



**COUNCIL OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION**

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CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION CONFERENCE

Keynote Address

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**Check against delivery.
Seul le texte délivré fait foi.
Es gilt das gesprochene Wort.**

I feel honoured and I am very pleased to have the opportunity to address this distinguished audience.

Allow me to start with a few words about the EU WMD Strategy for the implementation of which I am responsible.

1. Why is the WMD Strategy a novelty?

The adoption by the European Council in 2003 of the WMD Strategy, together with the "Solana's" Security Strategy, was a landmark event in the construction of a CFSP: for the first time in Europe, the two nuclear weapons States, the other NATO countries, the two members of the New Agenda Coalition and the other non-NATO countries supported, all together, a common approach towards non-proliferation of WMD.

Faced in 2003 with the threat of major terrorists attacks after 11 of September 2001, and in view of the EU's failure to define a common approach on Iraq, the EU Member States decided to formulate a common strategy: a far-reaching, coherent and multi-dimensional strategy which was the result of a collective effort.

The strategy is based on the principle of effective multilateralism, which means that the focus is on prevention and cooperation. We define prevention as "preventive engagement": the EU is ready to address difficult situations and to consider, if necessary, the option of coercive measures, in accordance with the UN Charter and international law. But this is the ultima ratio. Preventive engagement has to start much earlier, since acting before a crisis occurs, working on the root causes of proliferation, makes more sense than having to enforce the rules when it might sometimes be already too late.

Some may claim that preventive engagement was merely a response by European decision-makers to the criticism implicit in Robert Kagan's "Mars and Venus" theory, which cast Europeans in the role of Venus, fit for soft diplomacy only. In fact, looking back on the last two years of practice and experience of the EU WMD Strategy and on the challenges we faced in fighting WMD proliferation, we realise that "preventive engagement", with its twofold content of prevention *and* engagement, is an absolute must for all of us. It is also at the centre of the entire international system and of the multilateral non-proliferation regime in particular. That is why we, the EU and the US, should work together more to uphold the system, to make it work better and to ensure implementation and compliance.

But before looking at how to implement "preventive engagement", let me first start with the question of the threat assessment.

2. What are the main proliferation threats we are facing today and what main strategic priorities should we derive from them?

In its strategy papers adopted in 2003, the EU clearly identified two main aspects of the proliferation threat:

- a) A number of States continue to seek to develop WMDs and their means of delivery in breach of their non-proliferation commitments or outside non-proliferation regimes;
- b) The risk that terrorists will acquire chemical, biological, radiological or fissile materials and their means of delivery.

Let us take the newest threat first: preventing the nexus between terrorism and WMDs.

The EU, on the basis of its WMD Strategy and of a revised List of Priorities that is currently under consideration, intends to address these concerns working with others, its partners and international organisations, such as the IAEA and the OPCW, to increase effectiveness.

The main priorities in terms of prevention are:

- The physical protection and securing of facilities, laboratories and installations where sensitive nuclear, radioactive, chemical and biological materials are stored or used.
- Controls over trafficking in nuclear, radioactive, chemical and biological materials and substances.

The EU has launched a number of programmes in the past, focusing on nuclear material accountancy and control, radiological surveillance and physical protection of nuclear installations in the former Soviet Union. Since 2004, it has adopted two Joint Actions in support of the IAEA for similar programmes in the area of nuclear and radioactive materials, with a focus on specific regions including the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, the Mediterranean and the Middle-East. We are working with the OPCW in order to improve compliance with the CWC. The physical protection of biological laboratories will probably be one of our next priorities.

The threat of terrorists using WMD must be taken seriously. If an attack of the kind that took place in Madrid or London were ever carried out using a "dirty bomb", political leaders realise that they would share a heavy burden of responsibility if they had failed to take the necessary preventive actions.

This having been said, **we should not underestimate the continued and even increasing risk of State proliferation.**

In recent years, the temptation among certain States to acquire WMD capabilities, in particular nuclear, and their means of delivery has not eased in the slightest, nor have their attempts to do so become any less frequent, on the contrary. We should therefore not lose sight of this more "traditional" track of WMD proliferation.

If we let these developments continue unhindered, the result may be a dangerous escalation of tension regionally and internationally, as well as the nightmare prospect of a resurgence of a WMD or conventional arms race.

At the previous NPT Review Conferences in 2000 and 1995, we were recording significant progress:

- Universality of the NPT was making steady progress;
- A number of earlier nuclear proliferation programmes were rolled back in the 1990s, with the dismantlement of nuclear weapons capabilities and/or programmes in South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and Ukraine;
- The CWC was signed in 1996 and an increasing number of States were acceding to it;
- The CTBT had been finalised and opened for signature at the end of 1996 and a large number of States, including the two European nuclear weapons States, had ratified it without delay.

With the DPRK and Iran nuclear issues still unresolved, the situation today is less encouraging. In both regions, North-East Asia and the Middle East, there is a continuing risk of a build-up of new nuclear arsenals, which is already fuelling tension and spreading the temptation of WMD proliferation. To take the case of the Middle East, if Iran were to obtain nuclear weapons, many of its neighbours may no longer be in a position to forego the nuclear option. The total absence of controls on chemical or biological proliferation in certain key countries of the region, which have not yet adhered to the CWC or the BTWC, is another matter for concern.

We, the EU, the US and other bigger players, can try to contain a proliferating State while still feeling safe ourselves, but what about smaller countries? What about the neighbours? How will they react to an increasingly evident threat next door? Countries which have so far played by the rules may start to reassess their options.

In this situation, how can we reaffirm, strongly and in credible terms, the importance of the obligations of the NPT, the CWC and the BTWC, as we did in particular last year in adopting UNSCR 1540?

3. We believe that more preventive and complimentary engagement is required, in particular within the multilateral framework.

Firstly, on the need for *more prevention and cooperation*:

We need to close the loopholes in the network of controls on illicit trafficking but also on transit and transshipment of sensitive materials and technologies. Assistance programmes should raise awareness and assist all States around the world to mobilise their resources and meet the challenges of proliferation.

The EU is gaining experience as a result of the mainstreaming of WMD clauses in its association, partnership and trade and cooperation agreements with third States and in the Action Plans within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy: we secure legally binding commitments to promote non-proliferation in all its aspects (compliance, accession to new instruments, establishment of strict export controls, etc), and, in return, we are prepared to offer assistance tailored to the needs of the countries concerned. We also accompany this clause with an offer of political dialogue, including on security issues. It is crucial to counter proliferation also by addressing the security concerns of other countries.

Secondly, on the subject of the need for *more engagement*:

We need an international consensus in order to solve the proliferation crisis in Iran and DPRK. For Iran, the EU and US common work was instrumental in getting the message of the latest IAEA Board resolution through. But now we also have to work together with the Russians, the Chinese, the other G8 Partners and key NAM countries to find a political solution.

We need to engage and invest more in a multilateral approach. Who are the key players? Those States with the greatest capacity to help and to influence, but also international organisations like the UN (including the UNSC), the IAEA and the OPCW. We are convinced of the importance of continuing to work in an international multilateral setting by supporting international organisations, *politically* and *financially*, to enable them to enhance their cooperation with the countries party to the treaty as well as to strengthen their controls, inspections and, if necessary, enforcement of the rules.

We cannot have coherence if we ourselves question the principle of feasibility of international verification. If, as in the case of the BTWC, some of us are not sure that the type of verification system we have for NPT and CWC is really the appropriate one, then we must find alternatives and work on them in order to establish effective common rules and confidence-building measures.

After the failure of the NPT Review Conference, we have to do more in order to support and uphold the non-proliferation treaty base and adapt it to the new challenges.

- We need to consolidate the NPT regime by reviewing in a clear and fair way the rules regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (in particular the regime applicable to nuclear trade in its most sensitive areas) and the guarantees of access to nuclear fuel.
- We should also abide ourselves by the norms which we have promoted for others: e.g. the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. All participants should comply faithfully with the requirement for pre-launch notifications if we want this Code to be implemented internationally, including by China and others.
- Nuclear weapons States need to continue to engage in reducing nuclear arsenals, and also, specifically, as foreseen in the 1995 and 2000 NPT documents, in ratifying the CTBT and ensuring an early commencement of negotiations of an FMCT.
- Finally, we need to devote more efforts and resources to bridging the gaps in the international non-proliferation regime, by helping the OPCW to be able to organise challenge inspections, improving the IAEA safeguards, possibly with the help of the new Special Committee, strengthening the BTWC, assessing the need to establish a UN capability to investigate alleged use of BW and to prepare for ballistic proliferation challenges in potential future verification mandates.

4. How can we engage better as transatlantic partners to counter WMD proliferation more effectively?

Because our ultimate objectives are so close, we should be able to elaborate a complementary approach, and avoid misperceptions by others, particularly within the NAM.

- Therefore, my first conclusion would be: let us, the EU and the US, consult more regularly and in greater depth in order to coordinate better our messages and inform each other better and in advance of our moves and respective initiatives. The India-US Joint Statement on nuclear cooperation was clearly an important subject on which prior information and consultation would have been useful.
- Our cooperation brings qualitative added value. Once the US and the EU agree on something, it is much easier to get wider international support. This applies also to the pooling of incentives and the maximising of the deterrent effect of disincentives. (example: DPRK: we can do more together, the EU could be more involved in support for the Six-Party process).
- We should establish regular focused dialogue on specific issues. As decided at the last EU-US Summit, we will be starting regular dialogue on verification and compliance, which will allow us to exchange views on many areas of common concern. Let us not limit our dialogue to restating obvious joint commitments: our relation is special, deeper, and we have to go straight to real exchanges on policy challenges and find possible solutions together.

That is the core of what I would see as "preventive engagement", and here the collective input and momentum of the transatlantic partnership is very much needed. Too much for us and internationally is at stake. We have to do much more and better.
