreign policy is compatible for what you're suggesting.

And also, on Rose's point, she said, you know, there are things that they hear that they agree with and things they don't. It strikes me that you are proposing a rather holistic approach, and if you do a la carte and take pieces of it, it doesn't solve the problem, and it strikes me very likely that they'll want to take pieces of it but will say it's a nonstarter and talk about embracing the CTBT or whatever.

MS. MATHEWS: George, do you want to start?

MR. PERKOVICH: It's an absolutely vital point, both of them, but I'll try to address the first one about the philosophy that at least came into office in 2001. The problem isn't nuclear weapons; the problem is bad guys with nuclear weapons. Good guys with nuclear weapons, it's fine.

We don't think that you can solve the proliferation problem, the international security threat, with that approach, for several reasons. One is today's okay guy may be tomorrow's bad guy. So tell me, is Pakistan a good guy or a bad guy? And what you said in 2001 about Pakistan may have been, okay, fine, what's the problem, but then after the revelations of AQ Khan, do you still have the same judgment, and what could happen tomorrow?

So the problem with that approach is the characters may change, first of all. Secondly, you still have the security problems with the materials wherever they exist. But thirdly, as we know from any experience, when you're trying to set up a system that's a rule-based system and you have selective enforcement, the system becomes illegitimate and it degrades and holes appear in it, and it eventually collapsed. And that is what this approach would be; focusing on actors is a form of selective enforcement and others then won't join with you when you want them to go out and strengthen the rules and their enforcement.

Let me highlight an issue on Iran right now. In the last week since the president's trip, you will see in certain articles and statements being made that the problem is the clerical bomb in Iran, and they are putting an adjective before bomb, and it's "clerical" -- is the adjective -- which suggests an interesting view. First of all, the Iran with the bomb in a different regime wouldn't be such a problem. Now, that's not a bad way to start rationalizing if you don't think you can succeed and hold them back -- to get to Andrew's point -- and I say, well, you know, they are manageable if you have a different regime.

I think what is going on is people who are concerned the president is going to actually focus on solving a nuclear weapon problem and not primarily the regime change issue are trying to create pressure that says don't focus on the nuclear weapon; focus on the clerics and get rid of the clerical regime, to which I'm very sympathetic. The question is how do you do it and what order do you do it. But this -- your point is now being played out on Iran in some subtle ways and I don't think it will work. It has to be a holistic approach.

MS. MATHEWS: And let me just -- you go ahead --

MR. : Yeah, we all want a piece of this one.

MS. MATHEWS: Well, we won't because we'll let -- but to answer your question directly, yes, it's incompatible; but no, it's not a question of values. We're saying that changing the focus from what to who, as we put it, doesn't work -- is what in a sentence what I think George was just saying. But don't think this has anything to do with values.

Go ahead.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: And I'll just say very quickly that we do recognize that this is a comprehensive strategy but it's also a huge strategy. Joe just went through our top recommendations but there are over a hundred in the report. And recognize that whereas we need to hold it together as a comprehensive strategy and treat it as a holistic approach -- that nevertheless there are different priorities that can be addressed first. And other recommendations may take some time to be implemented but we try in our own work to keep the focus on implementing all aspects of the strategy.

I would only end by saying that the policy the Bush administration itself -- is evolving and therefore I think we needn't give up hope on all aspects even those that they say that are not keen on today. I was very pleased with the president's reaction to his trip to Europe and his openness now to considering closer work on the Iranian question with the EU-3. So I would just end with that point that even the administration policy is evolving and we should hope for further in that direction.

Q: Pete Shelly from Brookings and this follows up on this last question. My question is next steps for you and your group.

Other than the U.S. can you tell us of discussions you have had with other nuclear weapons states including the three where their reactions might be positive -- like, much of this we like; we're going to move forward? Or what are some of the reactions of these nuclear weapons states to some of your ideas and where might movement happen next?

MR. CIRINCIONE: Right, let's start -- you know, we've talked to representatives from all five recognized nuclear weapons states -- even to China, too, and the three non-NPT nuclear weapons states. And I don't think any of them said, thanks; I'll just put them on the president's or the prime minister's desk. (Laughter.) Nobody said that but I don't know if any of us have ever had that experience in anything. (Laughter.) But a great deal of interest -- a great deal of openness.

On some of the suggestions, as Rose said, you know, global threat reduction initiative -- let's go get that HEU. What is Ghana doing with HEU? Why does Vietnam have HEU? Let's go get that stuff before Osama bin Laden does. There is an open road, there is a lot cooperation and you see some of that moment happening in the last couple of weeks -- just things like that.

There's also -- you get the feeling that people are looking at this in terms of, well, if we don't do this, is this going to become the opposition's platform? And quite frankly, you know, we hope this -- the current administration in the United States adopts these plans, but if not, we hope those who hope to be the U.S. administration adopt these plans. There's a fertile political ground out there and people are hungry for ideas so we found a lot of interest in every country that we went to when we talked to the people in power and the people who want to be in power.

MS. MATHEWS: And also, we should say that nobody else has seen this yet. Right? This is a very different document than the one we released in June and so we will be – we will be taking it around and we are working actively with the chairman and the three subcommittee chairs of the non-proliferation review conference that opens in May and in a whole number of other venues. Can I go on or do you have something?

MR. PERKOVICH: Well, just real quick. I mean, some of the proposals actually come from those consultations so there are a number of French proposals in here, there are a number of adaptations we made having heard from the Indian's, for example. We've tweaked this so this draft as Jessica is intimating actually reflects a lot of the comments that we heard.

MR. : And also in-depth sessions with non-nuclear states. We spent days with senior officials going over line by line some of the recommendations here.

MS. MATHEWS: Michael.

Q: Michael Craypon (ph) with (Stimpson Center ?).

A response to James Kitfield (ph) – the value of selective proliferation is a recipe for more proliferation and what kind of a value is that? But I want to thank you all for doing this work which is usually important. If you could just crystallize the degree of danger – risk that you announced in the current nonproliferation regime, either numerically one to 10 or adjectively like the intelligence community – severe, moderate, high – how would you do it? Where do we stand?

MS. MATHEWS: Deep orange. (Laughter.)

MR. : Deep orange – (laughter) – amber.

MS. MATHEWS: I don't know. Does somebody else want to try?

MR. CIRINCIONE: Well, I forget the exact phrase that the high level panel on threats and challenges to the U.N. – the secretary general used but we believe – if you're talking about the regime itself, we believe the nonproliferation regime is in very real danger of collapse; it is in a very fragile condition. It's not just Iran, North Korea that are at a tipping point, the regime itself is at a tipping point. Now, it's been there before, as you know, Michael. This seems to us to be a particularly acute historical period and a great deal is riding on the wisdom of a handful of leaders in the world.

MS. MATHEWS: I just wanted to add that there is a section in here – begins on page 17 that is called “The Good News” and there is good news, as you know. And that is why we chose this phrase tipping point; there is an awful lot of good news; there is a tremendous number of risks and part of the reason we feel this document is important is that the choices – there are lots of choices still to be made.

MR. WOLFSTAHL: Maybe one thing to add. We used this example in the question on nuclear reductions but I think it sort of responds to your question in terms of the trends. And we do try to balance the good news and the bad news. But I think having now gone and walked a lot of miles in other country's moccasins, you sort of see that the incentives for nuclear weapon possession are growing rapidly and the benefits of waiting, the benefits of abstaining – not in every country but in a lot of countries in a lot of the key areas are dwindling and I think that is what crystallizes in my mind that if you put yourself as a decision maker in Iran or North Korea, or South Korea, or Japan, or Egypt, you think a lot more seriously about nuclear weapons as a means to guarantee your security than you might have five or 10 years ago. And that is I think the most troubling trend that we have seen.

MS. MATHEWS: Let me take some in the back. Right behind you is a mike.

Q: David Kelp with the Friends Committee on National Legislation.

The NPT Review Conference starts in two months. What is that people in this room should be urging the U.S. government to do so that we have a successful NPT Review Conference?

MR. CIRINCIONE: Daryl Kimball, do you want to answer that? (Laughter.) Go ahead, George, do you have the list?

MR. PERKOVICH: I've got a list. These are from the recommendations that we made and Darrel should then correct them or add to them. It strikes me that the NPT venue will be vital to -- do we talk about clarifying the withdrawal of procedures and consequence for withdrawal from the NPT? We specify examples here but that is something that is right for the NPT Review Conference to do

To encourage further work building on the al Bardaid (ph) experts group on multinational management of the fuel cycle – again, that would be given thrust by the NPT. You have to either reaffirm or update the 13 steps – I mean, that is going to be a fundamental position. So you ask what the U.S. can do – well, the U.S. has to go beyond saying what they don't like and start at least offering commensurate counterproposals.

The White Papers that Rose mentioned – it strikes us something that the – that if the NPT review conference – the parties called on the weapons states to detail these technical requirements that they would have to make in order to verifiably eliminate and control their materials, that would be a positive recommendation.

Endorse the speeding up of the global cleanout -- that shouldn't just be a U.S.-Russia thing; that should be a global mandate coming out of the NPT Review Conference. There are a couple of others but I think – it's fairly easy to actually go through the brochure – the list and say these actually coming out of the review conference would make a lot of sense.

MS. MATHEWS: And let me just add one to that. I think we – probably the five of us differ among ourselves on the question of whether complete disarmament is in fact feasible ultimately. But at the very least, we know that a decision to make new nuclear weapons is and will be seen by the entire rest of the world as a decisive step in the opposite direction, and that none of this is possible in that context – none of it politically. And so I would add to George’s list: active opposition to any decision by the Congress to move ahead on bunker busters.

Yes, gentleman, right there in the –

Q: Chalmers Wood (sp) with the Special Portions Association and the Mi Kong (ph) America Collaborative Foundation.

I have spent about the last 45 years dealing with the American-Vietnam relationship, and I found in my experience that as a private citizen, I could often get a better attitude change, even directly with the Communist than a committee could. Is there much movement in that area of energizing John Doe and (out doing the alley?) about the advantages and disadvantages of having nuclear weapons – i.e., for the want of a better word, private diplomacy?

MR. CIRINCIONE: Let me just a couple of things about that. This is a global document. We are having this document translated into Russian, into Chinese, into Arabic, and we’re working with local partners in those countries and regions to distribute this, in part to do exactly what you’re suggesting to help raise the awareness of citizens, not just the experts and officials. The document is being republished and distributed throughout India. So we are actively looking for international partners, international organizations to cooperate with you.

Notice that this is a free document. You can have as many of these as you can carry. (Laughter.) In fact, we will ship them to you.

MR. : Did you send some to Bollywood?

MR. CIRINCIONE: (Chuckles.) We are actively involved in helping to distribute this in India and George is actually going to Pakistan right after Tehran – we’ll be having talks there too. And of course it’s on that wonderful free distribution network – the Internet. This is entirely downloadable as a PDF for production and redistribution.

MS. MATHEWS: Gentleman right here in the red sweater.

Q: I’m Denis Howkar (ph) from the Indian Army, retired.

I had a comment about India, Pakistan, and the Israel triangle. India is the only country that does not have – I mean, has a non-first-use policy. Israel doesn’t have a policy that has been stated but it always said that it will not be the first country to use

nuclear weapons in the Middle East but also not be the second. (Laughter.) And Pakistan – yeah – and I think the greatest threat, as someone brought out was at the nexus of nuclear weapons with terrorist groups. Now, Pakistan, apart from the AQ-Khan network, which was well documented, we also know that two Pakistan scientists had met with the bin Laden network.

And my question was really about does anybody in the panel – have they been able to really find out what happened to those loose nukes that John Leavitt has spoken about some years ago. Do you have any information? Have they been recovered? Are they in safe hands with – back with the Russian government? Are they still loose somewhere? And isn't that really the possibility of those loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist groups and again be – unfortunately come back to our old friend and the two nuclear scientists that had met the al Qaeda network?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Well, the well-known weapons of General Lebed – we have been around the racetrack on this issue quite a few times over the years. I am rather skeptical of Lebed's original claims. But having said that, I very much agree with some of the reporting out of the intelligence community late – just in the last week there has been testimony at a very high level talking about, you know, loss of nuclear materials – fissile – weapon-usable nuclear materials from the former Soviet weapons establishment.

So I take this threat extremely seriously and for that reason I am 150 percent in agreement with the policy of the United States government and the Russian federation to work in close cooperation to secure nuclear materials and warheads. And so I think first of all, we have a real threat; it's a very serious threat and it's a threat against which we have a viable policy but it takes a lot of attention at high levels. We saw President Putin, President Bush just talking about it at Bratislava a few days ago and I welcome that very much.

But in terms of individual claims – you know, where we sit on the outside without access to intelligence, it's impossible to confirm, deny, or make comment about it. But I will repeat that I'm rather skeptical of Lebed's original claims.

MR. PERKOVICH: Briefly, on page 8 – (audio break, tape change) -- to your point about protecting materials in bringing in – one of the reasons of the contact group – I won't describe it all here – is it's a way to have the highest level leaders of Indian, Pakistan, and Israel in a discussion with other possessors of nuclear materials about what are the standards we're going to set on controlling our materials and our know-how, and if you need assistance in doing that, we're going to provide it.

This issue has been kept down at the – at a working bureaucratic level; it is not something that heads of state have gotten together and said this is the most important security threat we face; what are we doing to do about it? At the most you get a G-8 discussion but that doesn't include actors that you have mentioned. So we have a proposal on 87.

MR. WOLFSTAHL: And just very briefly, I think this is a great example of where we tie in universality because it shouldn't matter whether it's a civilian facility in a nuclear weapons state or in a non-nuclear weapon state, or a nuclear weapon – or enough material to build a weapon – there are obviously different ways you handle security. But the fact is that obligation should apply to all stocks of material. And so trying to get beyond this construct of well, you're a nuclear weapon state but in the treaties that you can't participate seems outdated in our mind.

MS. MATHEWS: Before I close – and I'm sorry, we do have to stop -- I wanted, on behalf of all of us, express our thanks to the people in this room and those who are listening, and many, many others who were extraordinarily generous with written comments, criticisms, and help – hours and hours of discussions and meetings – through many, many drafts of this document – that we could not have done it without all of that help. You have been – these have been fantastic questions. I know we could go on for much longer but everybody has some appointments to go to. Thank you for coming and we'll hope to see you here again.

MR. : Thank you.

(Applause.)

(END)