The following document is a new consensus statement of administration policy prepared by the White House. It was distributed by cable to all U.S. embassies and post abroad to provide American diplomats with talking points to help persuade other governments to support President Bush's plans for deployment of missile defense systems. The concepts in the paper were circulated on Capitol Hill earlier this week and briefed to reporters on Wednesday, July 11.

The Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project obtained a copy of the cable and is posting it on the web to increase public understanding of the Administration's proposals.

Project Director Joseph Cirincione provides an analysis of the defense plans in a Carnegie Analysis (click here for the analysis).

For key documents and background materials on missile defense, please see our Missile Defense section.

The cable is presented in four parts: "Principal Themes on Missile Defense," "Questions and Answers," "The Impact of the ABM Treaty on U.S. Missile Defense Programs," and "Misconceptions about Missile Defense."

SUBJECT: MISSILE DEFENSE PAPERS

1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. Enclosed at paragraphs 2 through 5 are four unclassified papers on missile defense: principal missile defense policy themes; likely questions and answers related to the themes; the impact of the ABM Treaty on missile defense development and deployment; and misconceptions about missile defense. Posts should provide copies of these papers to host governments and draw upon them, as appropriate, as part of the U.S. public diplomacy campaign.

2. (U) BEGIN TEXT of "Principal Themes on Missile Defense":

Principal Themes on Missile Defense

1. The United States intends to move beyond mutual assured destruction and the ABM Treaty. The world has changed fundamentally and the rationale for Cold War arrangements no longer exists. We require a new foundation for our strategic relationship with Russia.

-- The ABM Treaty codified the adversarial relationship between the two superpowers that existed during the Cold War. It was premised on a relationship of distrust and mutual vulnerability.

-- We need to move beyond the concept of mutual assured destruction with Russia. Russia is not the Soviet Union and is not an enemy. Retaining MAD at the center of our relationship with Russia perpetuates suspicions and encourages the retention of artificially large nuclear arsenals. Nuclear weapons should no longer be the principal currency of our relationship.

2. As part of a comprehensive strategy to protect against today’s threats, we need a new concept for deterrence. Today’s most urgent threat stems not from thousands of Soviet missiles, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction.

-- The principal threat today is no longer a disarming first strike like we thought about in the Cold War, but rather the use of long-range missiles by rogue states for purposes of terror, coercion, and aggression.

-- These states also possess large numbers of short- and medium-range missiles that pose a significant threat to deployed U.S. forces, and friends and allies abroad.

-- The leaders of these states have demonstrated a willingness to take large gambles and have stated that they are acquiring WMD and long-range missiles as a means to prevent us from coming to the assistance of our friends and allies in vital regions of interest.

-- We need an updated approach to deterrence that includes both offenses and defenses. Missile defense is not a replacement for an overwhelming response capability, but rather an added dimension of contemporary deterrence and an insurance policy against attack by a handful of missiles, It is also one element of a strategy to dissuade and deter countries from acquiring or using WMD and ballistic missiles.

3. To meet our deterrence and defense requirements in light of the changed security environment, the United States needs release from the constraints of the ABM Treaty to pursue the most promising technologies and basing modes to field limited, but effective missile defenses.

-- The ABM Treaty explicitly prohibits a nationwide defense of our territory from missile attack. We are only permitted to defend a missile field in North Dakota.

-- The Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

-- The Treaty prohibits giving ABM capabilities to non-ABM components. It bans the development, testing, and deployment of "theater defenses" to give them capability to counter longer-range strategic missiles. For example, the Treaty would permit the Airborne Laser to shoot-down shorter-range missiles like the North Korean No Dong but may well prohibit this program if it has the capability to destroy longer-range missiles like the Taepo Dong, which has demonstrated the capability to strike the United States.

-- The Treaty also prevents us from sharing and working on ABM defenses against longer-range missiles with our allies (and even from cooperating with Russia).

4. The Administration will pursue a robust missile defense RDT&E program to acquire the capabilities to deploy limited, but effective missile defenses as soon as possible to protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies.

-- The proposed missile defense testing for FY 2002 represents the first step in revising the program inherited from the Clinton Administration. That program did not draw on many of the most promising technologies and basing modes because they are prohibited by the Treaty.

-- We plan to add additional tests of other technologies and basing modes, such as air- and sea-based capabilities against longer-range missiles. As we have informed our allies and Russia, these tests will come into conflict with the ABM Treaty in months, not years.

-- There is no intent to conduct tests solely designed to exceed treaty constraints. There is also no intent to design tests to conform to, or stay within the confines of the Treaty.

-- As the President has indicated, the results of our RDT&E program will demonstrate what works and what does not. Those missile defense systems that progress most rapidly and show the most promise will receive greater emphasis and funding.

-- We will make choices regarding missile defense deployments based on the results of our RDT&E program.

-- Criticisms based on cost and effectiveness are premature and unfounded since the Administration has yet to select missile defense systems for deployment.

5. The Administration intends to construct a new strategic framework with Russia. We seek a framework that reflects the realities of the post-Cold War world and that is founded on common interests and cooperation.

-- The new framework will be premised on openness, mutual confidence, and real opportunities for cooperation.

-- The new framework will reflect a clean and clear break from the Cold War, and will not be based on the 1972 ABM Treaty.

-- The new framework will also include substantial reductions in offensive nuclear forces, cooperation on missile defense, enhanced non- and counter-proliferation efforts, and measures to promote confidence and transparency.

END TEXT.

3. (U) BEGIN TEXT of likely "Questions and Answers" related to the principal themes:

The Administration’s Principal Themes on Missile Defense:

Questions and Answers

Theme 1: The United States intends to move beyond mutual assured destruction and the ABM Treaty. The world has changed fundamentally and the rationale for Cold War arrangements no longer exists. We require a new foundation for our strategic relationship with Russia.

Q: Will the concept of mutual assured destruction remain a part of the Administration’s deterrence strategy?

A:

-- The concept of mutual assured destruction was an expression of the implacably hostile relationship that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

--To address the threats of the 21st Century, we need a new concept of deterrence that includes both offensive and defensive forces. Mutual assured destruction is not a part of this concept of deterrence.

-- As the President has said, Russia is not the Soviet Union, and is not our enemy. Mutual assured destruction no longer makes sense as the basis of our strategic relationship.

Theme 2: As part of a comprehensive strategy to protect against today’s threats, we need a new concept for deterrence. Today’s most urgent threat stems not from thousands of Soviet missiles, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction.

Q: Why does the Bush Administration believe that missile defense is the only response to dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery?

A:

-- The President has made clear that we need a comprehensive strategy to counter this complex and dangerous challenge. This strategy must include strengthening nonproliferation measures (prevention), more robust counterproliferation capabilities (protection), and a new concept for deterring contemporary threats, relying more on defenses and less on offensive nuclear forces.

-- Missile defense has received enormous attention and a common misperception is that this is the totality of our agenda in this area.

-- Missile defense is a key part of our broader strategy for dealing with proliferation, but is only a part of the overall approach.

Theme 3: To meet our deterrence and defense requirements in light of the changed security environment, the United States needs release from the constraints of the ABM Treaty to pursue the most promising technologies and basing modes to field limited, but effective missile defenses.

Q: Why not rely on threats of nuclear retaliation to deter countries like North Korea from launching a missile at the United States?

A:

-- As the President has said, "...Cold War deterrence is no longer enough. To maintain peace, to protect our own citizens and our own allies and friends, we must seek security based on more than the grim premise that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us."

-- Today, the list of countries with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles includes some of the world’s least responsible nations. They seek weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors and to keep the United States and other responsible nations from helping allies and friends in strategic parts of the world.

-- During the Cold War, our goal was to prevent one hostile power from using an arsenal of conventional and nuclear weapons against us. In the less predictable world of the 21st Century, our challenge is to deter multiple potential adversaries not only from using weapons of mass destruction, but to dissuade them from acquiring WMD and missiles in the first place.

-- One of the factors that make ballistic missiles so attractive to many states is that effective defenses have not been fielded to counter them. Missile defenses undermine the value of ballistic missiles, thereby reducing the incentive to acquire these weapons in the first place.

Theme 4: The Administration will pursue a robust missile defense RDT&E program to acquire the capabilities to deploy limited, but effective missile defenses as soon as possible to protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies.

Q: Can’t the United States do all the missile defense research and testing it needs in the next couple of years without breaking the ABM Treaty, like the Clinton Administration did?

A:

-- The Clinton Administration designed its missile defense architecture to be "as Treaty-complaint as possible." Therefore, it limited its development and testing programs primarily to ground-based components for defense against longer-range threats. The Treaty allows limited work of this kind (although deployment outside North Dakota, or in a way that would protect all 50 states, would not be allowed).

-- In addition to prohibiting us from defending out nation's territory and people, the Treaty bans development, testing, and deployment of many of the most promising technologies and basing modes for strategic missile defense, like sea- and air-based defenses.

-- As the President has said, we will examine all available technologies and basing modes for missile defense. As we have informed our allies and Russia, we expect our RDT&E efforts will conflict with ABM Treaty limitations in a matter of months, not years.

Q: Why not wait to see if missile defenses will "work" before rushing to deploy them?

A:

-- In addition, our determination to field missile defenses as soon as possible is driven by the urgency of the threat.

-- For example, in 1998 North Korea launched a three-stage Taepo Dong I missile that overview Japan. The Intelligence Community assesses that this launch demonstrated the ability of North Korea to deliver a small payload to the United States. The Taepo Dong 2 missile currently under development in North Korea will have an even greater range and payload capability.

-- Our programs will be structured so that the limited number of interim systems initially deployed can be progressively improved and replaced by more capable systems able to keep up with the threat.

-- Because interim capabilities cannot be expected to perform flawlessly, critics of missile defense may accuse us of deploying systems that do not "work." However, a limited interim capability is warranted in light of existing and emerging near-term threats and the unpredictable nature of those threats. We will fully consider test results and system effectiveness before making deployment decisions.

-- Such capabilities, even if not perfect, will provide more protection than we currently have -- which today is no capability at all against longer-range missiles able to strike American cities.

Theme 5: The Administration intends to construct a new strategic framework with Russia. We seek a framework that reflects the realities of the post-Cold War world and that is founded on common interests and cooperation.

Q: What will the new strategic framework with Russia consist of?

A:

-- The President has said we will seek to complete the work of changing our relationship with Russia "from one based on a nuclear balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests."

-- The new strategic framework should be premised on openness, mutual confidence and real opportunities for cooperation, including the area of missile defense. It should allow us to share information so that each nation can improve its early warning capability and its capability to defend its people and territory.

-- The new framework will also include cooperation to strengthen and enlarge bilateral and multilateral non- and counterproliferation measures.

-- The framework will also include substantial reductions in offensive nuclear forces. As the President has said, the United States is committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies.

END TEXT.

4. (U) BEGIN TEXT of "The Impact of the ABM Treaty on U.S. Missile Defense Programs":

The Impact of the ABM Treaty on U.S. Missile Defense Programs

The President has stated publicly that we must move beyond the constraints of the 1972 ABM Treaty -- "an artifact of the Cold War confrontation" that prevents us from acquiring the capabilities we need to deter and defend against new threats and that perpetuates an adversarial relationship with Russia. The Treaty explicitly prohibits any defense of our nation’s territory and bans development, testing, and deployment of many of the most promising missile defense technologies and basing modes.

Specific Treaty Restrictions

- Article I of the Treaty explicitly prohibits a nationwide defense of our territory from missile attack. We are only permitted to defend a missile field in North Dakota.

-- Article V of the Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems and components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

-- Article VI prohibits giving ABM capability to non-ABM systems or components. It bans the development, testing, and deployment of "theater defenses" to give them capability to counter longer-range strategic missiles.

-- Article IX prevents us from sharing and working on defenses against longer-range missiles with our allies.

Examples of Restrictions on U.S. Missile Defense Programs Based on these restrictions, the Treaty:

-- Prohibits deployment of ground-based ABM interceptors and construction of an ABM radar in Alaska. (The Clinton Administration plan could not be deployed under the Treaty.)

-- Prohibits the use of sea-based interceptors and radars aboard Aegis or other ships against long-range strategic missiles.

-- Bans the construction of an ABM. radar on a ship or barge to support ground- or sea-based interceptors.

-- Prohibits space-based ABM sensors.

-- Would permit the Airborne Laser to shoot down shorter-range missiles like the North Korean No Dong but may well prohibit the capability to shoot down longer-range missiles like the Taepo Dong, which has demonstrated the capability to strike the United States.

Missile Defense Development and Testing in FY 2002

-- The Clinton Administration designed its missile defense architecture to be as "Treaty-compliant as possible." Therefore, it limited its development and testing programs to ground-based components for defense against longer-range threats. The Treaty allowed limited work of this kind. (As noted, deployment in Alaska would not be allowed.)

-- The proposed missile defense testing for FY 2002 represents the first step in revising the program that was inherited from the Clinton Administration. The test program will be modified and built upon to reflect the goals and guidance of the new Administration. We will pursue all promising technologies and basing modes, including those prohibited under the Treaty.

-- We need a robust development and testing program to determine what works. In effect, the ABM Treaty prevents most elements of such a program. Only once we have conducted such a program will we know what to deploy and at what cost. To criticize the Administration’s approach on effectiveness or cost grounds now, before we have been able to pursue our development and testing program, is premature.

-- The objective of the test program is to field as soon as possible limited, but effective defenses against threats numbering in the handfuls, not hundreds or thousands. There is no intent to conduct a test solely to exceed Treaty constraints. There is also no intent to design tests to conform to, or remain within the confines of the Treaty.

-- As we have informed our allies and the Russians, we will seek capabilities not allowed under the Treaty, including sea-based and other mobile capabilities designed to intercept longer-range missiles.

-- Moreover, and again as we have told both allies and the Russians, while we do not know precisely when our programs will come into conflict with the ABM Treaty in the future, the timing is likely to be measured in months not years.

New Philosophy on Missile Defense Development and Deployment

-- DoD is adopting a flexible, evolutionary approach to missile defense RDT&E and deployment.

-- The FY 2002 Amended Budget will include new funds to reinvigorate research on technologies with missile defense applications, to speed development of proven technologies, and to enable robust testing and evaluation of systems that are more mature.

-- Under our new approach, test assets could be adapted and fielded as soon as possible to provide an interim capability against near-term threats.

-- For example, the prototype of the Airborne Laser is scheduled to attempt its first shoot-down of a missile in 2003. If this test demonstrates the capability to intercept, the Airborne Laser prototype could be available to provide an emergency missile defense capability.

-- In addition, deployment of an interim ground-based system could be completed in Alaska as early as 2004 by upgrading existing radar capabilities and emplacing interceptors drawn from test assets.

-- The flexibility and evolutionary nature of the missile defense RDT&E program will be different from the standard weapons development process. The process will be iterative and ongoing. Those systems that progress most rapidly and show the most promise will receive greater emphasis and funding.

-- The limited number of interim systems that could be deployed on an emergency basis will not be fully mature but, especially in combination, will make an important contribution to the defense of our cities, our forces and friends and allies.

-- Our missile defense programs are structured so that these interim systems can be progressively improved and replaced by more capable systems to provide effective, layered defenses against a limited missile attack, numbering in the handfuls, not hundreds or thousands.

-- Because interim capabilities cannot be expected to perform flawlessly, critics of missile defense may accuse us of deploying systems that do not "work." However, a limited interim capability is warranted in light of existing and emerging near-term threats and the unpredictable nature of those threats. Such capabilities, even if not fully mature, will provide more protection than we currently have -- which today is no capability at all against longer-range missiles able to strike American cities.

-- These capabilities are not an alternative or substitute for traditional deterrence, but rather an essential means to enhance deterrence against the new threats of today, not those of the past.

END TEXT.

5. (U) BEGIN TEXT of "Misconceptions about Missile Defense":

Misconceptions about Missile Defense

-- . States like North Korea and Iran would not dare to attack the United States, knowing that they would pay a terrible price in response. Nuclear deterrence prevented the Soviet Union from attacking the United States and our allies in the Cold War. We can continue to rely on offensive deterrence instead of missile defenses.

-- The world has changed greatly since the Cold War. We no longer have the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, but, as the President said, this is still a dangerous world, a less certain, and a less predictable one.

-- We need to update our concept of deterrence to reflect the realities of the current security environment, which includes weapons of mass destruction in the hands of some of the world’s least responsible states. These leaders place great value in possessing even a small number of long-range missiles.

-- The leaders of these states have demonstrated a willingness to take large gambles and are acquiring weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles as their means to deter us from coming to the assistance of our friends and allies in vital regions of interest.

-- These leaders may well believe that they can blackmail us -- prevent us from helping the victims of their aggression -- if they can hold even a small number of our cities or those of our friends and allies hostage to attack.

-- This is not Cold War deterrence. States like North Korea and Iran are not seeking massive arsenals for a first strike. We are seeking the ability to defeat a small number of missiles to deny these countries an instrument of coercion and aggression.

-- Missile defense also provides an alternative to the grim prospect of being forced to order a retaliatory strike that might kill many innocent civilians for the reckless act of an irresponsible dictator.

2. The technology for missile defense simply does not work.

-- The United States has formidable engineering and scientific capabilities that are up to the task.

-- In fact, we have already had several notable successes in our development programs.

-- The PAC-3 system has successfully intercepted target missiles in all seven intercept tests conducted thus far.

-- The last two intercept tests of the THAAD system were successful.

-- Israel’s Arrow missile defense system, which was developed jointly with the U.S., has had successful tests and is now being deployed.

-- The first intercept test of the ground-based system for defense of the U.S. against long-range missiles was also successful.

-- In this test, a warhead on a target missile launched from California was successfully destroyed by a kill vehicle launched from an atoll in the South Pacific.

-- This was not a "lucky shot," or an event that occurred "by accident" as some have described it. When a target warhead and a kill vehicle that are each about the size of a chair, collide in the vastness of space about 140 miles above the earth, at closing speeds of 15,000 miles per hour after being launched over 4,300 miles apart, that is not an accident.

-- Although we have had many successful tests of our missile defense systems, we have also had some failures.

-- This is not unusual for development programs. Test programs are designed to uncover engineering flaws and we expect that some future tests will inevitably not succeed. But we will learn from each event.

-- There were several notable failures in early tests of rockets for the U.S. space program. Yet we persevered, and eventually landed a man on the moon. In fact, manned space flight is almost routine today.

-- As the President has said, we will evaluate what works and what does not in our missile defense programs. We know that there will be failures and that some approaches won’t work. But we will build on our successes.

3. Even if it could work, missile defense costs too much money.

-- Bearing the cost of missile defense is a national security imperative given the growing threats we face from rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction and seeking long-range missiles.

-- The cost to inaction cannot be measured in dollars, namely vulnerability to blackmail or attack from rogue states armed with WMD and missiles.

-- Like other major defense programs, such as those to develop new fighter aircraft or ships, missile defense will require significant funding. Even so, it will only represent a small fraction of the defense budget.

4. Diplomacy and arms control are more effective ways to stop proliferation.

-- Diplomacy is an essential tool in countering WMD and missile proliferation. Prevention is the first line of defense.

-- We will work with friends and allies on nonproliferation and counter-proliferation efforts to prevent and protect against the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

-- The United States will continue to support arms control treaties like the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), but we understand that such agreements have limits. Some rogue states cheat on such agreements, as Iraq did with its crash program to develop a nuclear weapon prior to the Gulf War. Other rogue nations simply do not join such international agreements.

-- We know that despite our best efforts, WMD and missile proliferation has occurred on a wide scale and that determined nations will acquire greater and more dangerous capabilities in the future.

5. The 1972 ABM Treaty is the "cornerstone of strategic stability." There would be profound problems if the United States were to withdraw from the Treaty.

-- The world has changed greatly since 1972.

-- Unlike the Cold War, today’s most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of rogues.

-- The President has said we must move beyond the constraints of the ABM Treaty to deter and defend against the threats of today’s world.

-- The ABM Treaty codified the adversarial relationship between the superpowers that existed during the Cold War. It was premised on a relationship of distrust and mutually assured destruction. We need a new foundation for our strategic relationship with Russia. Russia is not the Soviet Union. Russia is not an enemy.

--We have begun real consultations with friends, allies, and, importantly, with Russia about a new cooperative framework that addresses the realities of the post-Cold War world.

-- This new framework will allow for defenses, substantial reductions in strategic offensive forces, as well as counter- and non-proliferation efforts.

6. Deployment of missile defenses will lead to a new arms race.

-- We have said all along that we seek missile defenses to deal with the threat of blackmail and terror by rogue states.

-- The limited missile defenses we intend to deploy would only be capable of defending against handfuls of incoming missiles, not hundreds or thousands.

-- The limited missile defense that we will deploy would not in any way undercut the Russian nuclear deterrent, even at levels below those reportedly being contemplated by Russia.

-- Furthermore, Russia has maintained a missile defense system around Moscow for decades and understands that missile defenses are not provocative or destabilizing.

-- China is already engaged in a substantial effort to modernize its strategic nuclear forces which are currently capable of striking the United States. We do not believe our deployment of limited missile defenses should lead Beijing to further accelerate or expand its buildup of strategic nuclear forces.

-- Defense procurement is a very transparent process in the United States. The limited scale of long-range missile defenses we seek will be clear to all and be the subject of public discussion and debate.

-- Furthermore, one of the factors that makes ballistic missiles so attractive to many states is that effective defenses have not been fielded to counter them. Missile defenses devalue these weapons, thereby reducing incentives for proliferation.

7. Deployment of missile defenses will harm relations with Russia and China.

-- We believe it is important for Russia and the United States to work together to develop a new foundation for our relationship in the 21st Century.

-- This relationship should no longer be based on the 1972 ABM Treaty, which was premised on an adversarial relationship of distrust and mutually assured destruction.

-- The ABM Treaty was created at the height of the Cold War, and prohibits us from defending our nation’s territory and that of our friends and allies against the growing threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

-- The new framework of our relationship with Russia should reflect a clean and clear break from the Cold War, and should be premised on openness, mutual confidence, and real opportunities for cooperation.

-- Over the coming months, we hope to complete the work of changing the U.S.-Russia relationship from one based on a mutual balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests.

-- With regard to China, we do not view China as an enemy, and our limited missile defenses are not directed at it. Our defenses are designed to protect against those states that would threaten or blackmail us.

-- We do not believe the deployment of limited missile defenses should compel China to increase the pace and scale of its already ambitious effort to both modernize its strategic nuclear forces and deploy hundreds of shorter-range missiles opposite Taiwan.

-- Furthermore, missile defenses are not provocative. These purely defensive weapons can only be used to defeat an incoming missile launched by an aggressor or a missile launched by accident.

8. Deployment of missile defenses will split the U.S. from our allies who are opposed to this idea.

-- There is a growing recognition among allies that the threat from WMD and missiles is growing and represents a major security challenge for the future. This is reflected in statements by many national leaders in Europe and Asia.

-- There is also a growing recognition that missile defenses are an essential element of the response to today’s threats. This is clearly seen in the remarks by a number of allied leaders.

-- The list of countries with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs includes some of the world’s least responsible states. This poses a growing threat to the United States, as well as to our friends and allies.

-- These rogue states seek weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors and to keep the U.S. and other nations from helping allies and friends who may be victims of aggression.

--When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the world joined forces to turn him back. But the international community would have faced a very different situation had Hussein possessed the means to blackmail us and our allies with even a few nuclear-tipped missiles.

-- Far from splitting the United States from our allies, missile defenses help us to meet our international commitments to come to their aid in a crisis.

-- The President recently sent several high-level U.S. delegations around the world to consult with friends and allies on this important topic.

-- We intend to continue working with friends and allies to create a new framework for security and stability that reflects the new strategic environment.

9. Missile defense does not defend against other means of delivering a WMD payload to the U.S., such as a terrorist using a suitcase or car bomb.

-- The United States must also defend against these other threats.

-- The United States spent about $11 billion last year on counter-terrorism efforts, about twice as much as we did on missile defense. We also work closely with friends, allies, and the broader international community on counter-terrorism initiatives.

-- The President recognizes the need to do more to protect America’s homeland and citizens against the possibility that a terrorist group could use weapons of mass destruction against targets in the United States.

-- In May, the President launched a major initiative, appointing Vice President Cheney to oversee the development of a coordinated national effort that will expand and integrate the myriad federal, state, and local government efforts in the WMD preparedness area.

-- The President has asked the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to create an Office of National Preparedness. This Office will be responsible for implementing the results of those parts of the national effort overseen by Vice President Cheney that deal with consequence management. Specifically, it will coordinate all Federal programs dealing with weapons of mass destruction consequence management within the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other federal agencies.

-- But, in addition to defending against the potential terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction in the United States, we also need missile defense because countries like Iran and North Korea are making enormous efforts to acquire and develop long-range ballistic missiles --suggesting that ballistic missiles are the "weapons of choice" for these nations for coercion and blackmail.

10. The United States has exaggerated the WMD and missile threat. We should wait until we see whether the long-range missile threat actually materializes before we deploy defenses.

-- The threat from ballistic missiles is already present and will continue to grow.

-- For example, in 1998 North Korea launched a three-stage Taepo Dong 1 missile that overview Japan. The Intelligence Community assesses that this launch demonstrated the ability of North Korea to deliver a small payload to the United States. The Taepo Dong 2 missile currently under development in North Korea will have an even greater range and payload capability.

-- A number of rogue states also possess large numbers of short- and medium-range missiles that pose a significant threat to deployed U.S. forces, and friends and allies abroad.

-- Ballistic missiles, first used over 50 years ago when Germany launched hundreds of V-2 rockets against Great Britain, have become an increasingly common feature of modern conflict. For example, hundreds of ballistic missiles were used during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s.

--In the Persian Gulf War in 1991, 28 American soldiers were killed and 99 were wounded by a single Iraqi Scud missile that hit a barracks in Saudi Arabia. This is a high percentage of the total casualties the United States suffered in that conflict, in which 148 troops were killed and 470 were wounded in combat.

-- Only now, more than 10 years after that attack, are we about to field an effective capability designed to counter the short-range threat. We do not wish to ever be put in such a position again.

-- Because of the time it takes to field defenses, we cannot wait until an even greater long-range missile threat is upon us to begin development and testing of systems to counter this threat.

-- The number of ballistic missiles on the face of the earth, and the number of countries possessing them is growing. The technology for ballistic missiles is ubiquitous. The existence of this threat is not debatable -- it is real.

-- Sweeping political changes have occurred over the last 15 years and many more will occur over the next 15 years. The world of 2015 will almost certainly be little like today, and will without a doubt be notably different from what today’s experts are confidently forecasting.

-- While it is difficult to know precisely who will threaten us, or where, or when, we know that the technology for ballistic missiles will not disappear. This is why we need to develop the means to defend against these weapons.

11. The U.S. can proceed with all the missile defense development and testing it needs in the next few years without withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.

-- Article V of the ABM Treaty states that "Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based."

-- Development and testing of ground-based ABM capabilities are permitted under the Treaty. While the Bush Administration will examine ground-based options, we will also explore other avenues. We will pursue all of the most promising technologies and basing modes to provide for a limited but effective defense against rogue state missile threats. This will include sea-based and airborne capabilities prohibited by the Treaty. Given the threat, the President has made deployment as soon as possible a top priority.