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by Hans Kristensen, www.NukeStrat.com One of the best things the Bush administration has done, former National Security Council and Pentagon official Frank Miller told the audience of the “Utility of Nuclear Weapons” panel, “was to take Russia off the enemy list.” That’s strange, because just last month STRATCOM conducted a nuclear exercise that simulated a Russian nuclear attack on the United States. Last time I checked, friends don’t nuke friends. But Miller’s mistake is only the latest in a growing list of statements from current and former officials that misrepresent the role of Russian in U.S. nuclear planning. Granted, the planning has changed compared with the Cold War, but Russia is certainly not off the threat list. Let’s be real. Anyone with a map and a general understanding of what targeteers point U.S. nuclear weapons at quickly has to admit that the Bush administration’s force level of 2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads by 2012 only makes sense if Russia remains at the center of the crosshairs. Daryl Kimbal had put together a panel of opinions ranging from Frank Miller, former STRATCOM command Eugene Habiger, Secretary-General of the WMD Commission and former Swedish ambassador Henrik Salander, and Strategic Security Project director Ivan Oelrich from the Federation of American Scientists. The views probably ranged as wide as in the real world. Habiger, Salander, and Oelrich formed an unintentional axis calling for deep reductions and limiting the utility of nuclear weapons. With reference to the Bush administration’s efforts to develop the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, Habiger issued a stern warning: “Don’t make nukes so attractive that they become attractive to use.” Although he agreed that the arsenal could be cut much lower, Miller rejected limiting the options for using nuclear weapons. “The point that deterrence is supposed to work,” he said. It was as if Dr. Strangelove was present in the room saying: “Yes, Mr. President, that is precisely the beauty of the whole thing, that we never have to use them.” On the issue of nuclear weapons in Europe, Miller’s claims were also off. He made three major points: that the weapons are deployed “because we jointly agree with NATO that they should be there;” it has absolutely nothing to do with Russia; and the numbers are down to “a handful” today. All are wrong. Only last month, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld told Der Spiegel: “Some European countries…made the decision to allow them to be on the continent. It was seen to be in their interest and is still seen that way today." No joint decision was defended, no essential military mission was emphasized. Just European nuclear tradition. But things are changing. Greece has withdrawn from the nuclear mission, a unilateral Belgian Parliament wants the nukes out, and Germany will likely withdraw from the nuclear mission over the next five years. As for Russia, both defense officials and the State Department use Russia as a justification for keeping nukes in Europe. During a visit to Moscow in October 2004, for example, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Stephen Rademaker, told the Russians: “I can assure you that when European audiences talk about the problem of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, their concern is directed toward the Russian tactical nuclear weapons and what countries they might be targeted on rather than the relatively small number of tactical nuclear weapons that remain in the NATO arsenal.” And the numbers are way off! The “handful” of weapons mentioned by Miller don’t even come close to the more than 400 that the President has authorized for deployment in Europe. Different views are entirely legitimate, but nuclear policy should be debated based on the facts.
Nuclear Policy Adrift To Be Or Not Taboo November 7, 2005 6:00 pm The Taboos, Secrets, and Hidden History of Nuclear Weapons panel organized by William Burr could have consisted of dusty documents being held up by dull historians. Instead it turned into dynamic discussion of many of the central aspects of nuclear weapons, including social science, nuclear planning, and democracy. Although the nuclear era has lasted longer than most people, Burr reminded us that only within the last two decades have historians been able to get access to substantial material to understand the beast. Three of them were on the panel (not to ignore Burr himself): Lynn Eden of Stanford University and author of Whole World on Fire (Cornell University Press, 2004), Nina Tannewald of Brown University and author of Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo (International Security, April 2005), and Robert S. Norris from the Natural Resource Defense Council and author of Racing for the Bomb (Steerforth Press, 2002). Norris began by dissecting the nuclear beast: methodically separating its limbs of declaratory policy, acquisition policy, deployment policy, and employment policy. This led to a discovery perhaps surprising to many: that the United States –despite excessive nuclear secrecy – is the world's best understood nuclear power. Eden told us that nuclear war actually was much worse than we thought: the planners had deliberately underestimated the effect of fire damage in the war plans. Although the planners currently take fires into account, Eden said it is her understanding that it is still being ignored. STRATCOM studied the issued in the early 1990s, but there is no major change around the corner. Tannenwald, who has a new book coming out in early 2006, explained her research into the origins and effects of the nuclear taboo. Her new book will challenge deterrence theory by arguing that deterrence is not the only reason nuclear weapons haven't been used for 60 years: instead, she said, it was the anti-nuclear movement that over the decades effectively castigated nuclear weapons as completely unacceptable for civilized nations to use. This taboo became institutionalized in 1960s through arms control agreements. What's more: the nuclear taboo is fundamental for the future of the non-proliferation regime, she said. The minute the taboo evaporates, we're toast! This a very important point today because nuclear cold warriors argue the opposite: that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons necessitates that we demonstrate that we're ready and willing to use nuclear weapons – even preemptively – against “rogue” states – yes even terrorists – armed with weapons of mass destruction. So what can be done? Tannenwald argued that the nuclear taboo is still fairly strong, but weakening. She believes that one reason for this is that the anti-nuclear movement is almost absent today compared with the 1980s. Previous U.S. administrations have almost all been clear about the value of the nuclear taboo; the Bush administration, in contrast, is very unclear. Government officials must be confronted with this question, she said. A different view was raised in a question: that there is no nuclear taboo as such, but rather a nuclear threshold. The taboo is diminishing, yes, but for other reasons than the diminishing peace movement. People taking to the streets may have an effect on declaratory policy, but not actual planning. Eden and Norris said that change would only come from top-down direction. Changing things would not be impossible, but it would require continuous pressure on the nuclear planning community, a far cry from where things are today where the planners are busy carving out new missions for nuclear weapons. Supernova Versus Critical November 7, 2005 1:20 pm “So, what's new,” Joe Cirincione began his armchair interview with Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. “You've gone supernova,” Cirincione said. With a budget no bigger than the Washington Redskins football team but recently armed with the moral highground of Nobel Peace Price award, ElBaradei appears like the embodiment of the world's non-proliferation aspirations. Unlike many others who saw Iraqi weapons of mass destruction everywhere, ElBaradei made the right call: “I just read the data,” he said. “We didn't see any indication that they were reviving their program. That's what we told the UN. I didn't send any wrong message. My conscience is clear.” And he seems to continue the same strategy on Iran 's nuclear program. “We still have outstanding questions,” ElBaradei said, but we're making progress. We're getting access.” He said he's telling Tehran that they have to be more transparent because of their record of concealing information. “They have understood that to some extent.” Yet with such a record, some people in the audience couldn't understand why ElBaredei supported the recent U.S-Indian deal. ElBaradei explained that he supported the deal to supply India with nuclear technology despite India 's refusal to join the NPT and despite many experts seeing the deal as undercutting one of the central bargains underpinning the NPT regime: that countries will have to join the NPT – not reject it – to get access to nuclear technology. “I support India agreement because India won't come to NPT without incentives,” ElBaradei said pointing to enhanced safeguards, closing supply loopholes, and separating India 's civilian and military fuel cycles. Some experts, including Michael Krepon with the Stimson Center, have questioned the deal saying that important issues need to be clarified. “These details can mark the difference between an agreement that makes us all safer or more vulnerable to nuclear dangers,” Krepon said in an early assessment of the deal. Several questions from the audience expressed concern over Japan's excessive plutonium reprocessing program, and that it will increase rather than reduce separation of nuclear bomb materials. ElBaradei's said he did not want to single out Japan, but added that he did not want to see any more reprocessing facilities built. Surprisingly he said he had not discussed the reprocessing program with the Japanese, but added: “I've been told that the Japanese are looking favorably at some of my proposals, and they have been more forthcoming.” Finally, when asked about a recent petition against changes in U.S. nuclear doctrine, ElBaradei said that IAEA was not dealing with the role of nuclear weapons. Yet he added his belief that unless an environment is created where nuclear weapons are not important and steps are taken to move towards complete disarmament, attempts to proliferate will continue. To get there, he said, the nuclear powers will need to work on alternatives to nuclear deterrence. “I haven't seen much on this work. We need to do it, and we need to do it fast.” Why They Come Monday, November 7, 2005 9:00 am Never turn down a good party, or a “nukefest” as Michael Krepon calls the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference. But why do they come? In preparation for this “blog” I asked some of the key participants what motivates them to pay the “steep registration fee,” as one said, to attend the conference and what they hope it will produce. Here's what they said: Michael Krepon, President Emeritus and co-founder of the Stimson Center, says he has been coming to the "nukefest" ever since Sandy Spector launched it. He finds it “remarkable how much it has grown under Joe's imprimatur.” Krepon comes “to hear what people have to say and how they say it” and to reconnect with colleagues who work in far away places. “The nukefest is one stop shopping: a wide array of topics and people,” says Krepon who will speak on “The Future of Verification” panel on Monday (Polaris room, 2-3:30 pm ). William Burr, senior analyst at the National Security Archive and director of the Archive's nuclear history documentation project, admits he has never been to the Carnegie Conference before…”not that the conferences didn't sound interesting.” This time he was asked to organize and chair “ The Taboos, Secrets, and Hidden History of Nuclear Weapons” panel on Monday (Horizon room, 2-3:30 pm ). Burr says he hopes the conference will give the participants a “better and richer perspective on the history of the nuclear danger.” Lynn Eden, the associate director for research at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, is also attending the conference for the first time but says she has wanted to come for some time but “never wanted to pay the pretty steep registration fee.” She says she hopes the conference will produce a “clear punchy and fresh statement” on non-proliferation that makes the press “so that the public becomes ever so slightly more aware.” Eden will speak on “ The Taboos, Secrets, and Hidden History of Nuclear Weapons” panel on Monday (Horizon room, 2-3:30 pm ).Robert S. Norris, a nuclear historian and senior research associate with the Natural Resources Defense Council, says the conference is “an essential, actually unique, opportunity for me to speak with colleagues from all over the world about the issues and concerns of the day.” Norris says the conference is “the one conference that everyone comes to.” He hopes to find out what other people are working on and to learn something new from the panelists and speakers. Norris participates in one of the opening events, “ A Conversation with Historians of the Nuclear Age,” on Monday (Amphitheater, 10:30-12:30 pm ). Later the same day he presents in “The Taboos, Secrets, and Hidden History of Nuclear Weapons” panel (Horizon room, 2-3:30 pm ). General Eugene Habiger, who is a Distinguished Fellow and Policy Adviser with the Center for International Trade and Security at University of Georgia, member of the Board of Directors at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and former B-52 pilot and Commander in Chief of U.S. Strategic Command (1996-1998), says the Carnegie Conference “ provides the most comprehensive and balanced forum to discuss [non-proliferation] issues.” Gen. Habiger hopes the conference will make policy makers aware of the “critical nature of the implications regarding the lack of aggressive actions required for today as well as the future.” Gen. Habiger will speak on the “ Utility of Nuclear Weapons” panel Tuesday (Polaris room, 9-10:30) and participate in the “60 Years of Trying to Control the Bomb” panel later that day for the live broadcast on National Public Radio's Talk of the Nation ( Amphitheater, 2-4 pm). Let the “nukefest” begin! |