Iran's Programs to Produce Plutonium and Enriched Uranium
Carnegie Fact Sheet
Updated 10/14/04
Revati Prasad
Below are details on the current status of Iran's programs to produce plutonium and enriched uranium.
I. URANIUM ENRICHMENT PROGRAM
Iran's uranium enrichment program is more advanced than previously thought and Israeli intelligence claims Tehran may be able to produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) to make a nuclear weapon by 2007. Iran has pursued two different methods for enriching uranium: gas centrifuge enrichment and laser enrichment. In late 2003, Iran declared that it would halt all enrichment-related activities and sign the Additional Protocol. Iran signed the protocol on December 18, 2003, though the Majlis (Iran’s parliament) has not yet ratified it and continued to assemble centrifuge components. According to press reports, Iran agreed to halt centrifuge production on March 19, 2004.
On June 18, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors
adopted a resolution condemning Iran for failing to cooperate fully with
the agency’s investigation of its nuclear programs. Iran responded by sending
a letter to the United Kingdom, France, and Germany stating that it would resume
assembling centrifuges and manufacturing related components on June 29. Iran’s
Foreign Ministry explained Iran’s decision saying that Iran’s decision
was in response to the European government’s failure to follow through
on a February agreement to “close our case at the IAEA.”
On September 18, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution demanding that
Iran freeze all work on uranium enrichment and grant full and prompt access
to IAEA inspectors and provide them with any further information needed
before the next IAEA meeting on November 25.
However, on September 21, Iran announced that it has started converting
raw uranium into uranium hexaflouride, which is the feedstock for enrichment.
Gas Centrifuge Enrichment
Work on Iran's uranium centrifuge enrichment program began in 1985.
Natanz
Natanz is the location of a pilot and future commercial uranium centrifuge enrichment plant located approximately 200 miles south of Tehran. The existence of the facility was disclosed by the National Council of Resistance of Iran in August 2002, and first visited by the IAEA in February 2003. The Natanz site contains buildings both above and below ground and covers approximately100,000 square meters.
- Kalaye Electric Company
- Esfahan Conversion Facility
This facility is capable of converting uranium yellow cake into uranium hexafloride (UF6), uranium dioxide (UO2), and uranium metal. UF6 from this plant will presumably be shipped to Natanz for enrichment. According to press reports, this facility became operational in late February.The June 18th resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of governors called on Iran to freeze the conversion of uranium in Esfahan.
- Jabr Ibn Hayan Lab - Tehran Nuclear Research Center
This previously undeclared facility is known to have converted uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) into uranium metal. This is also the site where previously undeclared nuclear material from China - uranium hexafluoride (UF6), uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), and uranium dioxide (UO2)-is stored.
On January 20, 2004, in response to an inquiry by the IAEA, Iran acknowledged that it had received advanced, P-2 centrifuge drawings from foreign sources in 1994. Authorities claim that no centrifuges or components were obtained from abroad, and that all P-2 components in Iran's possession, were produced domestically. Iran also conceded that in 1999 or 2000, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran signed a contract with a private company in Tehran to develop P-2 centrifuges. In 2003, all P-2 centrifuge equipment was moved to the Pars Trash Company, a subsidiary of the Kalaye Company, in Tehran. Iranian claims that information about the P-2 program had not been included in previous declarations due to 'time constraints.'
In late May 2004, IAEA visited the workshop where Iran states the composite rotor cylinders for the modified P-2 designs had been manufactured. In August, Iran provided the IAEA with more details on the manufacturing and mechanical testing of the modified P-2 composite rotors during the 2002-2003 period. The Agency verified that the rotor cylinders were manufactured at the workshop and also had a detailed discussion with the owner of the private company that had received a contract from the AEOI to investigate the P-2 design. However, Iran contends that there was no related activity on the P-2 centrifuges between 1995, when they receive the design and 2002 when the owner of the private company was shown the designs. The IAEA is not satisfied with this explanation.
Reprocessing Experiments
In October 2003, Iran acknowledged that it had irradiated depleted uranium dioxide (UO2) targets at the Tehran Research Reactor. According to Iran, experiments took place there between 1988-1992 and involved pressed UO2 pellets prepared at Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center. These experiments used depleted uranium that had been exempted from safeguards in 1978. They involved 7 kilograms of UO2, 3 kilograms of which were subsequently reprocessed for the separation of plutonium.
Laser Enrichment
Iran acknowledged in October 2003, that work began on a laser enrichment program in the 1970s, under the previous regime. For the last 12 years, Iran has been developing a laser enrichment program based on two techniques: atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) and molecular isotope separation (MLIS). The IAEA has completed its review of the AVLIS program and has concluded that the levels of enrichment achieved matched Iran’s description of the activity. The IAEA did, however, determine that the equipment could have been used for HEU production.
Lashkar Ab'ad
This is a pilot plant for laser enrichment that was established in 2000. Laser enrichment experiments were conducted at Lashkar Ab'ad between October 2002 - January 2003 using 22 kilograms of natural uranium metal to produce small amounts (milligrams) of reactor grade enriched uranium (3-4 % U235). This uranium metal was part of a 50 kilograms shipment that was undeclared and is suspected to have come from the Soviet Union in 1993. Iranian authorities claim that all equipment at Lashkar Ab'ad was dismantled May 2003, and transferred to a storage facility at Karaj. On October 6, 2003, the IAEA drew environmental samples from the Lashkar Ab'ad plant. The results of the agency’s analysis indicate enrichment levels consistent with those declared by Iran. Iran provided the agency with additional documents with regards to its laser program in August 2004.
Karaj
This is a previously undeclared storage facility related to the laser enrichment program. Karaj contains dismantled equipment from Lashkar Ab'ad, laser enrichment waste, and approximately 28 kilograms of natural uranium metal.
II. PLUTONIUM PROGRAM
Iran's plutonium program is less advanced than its uranium program but there are four known facilities currently planned or under construction that when complete, would allow Iran to manufacture material for use in nuclear weapons.
Arak Heavy Water Facility
In August 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran disclosed the existence of a heavy water production facility under construction at Arak. This site was visited by the IAEA in February 2003. Iran initially told the IAEA that it planned to produce heavy water for export but in May said that the heavy water would be used as a coolant and moderator for a planned research reactor at Arak.
Arak Heavy Water Reactor
In May 2003, Iran announced plans to build a 40 MW thermal heavy water reactor at Arak. Construction on this reactor is scheduled to begin in 2004. This reactor will use uranium dioxide (UO2) and heavy water and will be capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. Iran claims this reactor is for R&D purposes and the production of radioisotopes for medical and industrial use. Drawings for the facility, however, contained no references to hot cells. When the IAEA confronted Iran about this, Iran stated that it has tentative plans to construct another building at Arak with hot cells for the production of radioisotopes. According to non-governmental estimates, the planned Arak reactor could produce between 8-10 kilograms of plutonium annually, enough for one or two nuclear weapons a year. On 18 June 2004 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors adopted a resolution submitted by France, Germany and Britain, that called on Iran to freeze the construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak.
Esfahan Fuel Manufacturing PlantIn 2004, Iran informed the IAEA of its intention to begin construction of a fuel fabrication plant at Esfahan. This plant will supply fuel for the Arak reactor and possibly also for the reactor at Bushehr.
Bushehr Reactor
This is a light water reactor complex located southwest of Esfahan. In 1995, Iran signed a $800 million deal with Moscow to finish construction on one of the reactors, originally begun by Germany. This 1,000 MW re actor is scheduled for completion in 2005, and Russia plans to provide the reactor fuel. On 22 August 2004 the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization said Bushehr would become operational in October 2006, a year behind schedule. On October 14, 2004 Russia announced that it had finished construction of the plant and all that remained was finalizing the contract for the return of the spent fuel back to Russia.
Reprocessing Experiments
In October 2003, Iran acknowledged that it had conducted plutonium reprocessing experiments in three shielded boxes in a hot cell at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. The experiments took place between 1988 and 1992, and involved 7 kilograms of uranium dioxide (UO2) that was irradiated, 3 kilograms of which were subsequently reprocessed for the separation of plutonium. On November 8, 2003, the separated plutonium produced in these experiments was presented to the IAEA. Iran claims that it produced 200 micrograms of plutonium in these experiments. The IAEA estimates that more plutonium should have been produced in 3 kg of depleted uranium targets. The IAEA is investigating the discrepancy. The small amount of separated plutonium was stored in a laboratory of Jabr Ibn Hayan. The shielded boxes were reportedly dismantled in 1992.
In September 2003, the IAEA discovered that bismuth metal samples had been irradiated between 1989-1993. The irradiation produces polonium-210 (Po-210), which can be used with beryllium as a neutron initiator in some nuclear weapon designs. In a letter to the IAEA on November 13, 2003, Iran stated that the bismuth irradiation had been part of a feasibility study for the production and use of Po-210 in radioisotope thermoelectric generators(RTGs), or nuclear batteries. During visits to Iran in November and December 2003, the IAEA interviewed two Iranian scientists involved in the bismuth experiments. While the scientists confirmed the purpose of the project, Iran has stated that there are few records remaining related to the experiments and as a result, Iran has not been able to provide evidence supporting its claims. The agency is still assessing the information provided by Iran.
Possible Nuclear Sites
Razed site at Lavisan-Shian
In the summer of 2004, this site raised suspicions of a clandestine weapons program, particularly since the site was razed after November 2003, and Iran provided IAEA with access to the site only after much delay. This site first came to public attention in May 2003 when the Iranian opposition group, National Council for Resistance of Iran, announced that the site, called the Lavizan-Shian Technical Research Center, was associated with biological weapons research. Iran vehemently denies this accusation, saying that a Physics Research Center was established there in 1989 to prepare to combat and neutralize casualties resulting from nuclear attacks or accidents and to provide scientific advice and services to the Ministry of Defense.
Iran maintains that “no nuclear material declarable in accordance with the Agency’s safeguards was present,” and that no nuclear fuel-cycle activities were carried out at the site. Iran has provided a list of eleven activities, which took place there. Citing “security concerns” however, Tehran has not given a list of the equipment used at the Center. According to Iranian documents, the site was razed in response to a decision to return the site to the Municipality of Tehran from the Ministry of Defense. In September 2004, Reuters reported that the analysis of soil samples taken by U.N. inspectors at Lavizan shows no sign of nuclear activity.
The Parchin Military Complex
The Institute for Science and International Security, Issue Brief, David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, June 17, 2004.The Parchin military complex located about 30 kilometers southeast of Tehran is dedicated to the research, development, and production of ammunition, rockets, and high explosives. The site is owned by Iran's military industry and has hundreds of buildings and test sites. Within this larger complex, there is an isolated, separately secured site, which may be involved in developing nuclear weapons. According to the Agence France-Presse (AFP), the IAEA has known about this site for some time and it has independently assessed its potential for nuclear weapons work. As a result of its analysis, the IAEA recently asked Iran about visiting this location. But Iran has so far not agreed, added the AFP report.
Based on a review of overhead imagery of this site, called location 1 in this report, this site is a logical candidate for a nuclear weapons-related site, particularly one involved in researching and developing high explosive components for an implosion-type nuclear weapon. But the evidence that this site is conducting nuclear weapons work is ambiguous.
On September 15, 2004, U.S. officials told CNN that there was no evidence supporting nuclear activity at Parchin.
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-Pilot Plant |
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| -Large-scale Commercial Plant The commercial plant is scheduled to start accepting centrifuges in 2005 and is comprised of three massive underground structures. The two largest buildings will house cascade halls and are expected to contain approximately 50,000 centrifuge machines. At full capacity, this facility could produce approximately 400-500 kilograms of weapon-grade material annually, or enough for 15-20 nuclear weapons a year. In June 2004, Iran formally informed the IAEA that it would begin resumption of centrifuge testing and centrifuge equipment-manufacture at Natanz. This reported activity falls within Iran safeguard obligations, even though it negates a suspension agreement that EU ministers secured, and fails to reassure a skeptical international community. |
This is a site of enrichment activities in Tehran. In February 2003, Iranian authorities acknowledged that centrifuge components had been produced and that machines had been assembled at one of the company's facilities. Iran denied however, that Kalaye was used for any sort of actual enrichment work. The IAEA requested access to the company's workshop, which was granted in May, but the agency was not permitted to take environmental samples until early August. Results from samples tested positive for traces of both highly enriched uranium (HEU) and lowly enrich uranium (LEU.) In October 2003, Iran conceded that a limited number of centrifuge tests using uranium hexafluoride (UF6) had been conducted there between 1998 and 2002. These experiments reportedly involved 1.9 kg of UF6. Iran claims that it has not enriched uranium beyond 1.2% U-235 using centrifuges. It attributes the presence of HEU to contaminated centrifuge components that were imported. In response to IAEA requests, Iran has provided the agency with a list of imported components and the agency has taken new samples to verify these claims. In July 2004, agency inspectors recovered about 650 g of uranium from the dismantled equipment from the Kalaye Electric Workshop. As of October 2004, the recovered material is being analyzed.