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Israel, India and Pakistan: Regional Security and Politics Are the Solution, Not the NPT.

George Perkovich, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
September 19, 2003

Adherents to the NPT want the treaty to be universal. They believe that proliferation begets proliferation, and that regional and global security will be strengthened when all states are party to binding agreements barring the further spread of nuclear weapons. Treaty membership does not guarantee compliance (including with Article VI disarmament obligations) but global security against proliferation would be strengthened if all states were party to a common nonproliferation regime.

From this standpoint, India’s, Israel’s and Pakistan’s possession of nuclear arsenals is very problematic. These countries will not be accepted into the NPT as nuclear weapon states, due to the treaty’s amendment procedures and the interests of states that gave up their own nuclear weapons programs. On the other hand, the international community would be more secure if it knew that India, Israel and Pakistan were participating fully and faithfully in regimes of norms, rules, institutions and procedures that minimize risks of nuclear conflict and further proliferation.

That said, the nonproliferation regime itself is not a useful tool to address the proliferation issues arising from India, Israel, and Pakistan. These challenges must be addressed one-by-one, region-by-region, not as a common class defined by their non-membership in the NPT. The “Three State” problem will be solved by regional politics, diplomacy and, perhaps, military maneuvers, not by meetings of the IAEA in Vienna or the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. High-level political leaders must devote themselves to these challenges; the historically standard operating procedure of dispatching arms control and nonproliferation diplomats to deal with issues related to India’s, Israel’s, and Pakistan’s nuclear programs will yield no progress.

Moreover, the “Three State” problem is a misnomer. The political and security difficulties posed by the Indian, Israeli and Pakistani nuclear programs are connected to political and security challenges in the Middle East and Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia. The current proliferation crises in Iran and, less so, North Korea are related to the Israeli, Pakistani and Indian cases, as are fears of future proliferation in the Middle East. The following connections are relevant:

Israel, Iran -- Whether or not Israel’s nuclear arsenal actually poses a military threat to Iran, Iranians fixate on Israel’s nuclear status. They argue that Israel’s weapons threaten Iran and, more passionately, that the U.S. hypocritically has condoned Israel’s nuclear build up while embargoing, sanctioning and threatening Iran for pursuing nuclear capabilities to which it is entitled under the NPT. As a political reality, then, Iran is unlikely to permanently give up seeking nuclear options as long as Israel’s nuclear status is not addressed in a way that offers some measure of political equity. The salience of some measure of equity with Israel will grow, not decrease, if and when Iranian democracy is strengthened. Mass political leaders in competitive elections will seize on double standards and anti-Zionist sentiments, even if progressive Iranian leaders acknowledge they should stop supporting anti-Israel terrorist organizations.

Pakistan connects to the Iran-Israel web thanks to its proliferation of nuclear know-how and technology to North Korea and Iran.

Egypt, Libya…-- Israel’s nuclear status undermines Egypt’s, Libya’s and other Arab states’ willingness to strengthen nonproliferation inspection and enforcement mechanisms. More ominously, Egypt and Libya may seek to acquire proliferation-sensitive “peaceful” nuclear capabilities as a hedge against nuclear rivalry with Iran (which would be unstated) and Israel (which would be emphasized). Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and other Arab states are key transit points for suspect exports/imports; their willingness to strengthen customs and intelligence cooperation on nonproliferation will perhaps be affected by how the U.S. and others deal with Israel’s place in the nonproliferation regime. In short, the mid to long-term task of preventing further proliferation in the Middle East requires some politically persuasive address of Israel’s status.

Pakistan -- Pakistan’s nuclear status affects the nonproliferation agenda from several directions. First, Pakistan allegedly has passed nuclear know-how and equipment to other states, including North Korea and Iran. (North Korea, in turn, reportedly has helped Iran’s nuclear and missile programs). Second, observers worry about the character of possible future governments in Pakistan and the security and stewardship of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Third, the leverage nuclear weapons seem to have given Pakistan over the U.S. and India leads some in Tehran to conclude that Iran would gain status, political deference, and security if it acquired nuclear weapons. Moreover, Pakistan’s support of the Taliban and, in the past, Wahhabi fundamentalism, has threatened Iran. Fourth, Pakistan’s nuclear and security competition with India raises dangers of possible nuclear conflict that would profoundly affect future efforts to stem proliferation.

India -- India pressures nuclear reactor suppliers to adapt the nonproliferation regime to India’s benefit. India wants access to nuclear reactors and other sensitive technologies that have been denied on nonproliferation grounds. New Delhi makes such cooperation a test of U.S. willingness to elevate Indo-American relations. Russia already agreed to supply reactors to India prior to 1992 and, like France, may be interested in new sales if nonproliferation strictures could be revised. Conversely, Japan and other non-nuclear-weapon states strongly resist “rewarding” India for its development of a nuclear arsenal.

Indo-Pak arms race - global norms and practices of nonproliferation would be augmented if India and Pakistan accepted formal arms control and/or nonproliferation constraints that would bound their nuclear competition. Perhaps more urgently, India and Pakistan (clearly) are potential sources of nuclear material or know-how sought by terrorists; these two states should be brought into a global compact to ensure that state-of-the-art security is effected over all relevant materials.

Clearly the regional security and political dynamics in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and South Asia relate many of these proliferation “cases” to each other. The security considerations of Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Israel, Pakistan and India affect each other; as important, the political symbolism of nuclear competition among these states affects their leaders’ willingness to stem nuclear proliferation. Even if the major security rationales for seeking nuclear weapons were removed, political issues of equity, prestige, and partisan opportunism could make political leaders reluctant to abandon completely nuclear aspirations and capabilities.

Policy Strategy

Although the foregoing analysis questions the usefulness of treating India, Israel and Pakistan as a distinct class - the “Three State” problem - this strategy memo maintains the convention. It recommends policy strategies that focus on Israel, India and Pakistan and the most immediate proliferation problems related to them.

Iran-Israel-Arab States

The international community’s objectives vis a vis Iran require that Iran:

• Fulfill its NPT obligations not to acquire nuclear weapons;
• Sign and implement the IAEA’s additional protocol;
• Eschew acquisition of uranium-enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities (because these are inherently dual use) in return for strongly guaranteed, cost-beneficial access to low-enriched uranium fuel for power reactors;
• Eschew support of organizations that conduct terrorism or otherwise physically subvert the governments of other states.

The U.S., the European Community and Russia must play leading constructive roles in persuading Iran to accept and implement these objectives. Israel, too, must contribute significantly to reversing the Iranian nuclear challenge. Thus, the U.S., especially, must encourage Tel Aviv to take steps that would lessen proliferation pressures in Iran (and in Arab states). The objectives should be to:

• reduce Iranians’ sense of double standards and discrimination. The U.S. (and others) should acknowledge that Israel’s nuclear status is a problem that will be addressed fairly and consistent with all regional states’ security;
• persuade Israel that its long-term security will be augmented, not harmed, by constraining certain nuclear activities;
• reaffirm Israel’s commitment to effect a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

Achieving progress towards these objectives will take time and great effort. This effort can be built upon the following steps. No doubt each of these steps will be difficult to achieve. Yet, the alternative - failing to address fundamental security and political problems that fuel proliferation - results only in perpetual crisis and threats of war along with a weakening of existing nonproliferation norms and regimes.

Indeed, it should be recognized that even if Iran does soon accede to the Additional Protocol and receives Russian and European Union credit for this cooperation, the U.S., Israel and others will argue correctly that adoption of the Additional Protocol will make Iran’s pursuit of weapons capability more visible without preventing it. If, at the same time, Iran (and other states) continues not to recognize Israel’s existence, Tel Aviv will interpret this as an intention to destroy Israel. If this perceived intention were backed by nuclear weapon capability, Israel would feel itself mortally threatened and therefore needing to remove such threat or to deter it.

To avoid this threatening spiral, Israel and Iran must reassure each other. Israel as the more powerful state could begin by stating that it harbors no inherent antipathy toward Iran and would welcome reciprocal steps to reduce the threats each state perceives.

The following steps should be considered.

• All parties in the Middle East, and leading outside powers, should reaffirm the goal of achieving a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. formulated this point at the seminal 2000 Conference to Extend and Review the NPT: “Israel has stated that it is prepared to surrender its nuclear weapons in the context of a just, stable, and enduring Middle East peace...The US is making every effort we can to bring about such a peace, and we believe that once that is achieved, that Israel can and should join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state." Achieving this objective clearly requires incrementally creating security and political conditions that obviate perceived interests in acquiring WMD. Indeed, emphasizing the goal of a WMD-free zone provides the opportunity to focus attention on the conditions that must be created to achieve the goal. This shifts the burden of diplomacy from the mire of debating the unfairness and double standards involved in Israel’s status and instead challenges all parties to act constructively to redress it.
• As a first major step, the Secretary General of the UN (or other regionally respected actors) should convene representatives of all the Persian Gulf states, plus the U.S. and the United Kingdom as leading military factors in Iraq, to a diplomatic dialogue intended to reassure Iran that its security interests can best be met without nuclear weapons. (A similar multilateral diplomatic process could be undertaken to assure Iran that its energy needs - nuclear or non-nuclear - can be met cost-effectively without indigenous production and accumulation of fissile materials.)
• Israel, backed by the U.S. and the European Union, should reaffirm its commitment not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. This is another way of saying that Israel’s strategic capabilities are purely defensive - that if adversaries do not directly or indirectly attack Israel, Israel will not threaten or attack them. The U.S. can help guarantee this defensive commitment and insist on Iran’s and other states’ commitments to purely defensive security strategies. This would require, for example, rejecting support of terrorist organizations.
• Related to the foregoing two points, other states and organizations in the region must recognize Israel’s existence and right to security. Threats to a state’s existence are the most direct causes of interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. (The U.S. would have to reassure any government in Iran that Washington will not threaten its existence as long as Iran does not threaten international peace and security.)
• Israel, as confidence grows in the diplomatic process sketched here, should declare that it has adopted an indefinite moratorium on producing plutonium and ceased separation of plutonium from spent fuel and is prepared to make this permanent through negotiation of a global fissile material production ban.

Ultimately, the stated objective should be for all states in the region to adhere fully to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states.

Pakistan

The most acute proliferation threats posed by Pakistan can be addressed bilaterally or through coalitions - they do not have to be dealt with in the context of the NPT. Pakistan can and should be induced to impose strict, all-encompassing controls to prevent further proliferation of nuclear know-how, materiel or equipment. This is a categorical responsibility of civilization and stewardship over materials as dangerous as nuclear weapons. Indeed, for political purposes, Pakistan’s obligations can be framed as central to the global war on terrorism, to which Pakistani leaders have already subscribed. To be sure, Pakistan’s willingness to cooperate and enact desired norms and policies will be affected by its judgments that undesired behavior is not necessary to meet security threats from India, though this line of argument should not excuse Pakistan. Framing Pakistan’s obligations in this context reduces the neuralgia the Pakistani polity still feels over the NPT. The U.S. and other capable outside powers, especially China, should proffer the fullest assistance possible to secure Pakistan’s nuclear facilities and knowledgeable personnel to ensure that “assets” are not diverted, without augmenting Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

India

India, too, should be encouraged and assisted in adopting state-of-the-art technologies and procedures to secure its nuclear materials, weapons and know-how from diversion. This, too, should be done in the context of the war on terrorism.

The U.S. and others should not adjust the nuclear nonproliferation regime to accommodate India’s desire for access to nuclear technology. As a non-party to the NPT, India has the “right” to build and operate nuclear plants. Yet, others have no obligation to assist India in this enterprise. The costs of breaking faith with non-nuclear weapons states such as Japan, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Sweden and others who forswore nuclear weapons is too high to warrant accommodating India’s nuclear desires. Just as the U.S. and others have not provided nuclear assistance to Israel, they should maintain a similar position regarding India and Pakistan.

Indo-Pak Arms Race

The modest Indo-Pak nuclear and missile arms race does threaten regional and global security. While it is important to encourage the antagonists to reduce nuclear risks and constrain the costs and instabilities inherent in arms races, this objective need not be framed largely or mostly as a nonproliferation matter. Tools developed under the broad nonproliferation regime - including a test ban and a fissile material cut-off - can help, but these and other measures should be subordinated to diplomacy to improve regional security. Augmenting regional security in South Asia requires addressing the Indo-Pak conflict over Kashmir, terrorism and subversion, as well as Sino-Indian relations, including China’s relationship with Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs. Governments and independent experts have refined an array of specific policy steps that could be taken by all relevant actors. If more political energy were applied to these broader approaches, the results would likely be greater than will result from focusing on nonproliferation objectives per se.

Going deeper, the rise of Hindu and Islamist fundamentalist movements in India and Pakistan exacerbates mutual antagonisms and insecurities that make it more difficult to ameliorate conflict and de-energize nuclear competition. Fundamentalist movements in each state fuel those in the other. Outside powers rightly recognize the great sensitivity of these internal dynamics and the risk that outside interference in them can be counterproductive. Nevertheless, to the extent that intolerance and extremism within states can cause international insecurity, these issues warrant active diplomacy.

To achieve all of the above objectives regarding India and Pakistan, the U.S. and the international community should offer the two South Asian states assistance in constraining nuclear proliferation dangers through an expanded Cooperative Threat Reduction program. Rose Gottemoeller has carefully detailed a practical agenda for such work if and when India, Pakistan and the international community demonstrate the will to pursue it.