World Missile Chart

By Joshua Williams
November 2005

This table represents the Carnegie Non-Proliferation’s best assessment of the world's ballistic missile arsenals.
We count 30 nations as fielding some type of ballistic missile. Missiles reported to be in development are listed in italics.
Endnotes and a key are provided below. ¹

Ballistic missiles differ from military rockets, such as the widely proliferated FROG’s, because they have guidance systems. The development of accurate guidance systems remains one of the most challenging engineering obstacles facing states that wish to indigenously develop ballistic missiles. Only 11 nations have missiles with ranges over 1,000 km; all the rest have only short-range, Scud-type missiles. Only 8 nations have been able to develop nuclear weapons that could be fitted as warheads on these missiles.

Ballistic missiles are sometimes confused with cruise missiles. A ballistic missile is one whose payload reaches its target by way of an initial powered boost and then a free flight along a high arcing trajectory. Part of the flight of longer-range ballistic missiles may occur outside the atmosphere and involve the "reentry" of a warhead or the missile. A cruise missile, as defined by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, is "an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path." Such a missile may carry either a nuclear or conventional warhead (definitions are taken from an arms control glossary provided by the U.S. State Department). The U.S. National Air Intelligence Center further stipulates that cruise missiles are "usually categorized by intended mission and launch mode" such as anti-shipping cruise missile, land-attack cruise missile, air-launched cruise missile, submarine-launched cruise missile.

For more resources, please visit our web site pages devoted to Missile Proliferation and Anti-Missile Systems located at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/.

We welcome your comments. If you are aware of information that could update this table, or of sources that could expand the information on this page, please e-mail us at proliferationnews@carnegieendowment.org

COUNTRY¹	SYSTEM NAME	STATUS	RANGE (KM)	PAYLOAD (KG)	ORIGIN	NOTES
Afghanistan	Scud-B	O	300	1,000	USSR	Operational status questionable.
Armenia ³	Scud-B	O	300	1,000	Russia
Bahrain ⁴	MGM-140 (ATACMS)	O	165	560	USA	Missiles manufactured by Lockheed-Martin.
Belarus	SS-21	O	120	480	USSR
Belarus	Scud-B	O	300	1,000	USSR
China	CSS-8 (M-7)	O	150-230	190	I	Two stage, first solid, second liquid. Road-mobile.
	CSS-X-7 (DF-11/M-11)	O	300	500	I	Solid fuelled. Road-mobile.
	CSS-6 (DF-15/M-9)	O	600	500	I	Solid fuelled. Road-mobile.
	CSS-2 (DF-3/3A)	O	2,650/2,900	2,150	I	Gradually being retired.⁵
	CSS-3 (DF-4)	O	5,500	2,200	I
	CSS-4 (DF-5/5A)	O	12,000/13,000⁶		I	Extended version (DF-5A) to be deployed in 2005.
	CSS-5 (DF-21)	O	1,800	600	I
	DF-25	D?	1,700	2,000	I	May just be the first two stages of the DF-31.⁷
	CSS-9 (DF-31)	D/T	8,000	700	I	Could be deployed in 2005 or 2006.⁸
	DF-31A⁹	D	12,000	800	I	Could be deployed between 2007 and 2009.¹⁰
	CSS-N-3 (Julang I) SLBM	O?	1,700	600	I
	CSS-N-4 (Julang II) SLBM	D	8,000	700	I	Sea-based version of DF-31. Could be deployed by end of the decade.¹¹
Egypt	Scud-B	O/U	300	1,000	USSR/DPRK
	Project T	O	450	1,000	I/DPRK	Improved Scud.
	Scud-C	O	500	600	DPRK
France	M45 SLBM	O	6,000	1,000	I
France	M-51 SLBM	D	8,000	?	I	Will replace the M-45 SLBM. First test scheduled for 2005. Possible deployment by 2010.¹²
Greece	MGM-140 (ATACMS)	O	165	560	USA
India	Prithvi-150	O	150	1,000	I/USSR	From Russian SA-2. Army Missile.
	Prithvi-250	O	250	500-750	I/USSR	From Russian SA-2. Air Force missile.
	Dhanush (Naval Prithvi)	D/T	350	1,000	I	From Prithvi. Last tested November 7, 2004. ¹³
	Sagarika¹⁴	D?	250-350?	500?	I	From Prithvi. Deployment scheduled for 2010 or later.
	Prithvi-350	D	350	500-1,000	I/USSR	From Russian SA-2.
	Agni I	O¹⁵	600-750	1,000	I/US/France	From Scout;first tested February 18, 1994. Last tested on January 9, 2003.
	Agni-II	O	2,000/2,500	1,000	I/US/France	Last tested August 29, 2004¹⁶; India says missile limited production has begun¹⁷
	Agni-III	D	3,500	1,000?	I	Test planned by the end of 2004. ¹⁸

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COUNTRY	SYSTEM NAME	STATUS	RANGE (KM)	PAYLOAD (KG)	ORIGIN	NOTES
Iran¹⁹	Mushak-120	O	130	190	I
	Mushak-160	O	160	190	I
	Fateh-110 (NP-110)	P	200	600	I/PRC?	Last confirmed test on September 6, 2002.²⁰
	M-7 (CSS-8)	O	150	190	PRC	Modified SA-2.
	Scud-B	O/U	300	1,000	N.Korea/Domestic production
	Scud-C	O	500	500 -600	I/DPRK
	Shahab III	O/T ²¹	1,300	750-800	I/DPRK	From Nodong. Last tested October 20, 2004.²²
	Shahab IV	D/T?²³	2,000²⁴	1,000	I/Russia	Based on Russian SS-4.
	Shahab V	D?	3,000-5,500?²⁵	?	I/DPRK/Russia?	Possibly based on the North Korean Taepodong I and II. ²⁶
Iraq²⁷	Al Samoud II	O/U²⁸	180-200	300	I	Liquid-fuel missile. From Scud B.
Iraq²⁷	Ababil-100/AI Fatah	O²⁹	160	200-300	I	Solid-fuel missile from Scud B.
Israel	Lance	O/S	130	450	US
	Jericho I	O	500	750-1,000	France	Road-mobile.
	Jericho II	O	1,500	1,000	France/I	Road-mobile.
	Jericho III	D?	3,000-6,500	1,000-1,300	I	Reportedly based on the Shavit Space Launch Vehicle.³⁰
Kazakhstan	Scud-B	O	300	1,000	USSR
Kazakhstan	Tochka-U (modified SS-21)	O	120	480	USSR
Libya³¹	Scud-B	E	300	1,000	USSR/DPRK
Libya³¹	Al Fatah³²	D/T	200	500	I
North Korea³³	Scud-B	O/P	300	1,000	USSR/Egypt?
	Scud-C Variant	O/P	500	600-700	I
	Nodong	O	1,300	700-1,000	I	Single-stage, liquid fuel missile. Tested May 1993.
	Taepodong I	T	1,500-2,000	1,000	I	Combined Nodong and Scud; tested 31 August 1998.³⁴
	Taepodong II	D	3,500-5,500	1,000	I	Reportedly ready for flight test if North Korea ends flight-test moratorium.³⁵
Pakistan	Hatf I	O	80	500	I
	Hatf II (Abdali)	O	180/280	500	I/PRC?³⁶	First test-fired in 2002. Last tested on March 31, 2005.³⁷
	Hatf III (Ghaznavi/M-11)	O	280-300	500	I/PRC	2001 NIE lists the Hatf III to be an M-11. Last tested November 29, 2004.³⁸
	Shaheen I	O/P³⁹	700-750	500	I/PRC	Solid fueled. Thought to be an M-9 derivative. Last tested December 8, 2004.
	Ghauri I (Hatf V/Nodong)	O	1,300	500-750	DPRK	2001 NIE lists the Ghauri to be a Nodong; last tested October 12, 2004.
	Ghauri II	D/T	1,500-2,000	700	I/DPRK	From Nodong; last tested April 14, 1999.⁴⁰
	Shaheen II⁴¹	D/P	2,000/2,500	750-1,000	I/PRC?	Road mobile, two-stage. Last tested March 19, 2005.
	Ghauri III	D/T	2,700-3,500	?	I/DPRK	Thought to be based on the Taepodong-1. Engines have been tested, but flight test planned for June 2004 never occurred.

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COUNTRY	SYSTEM NAME	STATUS	RANGE (KM)	PAYLOAD (KG)	ORIGIN	NOTES
Russia⁴²	Scud B (SS-1c Mod 1)	O	300	1,000	I	Liquid fuel.
	SS-21	O	120	480	I	Solid fuel.
	SS-18 (Satan)	O	9,000-11,000	8,800	I	Liquid fuel. Last tested December 22, 2004.⁴³
	SS-19 (Stiletto)	O	10,000	4,350	I	Liquid fuel.
	SS-24 (Scalpel)	O	9,000-11,000	8,800	I	Solid fuel. Rail-mobile.
	SS-25 (Sickle)	O	10,500	1,000-1,200	I	Solid fuel. Road-mobile. Last tested November 30, 2005.⁴⁴
	SS-27 (Topol-M)	O/P⁴⁵	10,500	1,000-1,200	I	First road-mobile version of SS-27 expected to become operational this year.⁴⁶ Last tested December 24, 2004. ⁴⁷
	SS-X-26 (Iskander)	D/T	300	480	I	Solid fuel. Testing has been completed; will enter service next year. ⁴⁸
	Iskander-E⁴⁹	D/T	280	480	I	Solid fuel. Testing has been completed; will enter service next year.
	SS-N-18 SLBM	O	6,500-8,000	1,650	I	Last tested November 2, 2004.⁵⁰
	SS-N-20 SLBM	O	8,300	2,550	I	No longer in service.⁵¹
	SS-N-23 (upgraded version is known as the Sineva) SLBM.	O	8,300	2,800	I	Last tested September 2004.
	SS-N-27 (Bulava) SLBM	D/T	10,000	1,000-1,200⁵²	I	SLBM version of the SS-27; last tested September 27, 2005; will be carried by the Borey-class submarine, expected to be deployed in 2006.
Saudi Arabia	Dong Feng-3 (CSS-2)	O	2,600	2,150	PRC	Purchased from China in 1987.
Slovak Republic⁵³	SS-21	O	120	480	USSR
South Korea	Nike-Hercules-I/A	O	180	500	I /USA	Modified SAM.
	Nike-Hercules-II	D /T	260-300	450-500	I/USA	Modified SAM; Tested at reduced range in 1999.⁵⁴
	MGM-140 (ATACMS Block I/IA)	O	165/300	560	USA	Block I purchased in 1997; Block IA purchased in 2001, deployed in 2004.⁵⁵
Syria	SS-21	O	120	480	USSR	Transferred 1983.
	Scud-B	O	300	1,000	USSR
	Scud-C⁵⁶	O	500-600	600-770	DPRK	Syria can now produce its own Scud-C's.⁵⁷
	Scud-D	T	700	500	DPRK	Based on the No Dong; last tested September 2000; Syria may now be capable of producing its own Scud-D's.⁵⁸
Taiwan	Ching Feng	O⁵⁹	130	270	I/Israel	From Lance.
Taiwan	Tien Chi ⁶⁰	O?⁶¹	300	500	I	Modified SAM. Tested in 1997.
Turkey	MGM-140 (ATACMS)	O	165	560	USA
Turkey	Project J⁶²	D	150	150	I/PRC	Based on Chinese WS-1.
Turkmenistan	Scud-B	O	300	1,000	USSR
Ukraine	SS-21	O	120	480	USSR
Ukraine	Scud-B	O	300	1,000	USSR
United Arab Emirates⁶³	Scud-B	O	300	1,000	Russia?
United Kingdom	Trident II (D-5	O	7,400+	2,800	USA
United States	MGM-140 (ATACMS Block I/IA/II)	O	165/300/140	560/160/270	I	All three versions have different ranges and payloads; all three versions have been delivered to the Army.
	Minuteman III (MK-12/12A)	O	9,650+⁶⁴	1,150	I	Last tested September 2004; service lives being extended until at least 2020.⁶⁵
	MX Peacekeeper	O	9,650+⁶⁶	3,950	I	All will be deactivated by 2005, although neither silos nor missiles will be destroyed.
	Trident I C-4 SLBM	O	7,400	1,500	I	Will be retired by 2007, at which time the SSBNs that carry the C-4's will carry the D-5's.
	Trident II D-5	O	7,400+⁶⁷	2,800	I
Vietnam	Scud-B	O	300	1,000
Yemen	SS-21	O	120	480	USSR	Transferred 1988.
	Scud-B	O/U	300	1,000	USSR	Transferred to South Yemen in 1979.
	Scud (variant unknown)	O?	300-500	600-1,000	DPRK	Spain and the United States interdicted shipment from DPRK, but subsequently allowed it to proceed to Yemen.⁶⁸

Status

D: in Development

O: Operational

P: in Production

S: in Storage

T: Tested

U: Used

RANGE
SRBM	Short-range ballistic missile (<1,000 km)
MRBM	Medium-range ballistic missile (1,000-3,000 km)
IRBM	Intermediate-range ballistic missile (3,000-5,500 km)

Origin

I: Indigenous

Notes

INF Treaty: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

SAM: Surface-to-air missile

Endnotes

1. Principle sources for this table include: National Air Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (National Air Intelligence Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, September 2000); National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015, Unclassified National Intelligence Estimate, December 2001; US Department of Defense (DOD), Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, DC: GPO, November 1997); discussions with various U.S. government and relevant embassy officials; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2004-2005 (London: Oxford University Press, October 2004); various Natural Resources Defense Council “Nuclear Notebooks” as published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists; Congressional Research Service. Feickert, Andrew. “Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries.” Updated 5 March 2004; Missile Defense Agency. “Ballistic Missile Capability: 2004.” Available at www.acq.osd.mil/mda/mdalink/pdf/BM2004.pdf; Arms Control Association. “Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories.” May 2002. Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles.asp; Claremont Institute. “Ballistic Missiles of the World.” Available at http://www.missilethreat.com/missiles/; GlobalSecurity.org. “Missile Proliferation Summary.” Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/missile.htm.

2. There are some questions regarding whether Argentina and Azerbaijan continue to deploy ballistic missiles. A number of sources report that Argentina tested and may have deployed the Alacran short-range ballistic missile in the late 1980's and early 1990's. The deployment of this missile cannot be confirmed, however, and the U.S. Department of State does not credit Argentina with this missile. During the Cold War, Azerbaijan imported a number of Scud-B short-range ballistic missiles from the Soviet Union. The Azeri embassy states that Azerbaijan is no longer in possession of these missiles, and very few reliable and publicly available resources credit Azerbaijan with Scud-B missiles. For these reasons we include neither Argentina nor Azerbaijan in our final count of countries with ballistic missiles.

3. Russia is thought to have shipped 8 Scud launchers and 24 missiles to Armenia between 1992 and 1995. See Nikolai Novichkov, "RUssia Details Illegal Deliveries to Armenia," Jane's Defense Weekly, 16 April 1997, p. 15.

4. Belarus announced that they will acquire the Iskander-E SRBM from Russia by 2010. "Belarus to Acquire Russian Multi-Warhead Missiles by 2010." Financial Times, November 12, 2004.

5. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. NRDC: Nuclear Notebook, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2003." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2003.

6. 13,000 km is the range of the DF-5A, which will be deployed in 2005. See Norris and Kristensen, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2003."

7. See Feikert, "Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries."

8. See the Department of Defense's "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China" for FY 2005. Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf Site visited 11/18/04. See also Norris and Kristensen, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2003."

9. The DF-31A is often confused with the now cancelled DF-41 ICBM. See Norris and Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2003.”

10. Ibid.

11. See the DOD’s “Annual Report On The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China.”

12. Natural Resources Defense Council. “Nuclear Data.” Available at http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab16.asp Site visited 11/18/04; see also, Bruno Tertrais. “Nuclear Policy: France Stands Alone.” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July/August 2004, Volume 60, No. 4, pp. 48-55

13. The Dhanush is the naval version of the Prithvi series. “Dhanush Successfully Test Fired.” Government of India, Press Information Bureau, November 8, 2004. Available at http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=4788 Site visited 11/8/04. See also "India's Nuclear Forces, 2005," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2005.

14. The Indian government first acknowledged the existence of the Sagarika in October 1998, identifying it as a 250- to 350-kilometer sea-launched cruise missile derived from the Prithvi. Other sources maintained that the Sagarika program also contained a ballistic missile division. U.S. intelligence reports have classified it as an SLBM.

15. According to Indian Defense ministry officials, the military armed itself with the Agni in August 2004. See http://www.spacewar.com/2004/040829170937.537jwumo.html Site visited 11/18/04.

16. The Agni II was tested for a third time on August 29, 2004, travelling a distance of 1,200 km (Agence France Presse. “India Tests Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missile.” August 29, 2004). It traveled approximately 2,000 km in a January 2001 test.

17. On May 31, 2001, the Times of India reported that the government had approved the induction of the Agni II and the development of a longer-range missile. In June of 2001, India announced it had begun limited production of the Agni II and that it would be under the control of the army (Rahul Bedi, “Indian Army Will Control Agni II.” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 22, 2001, p. 15).

18. See “India Begins Deploying Agni Missiles,” August 31, 2004. Available at http://www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=35647 Site visited 11/18/04.

19. DOD reported that Iran also produces a 200-km "Zelzal" missile and a 150-km "Nazeat" missile, which may be variations of its "Mushak" series. Iran has also tried to acquire a complete North Korean No Dong system and the Chinese M-9 and M-11 missiles.

20. Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iran Successfully Test-Fires Missile.” Associated Press, September 6, 2002.

21. The Shahab III was handed over to the Revolutionary Guard on July 20, 2003. See Feickert, “Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries,” pp. 16-17. U.S. intelligence says Iran has a "small number ... available for use in a conflict." Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani claimed in November 2004 that Iran could mass-produce Shahab III’s. “Iran ‘Can’ Mass-Produce Missiles.” BBC News, November 9, 2004. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3997151.stm Site visited 11/18/04.

22. “Iran Conducts New Shahab III Missile Test with Observers Present: Minister.” Agence France Presse, October 20, 2004.

23.In November 2003, Iran denied that it was continuing development of the Shahab IV, but a report in Jane's Defence Weekly in September 2004 cited former Israeli Ballistic Missile Defense director Uzi Rubin saying that an August 11, 2004 test was probably a Shahab IV rather than a Shahab III. This was based on some technical differences between the missile fired on August 11 and the Shahab III. It is possible that Rubin is wrong, however, and that the missile fired was an upgraded version of the Shahab III. See Alon Ben-David. “Iran Unveils Redesigned Shahab Missile.” Jane’s Defence Weekly. September 27, 2004. Available at http://www.janes.com/aerospace/military/news/jdw/jdw040927_1_n.shtml Site visited 11/18/04.

Also, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, a dissident coalition, suggests that Iran has already tested the Shahab IV, in May and August of 2002. See http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/iran/missile2004.htm Site visited 11/18/04.

24. Former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani said that Iran had missiles with a 2,000 km range in October 2004. It is possible that he was referring to the Shahab IV, but he also could have been talking about a significantly upgraded version of the Shahab III. His claims may not be accurate, though, as Iranian officials declined to comment on the Shahab-3’s range after its most recent test, on October 20, 2004. See “Iran ‘Increases Missile Range’” BBC News, October 5, 2004. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3716490.stm Site visited 11/18/04. See also “Iran Conducts New Shahab-3 Missile Test with Observers Present: Minister.” Agence France Presse, October 20, 2004.

25. Estimates of the range of this new IRBM are only speculative, drawing upon remarks by the Iranian Defense Minister, who identified the missile as the "Shahab-V".

26. See Center for Defense Information, “Iran’s Ambitious Missile Programs.” Available at http://www.cdi.org/program/index.cfm?programid=82.

27. According to “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Assessment of the British Government,” Iraq illegally retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles with a range of 650 km (in violation of UN sanctions). See http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/iraq/wmd.pdf Site visited 11/18/04. No al-Hussein missiles have been uncovered as of yet, however, and the Iraq Survey Group’s “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD” concluded that Iraq no longer retained the al-Hussein missile after 1991, having likely unilaterally destroyed them all.

28. Al-Samoud II missiles began to be destroyed under the supervision of UNMOVIC on March 1, 2003. In all, two-thirds of the missiles were eliminated when the war began on March 17, 2003. Five al-Samoud II missiles were fired at coalition forces during the war, but the system was recalled due to “failures.” See United Nations Security Council. “Thirteenth Quarterly Report on the Activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission” S/2003/580, May 30, 2003, pp. 28-29. Available at http://www.unmovic.org/ Site visited 10/25/04. See also “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD.” (The Duelfer Report of September 30, 2004), Vol. 2, Section 1, pp. 6-7.

29. See United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission. “Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes.” March 6, 2003, p. 38. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/cluster_document.pdf Site visited 10/25/04.

30. See the Monterrey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Israel” page. Available at http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/israel.htm Site visited 11/18/04.

31. In December 2003, Libya privately pledged to the United States that it would eliminate all MTCR-class missiles, that is, missiles that can travel over 300 km with a payload of at least 500 kg. It was agreed, at that time, that the Scud-B missiles would be modified and kept for defensive purposes. See Paul Kerr. “Libya to Keep Limited Missile Force.” Arms Control Today May 2004, Vol. 34, No. 4, p. 28. However, in September 2004, Paula DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, testified before the House Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, saying, “Libya…has agreed to destroy its Scud-B missiles.” See “Completion of Verification Work in Libya.” Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, September 22, 2004. There have also been unconfirmed reports that Libya attempted to purchase No Dong’s from North Korea prior to its December 2003 decision to cease its pursuit of WMD. See http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/Missile/3834_3845.html Site visited 11/18/04.

32. Though intended to have a range of 950 km, the Al Fatah has been successfully tested to only 200 kilometers. See Department of Defense Proliferation: Threat and Response 2001, p. 47-48. The Al Fatah was not considered to be MTCR-class, and thus was not included as part of the deal made between Libya and the U.S. in December 2003.

33. Jane’s Defence Weekly reported that North Korea was developing two new missiles, one land-based and the other sea-based, in August 2004. Both missiles are reportedly based on the Russian SS-N-6 SLBM. The report has not been confirmed. See Joseph S. Bermudez. “North Korea Deploys New Missiles” Jane’s Defence Weekly August 4, 2004. Vol. 41, No. 31, p. 6.

34. This was the most recent missile test of any kind conducted by North Korea. The missile impacted 1,320 km from its launch point. It attempted and failed to put a small satellite into orbit, demonstrating some progress in staging technology.

35.See “The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context.” Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 9, 2004.

36. Most believe it is based on the Chinese M-11, but one report says it is based on French motor technology. See S. Chandrashekar, "An Assessment of Pakistan's Missile Capability," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, March 1990, p. 4.

37.Rana Jawad. “Pakistan Test-Fires Missile.” Agence France Presse, March 26, 2003.

38.“Pakistan Test-Fires Missile.” Agence France Presse, November 29, 2004.

39.Pakistan announced "serial production" of this missile in October 2000.

40.Shah Alam. “Pakistan Test-Fires Long-Range Ballistic Missile in Response to India.” Agence France Presse, April 14, 1999.

41.See Atul Aneja, "Pakistan Begins Work on Shaheen-II," The Hindu, September 27, 1999.

42. The Russian SS-N-8 SLBM is no longer deployed and is in the process of elimination. The 12 remaining SS-N-8’s are still counted in the biannual START memoranda of understanding, however, because they have not yet been eliminated. See http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/2004/30816.htm Site visited 11/18/04.

43. “Russia Test-Fires Ballistic Missile,” Agence France Presse, December 22, 2004.

44. “Russia Successfully Test-fires Ballistic Missile.” Daily Times (Pakistan), November 30, 2005.

45. 36 SS-27’s have been produced and deployed. See Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, NRDC Nuclear Notebook, “Russia’s Nuclear Forces, 2005.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2005, Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 70-72.

46. “Press Conference with Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov, Strategic Forces Commander.” Federal News Service, December 10, 2004.

47. “Russia Test-Fires Mobile Version of its Latest Missile,” Associated Press, November 30, 2004.

48. Interfax News Agency. “New Missile Launchers Will Be Shipped to Troops Next Year, Ivanov.” 27 August 2004.

49. The Iskander-E is merely the export version of the SS-X-26. It has been slightly modified, with a range of just 280 km, in order to comply with the 300 km, 500 kg limit laid out by the Missile Technology Control Regime.

50. “Russia Test-Launches Land- and Sea-Based Ballistic Missiles.” Associated Press, November 2, 2004.

51. Pavel Podvig. “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces: Strategic Fleet.” Available at http://www.russianforces.org/eng/navy/ Site visited 12/17/04.

52. Our estimate based on the fact that the Bulava (SS-NX-30) is the SLBM version of the Topol-M (SS-27).

53. Slovakia has eliminated its Scud-B missiles. Personal conversation with a State Department official in the Office of Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, October 1, 2004.

54. An unidentified missile traveled 62 km in a test firing on November 22, 2001. See Don Kirk, “South Korea Launches Missile In Its First Test Since Last Year.” New York Times, November 23, 2001.

55. “South Korea Completes Deployment of New Medium-Range Missiles: Report.” Agence France Presse, October 9, 2004.

56. The Jerusalem Post reported development of an advanced Syrian modification of the Scud-C (which could possibly be the Scud-D tested in September of 2000), but this report has not been confirmed by Western sources. See Arieh O'Sullivan, "Syrian Super Scud Ready Soon-Source," Jerusalem Post, September 16, 1999.

57. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Syria: Missile Capabilities.” Available at www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Syria/Missile/print/4126_4127.prt Site visited 11/18/04.

58. Ibid.

59. IISS, The Military Balance 2004-2005, p. 189.

60. This program was reportedly initiated in autumn 1995 and is based on the Sky Bow II SAM.

61. Jane’s Defence Weekly reported on 26 March 2001 that Taiwan had deployed up to 50 Tien Chi missiles on Tungyin Island and at an undisclosed second location.

62. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. The Middle East Strategic Balance, 2003-2004, Chapter 19: Turkey. Available at http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/balance/Turkey.pdf Site visited 12/17/04.

63. In 1989, the UAE reportedly attempted to purchase 25 Hwasong-5 (Scud-B variant) missiles from North Korea. According to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the UAE was not happy with the missiles and they were never operationalized. There is no publicly available evidence to confirm these reports, however. See the Monterrey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK.” Available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op2/fbmsl.htm Site visited 12/17/04.

64. The Minuteman III missile may have a range of up to 13,000 km, but the U.S. Strategic Command officially lists its range at “greater than” 9,650 km. Available at http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheetshtml/submarines.htm Site visited 12/3/04.

65. With the demise of START II, the U.S. has amended its plans to downgrade all Minuteman missiles to a single warhead. See Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. NRDC Nuclear Notebook, “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2004,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2004, Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 68-70.

66. The MX Peacekeeper may have a range of up to 11,000 km, but the U.S. Strategic Command officially lists its range at “greater than” 9,650 km. Available at http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheetshtml/submarines.htm Site visited 12/3/04.

67. The Trident II D-5 may have a range greater than 7,400 km, but this is the U.S. Strategic Command’s officially listed range. Available at http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheetshtml/submarines.htm Site visited 12/3/04.

68. Spain and the United States interdicted a North Korean shipment of 15 Scud missiles, warheads, and missile fuel on December 9, 2001. The shipment was eventually allowed to proceed and arrived in Yemen five days later. It is not known whether the Scuds in question were Scud-B’s or Scud-C’s. See Paul Kerr, “U.S. Stops Then Releases Shipment of N. Korean Missiles.” Arms Control Today, January/February 2003, Vol. 33, No. 1, p. 25. See also Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Hwasong-6 (Scud-C): Overview and History,” available at http://www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/msl/cap/NKM_Ch_hwaso6_GO.html Site visited 1/18/05.

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