

**CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

**CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL
NONPROLIFERATION CONFERENCE**

**9:00 – 9:20 A.M.
WELCOME AND OPENING REMARKS**

**JESSICA T. MATHEWS,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

**GEORGE PERKOVICH,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

**9:20 – 10:20 A.M.
A WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

**CHAIR: JESSICA MATHEWS,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

**AMBASSADOR MAX M. KAMPELMAN,
FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON LLP**

SENATOR SAM NUNN, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE

**MONDAY, JUNE 25, 2007
RONALD REAGAN BUILDING
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTER
AMPHITHEATER
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

*Transcript by:
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.*

JESSICA MATHEWS: This conference – is this on? Thank you. This conference is going to run like the bullet train. It's 9:00 so we'll begin.

It's always my great pleasure – and it's one of the big pleasures of every year for me – to open this conference. I want to welcome back all those who have been with us over the years, and say a particular word of welcome to the many first-timers this year.

Ten years ago, this was a gathering of NGOs and academic experts, almost entirely American. Today, we're gathering with 850 registered participants, a major number of those from governments, a significant number this year from the nuclear industry, which we are very happy about, and attendees and speakers this year from 31 countries. With us are representatives from all of the original nuclear states, from India, Israel, Pakistan, from Nigeria, South Africa, Indonesia, Iraq, Turkey, Egypt, Mexico, Argentina and Brazil, South Korea, Japan, and many more. We welcome all of you. It is almost a unique kind of gathering in the richness of its academic, NGO, scientific, and government expertise and business. And this makes it, I think, a particularly fertile gathering this year.

I want to mention, because it's conspicuous by its absence from the list, that we had invited and had confirmed an Iranian official, a key individual who unfortunately is now in prison and unable to come.

Among our 79 speaker this year are 46 from the United States and 33 from outside the U.S. So I think we have achieved our goal of making this meeting reflect what this issue is, which is a truly global challenge.

I should mention, if I may, that since we last met, Carnegie itself has tried to – has taken the first major steps to become a global think tank, the first global think tank. We now have offices in Beijing, Brussels, and Beirut, as well as our longstanding office that many of you are familiar with in Moscow. And we have two of the office directors, Fabrice Pothier from Brussels, and Rose Gottemoeller from Moscow with us, so we are very pleased about that.

I want to mention that one of the themes we have tried to capture in the planning for this meeting was to engage not just our huge number of speakers, but everybody among our group in thinking and contributing to the identification of key ideas. So in your registration packets is a blue card where we're asking for your help in identifying what policy recommendations that you believe will make the most difference by 2010, either with the impact by 2010 or steps that need to be taken before then that would have the largest long-term impact. We also hope you will identify on that card what are the best new ideas that you hear during this session. I hope there will be some.

And once you filled it out, you could return it to any member of the Carnegie staff or to the Carnegie booth where there is some boxes. We really will work with these cards, so please do take a few minutes to think about it. I also want to urge you to spend some time with the exhibitors' booths. They are a terrific group of organizations with lots of interesting material, so please do take some time in your schedule to visit them.

One of the consequences of having major government role in this conference is that governments give you last minute surprises. And last week, the Western foreign ministers convened an emergency meeting in Paris to discuss the crisis in Darfur and in the Middle East. And so, tomorrow's luncheon speaker, Foreign Minister Store of Norway is unable to be with us. He has to attend that meeting. What we're going to do instead is to use that lunch for time for networking – to use an awful word.

Anybody who would like to organize a table around a particular issue, please just tell the Carnegie staff. There will be signs on the table – reprocessing, moratorium on enrichment – whatever subject you would like to discuss at lunch. Just let us know and we will take care of it.

I also wanted to convey to you a message I received this morning from Javier Solana who had hoped to be here and couldn't be because of, again, obvious reasons. And he asked to please convey his regrets and his hope that next meeting, he will be with us.

I usually use this time to try to look back over what's happened since we last met. This morning, George Perkovich is going to do that. But I wanted just to – before I thanked – before I closed – it's traditional in this sort of opening to close by thanking the funders. It would be just as rational to open, because without their support, we couldn't begin to do what we try to do on this issue. So let me take a moment to thank them in alphabetical order – the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Flora Family Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the George Family Foundation, the Government of Norway, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Land Foundation, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Plowshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation. We are deeply indebted to all of them, and we thank them on our behalf and on yours.

Let me turn now to George Perkovich. But before I do, I want to say a word. I think it's obvious to everybody how much work goes into putting something like this together – 79 speakers, 850 people, schedules changing up until minutes before we begin. The person who has really taken the lead on this is the deputy director of Carnegie's non-proliferation program, Deepti Choubey. She has done – she has organized, I believe, the best conference we have ever had in 20-plus years, and I want to thank her very much. (Applause.)

So let me now turn the microphone over to Deepti's boss, George Perkovich, vice president for security studies at the Carnegie Endowment, and director of our non-proliferation program.

GEORGE PERKOVICH: Good morning. In March 2005, we released Universal Compliance. Its central argument was that non-proliferation is a set of bargains whose fairness must be self-evident if the majority of countries is to support their enforcement. The only way to achieve this is to enforce compliance universally, not selectively, including the obligations the nuclear weapons states have taken on themselves.

Well, events over the last two years have deepened this conviction. We thought at the beginning of the year to do an assessment, and we produced this report card on progress towards universal compliance as of 2007, which should be in all of your materials, and is available in different forms outside on the table.

Now, the report card analyzes how the priority policy recommendations we made in 2005 have fared. What have governments done since then? What issues have been neglected? To what effect? Our recommendations for action were grouped under the heading of six priority obligations. These were broad and the view was that all actors, as you could delineate, would need to comply in order to create an effective, robust, reliable non-proliferations regime.

In this case, in the report card, we've assigned a letter grade to each obligation, marking – and I want to emphasize – marking global progress and effort from mid-2005 to now. This conference includes panels or plenaries on each of these areas, each of these policy sets of issues. And the new report only takes 30 minutes to read. It's 56 pages, but as you'll notice, there's not a lot of words on each page, so you can kind of whip right through it.

And under each heading, you'll see that several policy challenges are assessed. And what I want to do briefly here this morning is highlight one under each heading. And I want to be very clear as I do this that while the United States has strongly affected the outcomes in each area and the grades that we produce, the United States alone cannot adopt and implement most of the policies that we discuss. Responsibility for the rather dismal performance is therefore widely shared.

The first obligation we talked about and that you'll see in the report is to make non-proliferation irreversible. We give here a letter grade D. As I mention, there are several policy issues under that heading. The one I want to focus on right now though is the need to devise new rules for managing production of fissile materials. Now, clearly, leading technology providers, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other actors, have made serious effort in the last two years to move in this direction. But little progress has been made to date.

Non-nuclear weapons states, such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, and South Africa, do not want to get shut out of the potential uranium enrichment business, and so they've made early bids to get in under the gate. Other states resent being denied access to additional nuclear technologies when they feel that they have not benefited from the nuclear cooperation they were promised at the beginning, and that the nuclear weapons states haven't fulfilled their disarmament obligations.

Facing this resistance in this early activity, the United States and other countries have fallen back to a voluntary approach, premised on the very valid argument that the market for nuclear fuel supplies has almost always worked well for states that fulfill their non-proliferation obligations. New proposals, therefore, are being offered to back up existing market arrangements, with terms so reassuring that countries will choose not to undertake the expense and difficulty of indigenous enrichment and reprocessing.

The 2007 report card discusses these ideas favorably, but we cannot help but note that these schemes would likely attract the states that do not pose security threats, while those interested in enriching uranium for export or in hedging or breaking non-proliferation commitments would choose to ignore the new voluntary arrangements being proposed. This remains, then, an area of utmost importance, but where the core security problems are not being taken head on, because competing industrial interests, and concerns over the fairness of the overall non-proliferation regime erode the confidence necessary to make new rules.

Obligation two – devalue the political and military currency of nuclear weapons. Here the grade is F. While many observers around the world single out the U.S. for criticism in this regard – and I would commend a study that Louis Dunn (sp) did for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency that looked at opinion around the world regarding U.S. nuclear policy. This singular attention or blame on the U.S. is unfair, as we talk about in the report card. In fact, each and all of the five nuclear weapons states under the NPT has made doctrinal declarations or undergone forced modernization programs in the last two years that suggest the ongoing high value they place on nuclear weapons, while India and Pakistan continue to develop their nuclear arsenals. This is not an effective approach to prevent the spread and possible use of nuclear weapons, as will be discussed throughout this conference, beginning with our first plenary session.

Obligation three – secure all nuclear materials. Here we gave a grade of C-. The United States, Russia, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the IAEA, the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, and others have all taken positive steps since 2005 to develop and to begin to implement standards for securing, monitoring, and accounting for all fissile materials. These steps are important and they deserve sustained attention at the highest level of the states with the largest nuclear arsenals and stockpiles of fissile materials.

Now, clearly, a grade of C in the C range is better than an F, but average performance is not good enough. What's interesting here is that the fact that this is an area where real progress has been made reflects the reality that securing all nuclear materials is in fact readily doable. Therefore, because it's so doable, anything less than excellence here poses unacceptable and unnecessary risks to world security.

Obligation four – stop illegal transfers of fissile materials, nuclear weapon-related materials. Here, we also give a C-. The report card discusses implementation of UN

Resolution 1540 of progress in the proliferation security initiative, and all of these are highly welcome.

Here, we want to focus on the recommendation we made that the IAEA additional protocol should be mandatory for all states and that the nuclear suppliers' group should make it a condition of supply. As of March 2007, 112 states have signed the additional protocol, but only 78 of those were enforcing it, and the United States and Russia were not among them. Iran signed the protocol and observed it voluntarily from 2003 to January 2006, but no longer does. Key states that have not signed the additional protocol include Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both with renewed interest in nuclear power programs, as well as Argentina and Brazil, each of which has uranium enrichment programs or aspirations.

The IAEA continues to place great emphasis on making the additional protocol a condition of supply, but the major suppliers of nuclear technology material do not agree amongst themselves on how to proceed in this area. For their part, Egypt, Brazil, Argentina, and other leading non-nuclear weapons states who wish to expand their nuclear activities resist linking nuclear cooperation to adoption of the additional protocol. This resistance is genuinely framed as an issue of equity and protest against further limitations being imposed on non-nuclear states without corresponding sacrifices by the recognized nuclear weapons states along with Israel, India, and Pakistan. But states may also be resisting the additional protocol, because it would impede their option in the future to conduct activities that would hasten achievement of the capacity to make nuclear weapons, if they decided to withdraw from the NPT.

The additional protocol is a powerful non-proliferation tool, precisely because it raises the risk of such hedging. We will argue in the protocol cannot be made a basis for future further nuclear cooperation, it is impossible to see how nuclear industry can expand without exacerbating risks of proliferation. And if proliferation risks grow, it is difficult to see how nuclear industry can be sustained over time.

Obligation five – commit to conflict resolution. Here we gave the highest grade of C+. This reflects genuine progress in South Asia and tentative, halting progress in Northeast Asia, particularly around North Korea. We discussed that in the Middle East, there is no progress to report. And there is an extensive discussion on Iran. And that is what I want to focus on here and highlight just one element of that discussion.

We note that Security Council Resolution 1747, which was adopted in March, is more important and promising than has been commonly appreciated. Besides authorizing tighter sanctions, 1747 contains an annex that for the first time specifies the Security Council's backing of positive elements of a comprehensive agreement with Iran. This offers a starting point for U.S. participation in international negotiations with Iran. Indeed, U.S. support for the positive elements in the resolution reflects a genuine shift in the Bush administration's policy along the lines we urged in early 2005.

The annex declares the Security Council's goal to be, quote, "a comprehensive agreement," end quote, with Iran. Under such an agreement, the Council would, quote, "reaffirm Iran's right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and commit to support actively the building of new light water reactors in Iran through international joint projects with legally binding, multi-layered fuel assurances to Iran.

All of this, of course, depends on resolution of the crisis, and that, in turn, cannot be achieved unless Iran temporarily stops activities related to producing fissile materials, and provides the transparency necessary to enable the IAEA to resolve the outstanding issues regarding whether Iran's nuclear activities are solely for peaceful purposes. But if Iran meets these obligations, the members of the Security Council, including the United States, offered the prospect that Iran could be welcome to resume fuel cycle activities after resolving the outstanding issues with the IAEA.

This is a vital and often missed point. Iran should not receive special incentives, as some people talk about, until it comes into compliance with its IAEA safeguard agreement and the UN Security Council resolutions. But it cannot do this as long as core questions about its past nuclear activities are unresolved. It is highly possible that Iran, in turn, cannot resolve these issues without admitting that the highlighted activities were, in fact, related to non-peaceful applications of nuclear energy or were conducted by military organizations. Such would be a violation of Article II of the NPT.

Therefore, Iranian leaders would not have to be paranoid to fear that such an admission would invite severe reprisals by the United States, if not others. Therefore, U.S. officials and Iran's P5 interlocutors, we argue, should do more in public and private to reassure the Iranians that they will not be penalized further for coming clean about the past and resolving the outstanding IAEA questions. If, in enabling the IAEA to answer the outstanding questions, Iran admits that its nuclear activities have not been exclusively for peaceful purposes, this admission should not prompt additional punishment. Rather, it should inform the process, including its duration, by which Iran would restore international confidence in its nuclear program so that it could then proceed.

Obligation six – persuade India, Israel, and Pakistan to accept the same non-proliferation obligations accepted by the weapons state signatories to the NPT, grade D-. Well, clearly, the U.S.-India nuclear deal wasn't what we had in mind, and it goes to the heart of this issue. The status of the deal is uncertain. The report card and the conference later will be discussing this more fully, so I am not going to do that here. I'm just going to say that our assessment at this point is that the deal has done significantly more harm than good to the non-proliferation regime, notwithstanding the other purposes that it might be serving and which may have more beneficial implications.

Finally, then, the world needs better than a near-failing performance, a D+, if it is to be spared a nuclear disaster. Rules are necessary to prevent nuclear technology, material, and know-how from being misused. Rule-based systems do not spontaneously emerge and enforce themselves; leaders must build them and hold them together.

The grading metaphor here is quite telling. The D+ is an overall average of six component grades. The sole F dragged down the average. The failure of the nuclear weapons states to devalue the currency of nuclear weapons weakened the whole enterprise and diminished its effectiveness in areas where real effort, especially by the U.S. and a few other states, was actually being made, such as in stopping illegal transfers, securing materials. Time and again, we see that the policies and postures of the states with nuclear weapons weaken the willingness of others to establish, and more importantly, to enforce rules that limit the spread of sensitive technologies and that enforce the rules against those who break them, who often happen to be weaker than the nuclear powers.

Still, to be more positive, the D+ is a better average than we would have given in 2005. And there is reason to hope that performance can improve by 2010, which is going to be a major juncture in the non-proliferation regime. By February 2009, new leaders will be running the governments in the United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom, among the permanent members of the Security Council. And new leaders will quite possibly be governing other key states with or without nuclear weapons – it's very possible you could have new leaders in Pakistan, Israel, and India, just to name three. These new leaders will do much better than their predecessors if they understand that international security requires sound rules strongly enforced, and that the only way to achieve this is through the equity of universal compliance.

Let me stop there and urge you all to read the report. And now, it's my pleasure to introduce Jessica Mathews who will moderate the next panel, A World Free of Nuclear Weapons. Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

MS. MATHEWS: All right, we are turning now from that depressing review to one of the real bright spots – in my judgment – in many years in this field. In Washington especially, but really anywhere in the policy world, the impact or import of something that is said or written – (pause) – if you have a hard time hearing me, somebody wave, and I'll – the impact of something that is said or written reflects two things. One is what is said, the content. But the other, sometimes even more important, is who says it.

In the Wall Street Journal six months ago, an article appeared that called for, as the title said, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons." Its authors included two American former secretaries of State, a secretary of Defense, and a former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, all of them leading experts of the nuclear age. And on a Nixon goes to China scale of 1 to 100, I think this article rated about a 98.

Six months before that, another article appeared, written by our other speaker this morning, Ambassador Max Kampelman, which laid the intellectual groundwork, I would say, for this piece, or certainly started down that path. And Ambassador Kampelman has been a key player, both with respect to what he wrote then, but also behind the scenes in

putting together this extraordinary coalition of Republicans and Democrats whose piece really represented, I think, a paradigm shift in this field.

So we are going to have a conversation here, first among us on the stage, but then with you, about this development and what it means, and how we take it forward. This is really the central theme for this whole conference, so we will try to cover as much ground as we can.

In his piece, Ambassador Kampelman talked about the difference between what is and what ought to be, and he wrote that appreciation of the awesome power of the ought should lead our government to embrace the goal of eliminating all weapons of mass destruction; this from a man who had spent a major part of his career negotiating painfully through small incremental changes in the nuclear arms race. So Ambassador Kampelman, tell us what took you there, what changed in your mind to call for – not an incremental step, but a quantum leap?

MAX KEMPELMAN: Thank you very much. I think at the very outset, I ought to make it very clear that I do not consider myself to be an expert in this field. As a matter of fact, when President Reagan asked me – (audio break) – in arms – (audio break) – nuclear arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union, I was not qualified. I knew I was not qualified, and tried very hard not to get this assignment. Just kind of sotto voce, the president understood this, and at one point said to me, Max, I'm asking you to do this, because I cannot get my secretary of Defense and my secretary of State to agree on anybody else. So I ended up with that assignment; I'd had some experience – actually three years of experience negotiating under the Helsinki Process, which turned out to be, after the three years, quite a successful development, mostly in our negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Now, the decision for me to move into the negotiating process, and the decision to start the negotiating process again between us and the Soviet Union was made in Geneva, at which time, both George Shultz and Mr. Gromyko, his Soviet counterpart, agreed that it would be desirable to bring Gorbachev and Reagan together. They had never met, and so a decision was made to bring them together, so they can get acquainted. And that was scheduled for December of 1985, as I recall. My negotiating talks with the Russians began a few months earlier than that. I did not attend the summit in Geneva in December.

But when the president returned to Washington, he called a meeting of his advisors at the White House to explain what had happened in his discussions with Mr. Gorbachev. And I was present at that meeting. That's the meeting when he said to us, Maggie was right; we can do business with this man. And I heard him say that.

And then, in the course of reporting to his group of advisors – there must have been about 20 or 20 Cabinet people and other people around there – he kind of slowly let drop that he had suggested to Mr. Gorbachev the desirability of having the talks lead to zero nuclear weapons. I can tell you that there was consternation in that room when he

made that statement. And I, frankly, did not know enough about the subject to know which was desirable, which was not desirable.

But the president's advisors in the main, and quite a few of them, very politely spoke up, and explained their view, which was that it was not in our interest to go zero. He very politely listened to all of this, didn't argue, didn't reply, and he did not reply until the next meeting in Reykjavik, when he repeated the offer.

Now, we had a negotiation. It's a negotiation that produced two treaties. None of them went to zero on INF, the intermediate forces, which he pushed very hard at all of our informal meetings. And I think that some of the people in our Defense Department who went along with the zero INF – I think, though, I wouldn't – I can't demonstrate this – but that was my sense. That was a way of saying, well, maybe it isn't the best to go to zero, but at least Reagan wants it; let's give him something. And that's at least my sense of what transpired. But at least we ended up with two treaties, the only two treaties in existence between our two countries on the subject. And one was zero and the other was 50 percent reductions.

Now, I've been quite active in Washington in its political scene and its civic scene and its legislative scene. I don't mean as a lobbyist, because I never did lobby. But I did spend six and a half years with Hubert Humphrey when he and I both came to Washington at the same time. So the government – and I taught political science – so that government and the study of government was something that was an integral part of my life wherever I was. And obviously, when I completed the assignment in Geneva, I kept active and interested in foreign affairs and domestic affairs and political affairs.

And obviously, it became very clear to me recently that we, the human race, is in serious trouble. I kept in touch, of course, with him – but before I even get to that, I want to say a word about those two treaties that I refer to, because also, that has its effect on my colleague, Senator Sam Nunn. Shortly after those treaties were ratified, I received a telephone call from the Soviet Embassy saying that the chairman of the Soviet Academy of Science was in Washington, and wanted to see me. I knew him; I'd met him a few times; and I found a rather angry man, when we sat down at the lunch – or at least, he acted as if he were an angry man.

And the anger had to do with, here you forced us into zero and 50 percent reductions – this is the theme, not the words particularly – and now what's happening; Iran is buying up all of my scientists. Some of them are going to Iran; others are on the payroll but remaining in Moscow. He went on also to say that they had a very serious problem over what to do with the weapons-grade material that was no longer useful to them. And he mentioned where they were placed in his country, and he also said, we don't have enough money to guard them, and people are coming in and stealing that uranium from us, and who knows what they're doing with it. You've got to do something about this, was his statement to me.

I did bring this issue to the White House who asked me if I would begin coming up with some kind of solutions to this problem. But I also brought it to a group in the Senate known as the Nunn-Lugar group, and I met with their staff. And I can say that the Nunn-Lugar solution to these problems – and Sam’s leadership in this area – proved of tremendous assistance.

The general direction of the solution was – or at least as far as it relates to this subject – was that we would buy the weapons-grade material from the Russians, and we would transform them into commercial-grade material. And I was a representative of our government without salary, trying to get this thing worked on. And we found a company in Washington, in the United States that did this. And the process began of moving the weapons-grade into civilian-grade. I can also say to you that rarely did some months go by before I would get a complaint from somebody in the Russian embassy of the difficulty of working with the U.S. Department of Energy, haggling over pace. I would have to find somebody in the White House who would make a phone call to the Department of Energy to get this thing straightened out.

I mention this, because it a little bit of the atmospherics that we’re talking about. In any event, as a citizen, somebody following government, as somebody with some experience in the field, it became increasingly clear to me as it has really for the intelligent world that we’re in trouble as a civilization. The United Nations was reporting different figures – 27, 40 countries doing the work, getting involved in nuclear weapons. I read the newspapers about the negotiations, and I can certainly see the representatives of North Vietnam (sic) and Iran and other countries saying, look, you’ve got them, the Brits have got them, other European – French have got them – the Russians have got them, Pakistan has got them, India has got them, Israel has got them; what are we? Why can’t we have them? And let me tell you, that’s a persuasive argument – at least I have always found it to be a persuasive argument.

And that’s part of the essence of our problem in the world. And frankly, as the father of children and grandchildren, and as somebody who had been active and continued to be active in community affairs, I see a situation where if Iran gets it, what does Turkey do, what does Syria do, what does Egypt do? In Asia, what does Japan do, except emulate? And we’re in a world that is ready to explode, and not a world safe for my children or grandchildren.

And I remembered Reagan – incidentally, I had very close relationships with President Reagan. He knew I was a Democrat; it didn’t matter to him. At one point, he pointed out to his staff that he was once a Democrat, too. I remember that vividly. But the fact of the matter is that a responsible citizen or responsible leader has to understand the human race is in danger. And what are we doing about it?

MS. MATHEWS: Let me take that as a segue here. Ambassador Kampelman is an awardee of the Presidential Medal of Freedom, which is the highest civilian honor in the United States. If there is justice, I think Senator Nunn will one day hold it as well, because I believe that nobody had done as much as he, both as a public servant, but as a

private citizen since leaving the Senate, to offer national and international leadership in this field.

Sam, in the negotiation between George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, and Bill Perry in itself is a pretty difficult negotiation, perhaps. Take us through the steps that the four of you were able to agree upon, and take us a little behind the scenes. What didn't make the list? Was it an obvious agreement, an easy agreement? Is this the list that we should all take as our marching orders? Take us through that a bit.

SAM NUNN: Like Max Kampelman, a person I deeply admire – and I'd say that Max more than any one person has been the inspiration behind the Wall Street Journal article, because Max made a marvelous speech at the conference George Shultz had at Stanford last fall, where he talked about the ought. And the ought was basically a world that was not plagued with nuclear weapons.

So all of us came from a different perspective, and of course, that's one of the strengths, I think, of the four of us getting together. Bill Perry was in the Department of Defense and led the Department of Defense during the period when the Nunn-Lugar, Max, was being implemented, and did a marvelous job. More than any other secretary of Defense, he led the way to the accomplishments of the early, mid-1990s under the Nunn-Lugar program, including having four countries that had nuclear weapons after the breakup of the Soviet Union end up with one country. Three countries got rid of all nuclear weapons, including Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. So it ended up with one nuclear power. You can take the world as we see it today and then multiply in terms of danger if all those countries were possessed of the nuclear arsenal they had. So Bill Perry comes from that background.

George Shultz comes from the background that Max Kampelman had laid out, the close relationship with Reykjavik and with Ronald Reagan. And of course, Henry Kissinger wrote the book on nuclear weapons and talked about it for many, many years.

From my perspective, very briefly, in 1962, I was 23 years old, right out of law school, and was asked to go on an Air Force trip – I was working here on Capitol Hill – to Europe. I happened to be there with the Air Force right during the Cuban Missile Crisis. I saw that firsthand, up front, top secret briefings everyday. So I saw how close the world came and how fortunate we were that we had sober, strong leadership making decisions at that crucial stage.

Then, in 1974, I went to Vietnam and I saw the problems we had there. I went to Europe right after that. I saw the problems we had with a demoralized military – alcohol problems, drug problems, and so forth – following Vietnam. That played a big role in my own background on this. I went to Europe after that – Germany, NATO – I saw thousands of tactical nuclear weapons. I talked to our people who were charged with using those weapons or recommending the use of those weapons if there was a conventional type war between the Warsaw Pact and the United States and our NATO allies.

So all that as a way of background, and then flash forward a few years – 1991, I was in Russia as they were debating the breakup of the Soviet Union. And I talked to a number of my Russian friends, including military friends who told me that they were basically sitting on a time bomb with all the problems they had with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials spread over those time zones. Came back, put all that together with background and present events, got with Dick Lugar, and we passed the Nunn-Lugar bill.

Now, evolving forward very quickly from that one, at NTI, we have been working for a number of years to try to get control of nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, working on the steps necessary to make the world safer, to reduce risk, not only in the nuclear arena, but also in the biological and chemical. I have slowly but surely come to the conclusion that the United States cannot be protected without the steps that we have outlined in that Wall Street Journal article, including protecting nuclear materials, including reducing nuclear numbers, including getting control of former Soviet Union nuclear materials as well as nuclear materials around the globe, including stopping the production of new fissile material, including the basic step of verification, which is enormously important – working verification – all of those steps are enormously important, and including solving the regional issues, which give rise to the demand side. All of those steps are enormously important, not only for our own security, but for the world.

So I came to the conclusion in the last several years that we cannot take those steps without cooperation of the world. We cannot get cooperation of the world without a vision. And I think that vision has to be back to the Non-Proliferation Treaty obligation of the nuclear powers to take steps – step-by-step – to get rid of nuclear weapons under Article VI and to prohibit nuclear weapons around the world. So without the vision, I do not believe we can get the cooperation. And without the cooperation, we're not going to be able to protect the security of the United States and the world.

During my experiences in 1962, 1975, 1991, the whole array of my experiences tell me that during the Cold War, both the United States and our allies and the Soviet Union were diligent in regard to nuclear weapons after we had some near misses. We were capable, we were effective, and we were very, very lucky. Now, you multiply the number of nuclear powers by two that we have now, you get up to 10, 15, 20 nuclear powers. Or, you add another 10 or 15 enrichers out there that are enriching nuclear material, albeit for legitimate purposes. You add all that together and we are approaching a perfect storm. The leaders in the future of 10, 15, 20 countries have to be diligent; they have to be absolutely effective; and they have to be lucky, time after time after time – not one time; every time like we were during the Cold War.

I don't think that's likely to happen, and I think we all should recognize that. So Jessica, bottom line, I think we are in a perfect storm. I think we have a combination of nuclear materials around the globe with continued fissile material production. We have

know-how proliferating in terms of groups being able to make weapons, not just nations. We have terrorists who we know will use weapons if they get them.

And then, you add to that perfect storm a couple of earthquakes. One earthquake is Iran and North Korea if they get weapons, and all the things that flow from that. And the other earthquake is another whole subject, which is global warming leading to a great deal of interest in nuclear energy. And I happen to believe that we need nuclear energy in the world. All of those things mean that we're going to have more people using nuclear materials, so we are at a precipice now.

And if we do not reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons around the globe, if we do not strengthen all the legs of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including access to technology in a safe and secure way, including Article VI obligations, and including no new nuclear powers – if we don't do all of those things, the perfect storm combined with two earthquakes, to me, means that we have a world that is on the edge.

MS. MATHEWS: Thanks. I want to now ask both of you the same question, which is rooted in today's external reality – the United States, probably with its lowest international standing ever, with huge problems all over the Middle East, with the end of an administration and a Congress in the other party's hands. In both of your views, what can be done unilaterally – can be, should be – by the United States, if anything? And what is realistic for us to think about? What is the most urgent, in your view, step that is politically feasible to imagine in the next, say, year or two, and that will really make the biggest difference?

MR. NUNN: Well, Jessica, my view is that this whole subject has to be done with a number of countries moving together. I don't think there are many – there are some – but there are not many unilateral moves that can be made by our nation without losing the ground support, political support you need. If this looks like a unilateral-type effort by the United States, I think that it will not be well-founded politically. But there are certain things we can lean on, because we are the country – we and Russia most of the nuclear weapons. So the United States and Russia have to lead; that's the way I view it. I view it a U.S.-Russian challenge to begin the leadership, and the other nuclear powers have to be very much involved in that as we move along.

A couple of things that come to mind – and President Gorbachev recently wrote an article in the Wall Street Journal in response to our article, which enumerated these two things, so I am concurring with him. One is, we can ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. That is something the United States can do and show leadership.

The second thing, I think we need to ask ourselves the question, how is it in the United States' security interest for a Russian president to have only a few precious minutes to decide, 15 years after the Cold War, whether – if a general comes in and tells him that they suspect that they are under attack and they may lose their weapons if they do not respond immediately – how is it in our interest for the president of Russia to have only a few precious minutes to decide whether to launch his weapons or possibly lose

them, when the notice could be erroneous? I think the Russians ought to ask themselves the same question. How is it in the Russian interest for the president of the United States to have only four or five minutes to make a decision that could basically decide the existence of both of our nations, and indeed, most of the world? I think the answer to the question is clear – it is not in the interest of either.

Now, why don't we do something about it? Why is it we have thousands of weapons on hair trigger alert – the worst possible example for India and Pakistan and Israel and other countries around the globe and China? Why is it we don't do something about that? Why don't the two presidents – they have a good relationship and we are fortunate in that respect – why don't they put some meat on the bones? There is no meat on the bones. There is nobody below them working on these things with a direct, focused leadership by our two presidents. Now, I'm not going to try and sort out who is more responsible, but the collective result is that we still have thousands of weapons on hair trigger alert.

Why don't they get our military leaders together and say, go off for a month if you need to, and find out what it is on the U.S. side that we're doing that makes you believe you've got to have your weapons poised to strike by the thousands in a very brief time. Can we help you increase your warning time? Can we increase decision time? The two leaders ought to charge that to the military leaders and come back – I know there are technical aspects here – but the fundamental fact is we are sitting in a hair trigger posture 15 years after the Cold War. I think that's the fundamental thing that we can work on, not unilaterally, but bilaterally with the Russians – that and the ratification of the CTBT.

MR. KAMPELMAN: I have a slightly different emphasis with respect to the question. I believe the United States can act unilaterally in the following way. I would have the president of the United States appear before the United Nations General Assembly and announce by putting in a resolution that the world should accept the notion that the possession and development of nuclear weapons is a crime against humanity and a crime against the international body. This – and Sam used the word that I've been using – ought – the declaration of what ought to be, identifies us as a people with that which is highly desirable and essential for world survival.

Now, does this accompany many complications? Of course. We're not going to unilaterally reduce any of our armaments, at least not from my point of view. But I do think it would be essential for us as a country, to be identified with the peoples of the world as to what ought to be. Now, there are complications. How do you inspect? How do you make sure there is no cheating, et cetera? Those questions would be referred to the Security Council, where we have a veto to make sure that our interests are protected.

But I do feel that this business of our not acting until somebody else acts or until a group of others act is a formula for inaction. And what I would like to see is leadership, because the American people do feel, I am convinced, as the peoples of all the world are convinced, that we've got to get rid of this danger. And we ought to get rid of this

danger. And we ought to say so as a government to the world that we have no risks involved, because we're not giving up anything until there is a system arranged, a system provided.

But I do feel very strongly on the power of the ought, and this is what I think Sam was referring to when he said that my emphasis is on the ought. I think the United States and the people of the United States ought to say to the world, we've got more arms than all of you put together. We're prepared, with proper inspection and proper guidance and proper punishment for the criminal states – we're prepared to get rid of ours, too.

MS. MATHEWS: Okay, let's –

MR. NUNN: Jessica, could I have one thing on that? There is no light between Max and me on this point. That is a unilateral leadership position by the United States, premised on multilateral response. So that, to me, is a multilateral move.

MR. KAMPELMAN: Right, that's the way we have harmonized our approach.

MR. NUNN: Yeah, I agree with that leadership.

MS. MATHEWS: Let's turn, following up on your identification of the U.S.-Russian channel as critical. With us is General Vladimir Dvorkin who has spent a 40-year career in, first Soviet, and Russian defense ministry agencies, and was a critical player in a whole range of arms control negotiations. So I wanted to ask him how Russian military planners respond to Senator Nunn's points. What do they have in mind as additional steps that could be taken to increase warning times and lengthen the nuclear fuse? How do you think, General, that the two countries could proceed on this?

VLADIMIR DVORKIN: (Remarks through translator.) Thank you, Jessica. On our way to the world free of nuclear weapons, it is necessary to make several very important steps so that on the first stage, we have to get away from the principle of the mutual nuclear deterrence between Russia and the United States. I am not going to speak about the absurd of this state. But as a first step, we need to increase the time for awareness and we also have to make sure that we get away from the principle of START for the rockets, for the missiles.

In 2004, upon the recommendation of Sam Nunn, I managed a project in this area. Highly qualified Russian specialists and experts participated in this project. All possible options were discussed and all possible solutions were discussed out of the lunch based on the awareness principle. As a result, it was demonstrated that it is possible to lower the readiness for launch without harming safety and security of the countries. There are many details in this project and I will not speak about the details right now.

However, I would like to mention that, together with Alexei Arbatov, we have prepared a draft of an executive agreement between Russia and the United States. This is

very well checked from the legal standpoint, which consists of seven articles, which plans for the ban to launch rockets and also control measures as a result.

I do not know who received this draft agreement from Sam Nunn in the United States, but we have submitted this proposal to our security council. Since then, on both sides of the ocean, there was a deep sleep state. In order to wake up everybody from this deep sleep, Alexei Arbatov and I have written a book together. And this book was published last year. This book is present here at this conference. In this book, we suggested that we should get away completely from the regime of the mutual nuclear deterrence between Russia and the United States. We also suggested to increase the time for awareness, and we also included time characteristics for both countries in case countries would need to return to the state of readiness for their nuclear weapons.

The January article, which was mentioned here by Jessica, Senator Nunn, and Ambassador Kampelman, contains certain elements, which we included in our proposal. How long will our leaders be sleeping this time, I cannot predict. But I think that without these proposals and without these steps, we will not be able to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, and without following Article VI, it will be difficult to achieve this peace.

MS. MATHEWS: Thank you. I want to – General Dvorkin told us we now have a draft executive order ready for two new presidents. Or maybe we should send it to Kennebunkport next week and not waste time. But if I may, I want to go on and just explore two other international aspects of these issues before we open the floor to everybody. The article called for the elimination of forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons. And for Turkey, that's a real issue. So I wonder – we have Mustafa Kirap Gogulu (sp) with us. And we've asked him if he would just say a word about how the elimination of tactical nuclear forces in Europe would affect Turkey's nuclear thinking with Iran on its border and the concerns that it has.

MUSTAFA GOGULU: Thank you, Jessica. The last name is difficult for even Turks, so don't worry about it. (Laughter.)

MS. MATHEWS: I'm sorry.

MR. MUSTAFA: Well, actually, it's a very good coincidence, because I had written an article just on this very subject, title, Isn't it Time to say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey, which was published in the December 2005 issue of European Security Journal, in which I discuss arguments for and against withdrawal of nukes from Turkey. Actually, nuclear weapons have been deployed in Turkey since the very first decision in this respect back in 1959 during the NATO summit.

And during the Cold War, Turkey has been a staunch supporter of NATO strategies. First few strategies said no to no first use; said no to a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Balkans. But since 1990, the Turks are quite aware that these are mere political weapons. But considering the unrest in the Middle East, such as the situation in

Iraq, Iran's nuclear program – which may be weaponized, which I believe that they are not going towards weaponization – added to this Putin's statement regarding the INF and the CFE agreements. So Turks would like to keep these weapons – I'm talking about the political analysts and policymakers would like to keep these weapons, not only as part of this consideration, but also, they see nuclear weapons as a part of the strong bond between Turkey and the United States, which the relationship has been deteriorated over the last five years. So they are quite aware of the fact that there are such proposals going around; they are throwing these weapons.

But they have serious concerns as to whether the United States has a secret agenda. Is the United States developing a special weapon that the U.S. will not be depending on the allies for these weapons for forward defense, projection power capabilities? And they are also concerned if there are secret talks with the Iranians who are complaining about nuclear weapons that are deployed in – (unintelligible) – base. And Iranians told me personally that they see Turkey as a nuclear weapons state because of the U.S. nukes in Turkey. So they wouldn't like to abandon, as Turkey was abandoned back in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Jupiter missiles were withdrawn without the consultations with Turkey.

Well, actually, I truly appreciate that Turkey's policymakers are concerned about this. But I think it's the time to say farewell to nukes in Turkey, because Turkey is promoting the idea of creating a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East. But Turkey cannot stay outside of these talks, because unlike the Cold War period, the Middle East countries are also looking at the situation in Turkey.

And although it is a topic for the time being, or very, very difficult to implement, I am a true believer of steps taken in that direction to make nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East. I have written on that 10 years ago back at – (unintelligible). So therefore, I think Turkey should endorse this view and therefore as a matter of responsibility should send back U.S. nukes, which have no deterrent value, in my opinion. And there is also this danger of these weapons and the material passing into the hands of the terrorists. So the Middle East is somewhat suffering from this. So I think it is time to start considering seriously and also urging other allies in Europe to send these nukes back to the United States. And then, in return for this, expect strong steps to be taken by the United States itself. Thank you.

MS. MATHEWS: Thank you. The quartet also called to get control of the nuclear enrichment process. Maybe on no other issue is the, if you, why not us problem more acute, because there may be significant commercial interests at stake as well. And here, an absolutely key player is Brazil, which has built its new enrichment plant, which is up and running and certified under full IAEA inspection. I want to ask Jose Goldenberg (sp) who has played a key role on these issues for decades how he thinks Brazil's enrichment plans and capabilities are affecting global efforts to stop the spread of fissile material proliferation to non-nuclear weapon states.

JOSE GOLDENBERG: I think what Jessica is really asking is if Brazil, in enriching uranium, isn't setting a bad example, maybe, to Iran. I think that's the real question. The answer is that the Brazilian program is under IAEA safeguards, and in addition to that, under safeguards of ABAAC, which is the Argentina-Brazil Agency for Accounting and Control, which introduce the neighbor controlling neighbor approach in South America, which proved to be very, very effective indeed. For that reason, Brazil is considered not a danger to proliferation today.

Now, Brazil and Argentina and the others want to keep their capability of enriching uranium as a safety net. I say safety net against politically future threats of fuel security interruption. That is the reason. And maybe become a fuel exporter, although I don't think that makes much economic sense, as it does not for Iran either. One way such perception could change, and therefore decrease the number of countries interested in enrichment, is to have ironclad supply guarantees of low enriched uranium, which only a fuel bank at the International Atomic Energy Agency, could give.

Talking of bad examples, however, the present efforts to create a plutonium economy, and the lack of progress on these several treaties that have been mentioned here by Senator Nunn, will certainly increase the dangers of nuclear proliferation more than small enrichment plants under full International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.

MS. MATHEWS: Thank you. All right, we're going to open the microphones now for your questions for Ambassador Kampelman and Senator Nunn. There is one in the back there and in the middle here. I urge everybody to please just go to the microphones and we'll take questions in the order people are in. If you can be as crisp as you can, we'll get as many questions as we can. Please, go right ahead.

Q: My name is Howard Moreland (sp). I would like to propose a target test. To me, nuclear weapons are all about targets. The Manhattan Project turned out to be about Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I think a nation, which wants to have a nuclear arsenal, should publish to the world its list of nuclear targets, and offer a justification why these targets might need to be destroyed, and why nuclear weapons would be necessary to destroy them. In other words, what is the military necessity for the United States or any other nation to have nuclear weapons and why should the world agree that we have the right to do it? We have to explain what our targets are and convince the world that we need weapons to destroy these targets.

MR. NUNN: I think, internally, that's what our Department of Defense should be doing all the time. I hope some of that work is going on internally. The strategic command under General Cartwright should be looking at why we need nuclear weapons for missions that conventional weapons could handle. I hope the Russians would do the same thing. I think you would probably, in the classified world, never have that public. And I would think that if it were public, I'm not sure it would contribute to the overall rational discussion, because I think that the public version of it would be so scaled down from what the real world is in the classified world that it would be of virtually no value.

But internally, you're absolutely right. And I believe that today, we really should be asking that question. Every nuclear state should be asking that question.

MS. MATHEWS: You want to add anything there?

Q: Thank you. Derek Roe (sp) from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thank you for two very interesting perspectives there. I was surprised that neither of our two speakers made any reference to the legal obligation, not only of the United States but the other nuclear weapons states under the NPT, to work towards eliminating their nuclear arsenals. And my second point is that I think there needs to be an initiative from the United States unilaterally. All of the major arms control treaties have their births in the U.S. one way or another.

And can you imagine the impact of a U.S. unilateral initiative on eliminating nuclear weapons? I'm not saying that the U.S. announces that they are unilaterally getting rid of their nuclear weapons, but take the leadership role in announcing new proposals along the lines that were mentioned here or other proposals, which would instantly grip the world in terms of moving this agenda forward, because we are now stuck in a deep morass. The NPT review process is failing; the Millennium Summit failed. And at the moment, nobody can see a bright light anywhere in this issue of ridding the world of nuclear weapons.

MS. MATHEWS: Thank you, please.

Q: Larry Widar (sp), I helped to negotiate the NPT. And I'd like to make a couple of comments on the idea of moving to general elimination of nuclear weapons. Remember, the United States spent many years attempting to negotiate general and complete disarmament, which involved the question of conventional weapons as well as nuclear weapons. And a lot of blood was shed on interagency fights, what went into the third stage and the last part of the third stage and the elimination of nuclear weapons in interagency fights.

The point I'm making here is that there's been a fundamental change in the prospects for moving towards the general elimination of nuclear weapons with the changed situation. We don't have a situation where we're faced with overwhelming conventional superiority in Europe. The American position in a non-nuclear area is such now that we have opportunities now that we never had before. But we do have obligations under the treaty, legal obligations as was mentioned.

Getting back to the question of what we could do now, I would argue that one thing that ought to be considered is the question of our nuclear weapons use policy. We tried, during the negotiation of the treaty, very hard to get some agreement on negative security assurances, which is another form of this. Some of those efforts were conducted formally; some informally. We never could get over the problem of the fact of the American perceived situation in Europe, where we thought we were faced with

overwhelming Soviet conventional superiority. We have a completely new situation today, and the inhibitions of the past don't apply.

And I think that one thing we could do now is consider, as a first step, a unilateral declaration by the United States of no first use of nuclear weapons. This is a policy that is overwhelming. Our present policy is different, and it's a book policy. And I don't believe it's believed by a lot of people in office. I put the question to President Bush about a year ago. Would he consider the question of a U.S. policy of no first use of nuclear weapons as a step, and ask others to join? The transcript of that exchange doesn't reflect the reality, I think, because he stood and thought about it a long time and said, I take your words to heart. Can you hear me? I take your words to heart and I'll think about it.

Now, maybe he was being polite, but I don't think it was just that. I think that a lot of leaders are prepared to do things we don't think they would do today. And I think that this is a policy that is directly related to the legitimacy of the position that the nuclear weapons states are in today. We're in an illegitimate position, and I would think this is a step that we could take.

MS. MATHEWS: Thank you, please.

Q: Thank you very much. Rebecca Johnson, the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy. I found this a very interesting and heartening conversation, and I was particularly delighted to hear you speak of the importance of U.S. ratification for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Now, clearly U.S. leadership – and in particular, if the U.S. ratified that treaty – it would immediately give a massive boost both to the non-proliferation regime and to international efforts to bring on board the remaining holdout states, which include North Korea, Iran, India, Pakistan. Just a handful of them are preventing this treaty entering into force. Now, it seems to me it needs a bipartisan initiative that will convince enough Republican senators to vote for a treaty that is very, very clearly in U.S. national interests.

So my question is, how can this bipartisan initiative build on the – and bring up to date – the Shalikhvili Commission to show the importance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and its excellent verification regime for U.S. national security interests as well as, of course, for international security and non-proliferation interests. And perhaps a good start would be to restart full U.S. funding for the CTBTO verification regime.

MS. MATHEWS: Sam, do you want to address that question?

MR. NUNN: Yes, I think the Shalikhvili position has basically been justified. That was an analysis done by a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, John Shalikhvili, back after the Senate declined to ratify the Test Ban Treaty. And he laid out a number of steps that he thought technology would assist in on the concerns of some of the senators who were trying to be constructive critics, rather than just all-out opponents. I think that a lot of that has already come to play in terms of technology capabilities, so I believe it's

time for the Senate to take another whole look at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and I think there is a possibility – probably in the next administration; probably not this one – for that fresh look to happen. And of course, as I said, I think that’s one of the steps the United States should take.

I would also say, in answer to Tarik’s question, I thought I had mentioned the legal obligation under Article VI, because we do have that legal obligation. Every president has endorsed that. But if I didn’t, I certainly would agree on that.

The second point on Tarik’s question – the fuel bank I think is important. The fuel bank or the Russian proposal, which I think is a good one, to have an international type fuel production of low enriched uranium on Russian soil. I think that Brazil could be a center there, if Brazil goes ahead with that. I think all of this has to be under IAEA control. And the way I visualize the fuel bank is a last resort that would be available if the market failed, if these other insurance policies fail. And it would not require people to forsake their sovereign rights forever to not enrich, but it would simply look on the ground. What are the facts? If you’re not enriching, if you’re not reprocessing, you are eligible for these backup guarantees. So we’re not advocating creating another have/have-not regime around the globe as we had under the NPT and still have.

MS. MATHEWS: Okay, we’re eating into the coffee break, but we’ll try to take a couple more comments.

Q: I’ll make it quick. My name is Fineas Anderson (sp). I have a question for the General and perhaps Senator Nunn. My understanding was that there was a center to be established in Moscow to do what Senator Nunn says is a real problem, which is to increase the warning time and to reduce the potential of accidents. I’m curious to hear from the General and from Senator Nunn what has happened to that. My understanding is it’s been delayed, and I can’t understand why, given the urgency of the situation.

MR. NUNN: Jessica, you want me to take that real quick? That was a proposal made in the Clinton administration. I thought it was a terrific proposal. For one reason or the other, it got bogged down, and it’s just sort of faded away. And I think that’s a dramatic mistake. I think we need to work with joint warning. I think the missile defense system needs to come under the auspices of increased warning time. United States and Russia need to increase the decision time for our leaders. General Dvorkin and Alexei Arbatov’s proposal is a very good one; it’s a beginning point to think through this whole equation of how we increase both warning time and decision time. If you could get General Dvorkin and Alexei sitting down with some of our top military leaders today and some of their counterparts who are still active duty, under the right political guidance – under the right political guidance from the two presidents, I think you could come up with some dramatic examples of leadership that would be instructive, not only to protect security of the U.S. and Russia’s citizens, but also for the world.

MS. MATHEWS: Okay, one last comment.

Q: I'm Ted Postal (sp) from the MIT working group. I was very struck and in complete agreement with Senator Nunn's stated concerns about the short warning time problems that could lead to a nuclear accident. Our group has been working on various early warning systems, and actually analyzing incidents with the early warning systems over the last few years. And we believe that we have technical solutions that could work globally. And I would very much like the opportunity to spend some time with you and any of your other colleagues, talking to you about technical solutions, which are realistic – we believe; I mean that is to say they could be implemented – in particular in the form of space-based early warning systems that are available using technology outside of the United States, not just American technology, which is often a barrier to doing things, that would probably give as much early warning as is physically possible.

And we've been talking to the international community about a variant of a system that could give global surveillance information. This is not the same – the technology is similar, although the objectives are different. And we'd very much like to provide you and your colleagues with some technical input on this matter. And then, of course, you could make your own judgments about whether or not it could be useful.

MR. NUNN: I would welcome that, and I would think that even more important, if we could get you with the people who can really make the decisions in the Department of Defense and in the White House, but we'd be delighted to try to be helpful in that regard. And I'd love to get briefed.

MS. MATHEWS: And Ted, maybe we can organize something at lunch tomorrow on this. I'm going to get fired by my staff if I take any more of your coffee break. We are going to be coming back to all of these ideas in the next two days. But I hope that you will join me in thanking our speakers for having raised the bar rather amazingly on everybody.

(Applause.)

(END)