

**CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

**CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL
NONPROLIFERATION CONFERENCE**

8:00 – 9:00 A.M.

PART 1: A CONVERSATION

WITH

**DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY CLAY SELL
ON GNEP AND NONPROLIFERATION POLICY**

HOSTED BY

**ROSE GOTTEMOELLER,
CARNEGIE MOSCOW CENTER**

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ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: (In progress) – and I don't want to take time with introductions. You know, of course, Clay has a very eminent background, which is fully outlined in the conference program. He has been a longstanding colleague of mine since I was in DOE in the 1990s, and I always very much valued his professionalism and his intellect. So I'm looking forward to a very interesting – plus he's a nice guy. I'm very much looking forward to his presentation this morning.

We have an added treat in that he told me he did not only want to talk about the global nuclear energy partnership and issues related to the non-proliferation policy aspects of that, but he would also like to talk to us about the RRW, the reliable replacement warhead. So we'll have two topics of conversation to cover, and then we'll spend as much time as we possibly can on questions and answers. So without further ado, welcome.

(Applause.)

CLAY SELL: Thank you, Rose. It's always a great pleasure of mine to be with Rose Gottemoeller. She has been a great friend and an advisor. And we haven't always agreed, but we've always maintained a close friendship and relationship. And just three months ago, I was with Rose in Moscow, and I shared the dais there with her at Carnegie Moscow. And I really appreciate the work you're doing in Russia and the great leadership that Carnegie Moscow provides there.

Ladies and gentlemen, your excellencies, and other distinguished participants in this conference, the theme of this year's conference is Tomorrow's Solutions, with a focus on tangible ideas to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. And Carnegie has kindly invited me to lead a conversation on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, and non-proliferation policy, and I will do that.

But as Rose alluded, I would like to first take the opportunity to broaden that discussion somewhat to consider a larger slice of the global nuclear enterprise, from weapons to watts to waste disposition. This allows me to use this forum to talk about and to put into context two of the most important, two of the most transformational, and – I would add – two of the most attacked nuclear initiatives of this administration – the future of the nuclear fuel cycle as carried in the global nuclear energy partnership proposal, and the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent, as carried in our proposal for a reliable replacement warhead.

Now, while these topics may appear as unrelated initiatives from opposite ends of the department, they are in fact built on the same strategic foundation – a firm commitment to minimizing the number of weapons and weapons-capable states while ensuring the benefits of nuclear power spread as widely as possible.

It has been nearly 70 years since the first successful experiments on nuclear fission. And since then, the release of atomic power has provided the world with some of its greatest opportunities and some its greatest challenges. Within humanity's grasp is the ability to produce enough clean electrical power to meet the world's energy demands. Yet that same technology, uncontrolled, brings with it the power to end the world as we know it. Together, the policies represented in GNEP and RRW seek to enable a world where nuclear power becomes the primary global source of electricity, where the world's stockpiles of nuclear weapons are reduced to a minimum, and where there are national, international, and commercial arrangements to keep all of this operating economically, safely, and securely. And I submit that the United States must seize the opportunity to help lead that effort, and that the Department of Energy has the technical and scientific wherewithal to play a major role.

Let me be more specific. The United States has the opportunity now to prudently, effectively, and significantly reduce the number of nuclear weapons by moving from a Cold War stockpile to a stockpile that is safer, more secure, and far less likely to ever require nuclear testing. President Bush pointed the way in 2001 when he said, quote, "we can and will change the size, the composition, and the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over." He further stated his commitment to, quote, "achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies."

Now, based upon that direction and the subsequent nuclear posture review and the Moscow treaty, the DOE then developed a concept for the reliable replacement warhead, the RRW. Now, while the RRW will not represent a new role for nuclear weapons and will have no new or different military capabilities, the RRW will have more robust performance margins that will increase reliability and enable us to significantly reduce the size of our overall stockpile. Furthermore, the RRW will have the latest safety and security systems, and it will be built in a smaller, safer, and more responsive complex sufficient for our national security needs, but one that frees us from relying on huge stockpiles of reserve weapons as we do today.

Now, we are confident we can build RRW and transform the production complex based on the continued and remarkable success of the department stockpile stewardship program. But while the number of nuclear weapons is to be reduced to the lowest possible number, as the president said, consistent with our national security needs, the number of civilian nuclear reactors must be increased to the highest possible number consistent with our energy security and environmental needs.

Let me elaborate – the Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration predicts that energy demand will increase by nearly 60 percent by 2030 – 60 percent by 2030. More dramatically, it predicts a near doubling – a near doubling – of world electricity demand during that same period. Much of that growth, of course, will come from the developing economies around the world. That is an extraordinary amount

of new demand that will require an extraordinary amount of new supply. As such, the president has stated a policy goal of promoting a great expansion of nuclear power here in the United States and around the world. Nuclear power is the only mature technology of significant potential to provide large amounts of completely emissions-free, base-load generation to meet this need, resulting in significant benefits for clean development, reducing world greenhouse gas intensities, pollution abatement, and the security that comes from greater energy diversity.

To be more direct, no person can be serious about dealing with climate change without being serious about significantly expanding nuclear power. But nuclear power, with all of its potential for mankind, carries with it its two historic challenges. What do we do with the nuclear waste and what can we do to prevent the proliferation of fuel cycle technologies that can lead to weaponization?

The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership seeks to address and minimize those two challenges by developing technologies to recycle the spent fuel in a proliferation-resistant manner, and support a reordering of the global nuclear enterprise to encourage the leasing of fuel from fuel cycle states in a way that presents strong commercial incentives against new states building their own enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. This is a major change in United States civilian nuclear policy. And no longer will the United States government be casting a baleful eye on the rest of the world's reprocessing activities, but instead seek international cooperation to foster the growth of global nuclear power, including improved methods of recycling. The usable material in spent civilian nuclear fuel and excess weapons fissile material will now be recognized as potential valuable assets to be developed and used, and not just as liabilities that must be buried.

Now, this approach was hardly endorsed just last month when Secretary Bodman met with ministers from China, Russia, Japan, and France, along with observers from the United Kingdom and the International Atomic Energy Agency, to discuss ways to enhance cooperation within the GNEP framework. As Secretary Bodman said after the meeting, quote, "today's joint statement officially puts the P in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. For Americans, pursuing nuclear power is wise policy. For industry, it can be good business. Internationally, it is unmatched in its ability to serve as a cornerstone of sustainable economic development while offering enormous potential to satisfy the world's increasing demand for energy in a clean, safe, and proliferation-resistant manner." I couldn't have said it better myself.

There are two items related to GNEP and non-proliferation that deserve additional comment – fuel leasing in the form of recycling that the United States envisions. In an international fuel leasing regime, enrichment and recycling of spent fuel would be limited to countries that already have these capabilities. They, in turn, would lease fuel to other nations who would agree to refrain from enrichment and reprocessing in return for a guaranteed fuel supply and removal of spent fuel.

Now, this is a concept that goes back to the Acheson-Lilienthal report of 1946. It has been discussed at various times and in various forms since then, and was actually

implemented by the former Soviet Union. What makes fuel leasing so important is the increasing recognition that enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel are, in principle, within the grasp of most nations, and could foster proliferation. Furthermore, there is now a view that spent fuel – spent fuel like enriched fuel – could become managed as an asset in states with advanced fuel cycle technologies. This latter realization opens up commercial possibilities for the provision of services benefiting both fuel cycle and reactor-only states. In this way, the market and the international desire for less proliferation could, in principle, become aligned, a potentially powerful combination.

But not all recycling methods – that of separation and burning of spent fuel – are equal. We believe that the current purex reprocessing technology can be significantly improved, and we are looking forward to working with our international partners to develop a new generation of more effective and proliferation resistant recycling technologies. These two policy ends – a reduction of nuclear weapons to the lowest possible numbers and increasing the beneficial use of nuclear power – are strategically and operationally linked in a number of specific ways.

First, reducing the number of warheads in the stockpile worldwide could result in a significant amount of uranium and plutonium to fuel an increasing number of reactors while at the same time reducing the amount permanently of weapons-usable material. The megatons to megawatts program is but one example of this.

Second, the science and technology, and in particular, the computation and simulation that was developed within stockpile stewardship, will surely be applicable to the next generation of civilian nuclear power. And many of the advanced security and safety techniques being developed for the RRW and the transformed weapon complex should likewise be applicable to an expanding global civilian nuclear power enterprise.

And third, as the global partnership expands and becomes embedded into international norms and behavior, it is not too far-fetched to envision further reductions in nuclear weapons among the partnership states.

Now, all of this represents a great opportunity and a great challenge for the Department of Energy. Perhaps it is even the greatest challenge that the department has faced since its creation 30 years ago. And quite frankly, some may doubt the ability of the Department of Energy to respond.

I remember when I first came into contact with the Department of Energy 12 years ago in 1995, when I was a legislative assistant for a great member of Congress from Texas named Mack Thornberry. At that time, the prospects for the Department of Energy were pretty grim. The superconducting supercollider in Texas had just been cancelled in 1993, the world's largest scientific experiment. The Rocky Flats plutonium plant posed real challenges for nuclear materials management – that's charitable – quite frankly, it was a disaster. The weapons labs were in despair about the loss of testing admission. The waste isolation pilot plant to permanently dispose transuranic waste was under injunction. The integral fast reactor had been cancelled, as had the advanced neutron

source. And the material protection control and accounting work in Russia had just begun. Indeed, when the Republicans – my party – took control of Congress in 1995, a major effort was launched to abolish the Department of Energy.

How things have changed. Now, from biofuels to carbon capture and sequestration to the advanced nuclear agenda to taking the lead in reinvigorating the country's investment in the physical sciences, the Department of Energy is in the lead on all of those. The Department of Energy was not abolished and has instead enjoyed some remarkable successes that bear on this discussion here about RRW and GNEP. And I'd like to cite a few examples.

Four new world-class office science user facilities have been constructed on time and on budget, and are now operating. The billion-dollar class spallation neutron source at Oak Ridge, Tennessee is the one that has opened most recently. All the buildings, all of the equipment, all of the material that constituted the disaster of Rocky Flats in 1995 are gone and it is now open prairie, a beautiful wildlife preserve on the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains.

Stockpile stewardship has been an astonishing success. All the weapons in the United States have been certified without nuclear testing, in large measure because of the deep understanding of the nuclear explosive process brought about by a reinvigorated nuclear weapons complex. The stockpile stewardship simulation program has driven the high-performance computing revolution.

Performance on real, difficult problems has improved by a factor of almost 10,000 during this period, and the United States is now, by far, the world leader in high performance computation, having been led there by the Department of Energy national laboratories. And today, those laboratories own six of the 11 fastest computers in the world. The waste oscillation pilot plant has been licensed and has now safely disposed of some 50,000 cubic meters of radioactive material. The Nuclear Power 2010 Program, the Generation-Four International Forum, the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative, and now the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership – programs all represent DOE's renewed commitment to civilian nuclear power.

The department's nuclear non-proliferations programs, under the leadership of Rose and subsequent leaders, will complete its work at 123 sites by the end of 2008, securing hundreds of tons of fissile material in Russia and other former Soviet states. And that program has converted 48 reactors in 27 countries from HEU to LEU. The department has trained thousands of U.S. and foreign customs officials, equipped over 100 sites with radiation detection equipment, and engaged thousands of former foreign weapons scientists at 180 institutes across the former Soviet Union, Iraq, and Libya. And lastly, we are on schedule to shut down two of the last three plutonium production reactors in Russia by 2008, with the remaining reactor being shut down in 2010. The megatons to megawatts program has blended down some 300 metric tons of Russian HEU to make fuel to generate 2.5 trillion kilowatts of United States electricity. To put that in context, that's about 10 percent of our nation's consumed electricity since the

inception of the program. And finally, the office of secure transportation has transported nuclear materials and nuclear weapons over 116 million miles since its creation in 1975 without a fatal accident or the loss, release, or damage to its cargo.

Now, in short, while hardly without our problems – and experts in the department will note that there are a number of projects that I did not mention – the Department of Energy is an organization with solid accomplishment, and is poised to provide the technical leadership for the global nuclear renaissance.

Now, of course, there is a different approach, and it should be debated. There are those who believe that nuclear weapons are just too dangerous ever to be controlled and so advocate for their immediate abolition. But those of us burdened with the duty of national leadership and the hard decisions that go with it know that nuclear deterrence will remain a critical element of our national security policy and that of our friends and allies who rely on it for the foreseeable future.

There are those that believe that nuclear power presents too much of a proliferation risk; the spent fuel problem is too difficult to solve; and nuclear power will always be too expensive compared to alternatives. In short, they feel the risk inherent in nuclear power outweigh any benefits of carbon and pollution-free nuclear energy. These critics desire a return to a nuclear phaseout policy, last at its peak popularity 20 years ago, in ignorance of the nuclear industry's safety and productivity accomplishments, and the new reality – the new reality of a carbon-constrained world.

But even if we were again to pursue this unwise path, the world's commitment to nuclear power would continue on without us, but without us there to shape it. We cannot run from this country. We cannot run from this future. Our country cannot run from this future. We must embrace it. Perhaps most importantly, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership starts from the premise of a global partnership where one seeks not to mandate what the partners should or what they should not do, but to work together towards a common goal defined by agreed principles while maintaining respect for national differences and nations working together toward a common goal is in itself a most desirable policy.

We cannot un-invent nuclear weapons, but we can reduce their levels, reduce their costs, dispose of excess material, avoid separating plutonium, and devise better ways of conducting nuclear commerce that provide energy, avoid carbon, and reduce proliferation. Indeed, I would suggest that the Bush administration's policies are a 21st century continuation of Eisenhower's 1953 Atoms for Peace speech to the United Nations, where he said, quote, "to the making of these fateful decisions, the United States pledges before you, and therefore before the world, its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma, to devote its entire heart and mind to find a way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but concentrated to his life."

And that, my friends and colleagues, I think, should again be our joint calling today. Thank you for listening intently. And I now look forward to your questions.

(Applause.)

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: We have about 15 minutes for questions and comments. I would ask you to line up at the microphones. I don't usually like to do this, but because we have such a large crowd, I think it's the most efficient way to proceed. And I will call on two people – one on one side, one on the other – for your question or comment. Please be fair to your colleagues and be as brief and succinct as possible. And Clay, you can then address two questions at once and we'll move on to the next two. So please.

Q: Ed Limon (sp) with the Union of Concerned Scientists. I just have two questions. The first, you referred to the ministerial meeting that was held last month here in Washington, and you described it as an endorsement of the goals of GNEP, and you went on to say that one of GNEP's major goals is an endorsement of the concept of fuel leasing as tied to a limitation of the spread of fuel cycle facilities like enrichment and reprocessing plants. However, the statement that came out of that meeting did not refer in any way to limiting the spread of fuel cycle facilities, or in fact to fuel leasing concepts, and I confirmed that with Buzz Savage (sp) of the department. So my first question is, can you explain how that meeting endorsed the goals of GNEP if it did not really address one of the major components of the part of the program that you emphasize would be beneficial for non-proliferation?

The second question has to do with the topic of excess weapons materials. So you referred to the fact that if there are continuing stockpile reductions that that material – both plutonium and HEU – could enter the civil sector. And my question is, would additional plutonium from dismantled weapons be directed to the mixed oxide fuel program that is currently constituted for disposal in light water reactors, or would it be directed toward the use in fast reactors in GNEP. Since I'm sure you're familiar with the House Appropriation Committee's direction that the mixed oxide fuel plant be transferred to the office of nuclear energy for integration into the GNEP program.

And finally, just one more thing. You were mentioning all these accomplishments in the department, and you didn't mention the RERTR program, which is one program that we think does deserve to be commended for its achievement. So thank you.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: (Off mike, inaudible.)

Q: My name is William Walker. I come from the UK. And coming to the United States, there had always been this puzzlement in the UK as to why you have this great arm of state, the Department of Energy, that thoroughly mixes up the administration of civil and military programs. And I mean, your message to us is that you take great pride in a project aimed at nuclear non-proliferation, the development of nuclear energy around

the world, and preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons in other countries. And yet, you also speak in great pride from the same platform about a nuclear weapon program here in the United States, and it's all under the same arm of the state, the Department of Energy.

Now, in my country, you have a thorough separation of the civil, which comes under the Department of Trade and Industry, and the military under the Ministry of Defense. So what is the logic of keeping these things together? And mightn't one of the solutions for the future being, in fact, to break up the Department of Energy, and achieve a clear separation of the civil and the military in the United States?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you. Would you like to take those sets of questions?

MR. SELL: I will. We do have clear separation between the civilian and military programs in this country in terms of facilities, in terms of management, in terms of all other respects. They are both under the control of the Department of Energy. I'm sure there are other models to do that. But the one thing that they have in common is the material – fissile material – and many of the technologies that go with it. And I think there is some synergy, which I tried to explain, for the two programs to be managed together under the same department, but I take your point – they need not be.

As to Ed Limon's comments, thank you, Ed, for the commendation on RERTR. I think you have accurately recognized that the accomplishments of the department are sufficiently long that I can't cover them all in such a short presentation. And you have been steadfast as a supporter and commender of the department, and I appreciate you doing it again today.

Why was fuel leasing not in the statement coming out of the GNEP ministerial? I have learned in my time in such diplomatic exchanges that the negotiation of communiqués and statements can be quite a long and tedious process. And at the end of the day, you never know exactly the exact language that is going to be in. But I can relate the conversations and I can relate the commitment.

Among the fuel cycle nations that joined here in Washington a month ago, putting forward technologies and developing new technologies that will allow a great expansion of nuclear power, in consideration of our joint non-proliferation goals – and the statement did say that – and consistent with growing nuclear power in a way consistent with our non-proliferation goals has long been the concept of fuel leasing. And just because last month, in our initial meeting, we could not detail at a great level exactly how that might work going forward, lessens in no way the commitment of those nations to pursue it aggressively as part of our effort in expanding global nuclear power.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you. Take this question?

Q: Hi, Dan Horner from Platts, McGraw-Hill. I wanted to ask about the proliferation resistance. When you use that term, do you mean more proliferation resistant than purex or are you developing specific criteria in terms of, for example, self-protecting radiation or DOE's attractiveness levels? And if you could sort of flesh that out, and as a second part of that, will those criteria be public or simply an internal DOE document? Thanks.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Tom Cochran?

Q: Tom Cochran of NRDC. Mr. Fell, your GNEP vision is doomed to failure because it is the marriage of two failed technologies – reprocessing, which failed economically, and fast reactors, which have demonstrated to be unreliable and more expensive than thermal reactors. And we tried, after spending upwards toward \$100 billion in today's dollars on fast reactor development in the world, building about 39 of them. The programs failed in France, in Germany, in the United Kingdom, in the United States, and in Japan and Italy. And the Russian program never used plutonium as a fuel; they're fast reactors use HEU and they never closed the fuel cycle, so it was a failure there as well.

The flagships of the French program, the German program, the U.S. program, the U.K. program, the U.S. program were all failures. Super-phoenix had a capacity factor of 6.7 percent – Monjou (ph) had a capacity factor of less than 1 percent, less than .4 percent. The U.K. fast reactor had a capacity factor in its first 10 years of less than 10 percent. How do you propose to get the industry – which in the Keystone Center findings claimed that they believed the critical elements of GNEP are unlikely to succeed for reasons I more or less outlined – how do you propose that the industry will build these uneconomical and unreliable fast reactors instead of continuing down the process of building light water reactors and other thermal reactors?

MR SELL: Tom, let me tell you why I think you're wrong. In the very way you asked the question suggests exactly why I think you're wrong. The way you asked the question, you're looking backwards. What I'm asking you to do is look forward. And look forward and ask yourself how the world is going to meet this incredible increase in electricity demand that we want to see, that we want to provide, because we want to see hundreds of millions of people lift themselves out of poverty in the developing world. And how will they do that? Do you want them to do it with coal plants?

Q: No, I want you to quit subsidizing nuclear power plants and let the free market find the best winners.

MR. SELL: And so, I ask you to look forward to a future that allows us to meet that demand in an environmentally sensitive way. And I think, in order to do that in a way consistent with our global climate change concerns, nuclear power must play a greatly expanded role. And when you think about nuclear power playing an expanded role – not the 400-so commercial nuclear reactors that are in the world today; but 1000 reactors possibly by 2050, a not unreal expectation – and those 1000 reactors spread

across 75 countries around the globe, what kind of system do we seek to have in place to control – to Dan’s question – our proliferation concerns? And we want to do a couple of things.

We need to recycle the waste and minimize it so we can better manage it. We need to recycle the waste so we can harvest the energy value that is in that material. And we need to do that in a system, which promotes and discourages the proliferation of enrichment and recycling technologies around the globe. The notion here, and the notion that the fuel cycle states have joined together to support, is that we will build these facilities in countries that already have them and have economies of scale, and make those services available to the rest of the world on attractive economic terms. And that way, we can actually envision a world with 1000 nuclear reactors and a well managed, market-driven, controlled stream of nuclear commerce.

Q: This is the same argument your argon crowd used in 1970 when they said –

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Tom – Tom, excuse me. There are some other people who want to speak and we’re running out of time. I apologize; you’ve had a good chance at the microphone. So, would you like to say anything additional about proliferation resistance – the point – Dan’s question. Is it going to be a public discussion of your proliferation resistant criteria?

MR. SELL: It is important in my judgment as we move forward that the technologies that we seek to develop must transcend party; it will certainly transcend administrations; and it will transcend generations. And I think as part of that, as part of building the case for a nuclear agenda going forward, there has to be heavy public involvement and heavy public debate about what we’re doing. And so, the separation technologies that we seek to develop will not separate plutonium. And they will separate material in a way that is much stronger from a counter-proliferation and counterterrorism standpoint. But those technologies will also provide an even greater proliferation benefit in that through a fuel-leasing regime, backed up by commercial incentives both on the front end and the back end, we can set up a situation, which prevents or greatly discourages the proliferation of fuel cycle technologies. And that is where, in our judgment, you get the great non-proliferation benefit over the coming generations.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you, two last questions. Please identify yourself and then we’ll take Matt Bone’s (sp) question.

Q: Liane Ortomero (ph) with the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. My question is will there be a requirement that whatever is extracted from the nuclear waste not be weapons-usable? I know you touted the benefit that it won’t be pure plutonium, but will there be a requirement that it not be able to be used in nuclear weapons?

And my second related question to that is, the United States is working with France and Japan and others. Have these other countries pledged to stop separating pure

plutonium? And is there a risk that by partnering with them, we risk legitimizing the processes that do separate out pure plutonium? Thank you.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you. Matt Bone?

Q: I was encouraged by your mention of possible additional reductions in plutonium and highly enriched uranium stockpiles as we reduce arms in the future. At the moment, the declared stockpiles in the United States that we haven't yet declared access are big enough to return essentially to a Cold War scale nuclear arsenal. And the stockpiles in Russia that have not been declared excess are even bigger. And I wondered whether there are any discussions underway yet with Russia about declaring additional quantities of material on both sides excess and available for use in civilian nuclear energy.

MR. SELL: The level of collaboration and discussion with the Russians has continued to increase. And as consistent with those conversations, I think we both envision – certainly on our side, and I think on their side as well – the prospect of getting the relationship and the progress to a point where additional amounts can be declared excess and disposed of. But we're not on the cusp of any new announcements today.

On the previous question, as to the – can we commit that all material that comes out of the separation process will not be weapons-usable? And I know that there is a great desire to grasp on to start declarations about what can or cannot be done. What we are seeking to do is promote a system that dramatically and significantly reduces proliferation risk and counterterrorism risks.

And there are a number of ways that we can do that through the quantity of material that is produced, through the self-protecting nature of the quantity that is produced, and the advanced security and safeguard mechanisms in the new facilities that will be built, to ensuring that these new separations facilities are only built in existing fuel cycle states with a strong culture of security and safeguards. And I think with a systematic approach to dealing with this threat is the most honest and most complete way to think about how we best protect our long-term interests.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you. Well, I can see that there is a lot of urge for debate in the room. You know, we do have a second session that will be chaired by Laura Holgate that will continue this discussion later on this morning. So I hope if you are interested in pursuing the debate, we will sadly lose our ministerial speaker here, but nevertheless, I think we will have some very good opportunities to continue on with the discussion later this morning. So first of all, I'd like to thank you all for coming at this early hour and participating, and I would also like to thank Deputy Secretary Clay Sell for coming and giving us such a wide-ranging speech. Thank you. (Applause.)

And I was just informed that the second session will be back in Meridian. So if you are attending that session later on, it will be in Meridian. Thank you.

(End of session.)