

## **The New Look of US Nonproliferation Policy**

**William Potter** opened the session by pointing out four principles of the Bush Administration's nuclear nonproliferation policies:

- Nuclear proliferation is inevitable; at best it can be managed, not prevented.
- There are good proliferators and bad proliferators.
- Multilateral mechanisms to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons are ineffectual.
- Regional security and economic considerations trump those of global nonproliferation.

**To view Henry Sokolski's presentation, please [click here](#).**

**Lewis Dunn** described the Bush Administration's nonproliferation policies and said that some were common to other administrations while others were not. These points include:

- The administration recently rediscovered the importance of prevention.
- Like any other administration, the administration occasionally subordinates nonproliferation effort to other security interests.
- Like some other administrations, the administration actively seeks innovative initiatives, such as Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
- Unlike some other administrations, the administration is concerned of the nexus between terrorism and proliferation.
- Unlike any other administrations, the administration does not engage in arms control diplomacy.
- Unlike most other administrations, the administration has been strongly committed to the missile defense.

**Harald Mueller** opened with harsh criticisms of current US nonproliferation policies, including:

- US national security is pursued without regards to other countries' security concerns.
- The US avoids any commitments or restraints which may become impediments to the freedom of US actions.
- The US undermines the universality of the NPT regime by its distinction between friends and enemies.
- The US's "fake" multilateralism, i.e., a coalition of willing, results in excluding non-US allies from global nonproliferation effort.

While admitting that there have been some successes that the Bush administration achieved, e.g., increasing the IAEA's budget, Libya and new initiatives such as PSI, Mueller remained critical of current US nonproliferation policies, especially the recent nuclear cooperation between the US and India.

Mueller then described European views on nonproliferation. According to Mueller, the EU values international laws as the best and most trustworthy tool to achieve nonproliferation, the EU does not see any correlation between democratization and nonproliferation and the EU doubts the effectiveness of military power on nonproliferation.

Mueller concluded that the “new look” of US nonproliferation is not a way to achieve the goal of global nonproliferation. If the US continues to move along its course, Mueller said, the world will face more proliferation cases.

During the Q&A session, key discussion issues dealt with the effectiveness of missile defense and the sustainability of the current nonproliferation policies. Regarding the missile defense, Dunn asserted that the system works to deter US adversaries from using nuclear weapons, especially in Asia, while Sokolski showed some reservations over its technical capability and Mueller strongly criticized it. As for the sustainability of the current nonproliferation policies, Dunn claimed that it totally depends on how well the US and the international community manage the cases of Iran and North Korea in the next two years. Sokolski said that the US should be tough on itself if the US wants to make the current enforcement approach work.

*Summary prepared by Mayuka Yamazaki, Georgetown University, MSFS 2005*