



THE HENRY L.  
STIMSON CENTER

*"Taking pragmatic steps toward  
ideal objectives."*

# Who Needs Verification?

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“To defeat this threat, we must make use **of every tool** in our arsenal—military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing.”

The National Security Strategy of the  
United States of America  
September 2002

# What Tools?

- Homeland Security
- Military capabilities to dissuade, deter, defeat potential adversaries
- Application of new technologies
- Intelligence collection and analysis
- Diplomacy, strengthened alliances and partnerships
- Arms control, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance

National Security Strategy (2002)

National Strategy to Combat WMD (2002)

National Defense Strategy (2005)

## Paragraph 18 ( of 37)

“Existing nonproliferation and arms control regimes play an important role in our overall strategy. The United States will support those regimes that are currently in force, and work to **improve the effectiveness of, and compliance with**, those regimes. Consistent with other policy priorities, we will also **promote new agreements** and arrangements that serve our nonproliferation goals. Overall, we seek to cultivate an international environment that is more conducive to nonproliferation.”

The National Strategy to Combat  
Weapons of Mass Destruction  
December 2002

# Missing Tools

- Transparency measures
- Assured access
- Improved treaty monitoring
- Verification

“...the U.S. approach to combat WMD represents a fundamental change from the past.”

# Nuclear Forces

## Intrusive Monitoring – INF Treaty (1987)

- Baseline Inspections
- Continuous Portal Monitoring
- Elimination Inspections
- Closeout Inspections
- Short-Notice Inspections

**EXPIRED: June 1, 1991**

# Nuclear Forces

## Intrusive Monitoring – START I (1991)

- Baseline Inspections
- Data Update Inspections
- New Facility Inspections
- Suspect-site Inspections
- Reentry Vehicle Inspections
- Post-Exercise Dispersal Inspections
- Conversion or Elimination Inspections
- Close-out Inspections
- Formally Declared Facility Inspections
- Technical Characteristics Exhibitions Inspections
- Bomber Distinguishability Exhibitions Inspections
- Bomber Baseline Exhibitions Inspections
- Continuous Monitoring at Mobile Launcher Production Facilities

**VERIFICATION PROVISIONS SET TO EXPIRE:  
December 5, 2009**

# Conventional Forces Transparency and Access

Stockholm 1986

- Prior notification of certain military activities
- Observation of certain military activities
- Annual calendar of military activities
- Recognize the role of National Technical Means
- Up to 3 inspections per year

Later Additions (Vienna)

- Evaluations of peacetime units and locations to verify data
- Arranged visits to air bases
- Demonstrations of new types of weapon systems

INDEFINITE DURATION

# Conventional Forces

## Transparency and Access

### Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (1990)

- Inspections (up to 5 times a year per country)
  - Verify numerical limitations
  - Monitor reduction processes
  - Monitor recategorization or reclassification of various aircraft
- Challenge inspections

As of 2002 more than 4,000 inspections have been conducted

INDEFINITE DURATION

# Multilateral/Nuclear Transparency and Access IAEA

- 1958 – Safeguard Division
  - One Japanese reactor
- 1961 – First Inspectors
- 1965 – INFCIRC/66
  - Reactors, reprocessing plants, and fuel fabrication facilities
- 1972 – INFCIRC/153
  - Full fuel cycle (NPT)
- Additional Protocol
  - More information
  - More inspections
  - Short notice inspections
  - Environmental sampling

# Multilateral Inspections Open Skies Treaty (1992)

- “Active” and “passive” quotas of overflights
- Agreed sensors
- Data must be shared
- Over 200 flights conducted so far

**INDEFINITE DURATION**

# Multilateral Inspections BWC (1972)

- States can lodge complaints to the UN Security Council
- UNSC tasked to “investigate”
- July 2001 - US opposes verification protocol
- Strengthening measures in limbo

# Multilateral Inspections Chemical Weapons Convention (1993)

- Initial inspections
- Continuous monitoring/Seals
- Destruction inspections
- Plant conversion inspections
- Challenge Inspections
  - Managed Access

As of September 2004, over 1,800 inspections have been conducted (zero challenge inspections)

# Multilateral Inspections Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (?)

“The U.S. policy review raised serious concerns that realistic, effective verification of an FMCT is not achievable.”

July 29, 2004

# Verification

## An Iffy Picture

- US sloughing off bilateral inspections, walking away from hard won gains
- US shifting emphasis from bilateral to multilateral monitoring
- Spotty approach to strengthening multilateral access
- Exceptions instead of norms
- US emphasis on enforcement

# The Future of Verification: Many Questions

- The CTR / Treaty mix?
- Can CTR succeed when treaties are hollowed out?
- Can we set global standards by demanding exceptions?
- Do you build upon or walk away from hard-won gains?
- Bilateral no / Multilateral yes?
- Verification for others but not oneself?


# Bottom Line

## A Comprehensive Approach, Using All Available Tools

- Strong homeland defense
- Strong military forces
- Timely, accurate and actionable intelligence
- Effective diplomacy
- Strong alliances and partnerships
- Addressing human needs

**PLUS**

- Effective verification and cooperative threat reduction



Safety from the most dangerous weapons  
in the most dangerous hands

*requires*

**Global Norms and Global Access**