Arab Reform Bulletin: June 2006
Published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Translated by Dar Al-Watan for Journalism, Printing and Publishing.
Michele Dunne, Editor
Julia Choucair, Assistant Editor
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Arab States: Security Services and the Crisis of Democratic Change
Amr Hamzawy
Kurdistan-Iraq: Can the Unified Regional Government Work?
Gareth Stansfield
Kuwait: Struggle over Parliament
Ghanim Al Najjar
Syria: Conflict with West Spurs Economic, not Political, Reform
Joshua Landis
Egypt: The Gamal Mubarak Paradox
Samer Shehata
Egypt: Crackdown on Demonstrators; Judicial Law Debated; Wafd Election
Palestine: Debate over Referendum
Syria: Human Rights Activists Detained; National Salvation Front Meets in London
Lebanon: Debate over Electoral Law
Jordan: Government Approves Anti-Terrorism Law
Iraq: Key Cabinet Posts Filled
Kuwait: Run-Up to Elections
Bahrain: New Press and Association Laws; Run-Up to Elections
Algeria: New Prime Minister
Morocco: Detention of Al Adl wal Ihsan Members
Upcoming Political Events
Views from the Arab Media
Read On
New reports on human rights and freedom of expression in the Arab countries, as well as publications on Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, the Gulf, and Saudi Arabia.
Arab States: Security Services and the Crisis of Democratic Change
Amr Hamzawy
The lack of democratic breakthroughs worthy of mention in Arab countries has spurred debate about barriers to change. Much of this debate has focused on economic, social, and cultural factors, or on the fragility of political forces demanding democracy. The debate would be incomplete, however, without a discussion of the means by which the authoritarian Arab regimes control their societies, namely the critical roles performed by security services with their quasi-military (police and interior ministries) and intelligence (internal and external) components.
First, the security services restrict opposition political mobilization with a mixture of preemptive and repressive practices. Opposition groups often cannot hold mass meetings or demonstrations and get their supporters to polling places, and are prohibited from legitimate gains by falsified electoral results. The degree of oppression, and whether it is constant or episodic, varies from Syria to Egypt to Morocco. In any case, the result of the security services' oppressive role is the continuation of ruling regimes, many of which lack popular support, and a culture of fear and aversion to political participation amongst citizens.
Second, a cursory glance at the Arab regimes reveals the hegemony of the security services over the executive authority. This phenomenon is not limited to modern republics, founded by militaries that view the security apparatus as an extension of the regular army, but also extends to monarchies. While the unchecked hegemony of the security services in Saudi Arabia and Libya results from the almost complete absence of a political apparatus, in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen the same phenomenon can be explained by the relative weakness of the ruling parties in the face of the organizational efficiency of the police and intelligence agencies. Moreover, the proliferation of emergency laws and special tribunals frees the hand of the security apparatus from judicial restraints in dealing with domestic political matters. Recent experiences in Egypt—the regime's reliance on security brutality against voters in order to salvage the 2005 elections in the face of Muslim Brotherhood gains, and the vicious manner in which the security services dealt with liberal opposition figure Ayman Nour—illustrate the phenomenon. Because Arab regimes lack effective political tools for exerting influence over society, even when claiming reformist intentions they often resort to their most effective weapon, oppression by security forces.
Third, officials with security backgrounds are overrepresented among the Arab ruling elites in comparison to other groups such as technocrats, businessmen, and university professors. Although there are fewer ministers with security backgrounds than there used to be in many Arab countries (with the important exceptions of Syria and Algeria), their penetration is still clear. One need only look at the provinces of Morocco, the governorates of Egypt, or the Saudi local councils to witness their heavy presence. Even more insidious is the fact that security services have been able to exercise influence—in some cases veto power—over appointments to leadership positions in legislative or judicial institutions. This security veto creates a structural bias within the Arab elite to the benefit of those desiring to preserve the status quo and against reformist elements, even those essentially loyal to the regime but striving to reform its institutions.
The mentality of the security apparatus fears nothing on this earth more than the call for change. The security veto, which represents a fundamental block to movement and renewal within the Arab elite, leaves Arab regimes either with a fragile band of true reformers with no real power, or with larger groups of phony reformers who advance in proportion to their adherence to the security mentality. Understanding this phenomenon can explain in large measure the schizophrenia of the Moroccan, Egyptian, and Jordanian political elites in recent years.
There remains the question of whether the security services are themselves beset by the same crushing social and economic crises that beset the majority of Arabs, and whether they too are lured by the siren call of political Islam. Or are security services merely a blind instrument for autocratic control, perpetually removed from society itself? Outsiders can venture only a few modest observations, based on limited evidence, as security apparatuses are generally a black box. Despite differences between low- and high-ranking members, security personnel all enjoy higher pay and better services than other segments of society, and are thus protected from unemployment and poverty. In addition, despite recent stories of Saudi security personnel belonging to radical Islamist organizations and of the sympathy of some Egyptian officers for the Muslim Brotherhood, in both cases those involved were either killed or purged. Thus far, it seems that opposition inroads are extremely limited and that security apparatuses continue to serve as an effective tool for the authoritarian control of society.
Amr Hamzawy is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This article was translated from Arabic by Kevin Burnham.
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Kurdistan-Iraq: Can the Unified Regional Government Work?
Gareth Stansfield
After months of negotiations, Nechirvan Barzani announced the formation of a unified Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Irbil on May 7, two weeks ahead of the announcement by Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al Maliki that a government for Iraq had been formed. While the world's media remained focused on Baghdad, it largely overlooked the significance of the events in the capital of the Kurdistan region of Iraq.
The KRG is already the preeminent governmental authority in Kurdistan-Iraq, with Baghdad's influence being non-existent. Unifying the Kurdistan region is also a powerful symbolic act that may serve to enhance the legitimacy of Kurdish politicians in Iraq as they negotiate their people's future with their Arab counterparts in Baghdad.
But there are of course problems facing Barzani and his new cabinet. The first is the rivalry between the KRG's two most important participants: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Nechirvan's uncle Massoud Barzani; and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by current President of Iraq Jalal Talabani.
The second problem is the dissatisfaction of many Kurds with the performance of the KRG to date. Accusations of corruption are rife, but so too is the popular belief that the leaders of the KDP and PUK are betraying their support base by making too many compromises in Baghdad rather than advancing Kurdish demands more forcefully. Both dynamics are opening a political space into which Islamist movements on the one hand, and ultra-nationalist groupings on the other, have emerged.
The third problem relates to the Iraqi Constitution passed in October 2005, which envisages a federal structure for the state that devolves significant powers to the regions. There remain several points of contention related to the relationship between Kurdistan and the central government. These include the ownership of natural resources and control of revenues accruing from them; the security responsibilities of the Kurdistan Army (the peshmerga) and, perhaps most saliently, the precise location of the boundary of the Kurdistan Region and the status of sensitive disputed territories, including Sinjar, Makhmur, and Kirkuk.
Many of the current challenges can be traced to the division of the KRG into two entities from 1994 onwards. Political competition between KDP and PUK leaders, an unworkable power-sharing system, and the destabilizing actions of neighboring states combined to push the KDP and PUK into a conflict that came to a draw in 1997. From this point on, Kurdistan's political geography stabilized into two distinct regions: one dominated by the KDP and covering Irbil and Dohuk; the other presided over by the PUK and including Suleimaniyah and the territories of Kirkuk outside the control of the Iraqi government. New KRGs were established in each region, with the result that Kurdistan had two cabinets, two prime ministers, two sets of legislative procedures—in effect, two administrative systems.
The United States applied pressure to unify these two administrations, leading to the Washington Agreement of 1998, but the matter became urgent only following Saddam Hussein's downfall in 2003. Since then the two Kurdish groups have agreed on the duration of Nechirvan Barzani's tenure as Prime Minister (ending December 2007) and the need to promote a transparent approach to government. In terms of ministerial distribution, the KDP heads 13 ministries and the PUK 14. Three ministerial portfolios are held by the Islamic Union and the Islamic Group, with Assyrian and Turkmen parties each having one ministry in a bid to show the inclusion of minority communities. Still, it is apparent that there is some way to go in the building of trust between the KDP and PUK. Sensitive ministerial portfolios, such as peshmerga (defense) and finance, remain double-staffed in Irbil and Suleimaniyah.
The vestiges of two de facto Kurdish statelets are numerous, leading to several structural problems that Barzani needs to manage by a process of extensive reform. These include a grossly overstaffed civil service, conflicting legislation in key areas such as personal status laws and foreign investment codes, and different cultural practices between civil servants from Irbil and Suleimaniyah.
In dealing with these challenges, Barzani must show that the unified KRG is not simply an extension of the KDP and PUK but rather is acting in the interests of the people of Kurdistan overall. By achieving this, the KDP and PUK will remain the leading popular political forces in Kurdistan-Iraq. If they fail, they will be increasingly challenged by Islamist movements, ultra-nationalist secessionists, and the Kurdistan region will again fall prey to the meddling of its neighbors.
Gareth Stansfield is Reader in Middle East Politics at the University of Exeter and an Associate Fellow of Chatham House. He has been a regular visitor to Kurdistan since 2003, undertaking research funded by a United States Institute of Peace grant.
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Kuwait: Struggle over Parliament
Ghanim Al Najjar
The current crisis over electoral redistricting—leading to the dissolution of the National Assembly and new elections set for June 29—is unusually sharp but by no means a first in Kuwait's 45-year history as an independent nation. If the issue is finally resolved, it could open the way toward a broader discussion of representation including the issue of possible legalization of political parties.
Since the 1960s, half of all Kuwaiti parliaments have been dissolved early. In 1967 the government falsified electoral results, leading to the resignation in protest of eight members elected to the National Assembly. The next crisis came in 1976 when the government dissolved the National Assembly unconstitutionally, that is, it failed to call new elections within 60 days the of the dissolution. In 1980 the government tried to change the constitution in the absence of the assembly, raising the number of electoral constituencies to 25. Another crisis occurred in 1986 when the government again unconstitutionally dissolved the National Assembly. The next came in 1999 when the government dissolved the Assembly, but this time observed the constitutional provision for new elections within two months. Thus we come to the Tenth National Assembly elected in 2003 and dissolved constitutionally in 2006, in the midst of a fierce political crisis between the government and popular movements representing most of the country's political currents.
The main controversy in Kuwaiti politics has been, and continues to be, electoral districts. The crux of the issue is that with a voting population as small as Kuwait's, a large number of electoral districts encourages vote buying and corruption and discourages debate of national issues. At the time of Kuwaiti independence in 1961, there was a division between popular support for a single electoral district for all of Kuwait, and a government desire for 20 constituencies. The struggle intensified to the point that a number of key political actors threatened to boycott elections if the government insisted on its position, leading to a compromise on ten districts. Four elections were held under that system, one of which was rigged (1967) and another of which lead to an unconstitutional dissolution of the Assembly (1976). The government's displeasure with the ten-district system became clear in 1981 when it insisted on raising the number to 25 districts, which is the current system.
Electoral districts remained a live issue after 1981, with many politicians insisting that the 25-constituency system was corrupt and in need of reform. Beginning with the 2003 National Assembly the government began to show signs of responsiveness, so several deputies put forth proposals and the government offered its own plan to the National Assembly. However, a proliferation of redistricting plans—including more than one from the government—created confusion and accusations of bad faith on the government's part, leading to failure.
When a new government headed by Sheik Nasser Al Muhammad Al Sabah was formed after the death of the former Emir in 2005, it presented itself as reformist and named electoral redistricting among its priorities. A committee was formed to deal with the issue and after careful deliberation concluded that the ideal solution was to divide Kuwait into five electoral constituencies. Opposition deputies announced their support of the five-district plan and mobilized a popular campaign on its behalf. The campaign, led by young people, chose the color orange as its symbol and included the participation of 29 (out of a total of 50) parliamentary deputies, while a smaller number of deputies came out against it. The government's position on the plan was ambiguous. After a group of parliamentary deputies demanded to interpellate the prime minister over the government's handling of the issue, the cabinet requested that the Emir dissolve the National Assembly.
While the June 29 elections will be held according to the 25-district system, the prospect of a reduced number of districts with a larger number of voters in each will shape debates and electoral outcomes. Above all, it will raise the importance of the issue of political parties, which would play an important role in a revised system. Although there are currently at least seven quasi-parties in Kuwait, they are technically illegal and the actual passage of a law regulating parties remains a distant proposition. Once the districting issue is resolved, those who hope to develop a party system in Kuwait will need to find ways to raise the profile of the issue and drum up public support and interest in parties, which so far is lacking.
Ghanim Al Najjar is Professor of Political Science at Kuwait University. He can be reached at: ghanim3322@yahoo.com. This article was translated from Arabic by Kevin Burnham.
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Syria: Conflict with West Spurs Economic, not Political, Reform
Joshua Landis
Political reform in Syria is not on. Last year's promises of a “great leap forward”—a rewritten emergency law, citizenship for stateless Kurds, and a new political party law before local elections in 2007—have been shelved. President Bashar Al Assad stated in a recent television interview that, given the situation in Iraq and Syria's mounting battle with the West, security would come first. That warning was the opening shot in a sweeping crackdown on opposition and human rights leaders, the most intense since the Damascus Spring leaders were imprisoned in 2001.
The Syrian regime insists it must clear the decks of potential fifth columnists as it prepares for a showdown with the Bush administration over Lebanon and the war on terrorism. June is a pivotal month. The new UN investigation into Rafiq Al Hariri's murder is expected to indict Syrian leaders; the question is whether the investigators have amassed enough evidence to move the Security Council to impose sanctions or initiate an international trial.
In addition to the threat from the West, the growing unity and tactical dexterity of the Syrian opposition worries the regime. Over the last year, not only has the internal opposition united and joined ranks with expatriates—read Muslim Brothers—in the promulgation of the “Damascus Declaration,” but former Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam (a Sunni Baathist) has come on board in an effort to split regime loyalists. The intended message to Syrians is: “this is not Iraq ; we will not hunt Baathists. We are pluralistic, moderate, and non-sectarian; the regime is Alawite, extremist, and sectarian.” The newly formed National Salvation Front met in London June 4-5 to agree on “an executive plan for the liberation and democratization of Syria.”
Among the challenges identified at the London meeting is accelerating opposition efforts to build bridges to the Lebanese Cedar Revolution. Syrian oppositionists recently signed a joint declaration with Lebanese activists in support of UN resolution 1680 (calling on Damascus to resolve border controversies with Beirut, establish a permanent diplomatic relationship, and control the movement of arms into Lebanon), an initiative that became the pretext for the recent regime crackdown. Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblat has met with Khaddam on several occasions and hosted a Muslim Brother delegation at his palace in Mukhtara in May. The next step would be for Future Movement leader Saad Hariri to champion the Syria opposition cause in Paris, Riyadh, and Washington, which would up the ante significantly.
If Syria's battle with the West has justified postponing political liberalization, it has hastened an economic opening. Washington's efforts to crash the Syrian economy and choke off its access to foreign finance have concentrated the mind of the regime. Last fall, when the Syrian currency lost 20 percent of its value overnight due to Western pressure, Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Dardari insisted to a number of associates that he would “[expletive] the black-market profiteers.” It is this lusty spirit of combat that has enabled regime reformers to drive forward the overhaul of Syria's financial sector, which is now considered a matter of survival.
Private banks have proliferated, and are growing rapidly although they have yet to capture a majority share of the market. Central Bank Director Adib Mayaleh said recently that the foreign ownership ceiling on private banks would be raised from 49 to 60-70 percent soon. Private currency trading has been legalized to eliminate the black market, and the Syrian lira has regained the value it lost last year. The finance ministry is also on its way to introducing treasury bills and issuing public debt, which will transform the government's ability to increase investment and plan budgets, a major step in modernizing the economy. So far, efforts by the United States and France to press private banks to cease underwriting lines of credit to Syria have had uneven results and failed to trump Syria's economic liberalization.
Still, economic liberalization has its limits, as Al Assad has not found the wherewithal to cut through the corruption, layers of socialist legislation, and cronyism needed to carry out real structural reform. Also, Al Assad's initial hope that rapid trade growth would lead Syria out of its economic doldrums has been disappointed. The U.S. closure of the Iraq market in 2003, followed by the expulsion of Syria from Lebanon in 2005, dealt Al Assad's plans a heavy blow, from which Syria has only partially recovered by reorienting its trade east to Russia, India, and China and sucking in some of the petrodollars washing through the Gulf.
Whether the Syrian regime can liberalize its economy, outmaneuver western sanctions, and preserve its power base is an open question. In the face of increasing Western and opposition pressure, high GDP growth and banner figures for foreign investment have become critical weapons for regime survival.
Joshua Landis, who spent 2005 as a Senior Fulbright Researcher in Damascus, is assistant professor of Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma and author of SyriaComment.com. His book, Democracy in Syria, will come out next year.
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Egypt: The Gamal Mubarak Paradox
Samer Shehata
Among the ironies of Egypt's stalled process of political reform is that it is inextricably linked to the future of 42-year old presidential scion Gamal Mubarak. The younger Mubarak fashions himself as a Western-oriented reformer and in fact has championed some notable economic and political liberalization measures. At the same time, many Egyptians would consider his eventual succession to the presidency—widely seen in Egypt as a fait accompli—antithetical to genuine political reform and competition.
Even before the Kifaya (“Enough”) movement came into existence in late 2004, anti-Mubarak and anti-Gamal slogans were frequently heard at protests. Beginning with the mobilization against the Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank in the spring of 2002 and continuing through the 2003 anti-Iraq war protests, demonstrations that were originally organized around foreign and regional issues often became opportunities to express anti-regime sentiments.
Public criticism of the president, the regime, and Gamal has become more pointed as the number of independent newspapers in Egypt has increased. Few opportunities to criticize the president's son are missed and hardly a day goes by without at least one front-page story about Gamal. Independent newspapers have had a field day, for example, with Gamal's allegedly secret trip to Washington in May. The headline of the leftist Al Ahali's newspaper read, “Mubarak gives America a choice: Gamal or the (Muslim) Brotherhood.” Banner headlines in Al Usbuu (nominally independent but closely linked to security services) declared “The Secret of Gamal Mubarak's Mysterious Visit,” reflecting popular suspicion about Gamal Mubarak's meetings with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley. Other widely read independent papers such as Al Dustour, Al Fagr and Sawt Al Umma, in addition to the liberal and more professional dailies Nahdat Masr and Al Masry Al Youm, also prominently feature Gamal in their coverage.
Opposition to Gamal Mubarak's increasingly prominent role and likely succession has also motivated the creation of protest movements in recent years. The Egyptian Movement for Change, known as Kifaya and its numerous offshoot organizations were founded on the slogan “No to extension [of President Mubarak's rule], no to hereditary succession, yes to freedom.” Even newly-formed issue-oriented reform groups, such as the March 9 Movement for the Independence of Egyptian Universities, are largely composed of individuals publicly opposed to hereditary succession.
The Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's most popular and powerful opposition movement, as well as secular opposition parties, also oppose Gamal's succession. The Brotherhood's Supreme Guide Muhammad Mahdi Akef recently declared that his organization “completely rejects” the possibility of Gamal “inheriting” the presidency. In a May 2006 statement, Akef highlighted Gamal's elitist image, saying that the younger Mubarak “has nothing to do with the people and knows nothing about the people.” Deputy Supreme Guide Muhammad Habib made similar remarks, interpreting a recent government crackdown on protests as “preparing the stage for an idea that is completely rejected by the Egyptian people, which is hereditary succession.”
In the increasingly free-wheeling political debate in Cairo, Gamal Mubarak's future has become daily fare. Public figures as diverse as veteran political commentator Muhammad Hassanayn Haykal, civil society activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim, and popular poet Ahmed Fouad Negm have all made public statements about Gamal's possible succession. At an event at the American University in Cairo on May 21, vice presidents of the Court of Cassation Mahmoud Mekki and Nagi Derballa were asked about a Gamal succession scenario. The judges responded that they had no objection to Gamal being elected president as long as the election was free and fair, but the mere fact that the issue was raised in a forum about judicial freedom reveals how intertwined political reform, Gamal Mubarak, and the nation's future have become.
Despite the ongoing controversy, if Gamal Mubarak were nominated as the ruling party's candidate and stood in controlled presidential elections, he would undoubtedly win. The process would be legal as per the amended Article 76 of the Egyptian constitution. Considering the weakness of the opposition and the Muslim Brotherhood's reluctance to challenge the regime directly, it is unlikely that the inevitable protests would result in anything more than temporary but surmountable turbulence for the regime.
The larger issue is that significant segments of the public would not welcome Gamal's installation and would consider his assumption of the presidency illegitimate. It is difficult to predict the precise problems that might arise from such a legitimacy deficit, for example, whether opponents to Gamal in the military or security services would take advantage of such a situation. The potential for trouble will be incre
