

**CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

**ARE NEW NUCLEAR  
BARGAINS ATTAINABLE?**

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GEORGE PERKOVICH: Good morning. I'm going to go ahead and start, if people will come in – although traffic this morning didn't look so bad on my bike, but I don't know. Everybody still has hangovers. Welcome, my name's George Perkovich; I'm the vice president for studies here at the Carnegie Endowment. And it's my pleasure to welcome you here this morning where we're going to launch, as it were – no pun intended – a new report by Deepti Choubey, "Are New Nuclear Bargains Attainable?"

And I think if you take the time to read this report, you'll find that it really has a lot of insights and documentation of perspectives on a set of issues that have kind of bedeviled or challenged negotiations in thinking about nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament for many years. And that was the objective; that's why Deepti undertook the task, because we're very aware of this kind of debate or these cross-cutting assertions about what non-nuclear weapon states, why they want it, how serious they are, whether they're serious or not. But, really, without that much of the database to go on – that much of an interaction – to try to draw out these questions. And that's what Deepti set out to do and I think, if you read the report, you'll realize that she did it marvelously, to great effect. And that's what we're here to present to you this morning.

We also are very fortunate to have as the most immediate commentators on the report two very talented diplomats who are deeply knowledgeable in this area. Peter Sawczak is the political counselor at the Australian Embassy in Washington, and before arriving in Washington for this task, he was director of counter-proliferation at the foreign ministry – or the department of foreign affairs and trade, as they call it, which maybe he could explain – but it seems like the foreign ministry, in many ways, to those of us who deal in nonproliferation. And he led the Australian delegation to the MTCR in Australia group and coordinated a major Australian policy paper: "Weapons of Mass Destruction; Australia's Role in Fighting Proliferation."

Our second commentator is Achilles Zaluar from Brazil – a minister-counselor at the Brazilian Embassy, where his portfolio includes nonproliferation, nuclear defense and multilateral matters. And prior to this, in Brasilia, he was the deputy head of the United Nations division at the ministry of foreign affairs. He's worked on nonproliferation and export control issues extensively; he's done academic research and writing in this topic. And so you'll see, in both of these guys, that there really is genuine, substantive expertise as well as diplomatic experience and skill. And that's why we're so glad to have them. So, without further ado, let me turn it over to Deepti, and then to Peter and Achilles. Thank you.

DEEPTI CHOUBEY: Good morning everybody, and thank you, George, for that introduction. And Peter and Achilles, I know how busy you both are and I really appreciate you taking the time to be with us this morning. And thank you to all of you; I know that it's very early on a Friday morning, and I really appreciate you coming out.

Some of you may already have seen the report; it was distributed earlier, and if you page through it, you'll see that there is a multitude of quotes, almost resembling the Zagat restaurant guide, which uses visitor reviews. And at one point, when I was writing this report, I worried that I was writing the Zagat guide to non-nuclear weapon states, which would have quotes like, "the ambience was mistrustful," or "wait for the new chef to arrive in 2009." (Laughter.) So, to extend the restaurant metaphor a bit longer, I've been told that the quotes are what add spice to this report, so I hope that you actually take a moment to read it.

So where did this report come from? Largely, it was a result of the observation that nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states are talking past one another. So I tried to document, well, what is the landscape of non-nuclear weapon state views, particularly because there seem to be assumptions and assertions that are thrown out, particularly in policy debates here in the United States.

So I went out and I spoke to 16 foreign ministries and one thing I want to state at the outset is that the focus of this report, which ended up being a U.S. focus, was unintended. My questions to these foreign ministry folks were about what should nuclear weapon states as a whole do, particularly focused on the P-5, yet 95 percent of the answers were always referencing what the United States should do. So, for me, I couldn't ignore the obvious implications of the research. That said, many countries must take corrective action to improve the nonproliferation regime, but I think the United States has the best capacity to do so.

With the alignment of the new U.S. administration, the sheer impact U.S. action can have on an international regime, and the impending 2010 nonproliferation review conference, I think the United States has a serious opportunity to reclaim its leadership. Moreover, because of the debates that we have here about the next nuclear posture review and that there are only 18 months between now and the nonproliferation review conference, I thought it was really important to inject the views of non-nuclear weapon states into the debates and to ensure that U.S. policy decisions going forward reflect this input.

That said, I do want to underscore one idea from the outset. The bottom line of this analysis is that the U.S. must demonstrate a serious commitment to disarmament. This call is not one of altruism, and it's not borne out of naiveté or idealism; instead, it's the result of hard-nosed analysis, which shows that the U.S.'s ability to advance and implement its nonproliferation agenda is in serious peril if we continue to ignore signals and messages from non-nuclear weapon states.

So today, I want to unpack the results of the report and share with you a reality check about the environment in which U.S. officials seek to advance the nonproliferation agenda, a clear and practical step-by-step approach for the U.S. to engage non-nuclear weapon states in pursuit of enhancing U.S. national security and non-nuclear weapon state reactions to nonproliferation initiatives, along with a call for non-nuclear weapon states to make use of what may be only a limited window of opportunity for them to maximize their agenda and respond to positive signals from the United States.

So what non-nuclear weapon states are involved? This analysis draws on interviews with foreign ministry officials who are based in Washington, New York, Geneva, Vienna or home capitals, and who are responsible for each state's nuclear policies. Officials interviewed represented – and I'll say this in alphabetical order – Argentina, Australia, South Africa, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Iran, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, and Turkey. So these are states that are from the North or the South; they may be NATO or non-NATO allies of the United States; some have the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella; some have a stake in preventing a regional nuclear conflict; and some may be members of the non-aligned movement or an otherwise active voice in the nonproliferation regime.

Although these discussions reveal that there are no automatic or immediate bargains to be had in the near term, several significant themes emerged for the United States to incorporate into its

understanding of non-nuclear weapon state landscapes. By the way, if I use – slip into – the use of the word, “we,” hopefully, you can tell by my accent, I am referring to the United States. So what is the problem with current non-nuclear weapon state and nuclear weapon state interactions? Well, I think we’re all aware that there is a renewed debate about the desirability and feasibility of nuclear disarmament, and it’s emerged from both sides of the political aisle, particularly here in the United States. But there’s the idea, though, that nuclear weapon states hope that in direct exchange for renewed action on disarmament, such as ratification of the CTBT, that non-nuclear weapon states will support nonproliferation efforts.

Such quid-pro-quo bargains are going nowhere fast, because non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear weapon states are talking past one another and don’t realize where current views are. So nuclear weapon states fail to understand that these bargains are not seen as fair exchanges by non-nuclear weapon state in light of long-overdue and unfulfilled promises made by nuclear weapon states. A German diplomat shed light on this issue when explained that, “More progress on disarmament is necessary for creating an atmosphere for non-nuclear weapon states to consider other nonproliferation steps.” The stark reality is that nuclear weapon states, particularly the United States, are seen to be in arrears or in the hole, and we have a significant debt to pay before key non-nuclear weapon states will consider additional nonproliferation commitments.

So why does that assessment matter? And why do non-nuclear weapon state views matter? Well, I think Americans should be worried by this reading of the state of affairs, particularly if, according to John Ikenberry, we agree that the most serious threat to U.S. national security today is not a specific enemy, but the erosion of the institutional foundations of the global order that the United States has commanded for half a century and through which it has pursued its interests in national security. Moreover, as a new global order emerges, with states vying for regional dominance, the United States should be concerned if mastery of the fuel cycle is seen as one of the credentials promoted by emergent states for their desired place in the international order.

As the traditional leader of the nonproliferation regime, the United States faces real challenges. On both nonproliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons, America’s leadership and authority have eroded so far that they have imperiled U.S. national security. But there’s a way forward if American policy-makers recognize that disarmament is not altruism; instead, disarmament is vital to U.S. security. And by understanding non-nuclear weapon state views and adopting a different approach calibrated to meeting their concerns, the United States has a real opportunity to craft a global order in which other countries go along with our nuclear interests rather than banding together against the United States.

However, current debates about the feasibility of nuclear disarmament, particularly within the United States, focus on the dynamics amongst nuclear-armed states and steps to be taken by them, individually or in concert; not enough attention is paid to the views of non-nuclear weapon states and how they might influence the calculations of nuclear-armed states. For example, we all know of the Wall Street Journal op-ed that was published in January 2007 and the call by the “Four Statesmen” for a world free of nuclear weapons. That call is welcome, but they, too, underestimate the role that non-nuclear weapon states can play in making that world a reality.

Their first step is for the United States and Russia to undertake further substantial reductions in their nuclear forces beyond the boundaries of the Moscow treaty. As this process proceeds, they envision other nuclear weapon states participating. The second step is to create an international

system of controls to manage the fuel cycle. The second step will require the cooperation of non-nuclear weapon states, which currently view most fuel cycle proposals as further infringements on their NPT Article 4 rights to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Taking the temperature of non-nuclear weapon states on these issues would show that actions proposed in step one are not enough to gain the support of non-nuclear weapon states to accomplish step two.

So to the extent that the future of the fuel – sorry, the future of the nuclear fuel cycle is linked to the fate of the nonproliferation regime, more work needs to be done to bring non-nuclear weapon states on board. My greatest concern is – about ignoring non-nuclear weapon states – is that we will have a failure of imagination in the development of U.S. nuclear policy. At the very least, non-nuclear weapon state views provide an opportunity to stretch the limits of existing debates on U.S. policy.

So how can we characterize non-nuclear weapon state views? For me, there were four broad characterizations which emerged. One is the nuclear weapon states alternatively describe themselves as either principled or pragmatic. The second one was that they all believe that the 13 steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT review conference were important, but they had different views on them. There were different views about the use or misuse of the U.N. Security Council in advancing nonproliferation goals. And then, finally, they believe that process matters.

So, in terms of this principled versus pragmatic divide, this is the clearest divide amongst non-nuclear weapon states surveyed. And between those that describe their government as having a principled approach to nuclear issues and those with a pragmatic one. Officials in developed countries, including NATO and non-NATO allies describe themselves as pragmatists who recognize the ideological debates, but are eager to move past them. Developing countries, particularly members of the Non-Aligned Movement, or the NAM, ardently described their principles-based approach in the vital importance of being a voice to hold other states accountable to their obligations.

This fissure plays out on critical issues such as how to move forward with the 13 steps. All states confirmed that the 13 steps are still benchmarks for disarmament; most officials, though, conceded that some steps needed to be updated or are now irrelevant. Noting their more practical rather than principled approach, a Canadian diplomat stated that they wanted to see continued progress on the 13 steps, but they need to be re-packaged for today's relevance. A German diplomat concurred and asserted that they are still relevant as – the 13 steps – as a part of a negotiated settlement, but some steps are obsolete, but nuclear weapon states should still try to do those that are feasible.

A Turkish official vigorously stated that they could not be renegotiated again, and echoing that sentiment, a Brazilian diplomat said the steps like the early entry into force with the CTBT – the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – have been paid for three times and non-nuclear weapon states will not pay again. In terms of the use or misuse of the U.N Security Council, this was really enlightening, in terms of the different worldview that are held by some non-nuclear weapon states, particularly amongst the Non-Aligned Movement. In the issue of U.N. Security Council 1540, there's a belief that the Security Council was inappropriately used to legislate that resolution and that set of obligations over all U.N. states, while circumventing the NPT process. And because of that, for some states, it lacks legitimacy. And they believe that the U.N. Security Council has been overused, and they would prefer that it really be used in cases where it's required.

That, for me, was very eye-opening. To kind of see, you know, that's what a diplomat's view is of how the U.N. apparatus is being used or misused, particularly by Western states, you can understand some of their frustration. That anecdote, for me, also underscored that process matters, particularly the importance that other states put on various aspects of the NPT apparatus. The disarmament and nonproliferation machinery is getting cranky, is what one Brazilian diplomat said, referring to the bad taste left in the mouth because of the current state of the CTBT.

The U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. First Committee, the U.N. Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament, and various prep. coms. and review conferences are important, but they work only as well as the U.N. member states want them to work. And in recent years, PrepCom and review conferences have fallen short of the vision that they would lead incrementally to substantive progress. As a result of that, in the moribund status of the Conference on Disarmament, there is no framework in place that really, now, enables negotiation between non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear weapon states. There is, however, a uniform demand that enables real negotiation in that both non-nations and NATO countries really want to open up the Conference on Disarmament for work on a variety of issues. But that requires new momentum.

The United States can help provide that momentum and create the opening for a constructive dialogue with non-states by acknowledging the importance of certain processes in principle, and in indicating that the United States is open to exploring elements of the U.N. disarmament machinery as a forum for discussing disarmament issues. Such actions may be a first step in response to the call for the West to effectively engage the majority of the world's population in global decision-making. If the United States proceeds down this path, it should also enlist the support of allies and more moderate voices in Latin America and Asia in order to better ensure a more constructive discussion.

So what are the current challenges and obstacles to the current state of affairs? Here, I would say there are four. One is ad hoc engagement between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. There's an atmosphere of distrust; there's a credibility problem that the United States is facing; and there's a perception of an imbalance in priorities given to the three pillars of the NPT, which are nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In terms of ad hoc engagement, the U.S. did get credit for being relatively more engaged than the other nuclear weapon states, but there was the perception that the United States comes with this checklist of nonproliferation issues that they want non-nuclear weapon states to sign up for, but there isn't real dialogue on disarmament. In only one case, which was with the Australians, did a diplomat say, no, no, no, but we really do talk to them about disarmament and further stockpile reductions.

The Chinese and the Russians were, perhaps, the least engaged. The Russians, I believe, were characterized as being "uninquisitive," when it came to nonproliferation. So, although the U.S. does relatively better, I don't think that's saying much. But that also, to me, revealed an opportunity for where non-nuclear weapon states could be a voice for putting more emphasis on what the Chinese, the Russians, and the other nuclear powers are doing in terms of their own disarmament obligations.

You know, Stephen Rademaker, the assistant secretary of state, he complains about, and I think rightfully so, why is there so much focus on what the United States is doing in terms of its

Article 6 obligations and not – and yet, people aren't as exercised about what the other nuclear weapon states are doing. And this is, again, where I think the non-nuclear weapon states could be deployed to put more pressure on these other states, particularly in terms of transparency and other measures. And I think that would actually create more political space here at home for people who want to advance a nonproliferation and linked disarmament agenda to do so.

In terms of the atmosphere of distrust, this largely has to do with unhappiness about the past – the current, but passing – past administration's policies. That said, every diplomat who raised criticism also called for renewed U.S. leadership, so I found that to be a very hopeful sign from these states that, although they have criticism, they still think the United States is a key player. In terms of the perception of an imbalance of priorities, according to an Indonesian official, the ultimate frustration for Indonesia and other non-states is what they call the unequal implementation of obligations. From some vocal non-nuclear weapon states such as Egypt, the perception is that states are fostering nonproliferation at the expense of disarmament. As described by a South African official, the situation is exacerbated by the view that nuclear weapon states see nuclear weapons as a permanent right.

So, taking all of that as some context, what is the near-term opportunity that I see? So although I think the nonproliferation and disarmament agenda should, in general, advance in concert and not at the expense of one another, the current level of frustration among non-nuclear weapon states requires that nuclear weapon states send strong disarmament signals, first and soon. I think the specter of the 2010 NPT review conference looms as a major test of the health of the nonproliferation regime.

Considering the dominant narrative by regime observers that it is on the verge of collapse, the vast majority of states do not want to see the 2010 review conference end in failure and without final result. The United States should make use of this opening to devise a strategy that primarily acknowledges the views of non-nuclear weapon states as a first step toward enlisting their support in a longer-term agenda involving both disarmament and nonproliferation efforts. The strategy should be coordinated with other efforts, such as crafting of the next nuclear posture review, and the national security strategy document. Past versions of this from the Bush administration have been widely misunderstood and misread by non-nuclear weapon states.

As signals to the rest of the world about U.S. intentions and commitments, this strategy should also connect with public statements made by U.S. leaders, such as the new president's inaugural speech or key speeches from the secretaries of state, defense, or energy. A new administration takes office in January 2009, making 2009 – or, sorry, in May – the PrepCom too early for major reorientation of U.S. policies. It is still, however, an opportunity for U.S. officials to get their bearings and for other states to present, constructively, their point of view so that Washington hears them.

U.S. officials should also be prepared to hear a good deal of criticism about the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation deal and questions about how it will be reconciled with other nonproliferation policies. Tactically, the next administration should do its best to ensure that it sends the right team to the PrepCom and to the review conference. It should include high-level officials, which signal U.S. seriousness. They should participate in these kinds of exchanges, but they should also be the kind of people who can read the political dynamics and use them to reshape the debates in advance of the 2010 review conference and afterwards. The U.S. should present a strategy and an action plan

that covers immediate and longer-term horizons on key issues for debate, such as implementation of the 13 steps, as agreed to at the 2000 conference.

As one German official advocated, the United States should change its posture from defensive to proactive by forcefully subscribing to the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world. One thing, though, that was clear from this assessment is that the United States is currently losing the soft power competition.

So what are the broad benefits of a new approach? I think one is, there is a slight opportunity to make use of the Obama dividend, which was written about yesterday by, I think, Nicholas Kristof in the New York Times and to try to improve the views that folks have of the United States outside of the U.S. Secondly, these steps or this approach would help allies help us, and I'll talk a little bit more about this later. And, finally, as I mentioned, there would be more pressure on other nuclear weapon states, which can create more political room to maneuver at home.

So what's the first step? If you believe there can be a reorientation of the U.S. approach, what's the first thing we should do? Well, how the United States addresses the 13 steps is the foundation for any dialogue that may occur with other states. Some non-nuclear weapon states believe that the Bush administration has walked away from the 13 steps. They cite the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, the slow-to-no progress on other steps – although by some counts, progress has been made on four of the 13 steps. Each representative from the non-nuclear weapon states surveyed for this analysis stated that the 13 steps are still the benchmarks of progress for disarmament, but there are varying positions on what should be done going forward, and in light of some of the steps that have been overtaken by events. One Norwegian diplomat also suggested, there could be other benchmarks.

So, just to give you a sense of the range of views on this issue, as it was one of the things that was clear from assessing these non-nuclear weapon states – that there is not a monolithic view – is that, although they all affirm the overall importance, a South Korean diplomat described a few of them as either premature, unrealistic, less-relevant, overtaken by events, or dead, but still surmised, for those steps, that the end goal is still important. A Japanese official agreed that the 13 steps are still important, but we need to review them. A Canadian diplomat added that they will have to be eventually updated. Other pragmatic views included statements such as: “they are too ambitious, right now, but we still have to deal with each separately, as it's difficult to approach as a whole.”

But states such as Turkey, who are open to updating them, firmly stated that they cannot be renegotiated. A more inflexible view was provided by an Iranian official who stressed: “We have agreed to them, and there should be no detraction at all.” I think we could put them in the more principled category of views. Acknowledging the U.S. commitment to the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of the nuclear arsenals is a first step toward setting the scene for a more constructive dialogue with critical non-nuclear weapon states. A slight modification in language and tone would achieve so much, urged a Norwegian diplomat.

Since the official U.S. position has not gone as far as repudiating the 13 steps, I think acknowledging the U.S. commitment to them should be a relatively easy concession to make. So what comes next? Well, after acknowledging previous commitments, the United States has several options for demonstrating its seriousness about disarmament. When asked what should be the top

three steps that would indicate that nuclear weapon states are serious about disarmament, a consensus emerged across the broad variety of states that I spoke with: The CTBT and the FMCT – so the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty – they rose to the top. A diverse selection of countries, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Norway, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, and Turkey stated that ratification of the CTBT by the United States and other states would send a very strong signal.

Argentina, Australia, Canada, Japan, Indonesia, Ireland, Norway, South Africa, and Sweden called for immediate negotiations on an FMCT. Some specified that it should happen within the Conference on Disarmament. Just within the CTBT, there was one diplomat who said, nobody's expecting that it would necessarily be ratified by the 2010 review conference, but it would be enough for a U.S. administration to send a strong signal of its intentions, and then, to create for itself the timeline that it needs to ensure that ratification occurs within the Senate.

After the CTBT and the FMCT, the measure that garnered the most support was further stockpile reductions. Interestingly, all of the states that support this are U.S. allies, including Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, Norway and Sweden. The vast majority of non-nuclear weapon states interviewed stated that stockpile reductions were less important than other steps indicating a commitment to disarmament. And I think this is a key finding to underline, particularly for debates here in Washington about what U.S. nuclear policy should be, as they, I think, overly focus on stockpile reductions. This point about the relatively less importance of stockpile reductions was made repeatedly at the 2008 PrepCom, particularly after the U.S. special representative for nonproliferation trumpeted American stockpile reductions by asserting that, “the numbers speak for themselves.”

The Brazilian delegation, the next morning, countered U.S. claims, stating, “While we welcome efforts by nuclear weapon states for the reduction of stockpiles, the progress achieved thus far does not, necessarily, represent a commitment to disarmament.” So what benefits can the U.S. expect after taking these steps? Well, if the United States acknowledges previous commitments and takes steps to move forward with the CTBT and FMCT, or other disarmament measures, there's the range of – there was a uniform message across the range of non-nuclear weapon states that progress on disarmament could lead to goodwill and would get the United States out of the hole to have a real conversation.

Allies resoundingly stated that such actions would make it easier for them to work with other states on the U.S.'s behalf, particularly Non-Aligned Movement countries. One Canadian diplomat surmised that countries like Canada can then go to the NAM and ask for more progress on nonproliferation, and the Japanese agreed that disarmament gains would make NAM countries more constructive. But revealing some of distrust amongst non-nuclear weapon states themselves, in referring to the resistance that some of these states have toward adopting the additional protocol and more stringent export control policies, a German diplomat asserted that the right steps by nuclear weapon states would take away the fig leaf behind which non-nuclear weapon states hide.

Alluding to the current environment, one diplomat acknowledged that disarmament progress would provide allies with more ammunition, whereas, right now, we have nothing. More pessimistically, an Australian diplomat flatly stated that the United States would get nothing for the CTBT, whereas a Canadian official thought that the ratification would at least bring goodwill, but

cautioned that ratification has been so delayed that it's uncertain that the United States would get even that.

So what, then, for nonproliferation? Well, diplomats and officials interviewed for this analysis were asked their opinions about fuel cycle initiatives, such as voluntarily foregoing enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, fuel supply assurances, and other nonproliferation proposals, such as making the additional protocol a condition of supply and clarifying and strengthening the NPT's withdrawal clause, Article X. The strongest reactions were to fuel cycle-related proposals and to making the additional protocol a condition of supply.

So, recalling the recommendations of the Wall Street Journal op-ed, promoted by Schultz, et al, reforming the fuel cycle was deemed the second step to take after further stockpile reductions. Well, if the United States pursues any of these proposals, a better understanding of how fuel cycle proposals are perceived by non-nuclear weapon states would be beneficial. So here, states such as Sweden, Australia, South Korea and Egypt – they were open to the ideas of proposals aimed at persuading states to voluntarily forego enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. A Swedish official said, the key is the voluntary nature of these proposals. Otherwise, they will be seen to restrict the rights and that's backtracking on the grand bargain. An Egyptian diplomat agreed, stating that these proposals are okay, if the rights are still intact.

The United States will have to combat the perception from the NAM that the non-nuclear weapon states have a right, as long as they don't use it. The assortment of fuel supply proposals elicited interest and skepticism from a range of states. There were concerns about being treated like Iran, and that, particularly, came from a Swedish official, who said, you know, it seems as if these proposals have come out of the challenge that Iran has been presenting the nonproliferation regime; non-nuclear weapon states feel like they're being treated as if they are an Iran. And then he says, we really should try to de-link those narratives, if you're trying to further these proposals.

Making the additional protocol a condition of supply is another area where non-nuclear weapon states' reactions are instructive for the United States. States strongly in favor of the proposal, such as Norway, South Korea, Sweden and Japan are friendly to the United States, but other states were either skeptical or flatly against the idea. The Indonesian position was described as not being in favor of making conditions on issues that are voluntary; don't change the rules in the middle of the game. The Egyptians also opposed the idea, but for different reasons. They said, we have accepted other commitments and there are still no positive steps on the universalization of the NPT and a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. This statement, for me, was a clear indication of the link made by some non-nuclear weapon states between additional nonproliferation commitments and nuclear weapon states making good on previous disarmament commitments.

So what concrete steps should the U.S. and non-nuclear weapon states take? Well, what I've previously talked about was meant to be a reality check for those of us in Washington who have assumptions about what non-nuclear weapon states feel and a reality check about the external environment in which U.S. officials seek to advance their nonproliferation agenda. By better understanding the environment, the United States has a chance to shape its interactions with non-nuclear weapon states more proactively, and thereby reframe currently polarized debates. The best way to change its approach to these issues would be for the United States to indicate its seriousness in step-by-step fashion. The United States and other states that are proponents of nonproliferation

should signal to frustrated states that constructive behavior on their part will be met by further measures to justify faith in the process.

So, in terms of a few steps that the next U.S. administration should take, I think one is, first and foremost, to acknowledge and reconfirm previous disarmament commitments; but they should set expectations about re-engaging aspects of the disarmament machinery, a timeline for action and the role and responsibilities of all states. So I'm not saying that the United States should do this all unilaterally; I think they can set the scene for their measures being met by actions from other states.

Secondly, I think the U.S. should suggest an action plan for previous commitments in today's environment. So this refers to what would be our approach? If we were going to keep with the spirit of the 13 steps, what would we do differently to account for today's environment? Third, I think we need to reconcile the U.S.'s CTBT policies with procedural actions that U.S. delegations take within U.N. forums. And this was a story about how – that diplomats were puzzled that the U.S. funds the CTBTO, yet, will procedurally block any mention of any resolution that has to do with the CTBT. So if we were going to have support for ratification of the CTBT under an Obama administration, we should make sure that the people who are the front line folks of U.S. delegations revise their procedural behaviors.

Fourth, the U.S. should enable partners to call on other nuclear-armed states to be responsible stakeholders on disarmament issues. We should explore crafting with other nuclear weapon states proposals to address any of the 13 steps that are either outdated or overtaken by events, and we should discuss those proposals that the next review conference. We should set the bar for transparency measures on arsenals, material stocks and security measures for other NPT nuclear weapon states to meet, and we should signal seriousness about negotiating and FMCT. I think there's the usual set of things around engaging the end-users of any of these fuel cycle initiatives to really figure out what their needs and preferences are if we're serious about bringing them on board.

I think we should also communicate properly to other states the implications of the next nuclear posture review, and the national security document, particularly if it continues to de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapon states in U.S. national security policy. And the final two things I think the U.S. should do are, update the NATO nuclear doctrine for today's threats, and reconcile that doctrine with nonproliferation and disarmament goals. And finally, send a senior-level team to the 2009 NPT PrepCom and the 2010 review conference.

But these steps need to be met with action from non-nuclear weapon states, and I think acknowledging the real difficulties that nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states have and will encounter will be a step forward for more constructive dialogue. So, here, I think non-nuclear weapon states should ensure a more equitable focus on nuclear-armed states making more progress on disarmament – so kind of take a little bit of the pressure off of the United States so that it has room to move and put pressure on the other nuclear weapon states. They should also prioritize their demands to focus on issues where there's enough common ground between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states to make, really, progress. And, of course, this is difficult; non-nuclear weapon states are not easily organized into blocs. But there are a few efforts out there like the Southern Nation Initiative and the New Agenda Coalition that can provide the necessary bridges for finding key states who can identify some common ground.

I also think states need to resolve internal consistencies within and across bureaucracies and policies. And this is particularly relevant to some NATO countries where some foreign and defense ministries have different positions on the utility of the NATO nuclear umbrella. And this is a set of questions that I hope to address next – is to really find out what it is that defense ministries feel about the utility of the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States, versus what their foreign ministries are saying.

And then, finally, I think non-nuclear weapon states need to find a way to weigh in on U.S. nuclear posture debates. Particularly U.S. allies who are protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella – they should articulate more forcefully and publicly their comfort with different sizes of the U.S. nuclear arsenal over time. I think that if the United States adopts this new approach, bridge building groups such as the Southern Nation Initiative and the New Agenda Coalition will be vital to facilitating the above activities. Without the leadership of non-nuclear weapon states that can engage important countries across regions and blocs, meaningful progress on disarmament, as well as renewed nonproliferation efforts, are likely to be delayed for a long time to come.

So what about expectations? And this is – and I'll then conclude. I'm a little worried about the expectations that the rest of the world has of an Obama administration. My most recent signal of being worried is that there's t-shirts that are now being printed with Obama as Superman. So – and I think that we need to tamp down those expectations or at least set them, because this administration is facing a very crowded policy agenda, and there are significant bureaucratic challenges for coordinating a reorientation in approach across the different bureaucracies that have responsibility for U.S. nuclear policy. Put that all in the context of a very short timeframe for action.

My hope, borrow a word from the president-elect, is that reactions to this report – it has received positive response from a wide range of folks, including a member of Congress, State Department officials, conservative analysts, noted academics, as well as diplomats from allied countries and the NAM. That, to me, indicates that the recommendations might enjoy broad support and that the administration might be able to take up some of them.

So, in conclusion, progress on disarmament may not result in any immediate or automatic bargains on nonproliferation, but the political landscape among non-nuclear weapon states reveals an opportunity to influence the conditions for such discussions. By incorporating the views of non-nuclear weapon states and understanding areas of agreement and divergence among them, the United States – more so than any other nuclear weapon state – can advance its national security interests and rehabilitate its reputation. This analysis has identified near-term actions for the U.S. to take before the next review conference for a reason; 2010 will mark nearly 15 years of frustration and disappointment from non-nuclear weapon states; it's unlikely that the United States will receive another chance to rehabilitate its reputation and reclaim its standing in the world. Thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. PERKOVICH: Thanks, Deepti. Peter?

PETER SAWCZAK: Thanks, George and thanks, Deepti. In fact, I feel like a bit of an impostor – I've only been three months here into my post in Washington and on an earlier occasion, I was incautious enough to praise Deepti's paper, and hence, she has invited me to this forum. (Laughter.) So I'll try to remain true to the initial praise as much as I can. So, are new nuclear

bargains attainable? Well, Australia clearly thinks so. And – or, at least, that we need to pursue nuclear bargains as a matter of urgency. This has been quite clear from the Rudd government’s recent initiative to set up the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, and to work specifically towards the goal of forming the possibility of new nuclear bargains in the lead up to the NPT review conference.

I might just very quickly say that what makes this commission perhaps a little bit different than similar efforts in the past is that it aims to address nonproliferation and disarmament in an effectively political – from a political perspective. It’s not going to produce technological encyclopedia of nonproliferation and disarmament issues; the intention is to restate the case for nonproliferation and disarmament in terms that are not only technically sound, but that also resonate with policy-makers and the general public as much as possible.

It’s probably quite appropriate that Gareth Evans was appointed as a co-chair with the Japanese co-chair, Madame Kawaguchi, in particular because it was under his stewardship as foreign minister in the previous Labor government in Australia that Australia was especially activist on disarmament and nonproliferation issues. And I’m thinking about the period between the mid-’80s and the mid-’90s, which was a very heavy period with negotiations and conclusions of negotiations on the CWC, work on a verification protocol to the BWC, Australia’s lead in establishing the Australia Group to supplement the efforts of the CWC, as well as our strong contribution to negotiating the CTBT.

Curiously, this was also a time that opportunities on the nuclear disarmament front were lost. So what’s needed now, 20 years after the end of the Cold War, perhaps, is – as Deepti suggested by her very pragmatic paper – is the approach that addresses these imperatives in a realistic and achievable fashion. The tone has clearly been set by the “Four Horsemen” op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal. And, obviously, in terms of timing, the NPT review conference looms as a reminder of past failures, of course, as well as an exhortation to finally get some progress, as well as to address compliance challenges and the block-work (ph) program in the CD.

Deepti’s paper, of course, very rightly focuses – it seems accidentally – on the need for a U.S. leadership role in this respect, as well as, of course, on what non-nuclear weapon states can reasonably do. Certainly, the commissions approach has been – the challenge is to have an integrated approach to all three pillars of the NPT. What we might look at is how these challenges are different since the last – how they’ve changed over the last 15 years – the main challenges confronting us in the NPT context.

First of all, there’s clearly much more mutual interdependence, both in the international system as well as in the issues themselves. What I mean by this is that nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation don’t exist in a security vacuum; I mean, there are particular security issues that need to play out, and they’ll affect what we can do in terms of disarmament outcomes. Israel-Palestinian question, Pakistan-Indian relations. U.S.-Russia, in terms of further disarmament cuts – so it’s very important to build interstate levels of trust. And secondly, of course, the disarmament and nonproliferation debate has expanded with discussion of a nuclear renaissance and what that might mean by the various non-nonproliferation factors that have come into play – nuclear energy and, of course – sorry, energy security, generally, as well as environmental concerns leading from climate change.

Secondly, nobody can deny that there's been a lot of disappointment in the performance from the nuclear weapons state on their Article VI obligations, or indeed, the challenges to comply as presented by Iran and North Korea. And these, of course, have deepened divisions and lessened propensity towards compromise in the NPT context. Thirdly, there's a strong likelihood of an exponential expansion of nuclear power in response to rapidly growing energy needs, particularly in developing countries. And this will, of course, bring Article 4 obligations much more to the fore, in a much more practical way.

All of this effectively means that what we do need, as I think Deepti's suggested in her paper, is perhaps what we could call a circuit breaker to basically shift the terms of the present debate as well as to move the agenda along. We also need to do this in order to expose traditionally sort of specious arguments perhaps being advanced by some NPT state parties against nonproliferation imperatives.

We're all quite aware, of course, that President-elect Obama has foreshadowed fairly broad initiatives in his blueprint on nonproliferation and disarmament in the course of the electoral campaign, including, specifically, to work to eliminate nuclear weapons completely. And I think Deepti's quite right that he's outlined the challenges facing an administration, but of course, I suppose in terms of the very big agenda facing the new administration, on the foreign policy front, it's no accident that several of those issues are specifically nonproliferation-related.

It will also be very important where it's possible, of course, to send – and the fact that we have an NPT review conference around the corner – that the new administration sends, at least early, clear, public messages, which would help set terms of reference for the administration, as well as work as a confidence-building measure among the non-nuclear weapon states in the lead up to the conference.

Among the interesting questions and observations that Deepti's paper threw up in my reading, I could sort of think about three in particular. First, that disarmament is vital to U.S. security, which is a very interesting way of putting it, but I think this is a view that's sort of gaining a lot of currency here in Washington and further afield. And, certainly, it leads on from the Wall Street Journal op-ed piece. And this should provoke, perhaps, a reconsideration of U.S. nuclear strategic doctrine.

Secondly, what struck me was the assessment that nonproliferation is widely seen as a barrel being pushed by the U.S. and its like-minded – this is unfortunate of course, and it hasn't been modified by various views of how U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 was achieved. So, then, my experience from Canberra – in fact, our department of foreign affairs is no less curious about the title of department of state, which always struck me as being a bit strange, but certainly is a foreign ministry. (Laughter.) One of the things that I was very closely engaged in was doing outreach on counter-proliferation issues – in particular, on export controls in East Asia. And there's a very poor level of understanding of how export controls directly relate to trade security, especially for countries that are engaged in onto port trading and as transshipment centers. We need to arrest this, of course.

Thirdly, what struck me was the possibility of a non-nuclear weapon state position. Deepti rightly identifies the challenges for a sort of single position. This is probably something that could probably stand a little bit more differentiation, perhaps. I think the principle-pragmatic divide is a

useful one, especially in terms of how it converts into practical diplomacy when we all get together in New York. I do think there, increasingly, a better understanding among traditionally principled nuclear weapon states of what can be achieved in light of geopolitical challenges in terms of disarmament. Australia, for example – and I think you quote a diplomat that wasn't me – who suggested that we do have – but I do know – that we do have raised nuclear disarmament regularly in our strategic-level exchanges with the U.S. We do this, also, publicly, but that's not to say that we haven't been very activist on nonproliferation issues; it's quite the contrary.

The bottom line, perhaps, for achieving some level of consensus among non-nuclear weapon states and how we can proceed is realization of some basic facts. I mean that the most pressing threat of nuclear weapons use doesn't come from nuclear weapon states – established nuclear weapon states – but, rather, new nuclear-armed states, potentially. And also that, you know, the U.S. has been particularly transparent on its nuclear weapons program – other nuclear weapon states have been less so, so it's not fair, necessarily, that the U.S. cops all the flak.

And we also have to face the reality that extended deterrence has, in fact, had a nonproliferation effect. There hasn't been – that's helped prevent the emergence of new nuclear weapon states or armed states. And so any meeting in the NPT context between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states has to acknowledge these realities.

I'll refrain here from offering a program of action from striking new nuclear bargains, let alone commenting on what the U.S. should be doing. But I think some of the immediate confidence-building measures, as well as those that are inherently worthwhile are pretty obvious. I mean, CTBT, work on FMCT – ideally, a verifiable FMCT – perhaps de-alerting, and also moving with bilateral cuts in the post-START context, between the U.S. and Russia and that converting into other nuclear weapon states being engaged, in particular lifting the levels of transparency in the case of some.

Instead of going down this track, I might just offer some points in conclusion as a sort of supplementary reality check to the one that Deepti wisely offers in her paper. The first one is, there's a problem with amassing a constituency for nuclear nonproliferation. This is changing a little bit because issues like terrorism and climate change have sort of come to the fore, more so than the existential threat from nuclear weapons perhaps.

So there's a new sort of way of looking at it. The other thing is that developing countries have been more focused on conventional weapons problems. It's probably – I don't know how we capture public attention with this. I mean, we've obviously done it very successfully in the context of landmines and cluster weapons but we really can't afford, you know, a humanitarian disaster in the nuclear context to move public debate along. So that's one issue.

The second one – this, in fact, leads me to the second – the second sort of challenge, and it's related. It's really hard to present nuclear challenges in layman's terms, across the board. And this is probably poised to get even harder as we try to explain how the nuclear renaissance comes into play here. So this is really quite a challenge for the scientific community, in fact, to explain how we can achieve disarmaments, intervening stockpile security, and increased nuclear energy quickly. And it's also going to be very important in the U.S. context, as you look at the possibility of ratifying the CTBT, I mean, to persuade Congress.

The third point I'd like to raise here is the changing nature of course, and I think we've alluded to this, of multilateral relations, which will bring new challenges to negotiations and the achievement of international agreement on these issues. We've already had a sort of a foretaste of this in the context of the global financial crisis. You know, there are more emerging powers that are becoming more assertive and cooperative solutions will have to become a little more persuasive and be more pragmatic and more goal-oriented.

You know, part of this problem, as I've mentioned before, is that a lot of countries don't see nonproliferation – and I think Deepti alludes to this in her paper – they don't see nonproliferation as an immediate threat or a sort of priority security challenge. And that's fair enough in the case of some countries, given they've got other preoccupations, sufficient outreach in Australia and Southeast Asia - I mean, problems of violence, secessionist movements, terrorism, piracy, and narcotics and people smuggling – these are much more realistic issues for them.

So even if we get around the political divisions in the NPT context, we can't assume that we're going to necessarily agree on common threat assessments, which is going to be quite important, I think. And part of this, of course, is the casting of the nonproliferation disarmament debate in terms of North-South, which is something we need to arrest, of course.

The fourth and final point I'd raise here is that we need to accommodate NPT non-state parties in a much more conscious and public way. And that's particularly important in the wake of the U.S.-India deal and it's something that the commission's certainly not shying away from. I don't know how you might sensibly do this but certainly, it was quite on purpose that the co-chairs made sure that we had commissioners from India, Pakistan and others. So that's going to quite an important thing. I mean, the risk of not addressing this challenge quickly is that these exceptions would become the rule, or at least, new nuclear weapon-armed states would like to see this becoming the rule. And we need to get across – cut across this. And the flipside, of course, of this in the NPT context is laying unambiguous groundwork for practical and assertive measures for dealing with compliance issues, straight up.

So perhaps in conclusion, certainly, I mean I think Deepti's paper rightly presents itself as a timely sort of reality check with some very strong recommendations to avert disaster in the NPT context. Certainly, we've been there before. My only criticism perhaps, and it's a gentle one, would be that it does sort of rely rather on diplomats' private views. Certainly, in my experience, diplomats' expansiveness when speaking off the record is inversely proportional to their usual occupational reticence. (Laughter.) So I hope I haven't been either of these, unduly so, in this public forum. Thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. PERKOVICH: Thank you, Peter. You got right it in the middle – nicely balanced. Achilles?

ACHILLES ZALUAR: Thank you George, thank you, Deepti. You know, since last Tuesday, I have had a feeling that everything's possible, I don't know why, including that so many bright people would exchange a beautiful, full morning, for instance, in Rock Creek Park to listen to diplomats speak. (Laughter.) I'll be very – I'll be very – you got it? I'll be very brief, very brief.

First, Deepti, I think I went through all of my notes and respond to your last comment. Don't try – I mean, in my opinion – don't try to tamp down expectations. Expectations – if you look at the theory – expectations – shattered expectations – are to the international regimes as credit is to banks and to the financial system. They are the stuff that, you know, the blood that makes it live and we may – reflecting about what happened in the last 10 years – we may find out that pulling the plug on the 13 steps, especially ratification of CTBT – also the others – but ratification of CTBT with – (inaudible). Pulling the plug on the 13 steps may be worse for the nonproliferation regime, as pulling plug on Lehman Brothers was to the international financial system.

And I think that was one of the strongest points; I think the great virtue of your paper was that it tried to establish a dialogue between different bureaucracies so that we could restore some sense of shared assumptions and shared expectations. You have these different circles, let's say. You have the nonproliferation and disarmament diplomatic circuit from which Peter and myself come, meeting in New York, Geneva, some other places, with it's own vocabulary, it's own history, it's own idiosyncrasies and neuroses. You also have – that's one.

You have think tank land, which we are in the inner sanctum right here. (Laughter.) Inside, let's say, the Beltway think tanks and its academic outposts – that's another very important idea factory. And we also have the nuclear establishments, the nuclear – let's say, here, in the United States, we have the nuclear weapons establishment, the NNSC people and the weapon labs people. In Brazil, we also have the nuclear civilian people. We also – in every country – have these little circles with their own culture, also.

And these are different dioceses in the church of nonproliferation, right? And the nonproliferation regime is what makes possible for these different groups to come together and understand each other and bargain and scream at each other and reach some sort of compromise – move things forward. That's what the nonproliferation regime is. So when I look at the type of paper – which, I think, what you did is what we really must do; we need to go to the weapons people, to the nuclear people, to the diplomatic people, to all this bureaucracies that are the priests and monks and heretics of the nonproliferation church and get them, again, to have the same – creed? How to say that in English?

MS. : Creed or credo.

MR. ZALUAR: Credo. Yeah, I'm a Catholic so I know the importance of having the formal credo. (Laughter.) If not, you lose, you know, even if you hate the guy who's right next to you in the pew, if you have the same credo, you have a basis for working together. So let's start on the paper, very – so the title is “Are New Nuclear Bargains Attainable?” And it got me thinking, you know, be careful what you wish for. Are you so safe that the old nuclear bargain is – are we ready to throw it away? Because you know, let's go back to 1968.

It was extremely hard to negotiate the NPT, but it was possible because, you know, the United States and the Soviet Union, they were the negotiators and they could bring along their close allies and even – but even in those favorable conditions, it took about 25 years to make the NPT almost inverse, because for a long time in the '70s and '80s, there were these huge gaps and Brazil was not a member of the NPT. We only became members in 1998. But you could – in 1968, it was possible to reach this bargain and after 25 years, it was possible to sell it to most everybody. Would we be able to do it today?

If you imagine the world as it is, with eight nuclear-armed states, North Korea, who nobody knows what status to – and some problematic states, some nice clean states. (Laughter.) Imagine that you didn't have the nonproliferation regime. Would you be able to negotiate the deal that's as good as the NPT today? I don't think so. I don't think because it would be much harder, because the world is not organized as it was during the Cold War. So it would have to be something totally different and maybe something that's not as good as what we already have.

So before we go into – and that's the conservative in me – before you go into thinking about new nuclear bargains, let's cherish the bargain that we have in the NPT and let's put our minds on how to make it live because, frankly, it has been a little subdued for a while. There was an editorial in a British newspaper – we read everything on the Internet these days about the elections here in the United States and the title of the editorial, I think, represents the feeling of lots of people, you know: “Welcome Back.” “Welcome Back.” We – let's talk a little bit about the NPT review process.

There was this extraordinary idea that you put people like Peter and myself to work for four years to produce an outcome document on the NPT conference and it takes a lot of work. You know, I have to negotiate with Iran, with Syria, with Canada, with Australia, with Brazil, those pesky Brazilians and the Germans and the Americans and the Russians, the Chinese, so I have to write everything. The next day, it's nothing. The next day, you can forget it. The outcome document is only alive until the day – the last minute of the conference. When the gavel comes down, when thousands of gavels come down and the very nice document to the 13 steps, the next day, it was nothing.

That's the theory – that's the assumption, that's the message you've received. So the negotiation of an outcome document at the NPT conference was becoming like a jobs program for diplomats like us. (Laughter.) Just like the RRW may be for the weapons labs, according to some. And when people realize that, the process to negotiate an outcome document in 2005, you know, a document that could bring the consensus of all the 190 NPT parties sort of, you know, started losing steam because why would we compromise in our positions if it was just for – just for show – if it was not going to be translated into policy? So we have to a sense of what is the NPT review process about because NPT review process, if you remember, was an essential part of the '95 bargain, the bargain that led an indefinite extension of the NPT.

Without it, the South African president, I don't think he would have been able to bring them aboard for that outcome. That was part of the – of the sale speech, that and CTBT. So that was the whole – that was what the main countries received in exchange for indefinite extension of the NPT; it was CTBT, and it was the review conference. You throw away those two things, you know, it doesn't look like a such a great deal, you know? That's a little bit of posturing here. It's still a good deal and most – I mean, the near-totality of NPT, non-nuclear weapons countries, they like NPT because they derive security benefits from it. It's not out of some – but still, if you undermine the shared assumptions, you have taken away the blood of the regime and the shared assumptions and the positive expectations are what make these bureaucracies able to work together, just like credit, trust is what enables banks to send money – billions of dollars to each other.

If there's no trust, there's no finance and if there's no shared assumption or shared expectations about things like the elimination of nuclear weapons, non-dissemination, peaceful uses,

disarmament, I think that to find in the whole of the NPT. If you don't have shared assumptions, then credit starts to shrink. And then you need to cash a check, you know, to deal with North Korea for instance, you may find that, you know, it is a little harder. You have to work a lot harder to get the funds than what would otherwise be the case if the regime was healthy.

Another observation that I made to Deepti is that you know, the bargain, that idea that you – and I think Deepti agrees with me – the idea that you have, you can sit the nuclear weapon states on one side and all the non-nuclear weapon states on the other side and drive a bargain – that's not how it works. That's not how it works. The nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapon states are not blocs. They don't behave as blocs; they don't negotiate as blocs. There is sometimes – there's an attempt to do that but it's – I mean, we probably enjoy much closer and better relations with the United States, which is a nuclear weapon state, than with some of the problematic non-nuclear weapon states that create so many problems with that. So which bloc are we really on? I don't know. It's different.

I think the bargain that we have is the bargain that we establish in the NPT and not we, it was essentially the Americans and the Soviets that reached this deal and with time, it proved to be a rather good deal. You have a chair with three legs and one leg is, let's say, non-acquisition, the other leg is peaceful uses and the other leg is disarmament – so like one of those modernist chairs that you see in some fancy stores. So if your chair has three legs and you kick one off and try to sit on it, what happens? You fall on the floor and so you have to be very strong on non-acquisition and that's why North Korea and Iran are important.

We have to be very strong on peaceful uses and that's why not give the impression that you're launching an assault on the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy is also important. And you have to also be very strong on disarmament because you cannot give the impression that nuclear weapons are such a fine thing, a nice thing that everybody should, you know, be jealous of those who have it. Nuclear weapons are a dangerous thing. They're a complicated thing, a thing that comes with a lot of risks and expenses. And if you have one, it's like you sold your soul to the devil in that you have to work very hard to keep this thing in a box. Maybe you have to keep it, because you are afraid if the other guy's going to use it on you.

So you have to deter it, that's understandable. But that's it. That's the only legitimate use, is to prevent the other guys from bombing your cities, so you threaten to bomb it back. It's not for those 20 creative uses, you know, like hedging against future contingencies and prepare for unforeseen events and surprise military developments. You know, the nuclear weapon establishments, they write lists and lists of wonderful things that nuclear weapons do and people sometimes, you know, read it and think, oh, if it's like that, I have to have one. So this erodes the credibility of the regime.

So conclusion – you have to attack that and say firmly and once for all, nuclear weapons are for deterrence only. No ands, ifs and buts. None of these complicated statements, yes, well, there's chemical and biological and there is also the security of our allies and blah, blah, blah. And then you read everything and it'll put in reverse. You have a list of situations of each of you to actually use the nuclear weapons, you know? And the assurance became as a threat; It's not an assurance at all. So no first use and deterrence purposes only is the first thing to transform nuclear weapons this from this wonderful thing into this creature that you keep locked in a basement, you know, away from the view of children – (laughter) – which is where we want to take them.

Second, CTBT – I made a mistake – I told Deepti that CTBT had been paid for three times. I was wrong. It has been paid for four times. It was paid for in the preamble to the PTBT Moscow Treaty, it was paid for in the preamble of the NPT, it was paid for in the extension – indefinite extension decision, and it was paid for in the 2000 13 steps. So what will the nuclear-armed states – I’m not going to single out the United States in talking about all of those that have not ratified the CTBT. What will the nuclear armed states get when they ratify CTBT? They’ll get their credibility back and that’s an extremely important thing to get, in my opinion. And I think I’ll leave it there. Thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. PERKOVICH: I think you can see why we’re so glad to have Peter and Achilles here with us this morning. Let’s open it up to questions. The microphone – a person with a microphone will find you and please state who you are and we’ll go from there. Let’s start in the back with Nicolas – right there –

Q: Thank you very much. Nicolas Roche with the French Embassy. Thanks very much for all of you and thanks, Deepti, for your tremendous work and paper. This is extremely interesting in terms of – for understanding the perceptions out there. I’m a diplomat and just as you, so I belong to that very small community and would like to question the very basis of my job here and then question the title of your paper – not its content – but the title and the concept of a bargain, because all – bargain implies that you make tradeoffs – that you compromise between different interests.

And I would really question that concept here, because when the nuclear weapon states disarm or take steps towards disarmament, I’m not sure that we give something to the others. We do it for our own interests, too. And when Sarkozy, in his speech in Cherbourg, proposed an action plan with different measures earlier this year, this is something that needs to be done in parallel to other things. And this is the same thing for the non-nuclear weapon states. When they take steps, just as we do, to fight against proliferation, they don’t do a favor to the nuclear weapon states. This is not something that they give to us. This is something that is in their very interests, in their very security interests. So it needs to be done and it needs to be done whatever happens in the other tracks.

So I would really question that concept of a bargain. These are parallel tracks. Things need to be done, measures need to be taken – we have the list of them, in fact. And the first one that has been mentioned everywhere – the CTBT – is part of all our different lists. We have – each office has a list of measures that need to be taken. CTBT is one of them. Transparency and confidence-building measures is another one of them. Deal with missiles is another one of them and so we have a long list – FMCT – we have a long list of things that needs to be done, whatever happens in the other arenas. And this is the same thing for the nonproliferation. These things need simply to be done so this is not, as such, a bargain and I run contrary – I really run contrary to the foundation of my job because we diplomats are paid for bargaining but I would really question that concept.

MR. PERKOVICH: Let me – because we have so many questions, I want to take two at a time. So let me go to Scott and then afterwards, we’ll work back from that side.

Q: Thank you. I wanted to –

MR. PERKOVICH: Scott, say who you are because I only know your first name.

Q: I'm sorry. I'm Scott Davis with the State Department. I wanted to, in part, question Achilles' assertion that we shouldn't tamp down expectations. And I raise that specifically in connection with the 2010 review conference. And the reason I do that is that I've noticed that increasingly, references are made to the conference and expectations are tied very closely to it, either things that should happen by the time of the conference or during the conference. Now, I think in a broad sense, it's good to have high expectations because that helps you reach them – if you reach for, you hopefully will get at least part way there.

But I'm concerned about this emphasis being put on the conference. And it has to do, I think in large part, with another point you raised, which is the question of reaching consensus documents at review conferences. We know we did not reach one in 2005; we know there's great contention among parties on a range of issues; and I will suggest that it will be very difficult to get consensus on at least a comprehensive set of NPT issues at the 2010 conference, certainly, before that. So I wanted to just get your sense about, you know, expectations with regard to the conference and also sort of your view about the possibility of consensus documents before, during, or maybe after.

MS. CHOUBEY: Well, I'll take the first question. Nicolas, if I have you, as a nuclear weapon state diplomat, questioning your job, then I think my job is done – (laughter) – so but that said, in all seriousness, I absolutely agree with you about the nature of existing bargains. The title of my report, which was more to be provocative and to get all of your attention is actually referencing the wrong-headed bargains that are being floated today. So the idea within the United States that if we ratify the CTBT, what do we get from it in terms of nonproliferation support? So that was – that was the set of bargains I was talking about and I hope the clear message from my report is that I think they're wrong-headed; we shouldn't go down that path. And in fact, we have to come back to what we have agreed to. But again, not out of a sense of that it's owed to anybody else, but actually that we need to do it for our own interests, so just as you say.

MR. ZALUAR: Yeah, I think that's Scott's absolutely right that negotiation of 2010 outcome document will be extraordinarily hard, but the negotiation of all outcome documents has been extraordinarily hard and the negotiation of the extension conference in '95, I was a member of the observer delegation was even harder. The – you have to have this signature on the paper or the assent of everybody from Syria and Iran to the United States and Brazil and that's not an easy thing to do. However, it's a thing that actually, even diplomats, do every year. For instance, the U.N. budget is approved by consensus among the same set of countries that – why – why is that so because you – the regimes is still alive.

You can fall back on the text of the treaty, you can fall – everybody's performance is checked compare to the text of the treaty and to the accepted interpretation. And if there is a particular obdurate country that is evidently played in bad faith, he gets isolated in the conference and put on the spot and in the end, the countries that made an earnest effort to reach consensus – even if there's no consensus in the end, they get out of the process with a stronger diplomatic position than those countries that went there and were pigheaded during the whole time.

That's part of the process. That's how you acquire and lose credit in the multilateral arena. You know, there is the whole debate, you know, inside the Beltway, whether this is actually an exercise that is worthwhile or not and whether you believe this process that they describe, this is best thing since mother with an apple pie or an abomination that just prevents the superpower from leading the world. It depends on your assumptions, on your ideas about how the world works and how the world should work.

I do think that if we consider the NPT valuable, we should put a lot of good faith effort into the 2010 review and there, I agree with Deepti: If the countries that value nonproliferation do not put this effort, do not put this time, do not appear to be flexible, consensus seeking, and good intentioned, then it's another, you know, another break that you take away from the wall of nonproliferation. And the wall is large, et cetera, but if you take another bricks, there will be one day when it will go down.

MR. PERKOVICH: Wow, Jennifer and Daryl and then we're going to leap to the front and then we'll work out way back. All right, I see Mike and Laura.

Q: First, I want to thank you, Deepti. I think this was a wonderful report and very much needed and it's the right time for it and I agree largely with the report. I'm Jennifer Nordstrom. I was the former project manager of the Reaching Critical Will Project. And so someone who has followed international negotiations in disarmament for years, I think that you're absolutely right that the United States needs to revisit its disarmament obligations and its commitment to those obligations. And I really appreciate you emphasizing the 13 steps, the 2000 and 1995 review conferences. I think that that will be extremely important in terms of 2010.

So that said, largely agree with you, I guess I have a question about – you're focusing on non-nuclear weapon states and I was curious that the issues of negative security assurances didn't come up. I was wondering if you were considering that under the revision of the NPT, which I also think is very important and I think we heard Achilles bring it up and when he said, you know, first use and that has been one of the issues that's been very prominent, both in the NPT context and in the Conference on Disarmament. So I was just wondering if you could address that came up in your discussions. Thank you.

MR. PERKOVICH: Give it to Daryl.

Q: Good morning, Daryl Kimball with the Arms Control Association. Also, thank you Deepti for investing the time in this report. I have a couple of questions, one of which may be a little provocative. Along the lines of Scott Davis' question, you know, expectations for 2010, Deepti, you also made a remark in your comments about the May 2008 PrepCom being too early to reorient the U.S.

MS. CHOUBEY: Two thousand nine, right.

Q: I'm sorry, 2000 – yes, 2009, the U.S. approach. I strongly disagree.

MS. CHOUBEY: Two thousand nine, right.

Q: I'm sorry, 2000 – yes, 2009, the U.S. approach. I strongly disagree. You know, we just had an election. We have a president-elect who's got views that are substantially different from the previous president on many nonproliferation, disarmament issues. I think it is not just possible, but it's absolutely necessary that the PrepCom recognize that the 2010 review conference review the progress or the lack of progress on the commitments made in 2005 and 2000. Otherwise, based on my conversations with a number of diplomats, it is going to be extremely difficult to achieve the consensus that states ought to strive for in 2010. So I'd like just each of you to quickly tell us what you think is necessary and possible in terms of the 2009 PrepCom.

A couple of you have mentioned the India nuclear cooperation deal. And we haven't had a lot of time to process this. But I would just ask each of you to try to attempt to describe what you think needs to be done in the context of the NPT to avoid that becoming yet another significantly – significant and difficult issue. One diplomat who I've spoken to since the NSG made its decision to give India waiver has suggested that this will become a compliance issue to the extent that the United States and other nuclear weapons states call out Iran, for instance, for noncompliance as the Bush administration did in 2005.

Many states are going to call out those states who allow this waiver to go through for being guilty of noncompliance on the safeguards, commitments as well as Article I. And this is not just something that the nuclear weapons states have responsibility for but Brazil and Australia, who both facilitated this, I think, tremendously damaging decision.

MS. CHOUBEY: Thanks to you both for those questions. Jennifer, in terms of negative security assurances, it did come up in conversations and fortunately, it was low down on the list of answers when I asked the question of what would be the top three things nuclear weapons states could do to demonstrate their seriousness. And they also, you know, just to give you a sense of what that second tier and it was actually quite a distance in terms of the votes tallied for each of the initiatives that were offered. Just to give you a sense of what was in that second tier was devaluing the currency of nuclear weapons, increasing transparency among nuclear weapons states, creating a disarmament forum within the Conference on Disarmament, and ensuring that stockpiles are – stockpile reductions are irreversible.

And then – I'm sorry, then in the third tier, there was only a smattering of support for offering negative security assurances. So it was just interesting to me that that did not rise to the top of what these diplomats said would be important to them. That said, I think that there are conversations happening, I think, outside of government about, you know, should the United States, you know, what should its position be on no first use and negative security assurances. So I think that's happening out there. I didn't want to spend too much time on it because it just – it didn't rise to the top.

Daryl, in terms of your question about the likelihood of a reorientation in time for the May 2009 PrepCom, I hope you're right. I really do and my concern is that you know, I think about the 1995 Review Conference where stories I've heard is that the Clinton administration was kind of clueless about what was actually happening and they tuned in rather late in terms of devising a strategy and getting engaged. I hope that doesn't happen this time but my concern is that, you know, the signals from the Obama administration about what is a priority for them. It's unclear to me where support of the regime, you know, strengthening it, taking on nonproliferation and

disarmament, being aware of what these issues are. It's unclear to me that although it's understood well within bureaucracies, that that's going to float to the top.

But my hope is that if there is an inaugural speech, if there is a significant policy speech made at the April 2009 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference – (laughter) – that that will actually send the right signal that bureaucrats will get some direction from up top. So that's my hope. On the U.S.-India nuclear deal, one of the comments I got on the paper was, how come you don't address this, you know, more comprehensively? And I said, well, if I did, this paper would be twice as long.

So I had to make a decision about what I was going to include. And I agree with you. I think it's going to be a real challenge for the team that goes to the PrepCom and in the lead up to the review conference for the United States to answer some really hard questions about how we reconcile what was sold as a nonproliferation deal with what our other deals and agendas are on nonproliferation and disarmament. So I agree with you but I would offer this up to Achilles and Peter and also talk about their perceptions of, you know, what will be the fall out of the India deal.

MR. SAWCZAK: Yes, certainly that's an interesting question, Daryl. I mean, I suppose there are various ways of looking at it, obviously in a purely legalistic way, in a heartless, immoral, amoral, legalistic way. India, of course, is not Iran. It's not the DPRK, it's not in compliance with the NPT because it's not a state party. Having said that, there are two normative realities. The first one is that India is also not DPRK or Iran or Pakistan in terms of its proliferation reputation. So and the deal was obviously on the basis of a sound, nonproliferation credentials is how the U.S. administration put it. It's a special case.

And the second normative reality is that India won't sign the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, I imagine. So this makes for a very tricky business for a multilateral diplomats among whose ranks, thankfully, I'm not. But I suppose the subtext, in the example of India would be in everybody's mind in the NPT context. How it's voiced is yet to be seen but I think there's obviously a high – well, there's a high degree of responsibility on the part, on the U.S., frankly, to make India come good on its undertakings in relation to FMCT, CTBT, in terms of maybe signing on to PSI or other areas for it to springboard on. So that's really a responsibility that will fall to the U.S. and as well as obviously others. We saw how the debate in the nuclear suppliers group panned out. I mean, there's a lot of very strong principle positions there and so that's what we're working off.

MR. ZALUAR: I can't really improve what Peter said.

MR. PERKOVICH: I'm going to on Laura Holgate and if you could bring that and Mike Wheeler. But I would just add on this one that to Daryl's concerns, I would add that if President-elect Obama pursues the CTBT as he indicates that he would and as that moves forward, India ain't going to sign that. And we're going to see some friction between the U.S. and India and others and India that will refer back to the India deal – what do you mean, you're not going to sign this thing? We've prepared to do it and it can enter into force if you don't sign it. We made a deal. And so stay tuned, I think.

MS. : (Inaudible.)

MR. PERKOVICH: I'm talking about expectations – I understand that entirely but I'm talking about expectations and how it'll play out if the U.S. Senate is deciding it wants to ratify this thing. And a part of that discussion is well, does it enter into force if we ratify it, et cetera, et cetera. And people say, well, it would depend on if India does and what you're going to get back from India is we're not going to sign this thing, people are going to say, wait a minute, I thought and there's no specific legal deal, obviously. But the politics and how it plays will be non-trivial, I would think and in a very different context from what has existed with the Bush administration, which didn't care about the CTBT. So this wasn't an issue. That's all I'm saying.

MS. CHOUBEY: Can I just add one thing though on the environment at the next PrepCom – for all those states who are raising, you know, rightfully so, questions about the U.S.-India deal and as I have recently said to some European colleagues, you know, there are other states that have to answer for it as well. They had an opportunity to stand up in the NSG and they chose not to. So as much as there is concerns about the U.S. position, I think there's plenty of concern of blame to go around.

MR. PERKOVICH: Mike and then Laura.

Q: Mike Wheeler, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Let me begin with an observation, briefly, that leads into the question. The observation is this: the global financial crisis has been mentioned but it really is not simply one factor among others. I think what we're going to see over the next two years is it's going to be a dominating factor at the senior level of almost all governments. And it's only the global financial crisis. It's attempting to ensure that that doesn't become a global governance and stability crisis that shifts the tectonic plates, that the pillars of the international system rest on. And those pillars may look different after we get through whatever's going to be done.

Now, having said that, every White House has priorities that it has to balance, every head of government, every legislature has priorities. But my suspicion is that the next couple years are going to be less like, say, the Johnson administration. Lyndon Johnson, when he received the Gilpatric Commission Report in January 1965, which is really what led the United States to commit the prestige of the White House and the presidency to disciplining the bureaucracy, to do everything else to make the hard tradeoffs to get the NPT. But he received the report the same day he was making some of the critical decisions on Vietnam, in particular, the decision to do the Rolling Thunder air campaign, a distracted priorities demand – he managed it.

My suspicion is that the atmosphere that the next president of the United States is going to be in will be a little more like Franklin Delano Roosevelt when he took office. Recall there was a general disarmament conference that was going on. It was important to him. But it wasn't the thing that dominated the decision-making. And what that means then is that of course, you're going to defense and foreign ministries and bureaucracies that are going to be doing all the things that will be done in 2009 and 2010, which leads to my question.

If, in fact, you have the energy sucked out at the senior level of almost every government and if the congressional attention is going to be in the parliamentary attention elsewhere is going to be on the broader issues that we'll see in the next few years, what can you do to manage expectations that the 2010 conference really is a step on the way to 2015 as opposed to a make-or-break conference, which is some of the ways that the expectations have been posed here?

Q: Thanks. Laura Holgate for the Nuclear Threat Initiative. I was just really struck by Achilles' comments about U.S. nuclear use doctrine and thinking of where we were in this room last week with Secretary Gates making comments about what many perceived to be a much-expanded Bush administration approach to use doctrine and even expanding it on that day, in some senses. And you answered it partially, Deepti, in response to the earlier question about first use and negative security assurances. But I really was wondering whether there's – in between those two options, in the broader context of use control, of reinforcing and as a affirmative statement, the deterrence only of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in your discussions or in the conversations that Peter and Achilles have in their context. How much would that help in terms of the context setting, in terms of being responsive, if not to a – one of the 13 steps, to the spirit of the 13 steps?

MS. CHOUBEY: Great. Mike, thank you so much for question and then actually for that bit of history as clearly, I wasn't alive when those things happen. But neither were you, I imagine – (inaudible, laughter). So you know, that said, I actually agree with your strategy, which is, you know, how we shape expectations that 2010 isn't make or break and instead, that it can be a stepping stone and I particularly say that because I'm mindful that there are only 18 months between today and the next review conference.

However, the reason I focus so much on 2010 is I was trying to create that sense of urgency, at least for American policy-makers, you know, and at least to share that sense of frustration from non-nuclear weapon states. And that's actually to Achilles' point about let's not tamp down expectations and I'm trying to do that by slightly tamping down expectations but actually trying to create an increased sense of urgency. In terms of what can be done, again, I think early policy statements from the Obama administration, I think, could be really helpful.

I think the rest of the world, people who care about these issues, they'll be tuning in. You know, even take a look at Ahmadinejad and his statement about an Obama administration, you know people are listening. So I think that that could help and you know, my hope is that some of the people who are surrounding President Obama as advisors are people who are tuned in to some of these debates. My hope is that it's a more comprehensive understanding of what can be done.

Laura, in terms of your question, this is part of why it was really important for me to inject non-nuclear weapon state views into this debate because I have concerns about what I'm hearing as the outcome of these congressional commissions and on the Nuclear Posture Review. It is, you know, unclear or/and even some of the efforts outside of government for NGOs and civil-society people to come up with the next Nuclear Posture Review, where I asked one of the people involved in that this question about to what extent are you considering these outside views. And it was summarily dismissed as oh, these are just the views of a few career diplomats in Geneva. And that's not true. The views that I have are people from home capitals. These are the people who are influencing policy decisions.

So my concern is that what may come out of these efforts will not be what we actually need. That said, I think a policy that really underlines that the only reason for our nuclear weapons is deterrence, I think it would be hugely useful. The main thing that I heard from these conversations is that they are unconvinced – non-nuclear weapon states are unconvinced that nuclear weapons have taken an increasingly deemphasized role in our national security policy. So I think there are some things that we can do to better communicate that. I think some of that is what our actual

policies are but some of that is also how we communicate them. I think we've done a really bad job of communicating our policies to the rest of the world. But again, I also invite, you know, Achilles and Peter to weigh in on that.

MR. SAWCZAK: I don't really have much about that except perhaps in relation to Achilles' initial comment, I mean, about expectations and Scott's effort to, perhaps, moderate them. I don't know if it's a question so much of expectations as that we have to go to the NPT Review Conference with a high degree of effort, effectively. I mean, we need to invest in, you know, reaching for the sky in order to reach the treetop at least. And the imperative is there is that these papers are very well contextualized. And to do that, we need to come in with a very broad view and that was one of the reasonings for the commission.

I mean despite our theological discussions here about churches and trying to be ecumenical, I think we're right. We've had our ecumenical councils and that's the NPT now enshrined. Now, we need to sort of put in the details and avoid further schisms. And for this reason, the commission, purposefully, is not going to be a priesthood to a priesthood. It's a very pragmatic exercise with practical – with practical, sort of considerations and including the possibility of a further abort after the NPT Review Conference in case it comes to naught.

And this consequence, perhaps, Nicolas' very pertinent comment in relation to a bargain. I mean, I agree entirely. I mean, we're all here for a security dividend across the globe. But the fact of the matter is because of the delay in how the process has become a little bit politicized, there are entrenched positions where we'll give you this in exchange for that. And that's because – and the point I raised earlier that there isn't a common understanding of the threat, effectively, and that's an issue we'll have to grapple with. I don't think we'll ever solve the NPT conflicts anyway.

MR. ZALUAR: Let me go – just a small comment, George. It's very interesting but Deepti's work is especially valuable because she goes from this career diplomats and all terrible people to the nuclear weapons people and back and forth. And I also try to go to my own country's nuclear establishment as much as possible and get their views because they have – they may think things that are completely different from the things that I myself as an NPT lifer may think. And they have to a consensus. What we can't do, should not do, is to be dismissive because if – of other people's opinions.

I was maybe a little dismissed when I said our – (inaudible) – was jobs program. That's what they think. But that's very respectful and maybe it's not appropriate. If anybody took offense here in this room, I apologize but you know, the hard work of getting everything on the same page must be done at the some point and I think the Clinton administration definitely allowed, from what they saw, really did a good job in '95 and it was good that the extension conference was '95 because if the extension conference wasn't 2005, I'm not sure that NPT would have been extended. Thank you.

MR. PERKOVICH: Yes, ma'am and then lady behind – hold on one second. I'd like – (inaudible).

Q: Two quick questions. I'm Frederiga Bindi, I'm from the Brookings Institution. And I have two questions. First of all, Deepti – Deepti, actually – I completely share and I'm really worried about expectations and the fact that expectations abroad will not be matched and quickly

because the rest of the world is expecting huge things from Obama and I don't think he can deliver most of them.

So my first question would be, given the numbers that you need in a Senate to ratify a treaty and given the fact that, as I understand from another Brookings colleague who works in government, the first names – the first nominees that Obama put forward indicates that he has a will of working with the Congress. Can't it be in the case that he won't want to push on ratification because that would spoil his chances – that could found by the Senate as enforcing and would spoil his chances of better working with the government? And so how – and he will also need Republicans to ratify it. So how many are the chances that the treaty will actually be ratified despite what he said in the campaign?

And then to the Achilles Zaluar, or any of you who wants to answer, how many chances will we have that the revision conference will fail, NPT Revision Conference will fail, and what can we do to avoid that?

Q: Leonor Tomero with the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation. Thank you again, Deepti, for a fantastic report and a very good discussion. My question is you mentioned that several non-nuclear weapon states have said that the United States would get nothing in return for ratifying CTBT and fulfilling some other promises that have been traded many times before. But you qualify that by saying there would be no immediate gain. My question is does that mean that they meant there would be good will built for future progress and in the context what Achilles mentioned about valuing the bargain we have, was there any mention about what would happen if the United States failed again to ratify the CTBT or did not make sufficient progress? Would they reconsider their commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty? Thank you.

MR. CHOUBEY: Great. I'm going to try to quickly answer these questions as I know we're over time and I'm sure you all have other places to be. I heard a question about an Obama administration's willingness to advance the CTBT. You know, from policy statements, I believe he's in line with supporting the ratification of the CTBT as a political matter, you know, there are three Senate races that are still outstanding but maybe the Democrats can get to 60 but it's not a matter of that. It's a matter of converting Senate Republicans, who I think have a reflexive view of what the CTBT is and if you asked them, I don't think they know why they're against it. And in fact, there's a lot of updating and education that needs to happen of these Senate Republicans but it also need to happen quietly and by the right people.

I think a huge challenge to that is over the last eight years, I think, the Republican Party has purged a lot of its moderate members. They've either retired or you know, they've lost seats or whatever it is. That makes it really challenging and then there's also the undeniable fact that the strongest opponent to the CTBT is Senator Kyl is still in the Senate. So that's to say that yeah, there are considerable challenges there but if I can see a scenario where senator – or President-elect Obama can make statements about the CTBT, I think Secretary Gates' answers to some Q&A in his speech last week creates also space for moving forward with the CTBT. I can see where he can make statements about it but there's a longer time period for doing the tactical groundwork to cultivate support. And that's at least my hope of where the political calculations will come out. And again, the other hope of my report was to say, look, if you're going to do one thing, like this is at least one thing to make a statement about.

Leonor, to your question, they did say good will was at least the basis of what we would receive from ratifying the CTBT. That said, I actually think there are increasing security benefits to us doing it because we will push other holdouts from revealing their position and I think that that's a strategic advantage for the United States. And I'll let them answer the question about the chance of failure at the next review conference.

MR. ZALUAR: Terrible prognostics. I missed all the primaries and I didn't – (laughter) – but I'll be a little bit – (inaudible) – here. I think that there's a very good chance that the 2010 conference is going to be better than expected. It's going to – because you know, you have these four statesmen articles. You have a change of policy here. You have everybody trying to make good with a new administration, including the other nuclear armed states. You have good relations between the U.S. and India. I think you have a positive climate diplomacy in general and that we'll – much more positive than we had, let's say, just after the invasion of Iraq and I think that will go into the 2010 conference. That said, I'm a very bad prognostic.

(Laughter.)

On the CTBT, I don't think either Brazil or Australia will review commitment to nonproliferation. I mean, I'm sure we won't. The nonproliferation regime is like a chain – it breaks in the weakest link, yeah? That is, it's not in the countries that are more or less satisfied in terms of securities. It's the country that feels threatened. It's there that the tension occurs and there is also, since 1945, there's also been a next country on the line – the country that is like the most likely candidate to get a bomb.

And that's the challenge because at one point, you want to stop this list from growing and you know, land this airplane. So the benefit from ratification of CTBT – let's be serious. CTBT's a no-brainer. From outside here, we cannot understand the debate in the United States. We cannot understand. It's a no-brainer except for the weapon labs and for the possible proliferating countries. These are the countries that may – they're like the places that may have doubts about the CTBT. But in terms of security only, security only, what's the marginal utility of a new nuclear weapon test in the United States?

It's close to zero because you guys have 1200? What's the marginal utility of a new nuclear weapon test in North Korea? It's huge. So if nobody can test, if there is this huge international consensus that there shall be no more tests, what's the security benefit for Brazil, for Australia, for the United States? It's huge. I mean, I have read this – about this until I couldn't anymore and I never understood the contradicting argument.

MR. SAWCZAK: And just very briefly, I'm going to comment on the risks failure, the NPT Review Conference because unlike my colleague Achilles, I'm not an NPT lifer. And he has – as an NPT lifer, he probably has invested interest in it going as long as – (laughter) – as health as possible. So may you have a long life and a prosperous – (laughter) – one that Achilles. And on CTBT, well, look, I mean, I agree entirely with Achilles but perhaps would be more reserved in commenting on it.

I mean, I certainly wasn't the Australian diplomat that Deepti cites as suggesting that the CTBT wouldn't bring the U.S. any benefits in the NPT context. I think that's quite – certainly not the case. I mean, it is a no-brainer. I mean the fact of the matter is CTBT has a very direct and

practical role in preventing new nuclear weapons states. If you can't – if you wanted a sophisticated – if you haven't got as sophisticated a technological base as the U.S. has, you'll have to expose yourself to a test at some stage and it's just very clear, very easy thing to do.

And there's a certain logic in doing CTBT first – on following in its heels so that we have it. I mean, in terms of how it will fare in the Senate. Well, I mean, that's something to be seen. And my understanding is that perhaps not all Democrats are on board either but you know, I mean, I think it shouldn't be too hard to show how in the intervening 10 years, of how well verifications cover off and you know, so the debate might conflate well the things like – (inaudible) – but that remains to be seen.

MR. PERKOVICH: Unfortunately, I know there's still more questions but I need to cut it off. I'm not sure what the next room schedule is but I imagine Deepti and others may be able to have a further conversation but I want to liberate the room and people to go. But I want to thank you all for coming and I also want to obviously thank Deepti and our two colleagues for a very interesting discussion. Thank you.

(Applause.)

(END)