

## **The Future of Verification**

### Dori Ellis, Sandia National Laboratories

Opening remarks: Verification has been a critical element of our negotiating strategy of arms control and nonproliferation treaties since the 1960s. However, the different environment of the post-Cold War international system requires more rigid and intrusive verification measures with countries that we do not have long-standing relations.

### James Goodby, Brookings Institution

Transparency is not a virtue and secrecy is not a vice in the world of national security affairs. International cooperation to promote transparency is not an easy and automatic procedure. Indeed, it has had a long and troubled history that blocked security cooperation between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It was customary during the Cold War to assign all blame to Moscow and all praise to Washington. But in reality, the Soviet Union was not opposed to transparency nor was the US an unqualified supporter.

The current US-Russia relationship is dependent on the concept of cooperative transparency but there have been many difficulties in implementing cooperative measures. Historically, confusion and miscommunication over the meaning of transparency precluded any cooperation. The Soviets had long argued that transparency was not always a positive factor and that a misinterpretation of facts could lead to mutual distrust and war. Conversely, the US argued that transparency could reduce the danger of a surprise attack.

This historic disconnect and mutual suspicion continues to a certain extent today and will complicate efforts to transform the US-Russia relationship.

### Alexei Arbatov, Carnegie Moscow Center

The dialectic over arms control verification began forty years ago but it has failed to evolve to embrace the post-Cold War stage. The dialectic has come full circle to the argument that a comprehensive and sophisticated system of verification and transparency is unnecessary now that the Cold War is over. No political will exists to contemplate a new type of arms control rather than a policy of mutual nuclear deterrence.

Consequently, there is no serious arms control treaty planned to succeed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START I, when it expires in 2009. START I established an intrusive verification regime and an extensive range of notifications. However, START I should be the framework for future verification systems. Its extensive verification measures should be indefinitely extended and those verification measures should be retained in a new treaty to ensure a correct process of transparency.

### Paula DeSutter, US Department of State

A key component of meeting the core objective within the United States' nonproliferation policies is our approach toward verification of arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament agreements and commitments. The Bureau of Verification, Inspection, and

Compliance is attempting to change the concepts of noninterference with national technical means of verification and incorporating on-site inspection. These changes are:

- The US has worked hard to coordinate our own approach when examining the concepts of underlying verification, in organizing to take on this important work, and in ensuring that our ability to assess verification and compliance is robust and rigorous.
- The old term “National Technical Means of Verification,” must be replaced by the new term “National Means and Methods.” A new conceptual approach should accompany this new nomenclature to allow for the adaptability of older concepts of verification. The US has undertaken and urged a more balanced assessment of the relative merits of cooperation measures and the proper balance between such measures and National Means and Methods.
- The US believes that consideration of verification requirements independent from consideration of the challenges of compliance assessment and compliance enforcement is nonsensical.

Michael Krepon, Henry L. Stimson Center

The verification picture is incomplete. The current administration is off-loading bilateral inspections and walking away from hard-won gains of the START I treaty and other nonproliferation regimes. The administration’s approach to combat WMD proliferation claimed to represent a fundamental change from the past. But what is fundamentally new are the missing tools and de-emphasis on traditional tools. Transparency measures, assured access, improved treaty monitoring, and verification were either left unmentioned or were not given much reinforcement.

We need a comprehensive approach that emphasizes global norms and global access. Our current policy of country exceptionalism is a poor substitute for norms and it is corrosive because it hallows out the verification measures in treaties. This is not a sustainable approach. Instead we should maintain the existing bilateral intrusive monitoring of Russian arsenals and move forward with these provisions.

*Summary by Allison Massagli, Georgetown University, MSFS 2005*