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In the world of national security affairs, transparency is not a virtue and secrecy is not a vice. International cooperation to promote transparency is not a natural thing for any nation to engage in. This phenomenon blocked security cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. It is preventing Russia and the United States from moving on to a new level in their contemporary relationship. It was customary during the Cold War to assign all the blame to Moscow. But the Soviet Union, which did see secrecy as a strategic asset, was not opposed to transparency in all circumstances. Nor was the United States always an unqualified supporter of it. Transparency achieved through intelligence means was not enough during the Cold War and it is still no substitute for cooperative transparency. Intelligence can prevent the worst from happening. It cannot change relationships. A few stories from my own experience will set the stage for a discussion of the future.

In a memorandum to John Foster Dulles dated September 8, 1953, Eisenhower wrote that

. . . our own preparation could no longer be geared to a policy that attempts only to avert disaster during the early “surprise” stages of a war, and so gain time for full mobilization. Rather, we would have to be constantly ready, on an instantaneous basis, to inflict greater loss upon the enemy than he could reasonably hope to inflict upon us.

This generated an acute need for transparency. Eisenhower’s second term was a period of rapid advances in unilateral intelligence-gathering aimed at understanding the threat

posed by Soviet nuclear and missile developments. I'm thinking of the U-2 and the first U.S. reconnaissance satellites. Not content with unilateral intelligence, Eisenhower sought cooperative U.S.-Soviet actions to enhance transparency. He had good reasons to test the waters. In the years following Stalin's death, in 1953, the Soviet leadership wanted a relaxation of East-West tensions and more engagement with the West. In 1955 Eisenhower proposed an exchange of military data—he called it “blueprints of our military establishments from one end of our countries to the other.” Reciprocal aerial inspection would confirm the accuracy of the data. The Soviets replied, candidly and forcefully, that transparency would fuel an arms race.

In the first year of his second term, 1957, Eisenhower was still hoping that a cooperative threat reduction system based on cooperative transparency could be achieved. His hopes were vested in Harold Stassen, his chief disarmament adviser. Stassen, at age 50, was not quite the “Boy Wonder” of Republican politics that he had been and he was looking for a success in the U.N. Subcommittee on Disarmament that met in London that year. Two nuclear issues were on the agenda: a fissionable material cutoff and a nuclear test ban. An inspection zone to prevent surprise attack also was high on the agenda. Eisenhower was interested in all of these issues, although many in his administration were not.

On June 14, 1957, Ambassador Valerian Zorin proposed a two or three year moratorium on nuclear testing. Zorin also proposed an international commission to supervise a test ban. And he proposed the establishment of control posts in the Soviet Union, the United States, the U.K., and in the Pacific. Stassen might have been able to

make something of that opening but by June he had fatally damaged his credibility in Washington because of his handling of the other major issue: inspection zones.

I watched Stassen end his career and end his usefulness as a disarmament negotiator on May 31, 1957 when I accompanied him to a meeting with Zorin. Stassen had been in Washington in late May for NSC meetings and returned with the word that he had new, more flexible positions. He then made a disastrous decision: without waiting for new instructions, he drafted a paper outlining new U.S. positions and, without consulting with the Allies, he presented it to Ambassador Zorin. It included an idea which the Soviets had been pushing and which Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, when he heard of it, interpreted as a zone of inspection focused on Central Europe. Adenauer feared this would seal the division of Germany. Within days, the State Department notified the Soviet government that Stassen's paper was "without status as a communication between governments". From then on, Stassen was on a tight leash, unable to exploit any openings there might have been.

But the test ban and transparency to prevent surprise attack lived on. In 1958, Eisenhower proposed, and Khrushchev accepted, two technical conferences, one on monitoring a test ban, the other on preventing surprise attack.

The 1958 meeting of technical experts on the proposed nuclear test ban was a breakthrough in itself. It was the first time that Soviet and Western scientists had worked together to produce a monitoring system which also included on-site inspections. That agreement led to a U.S.-U.K.-Soviet test ban conference, accompanied by a test moratorium which lasted well into 1961. Again, opportunities were lost and by 1961, Kennedy's first year in office, Khrushchev had lost interest in a test ban treaty. Soviet

atmospheric testing resumed in early September 1961 and lasted two months. The United States followed suit.

After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Khrushchev and Kennedy agreed to make another effort at a test ban. I was a member of a U.S. delegation headed by Bill Foster, the first ACDA director, that met secretly with the Soviets in New York in January 1963. The two sides were still far apart over how many on-site inspections would be required. Khrushchev was ready to accept two or three but this was not sufficient in Kennedy's judgment.

I advised Foster to try to engage the Soviets in a discussion of what would actually be done in an on-site inspection, hoping that quality might make up for quantity. But the Soviets had no interest in that, or in exploring the location of unmanned seismic stations.

But in the early summer of 1963, I think because of the growing split with China, Khrushchev decided to opt for a limited test ban treaty and in July, that treaty, which had been on the negotiating table in Geneva for a year, is what Averill Harriman initialed in Moscow. It contained no requirement for cooperative transparency. It was not the powerful anti-proliferation tool that a comprehensive test ban treaty would have been.

Not until 1996, 38 years after the first negotiations began, was it possible to secure a comprehensive test ban treaty with an international monitoring system that included monitoring stations and on-site inspections. And that was shot down by the U.S. Senate in 1999 over concerns about verification, among other things. In 2000, General John Shalikashvili, former JCS chairman, at the request of President Clinton and Secretary Albright, consulted with Senators to see whether the treaty could eventually be

ratified. I was his deputy. He and I, and Nancy Gallagher, now at the University of Maryland, met with President Clinton on January 5, 2001 to discuss our findings. Clinton told us he would ask President-elect Bush to reconsider his opposition to the treaty. If he did, his advice was ignored, and so was General Shalikashvili's report, which concluded that a comprehensive test ban could be effectively monitored. So, today, we have had a testing moratorium in effect since 1992, monitored by U.S. intelligence, but without the support of cooperative transparency that the treaty would have provided.

The story of Ike's other 1958 initiative is equally poignant. I was the AEC representative in the Surprise Attack Conference which met in late 1958. The head of the U.S. delegation was Bill Foster. He assembled the largest delegation in U.S. arms control history, over 100 persons, the only delegation I've been connected with that required an organization chart complete with boxes and lines of authority. He also brought in some real heavy-weights: Albert Wohlstetter, George Kistiakowsky, Dick Garwin, Jerry Wiesner, and Harry Rowen to name just a few. The delegation included a very strong military contingent.

The U.S. delegation came with the idea of engaging in a discussion of monitoring strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Ambassador V.V. Kuznetsov, the leader of the Soviet delegation, had studied engineering in Pittsburgh and had a clear, incisive way of analyzing issues when not indulging in stock propaganda rhetoric. He was a worthy adversary and could have been a worthy negotiating partner under different circumstances.

Kuznetsov and the other eastern delegations argued that transparency, again to use our contemporary term, would not in itself reduce the danger of surprise attack. Only

steps to reduce concentrations of armed forces and to ban the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in forward areas would do that. They also asked for a ban on flights of bombers loaded with nuclear weapons and proposed zones of inspection.

Ever since Eisenhower had unveiled his data exchange and aerial monitoring proposal, Moscow had argued that transparency was not always a positive factor. Kuznetsov followed this line in responding to the Western agenda. “The final result,” he said, “would be a contest to see who acquires the most military information. . .it is surely clear that the Conference would then achieve nothing but an increase in mutual distrust and suspicion among the Powers. . .the Soviet Government cannot act as an accomplice of those who are striving not for the prevention of the danger of surprise attacks, but for the acquisition of intelligence data on present-day types of atomic, hydrogen, rocket and other weapons at the disposal of the Soviet Union.”

Their argument that transparency was undesirable even borrowed from a book, new at that time, written by Henry Kissinger, entitled *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. The Czechoslovak representative took pleasure in quoting the following passages:

The relative ineffectiveness of inspection in preventing surprise in an all-out war is due to the nature of strategic striking forces.

A system of inspection may well make a tense situation even more explosive. The value of an inspection system depends not only on the collection but also on the interpretation of facts. Instead of reducing the danger of an all-out war, inspection systems may make more likely a showdown caused by a misunderstanding of the opponent’s intentions.

I thought that George Kistiakowsky, a leading scientist in the Manhattan Project and, later, President Eisenhower’s science advisor, did the best job of defending transparency. By 1955, he said, it had become infeasible to assure, through inspection, that nuclear weapons had been eliminated. Therefore, “the only practical step to reduce

the danger of surprise attack by nuclear weapons is to monitor the vehicles of delivery.” “Cooperative systems of observation,” he said, could “reinforce national warning systems and improve reliability and lengthen the warning of an impending attack.” This was a promising area for exploration but it was not picked up. In fact, it still has not been acted on to the extent that it could be. The Conference adjourned without any meeting of the minds after several weeks of futile debate.

Fast forward now a quarter of a century to the 1984-86 Stockholm Conference on confidence-and security-building measures in Europe. Although it focused on conventional armed forces, it was in many ways the reincarnation of the 1958 Surprise Attack Conference in the sense that the United States again argued that transparency could reduce the danger of surprise attack. By that time I was the lead negotiator making that argument. The Soviet delegation started out in a mode very much like Kuznetsov in 1958. They proposed a series of old Soviet non-starters but Gorbachev was not Khrushchev and Oleg Grinevsky, my very able Soviet counterpart, had the flexibility to respond to changing times. The negotiation was successful this time: the final agreement provided for observers at military exercises and the first requirement for on-site inspection that the Soviet Union had ever accepted.

The Russian-American relationship today is not what most of us would want it to be, and escaping from the shadow of the past may be dependent on cooperative transparency, still difficult to achieve. There are many examples of this. In my negotiations on the Nunn-Lugar program I found lack of access to sensitive sites hindered our efforts to provide assistance. I ran into roadblocks in my negotiations in 1995-96 to induce some measure of cooperation and irreversibility into the process of U.S.-Russian

warhead dismantlement. Since then, I have seen problems in implementing President Clinton's initiative to enhance U.S.-Russian cooperation in early warning and President Bush's commitment to U.S.-Russian cooperation in ballistic missile defense. If we cannot do these things, all of which require cooperative transparency, it will be difficult to really transform the relationship. It is a sad commentary that just as in 1953 both sides believe they must be "constantly ready on an instantaneous basis", as Ike put it, to launch their strategic nuclear forces. We can do better.