

*Speech as delivered by Carnegie Director for Non-Proliferation Joseph Cirincione at the Arms Control Association Annual Meeting on February 3, 2005.*

Thank you, Daryl, and my deep thanks to the Arms Control Association and its board of directors for organizing this very important day of events and for inviting me to speak on this panel. I congratulate Secretary Rademaker and Ambassador Abdenur on the power and eloquence of their remarks.

In my brief comments, I would like to draw from, and offer you a preview of, the new report from the Carnegie Endowment that we will release on March 3. It is a much improved version – thanks to months of international consultations and comments – of the draft report we issued in June 2004 entitled, *Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security*.

Let me start with the obvious: The rules that govern nuclear exports, safeguard nuclear materials, and control and eliminate nuclear weapons are not self-enforcing. States and international agencies must struggle to mobilize the power needed to enforce and adapt these rules as conditions change.

In 1995, in perhaps the single greatest strengthening of the regime since its founding, the signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty agreed to transform its original twenty-five year term into an open-ended commitment. In doing so, they committed themselves to a stringent bargain. One hundred and seventy-three states in that year reaffirmed their renunciation of nuclear weapons in return for the explicitly reaffirmed commitment by the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom to eventually eliminate their nuclear arsenals. All states did so with the understanding that while the treaty was clearly imperfect, it nonetheless made them all safer—individually and collectively.

But the world has changed dramatically in the last ten years. We have seen terrorism, wars, nuclear black markets, and states cheating on, and even leaving, the NPT. Perhaps today's greatest threat stems from the wide availability of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the fissile materials that are the fuel of nuclear bombs. These materials have become more accessible to terrorists through the poor security at nuclear stockpiles in the former Soviet republics and in dozens of other countries.

There is also danger that new nations could acquire nuclear weapons by exploiting the NPT's failure to define specifically what constitutes the "peaceful" application of nuclear capabilities. As the treaty has been interpreted, countries can acquire technologies that bring them to the very brink of nuclear weapon capability without explicitly violating the agreement, and can then leave the treaty without penalty.

There are also newer concerns. Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, the majority of countries feel that the five original nuclear weapon states do not intend to fulfill their end of the NPT bargain—the pledge to eliminate nuclear weapons. That growing conviction erodes the willingness among members of this majority to live up to their side of the bargain—much less to agree to strengthen the regime.

For all these reasons and more, there are rising doubts about the sustainability of the nonproliferation regime. Nations with ample technological ability to develop nuclear weapons may be reconsidering their political decisions not to do so.

All of these developments show that in spite of major successes much more needs to be done to reduce the possibility of nuclear catastrophe. All nations—including the three unwilling to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty—need to be covered. Access to weapons material and the means of producing it needs to be far more tightly limited everywhere. Nonproliferation rules must be extended to individuals and corporations.

The Bush administration has correctly drawn international attention to the need for serious enforcement. For many years, too much attention had been paid to obtaining signatures on treaties, and not enough to achieving compliance with them. The absence of a collective political will to stop bad actors—by force if necessary—undermined deterrence. The United States itself had routinely made proliferation concerns secondary to other strategic and economic issues in relations with key states such as Pakistan, Israel, and Iraq.

However, the current Bush strategy—like the one it replaced—has proven insufficient. Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons requires more international resolve than previous administrations could muster, but it also demands more genuine international teamwork than the Bush administration recognizes. Nuclear weapons and fissile materials are problems wherever they are, not just in a handful of "evil" states. The threat cannot be eliminated by removing whichever foreign governments the United States finds most threatening at any given time. History has shown again and again that today's ally can become tomorrow's problem state. Moreover, terrorists will seek nuclear weapons and materials wherever they can be found, irrespective of a state's geopolitical orientation.

The United States cannot defeat the nuclear threat alone, or even with small coalitions of the willing. It needs sustained cooperation from dozens of diverse nations—including the leading states that have forsworn nuclear weapons, such as Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan, South Africa, and Sweden—in order to broaden, toughen, and stringently enforce nonproliferation rules. To get that cooperation, the nuclear weapon states must show that tougher nonproliferation rules not only benefit the powerful but constrain them as well.

Success will depend on the United States' ability to marshal legitimate authority that motivates others to follow. As Francis Fukuyama notes, "Other people will follow the American lead if they believe it is legitimate; if they do not, they will resist, complain, obstruct, or actively oppose what we do."

Recent events, most dramatically the war in Iraq, have undermined America's legitimacy. With societies bristling at U.S. government rhetoric and action, elected leaders in key countries distance themselves from U.S. initiatives.

Even when others share U.S. views of the nuclear threat, they may balk at following U.S. policies because they do not see Washington acting on *their* priorities, for example, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

In Robert Kagan's words, "The United States can neither appear to be acting only in its self-interest, nor can it, in fact, act as if its own national interest were all that mattered." As Prime Minister Tony Blair said just one week ago, "If America wants the rest of the world to be part of the agenda it has set, it must be part of their agenda too."  
So, how do we do this?

### **What We Must Do**

Global nuclear security requires *universal compliance* with the norms and rules of a *toughened* nuclear nonproliferation regime. *Compliance* means more than signatures on treaties, or declarations of good intent – it means actual performance. *Universal* means that nonproliferation norms and rules must be extended not only to states that have joined the treaties, but to all states, and to nonstate actors as well.

Let me close with just two examples of the obligations and related policy recommendations we will make in the Carnegie study next month.

### **OBLIGATION NUMBER ONE: We Must Make Nonproliferation Irreversible** **This means we must revise the rules managing the production of nuclear weapon-usable materials, and clarify and tighten the terms by which states can withdraw from the NPT.**

Specifically, this means we should

- Preclude the acquisition of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing plants by any additional state.
- Provide states internationally guaranteed, economically attractive supplies of the fuel and services necessary to meet nuclear energy demands.
- End the production of highly enriched uranium and adopt a temporary "pause" in the separation of plutonium.
- Pass a new UN Security Council resolution making a state that withdraws from the NPT responsible for violations committed while it was still a party to the treaty.
- Bar states that withdraw from the treaty from legally using nuclear assets acquired internationally before their withdrawal; and,
- Suspend nuclear cooperation with countries that the IAEA cannot certify are in full compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

### **OBLIGATION NUMBER TWO: We Must Devalue the Political and Military Currency of Nuclear Weapons**

**All states must diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and international politics. The nuclear weapon states must do more to make their nonproliferation commitments irreversible, especially through the steady verified dismantlement of nuclear arsenals.**

Specifically, this means we should:

- Disavow the development of new types of nuclear weapons, reaffirm the current moratorium on nuclear weapon testing, and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
- Lengthen the time decision makers would have before deciding to launch nuclear weapons; and

- Make nuclear weapon reductions, such as those required under the 2002 Treaty of Moscow, irreversible and verifiable.

The new proliferation challenges make it clear beyond denial that the present nonproliferation regime needs fixing. This is a time that demands systemic change: a new strategy to defeat old and new threats before they become catastrophes.

Only by forging this balance of obligations involving all states and all actors can we erect a defense in depth to the dangers from the spread of nuclear weapons

Thank you, very much.