Nonproliferation

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II is the most recent product of the bilateral arms control track between the United States and the Russian Federation. It was signed by Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin on January 3, 1993, during the summit in Moscow, and The United States Senate ratified the START II treaty on January 26, 1996. A Protocol to the original text was negotiated at the Helsinki Summit in March of 1997. The Helsinki Protocol, subject to the ratification of both parties, was signed in New York City on September 26, 1997. The Russian Bill of Ratification was adopted on April 14, 2000.

START II

By December 31, 2003, each side shall deploy no more than 3,000-3,500 strategic nuclear warheads.
All land-based ICBMs with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) must be eliminated.

Helsinki Protocol

Extension of the implementation deadline from December 31, 2003 to December 31, 2007.
Agreement to begin negotiation of START III, limiting deployed forces to between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads by December 31, 2007, immediately following START II’s entry into force.
By December 31, 2003, ‘deactivation’ of all delivery vehicles to be eliminated under the treaty.

The most common estimate of Russia’s current nuclear weapons arsenal is between 20,000-25,000 weapons. Of these, 6,250 are currently deployed strategic weapons, approximately 4,000 are deployed tactical weapons, and the remaining 10,000-15,000 are either in reserve, in storage, or awaiting dismantlement. The U.S. has 7,250 deployed strategic warheads within a total stockpile of some 12,070 weapons.
START II requires the destruction of delivery systems, not warheads. Even with the START II and START III reductions in the number of deployed strategic weapons, Russia’s total number of weapons-usable warheads will likely exceed 10,000 for the indefinite future.

Economic Uncertainty: Many Duma members do not believe that Russia can afford the investment required to replace the multiple warhead SS-18s and SS-24s with comparable single warhead missiles, especially when it might have to dismantle the same weapons under START III. In addition, some Russian strategic planners feel that Russia is ill prepared to make adequate projections for a new nuclear posture in a time of budgetary austerity and economic uncertainty. Most Duma members recognize that economic necessity will force Russia to reduce its operational forces below the START II level with or without START II. Some leading members still oppose START II, however, because it would eliminate MIRVed ICBMs, the most economical way for Russia to stay close to, if no longer equal with, the U.S. deployed strategic forces.
Strategic Uncertainty: Other factions in the Duma feel that the strategic tide has turned against Russia since the signing of START II. They see NATO expansion as a direct threat to Russia and see U.S. leadership on several other international issues as an effort to marginalize and isolate Russia. They see leading United States government officials calling for the abandonment of the ABM treaty and for the deployment of a National Missile Defense system that will place a smaller Russian force in even greater jeopardy. Furthermore, the Duma perceives a disparity between the U.S. and Russian ability to reconstitute their forces in the case of the breakdown of the treaty (commonly referred to as "breakout potential."). With deteriorating conventional forces, many believe that now is the wrong time to commit to further nuclear weapons reductions.
These uncertainties might be alleviated if the U.S. and Russia were to finalize a START III agreement at lower ceilings, for example 1,500 to 1,000 deployed strategic warheads. However, the U.S., for political and strategic reasons, is unwilling to negotiate START III before the Duma ratifies START II. The Clinton and Yeltsin administrations have thus far been unable to devise a way out of the START box they have created.