STATEMENT TO THE NPT 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE
H.E.
MR. OLEXANDER O. CHALYI
FIRST
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, UKRAINE
New York, 25 April 2000
Let
me join the previous speakers in congratulating you on your presidency at
this forum. I am hopeful that its importance will inspire us with determination
to work constructively in the spirit of mutual trust and respect to achieve
forward-looking and far-reaching results. I would like to reiterate to you
my delegation's full support and readiness to invest into the work of the
Conference.
My
delegation fully shares your thought, that the common dream of a world free
from the threat of nuclear weapons has yet to be realized, and that the
road leading to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons remains long
and rugged.
Five
years ago at the 50th session of the UN General Assembly the President of
Ukraine Leonid Kuchma from this very rostrum launched an initiative of making
the world of the twenty-first century free from nuclear weapons. He also
proposed to translate this idea into the concrete actions within a United
Nations programme. This concept has been echoed in the joint declaration
"Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World: The Need for a New Agenda",
made by a number of countries wishing to put the nuclear agenda back on
track. We believe that the only way to turn this idea into reality should
be the genuine contribution of all Member States into the process of practical
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It applies both to the nuclear
powers and non-nuclear states.
In
this context, Mr. Chairman, the voluntarily renunciation of nuclear weapons
by Ukraine and other newly independent states, emerged after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, or renunciation of national nuclear programmer by the
others, could hardly be overestimated in the context of current situation
in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We strongly believe that these
unprecedented steps could serve as an example of great moral significance
and political courage to be followed. The international community welcomed
this contribution Of Ukraine as reflected in a number of international documents,
including resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council
as well as in the documents of the Preparatory Committee for this Conference.
We expect that it will be also properly reflected in the final document
of the 2000 Review Conference.
We
reaffirm our commitment to the NPT, to which Ukraine acceded as a non-nuclear
weapon state in 1994. At the same time we take full account of the fact
that Ukraine possessed the third largest nuclear potential in the world.
We believe, this is fundamental both to our legitimate interests as a party
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to Ukraine's succession, in conformity
with international law, in respect of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile systems (ABM Treaty), the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate
Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) and the Treaty on the Reduction
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty). In this context
let me underscore that Ukraine has been and will remain in the forefront
of international efforts to enhance nuclear disarmament.
As
of today Ukraine has made a significant reduction of strategic armaments
deployed on its territory – 77% of the total number of its strategic offensive
arms is already eliminated under START-I Treaty. At present Ukraine has
embarked upon the third and final phase of reducing its strategic arms,
which has to be completed by December 2001. We are convinced that the START
process should only be sustained and developed further on by decisive measures
of the states parties. Now it is imperative to ensure the implementation
of START-II and to resume talks on the START-III. The recent ratification
by the Russian Federation of START-II is a very important step in this direction.
We
reaffirm the importance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty)
as one of the pillars of strategic stability, and we wish to see the Treaty
preserved. We believe that any possible actions of the party to this Treaty
in order to decrease the possibility of a missile attack should not contradict
the Treaty obligations. We call upon the parties to the Treaty to find a
mutually acceptable solution to this problem, that would enable to preserve
the arms control treaties (ARM Treaty, INF Treaty, START Treaty) and strategic
stability.
The
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is rightfully regarded as another
key element in the architecture of strategic stability in the world and
as a major complimentary effort to the non-proliferation at large. The initial
role of the Treaty is significant in its essence: to stop or considerably
constrain the nuclear states from improving their nuclear arsenals and to
prevent the emergence of new nuclear weapon states.
From
this perspective we welcome the ratification by the Russian Duma of the
CTBT as a positive historic step towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
We hope that the precedent, set by Russia, will
be followed by other nuclear weapon states. This is crucial in the light
of their obligations under article VII of the APT, and it would also substantively
promote the ratification of the CTBT by other states-parties to the Treaty.
Ensuring
of the universality of the NPT is a matter of priority for Ukraine. Regretfully,
the progress made in this field up till now can be seen more in terms of
quantity than in quality. The fundamental principle of the non-proliferation
has been undermined by the developments in South Asia and also challenged
by the states not yet parties to the Treaty, which possess unsafeguarded
nuclear facilities. Therefore, we believe it is imperative that those states
accede to the NPT as non-nuclear states without delay and put their nuclear
objects under the IAEA safeguards.
Another
clear priority in the advancement of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
is the negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). This Treaty
would provide valuable security benefits to both nuclear weapons states
and to non-nuclear weapon states. Such a treaty would be an integral and
indispensable part of nuclear disarmament and an important step towards
a world free of nuclear weapons. It is discouraging to note that negotiations
on the FCMT have not moved forward. We stand for the immediate commencement
of those negotiations in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament
as the next necessary step.
We
fully recognize the importance of the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones,
and consistently support such initiatives. We believe that, established
on the basis of the arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the
region concerned, such zones could play a valuable role in maintaining regional
and global security as well as contribute to the strengthening of the international
nonproliferation regime. It is clear that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free
zones in the regions of Central Asia and Middle East could serve as important
step to this end.
We
believe that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays an increasingly
important role in the areas of non-proliferation and peaceful uses of atomic
energy. We commend the Agency's efforts in strengthening safeguards regime.
Since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference Ukraine has considerably
improved its non-proliferation record. In 1997 Ukraine ratified the Agreement
with the IAEA for the application of comprehensive safeguards in connection
with the l\TPT. We intend to sign the Additional Protocol to this Agreement
next year.
This
Conference is convened at the critical moment in the history of nonproliferation,
when mostly negative external and internal tendencies dominate over the
viability of the NPT. A lot of pessimism has been recently expressed over
the future of the nuclear non-proliferation. The lack of speedy progress
on genuine nuclear disarmament, serious threats to the existing non-proliferation
regime coming from South Asia, the continuing reliance on the nuclear weapon
benefits, and, as a result, stalemates in the multilateral disarmament fora
- all these aspects- create an atmosphere of frustration and despair. In
our view, should build on the progress achieved, rather than criticize regressive
developments.
May
I recall that the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 - a legally binding instrument
- provided to Ukraine the guarantees of its national security on the part
of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation
as well as did the unilateral statements by France and China. They were
among the key factors that contributed to Ukraine's decision to accede to
the NPT and reflected the unique situation of Ukraine in terms of security
assurances to non-nuclear weapon states.
We
believe that experience of my country could be of value for elaborating
a universal, legally binding document on assurances. I would like to state
here that we are particularly concerned over the failure of the negotiations
within the Ad Hoc Committee established by the Conference on Disarmament
in 1998 to hold collective consultations on security assurances. If we want
to make progress, we will need to re-establish this Committee and enable
it to bring its work to a successful conclusion.
Allow
me to say a word on the Security Council resolution 984 (1995). It is noteworthy
for its considerable impact on the design of the nonproliferation regime.
This resolution was adopted by the Security Council in conjunction with
the unilateral declarations by five nuclear weapon states to substitute
the Security Council resolution 255 (1968), adopted 27 years earlier and
widely considered inadequate. I believe, the Council should pursue further
expansion of the nature and scope of application of the security assurances
in line with the entire non-proliferation review process.
To
sum up, we expect that all the parties to the NPT will demonstrate their
faithful commitment to the real disarmament and non-proliferation. We should
double our efforts to provide a favorable arena for honest and comprehensive
discussion. Our common task is to use this momentum to achieve progress
in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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