NPP

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II)

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II is the most recent product of the bilateral arms control track between the United States and the Russian Federation. It was signed by Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin on January 3, 1993, during the summit in Moscow, and The United States Senate ratified the START II treaty on January 26, 1996. A Protocol to the original text was negotiated at the Helsinki Summit in March of 1997. The Helsinki Protocol, subject to the ratification of both parties, was signed in New York City on September 26, 1997. The Russian Bill of Ratification was adopted on April 14, 2000.

The official Text follows:

INDEX OF TREATY ARTICLES
Article I
Article II
Article III
Article IV
Article V
Article VI
Article VII
Article VIII

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,

Stressing their firm commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and their desire to contribute to its strengthening,

Taking into account the commitment by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties,

Mindful of their undertakings with respect to strategic offensive arms under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, as well as the provisions of the Joint Understanding signed by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992, and of the Joint Statement on a Global Protection System signed by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992,

Desiring to enhance strategic stability and predictability, and, in doing so, to reduce further strategic offensive arms, in addition to the reductions and limitations provided for in the START Treaty,

Considering that further progress toward that end will help lay a solid foundation for a world order built on democratic values that would preclude the risk of outbreak of war,

Recognizing their special responsibility as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for maintaining international peace and security,

Taking note of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/52K of December 9, 1992.

Conscious of the new realities that have transformed the political and strategic relations between the Parties, and the relations of partnership that have been established between them,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate number for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, a number between 3800 and 4250 or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 4250.

2. Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for each Party shall not exceed:

(a) 2160, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs;

(b) 1200, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead is attributed; and

3. Upon fulfillment of the obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall further reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that no later than January 1, 2003, and thereafter, the aggregate number for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMS, deployed SLBMS, and deployed heavy bombers, a number between 3000 and 3500 or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 3500.

4. Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for each Party shall not exceed:

(a) a number between 1700 and 1750, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 1750;

(b) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead is attributed; and

5. The process of reductions provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall begin upon entry into force of this Treaty, shall be sustained throughout the reductions period provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, and shall be completed no later than seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty. Upon completion of these reductions, the Parties shall begin further reductions provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, which shall also be sustained throughout the reductions period defined in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 6 of this Article.

6. Provided that the Parties conclude, within one year after entry into force of this Treaty, an agreement on a program of assistance to promote the fulfillment of the provisions of this Article, the obligations provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article and in Article II of this Treaty shall be fulfilled by each Party no later than December 31, 2000.

Article II

1. No later than January 1, 2003, each Party undertakes to have eliminated or to have converted to launchers of ICBMs to which one warhead is attributed all its deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this Treaty (including test launchers and training launchers), with the exception of those launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities allowed under the START Treaty, and not to have thereafter launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed. ICBM launchers that have been converted to launch an ICBM of a different type shall not be capable of launching an ICBM of the former type. Each Party shall carry out such elimination or conversion using the procedures provided for in the START Treaty, except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article.

2. The obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to silo launchers of ICBMs on which the number of warheads has been reduced to one pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article III of this Treaty.

3. Elimination of silo launchers of heavy ICBMS, including test launchers and training launchers, shall be implemented by means of either:

(a) elimination in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the START Treaty; or

(b) conversion to silo launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Elimination and Conversion Protocol. No more than 90 silo launchers of heavy ICBMs may be so converted.

4. Each Party undertakes not to emplace an ICBM, the launch canister of which has a diameter greater than 2.5 meters, in any silo launcher of heavy ICBMs converted in accordance with subparagraph 3(b) of this Article.

5. Elimination of launchers of heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities shall only be carried out in accordance with subparagraph 3(a) of this Article.

6. No later than January 1, 2003, each Party undertakes to have eliminated all of its deployed and non-deployed heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol or by using such missiles for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, and not to have such missiles or launch canisters thereafter.

7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections in connection with the elimination of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters, as well as inspections in connection with the conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMS. Except as otherwise provided for in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol, such inspections shall be conducted subject to the applicable provisions of the START Treaty.

8. Each Party undertakes not to transfer heavy ICBMs to any recipient whatsoever, including any other Party to the START Treaty.

9. Beginning on January 1, 2003, and thereafter, each Party undertakes not to produce, acquire, flight-test (except for flight tests from space launch facilities conducted in accordance with the provisions of the START Treaty), or deploy ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this Treaty.

Article III

1. For the purposes of attributing warheads to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs under this Treaty, the Parties shall use the provisions provided for in Article III of the START Treaty, except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article.

2. Each Party shall have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs only of existing types, except for heavy ICBMS. Reduction in the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs of existing types that are not heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article III of the START Treaty, except that:

(a) the aggregate number by which warheads are reduced may exceed the 1250 limit provided for in paragraph 5 of Article III of the START Treaty;

(b) the number by which warheads are reduced on ICBMs and SLBMS, other than the Minuteman III ICBM for the United States of America and the SS-N-18 SLBM for the Russian Federation, may at any one time exceed the limit of 500 warheads for each Party provided for in subparagraph 5(c)(I) of Article III of the START Treaty;

(c) each Party shall have the right to reduce by more than four warheads, but not by more than five warheads, the number of warheads attributed to each ICBM out of no more than 105 ICBMs of one existing type of ICBM. An ICBM to which the number of warheads attributed has been reduced in accordance with this paragraph shall only be deployed in an ICBM launcher in which an ICBM of that type was deployed as of the date of signature of the START Treaty; and

(d) the reentry vehicle platform for an ICBM or SLBM to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed is not required to be destroyed and replaced with a new reentry vehicle platform.

3. Notwithstanding the number of warheads attributed to a type of ICBM or SLBM in accordance with the START Treaty, each Party undertakes not to:

(a) produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it under this Treaty; and

(b) increase the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM that has had the number of warheads attributed to it reduced in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

Article IV

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number of warheads attributed to each deployed heavy bomber shall be equal to the number of nuclear weapons for which any heavy bomber of the same type or variant of a type is actually equipped, with the exception of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Article. Each nuclear weapon for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall count as one warhead toward the limitations provided for in Article I of this Treaty. For the purpose of such counting, nuclear weapons include long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), nuclear air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 kilometers, and nuclear bombs.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall be the number specified for heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type in the Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum on Attribution.

3. Each Party undertakes not to equip any heavy bomber with a greater number of nuclear weapons than the number specified for heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type in the Memorandum on Attribution.

4. No later than 180 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall exhibit one heavy bomber of each type and variant of a type specified in the Memorandum on Attribution.

The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber of a given type or variant of a type is actually equipped.

5. If either Party intends to change the number of nuclear weapons specified in the Memorandum on Attribution, for which a heavy bomber of a type or variant of a type is actually equipped, it shall provide a 90-day advance notification of such intention to the other Party. Ninety days after providing such a notification, or at a later date agreed by the Parties, the Party changing the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall exhibit one heavy bomber of each such type or variant of a type. The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the revised number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of the specified type or variant of a type are actually equipped. The number of nuclear weapons attributed to the specified type and variant of a type of heavy bomber shall change on the ninetieth day after the notification of such intent. On that day, the Party changing the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall provide to the other Party a notification of each change in data according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum on Attribution.

6. The exhibitions and inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections.

7. Each Party shall have the right to reorient to a conventional role heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMS. For the purposes of this Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are those heavy bombers specified by a Party from among its heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs that have never been accountable under the START Treaty as heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMS. The reorienting Party shall provide to the other Party a notification of its intent to reorient a heavy bomber to a conventional role no less than 90 days in advance of such reorientation. No conversion procedures shall be required for such a heavy bomber to be specified as a heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role.

8. Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall be subject to the following requirements:

(a) the number of such heavy bombers shall not exceed 100 at any one time;

(b) such heavy bombers shall be based separately from heavy bombers with nuclear roles;

(c) such heavy bombers shall be used only for non-nuclear missions. Such heavy bombers shall not be used in exercises for nuclear missions, and their aircrews shall not train or exercise for such missions; and

(d) heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall have differences from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection.

9. Each Party shall have the right to return to a nuclear role heavy bombers that have been reoriented in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article to a conventional role. The Party carrying out such action shall provide to the other Party through diplomatic channels notification of its intent to return a heavy bomber to a nuclear role no less than 90 days in advance of taking such action. Such a heavy bomber returned to a nuclear role shall not subsequently be reoriented to a conventional role.

Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that are subsequently returned to a nuclear role shall have differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection from other heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that have not been reoriented to a conventional role, as well as from heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that are still reoriented to a conventional role.

10. Each Party shall locate storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments no less than 100 kilometers from any air base where heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are based.

11. Except as otherwise provided for in this Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall remain subject to the provisions of the START Treaty, including the inspection provisions.

12. If not all heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type are reoriented to a conventional role, one heavy bomber of each type or variant of a type of heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role shall be exhibited in the open for the purpose of demonstrating to the other Party the differences referred to in subparagraph 8(d) of this Article. Such differences shall be subject to inspection by the other Party.

13. If not all heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type reoriented to a conventional role are returned to a nuclear role, one heavy bomber of each type and variant of a type of heavy bomber returned to a nuclear role shall be exhibited in the open for the purpose of demonstrating to the other Party the differences referred to in paragraph 9 of this Article. Such differences shall be subject to inspection by the other Party.

14. The exhibitions and inspections provided for in paragraphs 12 and 13 of this Article shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections.

Article V

1. Except as provided for in this Treaty, the provisions of the START Treaty, including the verification provisions, shall be used for implementation of this Treaty.

2. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Bilateral Implementation Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Bilateral Implementation Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and

(b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.

Article VI

1. This Treaty, including its Memorandum on Attribution, Elimination and Conversion Protocol, and Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections, all of which are integral parts thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, but not prior to the entry into force of the START Treaty.

2. The provisions of paragraph 8 of Article II of this Treaty shall be applied provisionally by the Parties from the date of its signature.

3. This Treaty shall remain in force so long as the START Treaty remains in force.

4. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article VII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.

Article VIII

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA: FOR THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION:

Protocol On Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offiensive Arms

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the elimination of heavy ICBMs and upon procedures governing the conversion of silo launchers of such ICBMS.

I. Procedures for Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and Their Launch Canisters

1. Elimination of heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section at elimination facilities for ICBMs specified in the START Treaty or shall be carried out by using such missiles for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space. Notification thereof shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) 30 days in advance of the initiation of elimination at conversion or elimination facilities, or, in the event of launch, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988.

2. Prior to the confirmatory inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section, the inspected Party:

(a) shall remove the missile's reentry vehicles;

(b) may remove the electronic and electromechanical devices of the missile's guidance and control system from the missile and its launch canister, and other elements that shall not be subject to elimination pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Section;

(d) shall remove liquid propellant from the missile;

(e) may remove or actuate auxiliary pyrotechnic devices installed on the missile and its launch canister;

(f) may remove penetration aids, including devices for their attachment and release; and

(g) may remove propulsion units from the self-contained dispensing mechanism.

These actions may be carried out in any order.

3. After arrival of the inspection team and prior to the initiation of the elimination process, inspectors shall confirm the type and number of the missiles to be eliminated by making the observations and measurements necessary for such confirmation. After the procedures provided for in this paragraph have been carried out, the process of the elimination of the missiles and their launch canisters may begin. Inspectors shall observe the elimination process.

4. Elimination process for heavy ICBMS:

(a) missile stages, nozzles, and missile interstage skirts shall each be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(b) the self-contained dispensing mechanism as well as the front section, including the reentry vehicle platform and the front section shroud, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size and crushed.

5. During the elimination process for launch canisters of heavy ICBMS, the launch canister shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or into three pieces in such a manner that pieces no less than 1.5 meters long are cut from the ends of the body of such a launch canister.

6. Upon completion of the above requirements, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in a factual, written report containing the results of the inspection team's observation of the elimination process that the inspection team has completed its inspection.

7. Heavy ICBMs shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in this Section. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol Relating to the START Treaty.

II. Procedures for Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs, Silo Training Launchers for Heavy ICBMs

1. Conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMS, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMS, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in situ and shall be subject to inspection.

2. Prior to the initiation of the conversion process for such launchers, the missile and launch canister shall be removed from the silo launcher.

3. A Party shall be considered to have initiated the conversion process for silo launchers of heavy ICBMS, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMS, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs as soon as the silo launcher door has been opened and a missile and its launch canister have been removed from the silo launcher. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraphs I and 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol Relating to the START Treaty.

4. Conversion process for silo launchers of heavy ICBMS, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMS, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs shall include the following steps:

(a) the silo launcher door shall be opened, the missile and the launch canister shall be removed from the silo launcher;

(b) concrete shall be poured into the base of the silo launcher up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher; and

(c) a restrictive ring with a diameter of no more than 2.9 meters shall be installed into the upper portion of the silo launcher. The method of installation of the restrictive ring shall rule out its removal without destruction of the ring and its attachment to the silo launcher.

5. Each Party shall have the right to confirm that the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section have been carried out. For the purpose of confirming that these procedures have been carried out:

(a) the converting Party shall notify the other Party through the NRRCs:

(i) no less than 30 days in advance of the date when the process of pouring concrete will commence; and

(ii) upon completion of all of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section; and

(b) the inspecting Party shall have the right to implement the procedures provided for in either paragraph 6 or paragraph 7, but not both, of this Section for each silo launcher of heavy ICBMS, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMS, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted.

6. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete into each silo launcher of heavy ICBMS, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMS, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted, and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. For this purpose:

(a) the inspecting Party shall inform the Party converting the silo launcher no less than seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it will observe the filling of the silo in question;

(b) immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete, the converting Party shall take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible, and that the depth of the silo can be measured;

(c) the inspecting Party shall have the right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete from a location providing an unobstructed view of the base of the silo launcher, and to confirm by measurement that concrete has been poured into the base of the silo launcher up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher. The measurements shall be taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the top of the concrete fill, after the concrete has hardened;

(d) following notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. The restrictive ring shall not be shrouded during such inspections. The Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections;

(e) the results of measurements conducted pursuant to subparagraphs © and (d) of this paragraph shall be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort;

(f) inspection teams shall each consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty; and

(g) such inspections shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START Treaty.

7. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to measure the depth of each silo launcher of heavy ICBMS, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMS, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted both before the commencement and after the completion of the process of pouring concrete, and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. For this purpose:

(a) the inspecting Party shall inform the Party converting the silo launcher no less than seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it will measure the depth of the silo launcher in question both before the commencement and after the completion of the process of pouring concrete;

(c) the inspecting Party shall measure the depth of the silo launcher prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete;

(d) following notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring, and to remeasure the depth of the silo launcher. The restrictive ring shall not be shrouded during such inspections. The Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections;

(e) for the purpose of measuring the depth of the concrete in the silo launcher, measurements shall be taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the top of the concrete fill, after the concrete has hardened;

(f) the results of measurements conducted pursuant to subparagraphs (c), (d), and (e) of this paragraph shall be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort;

(g) inspection teams shall each consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the fist of inspectors under the START Treaty; and

(h) such inspections shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START Treaty.

8. The converting Party shall have the right to carry out further conversion measures after the completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 6 or paragraph 7 of this Section or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section.

9. In addition to the reentry vehicle inspections conducted under the START Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct, using the procedures provided for in Annex 3 to the Inspection Protocol Relating to the START Treaty, four additional reentry vehicle inspections each year of ICBMs that are deployed in silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that have been converted in accordance with the provisions of this Section. During such inspections, the inspectors also shall have the right to confirm by visual observation the presence of the restrictive ring and that the observable portions of the launch canister do not differ externally from the observable portions of the launch canister that was exhibited pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the START Treaty. Any shrouding of the upper portion of the silo launcher shall not obstruct visual observation of the upper portion of the launch canister and shall not obstruct visual observation of the edge of the restrictive ring. If requested by the inspecting Party, the converting Party shall partially remove any shrouding, except for shrouding of instruments installed on the restrictive ring, to permit confirmation of the presence of the restrictive ring.

10. Upon completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 6 or paragraph 7 of this Section or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the silo launcher of heavy ICBMs being converted shall, for the purposes of the Treaty, be considered to contain a deployed ICBM to which one warhead is attributed.

III. Equipment; Costs

1. To carry out inspections provided for in this Protocol, the inspecting Party shall have the right to use agreed equipment, including equipment that will confirm that the silo launcher has been completely filled up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher with concrete. The Parties shall agree in the Bilateral Implementation Commission on such equipment.

2. For inspections conducted pursuant to this Protocol, costs shall be handled pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol Relating to the START Treaty.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION:

Protocol on Exhibition and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offiensive Arms

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree to conduct exhibitions and inspections of heavy bombers pursuant to paragraphs 4, 5, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty.

I. Exhibitions of Heavy Bombers

1. For the purpose of helping to ensure verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, and as required by paragraphs 4, 5, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty, each Party shall conduct exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role, and heavy bombers that were reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role.

2. The exhibitions of heavy bombers shall be conducted subject to the following provisions:

(a) the location for such an exhibition shall be at the discretion of the exhibiting Party;

(b) the date for such an exhibition shall be agreed upon between the Parties through diplomatic channels, and the exhibiting Party shall communicate the location of the exhibition;

(c) during such an exhibition, each heavy bomber exhibited shall be subject to inspection for a period not to exceed two hours;

(d) the inspection team conducting an inspection during an exhibition shall consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty;

(e) prior to the beginning of the exhibition, the inspected Party shall provide a photograph or photographs of one of the heavy bombers of a type or variant of a type reoriented to a conventional role and of one of the heavy bombers of the same type and variant of a type that were reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role, so as to show all of their differences that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection; and

(f) such inspections during exhibitions shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START Treaty.

II. Inspections of Heavy Bombers

1. During exhibitions of heavy bombers, each Party shall have the right to perform the following procedures on the exhibited heavy bombers; and each Party, beginning 180 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, shall have the right, in addition to its rights under the START Treaty, to perform, during data update and new facility inspections conducted under the START Treaty at air bases of the other Party, the following procedures on all heavy bombers based at such air bases and present there at the time of the inspection:

(a) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, in order to confirm that the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped does not exceed the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber where the inspected heavy bomber is equipped for weapons, as well as to visually inspect the weapons bay of such a heavy bomber, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior;

(b) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role, in order to confirm the differences of such heavy bombers from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection. The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber having the differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior; and

(c) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers that were reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role, in order to confirm the differences of such heavy bombers from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection, and to confirm that the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped does not exceed the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber where the inspected heavy bomber is equipped for weapons, as well as to visually inspect the weapons bay of such a heavy bomber, and to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber having the differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible to inspection, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior.

2. At the discretion of the inspected Party, those portions of the heavy bomber that are not subject to inspection may be shrouded. The period of time required to carry out the shrouding process shall not count against the period allocated for inspection.

3. In the course of an inspection conducted during an exhibition, a member of the in-country escort shall provide, during inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph l(a) or subparagraph l© of this Section, explanations to the inspection mm concerning the number of nuclear weapons for which the heavy bomber is actually equipped, and shall provide, during inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph l(b) or subparagraph l© of this Section, explanations to the inspection team concerning the differences that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offiensive Arms

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged data current as of January 3, 1993, on the number of nuclear weapons for which each heavy bomber of a type and a variant of a type equipped for nuclear weapons is actually equipped. No later than 30 days after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties shall additionally exchange data, current as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty, according to the categories of data contained in this Memorandum, on heavy bombers equipped for nuclear weapons; on heavy bombers specified as reoriented to a conventional role, and on heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that are subsequently returned to a nuclear role; on ICBMs and SLBMs to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed; and on data on the elimination of heavy ICBMs and on conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs.

Only those data used for purposes of implementing the Treaty that differ from the data in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the START Treaty are included in this Memorandum.

I. Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers Other On Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role

1. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IV of the Treaty each Party undertakes not to have more nuclear weapons deployed on heavy bombers of any type or variant of a type than the number specified in this paragraph. Additionally, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article IV of the Treaty, for each Party the numbers of warheads attributed to deployed heavy bombers not reoriented to a conventional role as of the date of signature of the Treaty or to heavy bombers subsequently deployed are listed below. Such numbers shall only be changed in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty. The Party making a change shall provide a notification to the other Party 90 days prior to making such a change. An exhibition shall be conducted to demonstrate the changed number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of the listed type or variant of a type are actually equipped:

(a) United States of America
Heavy Bomber Types Number of Warheads
and Variant of a Type*
B-52G 12
B-52H 20
B-1B 16
B-2 16
Aggregate Number of Warheads
Attributed to Deployed Heavy
Bombers, Except for Heavy Bombers
Reoriented to a Conventional Role __________

(b) Russian Federation Number of Warheads
Heavy Bomber Type
and Variant of a Type

Bear B 1
Bear G 2
Bear H6 6
Bear H16 16
Blackjack 12

Aggregate Number of Warheads
Attributed to Deployed Heavy
Bombers, Except for Heavy Bombers
Reoriented to a Conventional Role __________
II. Data on Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role and Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role that Have Subsequently Been Returned to a Nuclear Role

1. For each Party, the numbers of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are as follows:

______________________________________________________________________

* Heavy bombers of the type and variant of a type designated B-52C, B-52D, B-52E, and B-52F, located at the Davis-Monthan conversion or elimination facility as of September 1, 1990, as specified in the Memorandum of Understanding to the START Treaty, will be eliminated, under the provisions of the START Treaty, before the expiration of the seven-year reductions period.

(a) United States of America
Heavy Bomber of Type Number
and Variant of Type
__________ __________
__________ __________
(b) Russian Federation
Heavy Bomber Type Number
and Variant of a Type
__________ __________
__________ __________

2. For each Party, the numbers of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role as well as data on related air bases are as follows:

(a) United States of America
Air Bases:

Name/Location Bomber Type
Variant of a Type
__________ __________
Heavy Bombers Reoriented Number
to a Conventional Role __________
(b) Russian Federation
Air Bases:

Name/Location Bomber Type and
__________ Variant of a Type
Heavy Bombers Reoriented Number
to a Conventional Role __________

3. For each Party, the differences observable by national technical means of verification for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are as follows:

(a) United States of America
Heavy Bomber Type Difference
and Variant of a Type
__________ __________
(b) Russian Federation
Heavy Bomber Type Difference
and Variant of a Type
__________ __________

4. For each Party, the differences observable by national technical means of verification for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that have subsequently been returned to a nuclear role are as follows:

(a) United States of America
Heavy Bomber Type Difference
and Variant of a Type
__________ __________
(b) Russian Federation
Heavy Bomber Type Difference
and Variant of a Type
__________ __________
III. Data on Deployed ICBMs and Deployed SLBMs of Which a Reduced Number of Warheads Is Attributed

For each Party, the data on ICBM bases or submarine bases, and on ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types deployed at those bases, on which the number of warheads attributed to them is reduced pursuant to Article M of the Treaty are as follows:

(a) United States of America
Type of ICBM or SLBM
____
Deployed ICBMS or Deployed
SLBMs, on Which the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced ____

Warheads Attributed to Each
Deployed ICBM or Deployed
SLBM After Reduction in the
Number of Warheads on It ____

Number of Warheads by Which
the Original Attribution of
Warheads for Each ICBM or
SLBM Was Reduced ____

Aggregate Reduction in the
Number of Warheads Attributed
to Deployed ICBMs or Deployed
SLBMs of that Type ____

ICBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed ICBMs Is Reduced:

Name/Location ICBM Type on Which
the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced
__________ ____
Deployed ICBMs on Which the
Number of Warheads Is Reduced ____

Warheads Attributed to Each
Deployed ICBM After Reduction
in the Number of Warheads on
It ____

Number of Warheads by Which
the Original attribution of
Warheads for Each ICBM Was
Reduced ____

Aggregate Reduction in the
Number of Warheads Attributed
to deployed ICBMs of that
Type ____

SLBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed SLBMs Is Reduced:

Name/Location SLBM Type on Which
the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced
__________ ____
Deployed SLBMs on Which the
Number of Warheads Is Reduced ____

Warheads Attributed to Each
Deployed SLBM After Reduction
in the Number of Warheads on
It ____

Number of Warheads by Which
the Original attribution of
Warheads for Each SLBM Was
Reduced ____

Aggregate Reduction in the
Number of Warheads Attributed
to deployed SLBMs of that
Type ____
(b) Russian Federation
Type of ICBM or SLBM

____
Deployed ICBMs or Deployed
SLBMs, on Which the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced ____

Warheads Attributed to Each
Deployed ICBM or Deployed
SLBM After Reduction in the
Number of Warheads on It ____

Number of Warheads by Which
the Original Attribution of
Warheads for Each ICBM or
SLBM Was Reduced ____

Aggregate Reduction in the
Number of Warheads Attributed
to Deployed ICBMs or Deployed
SLBMs of that Type ____

ICBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed ICBMs Is Reduced:

SLBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed SLBMs Is Reduced:

IV. Data on Eliminated Heavy ICBMs and Converted Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs

1. For each Party, the numbers of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs converted to silo launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs are as follows:

(a) United States of America
Aggregate Number of Converted Silo Launchers ____
ICBM Base for Silo
Launchers of ICBMs:
Name/Location ICBM type Installed
in a Converted
Silo Launcher
______
Silo Launcher Ground: (designation)
______
Silo Launchers: ____
______

(b) Russian Federation
Aggregate Number of Converted Silo Launchers ____
ICBM Base for Silo
Launchers of ICBMs:
Name/Location ICBM Type Installed
in a Converted
Silo Launcher
______
Silo Launcher Group: (designation)
______
Silo Launchers: ____
______

2. For each Party, the aggregate numbers of heavy ICBMs and eliminated heavy ICBMs are as follows:

(a) United States of America Number
Deployed Heavy ICBMs ____
Non-Deployed Heavy ICBMs ____
Eliminated Heavy ICBMs ____

(b) Russian Federation Number
Deployed Heavy ICBMs ____
Non-Deployed ICBMs ____
Eliminated Heavy ICBMs ____

V. Changes

Each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in the attribution and data contained in this Memorandum.

The Parties, in signing this Memorandum, acknowledge the acceptance of the categories of data contained in this Memorandum and the responsibility of each Party for the accuracy only of its own data.

This Memorandum is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree on such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to change the categories of data contained in this Memorandum or to make other changes to this Memorandum that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION:

1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington, DC 20036-2103

Phone: 202 483 7600 Fax: 202 483 1840 Email: info@carnegieendowment.org

Nonproliferation