Beyond U.S.-Russia Arms Control: Multilateral Reductions and the "Low Numbers" Problem

For the time being, it makes little sense to expand U.S.-Russian arms control efforts to include other nuclear-armed states. But, if the United States and Russia do continue to build down, the disarmament process will eventually hit a concrete floor if China is not brought into it. (China would also insist that the other NPT nuclear-weapon states—the UK and France—join, too.) Many treatments of the nuclear disarmament challenge assume that after the United States and Russia reduce their arsenals to 1,000 each, China would join. Yet, there is no evidence for this assumption. General Pan Zhenqiang acknowledges this in his wide-ranging contribution, writing that “China should be prepared to respond to a legitimate question raised in the … paper, that is, at what phase of nuclear disarmament by the two major nuclear powers would China think it is time to join them for further actions. An appropriate answer will require a lot of homework on the part of China.”

Of course, Beijing is not the only capital that must do intensive homework on this question. If multilateral reductions are to be feasible, many unexplored security questions must be answered. Brad Roberts writes that should the major powers “reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons and adapt their strategic postures to new circumstances,” they “will confront new problems of instability.”

If multilateral reductions are to be feasible, many unexplored security questions must be answered.

Lawrence Freedman notes that “a more inclusive process” of nuclear reductions “would not … necessarily address the issue of more delicate nuclear balances, when small numbers multiply the impact of any aggressive first strike.” Freedman adds that “[t]here is no reason to suppose [danger] just because the numbers had fallen below some threshold level. Nuclear options would come into play only when international relations were already at a breaking point. Nonetheless, those who rely on extended deterrence are going to be more concerned.…”

In other words, a great deal of analysis and debate is needed to assess whether and how reductions could be managed to the point that no nuclear-armed state had more than, say, low-hundreds of nuclear weapons. None of today’s nuclear-armed states (and those depending on them for security guarantees) would commit to major proportional reductions in their arsenals without well-vetted studies by their national defense establishments. And because the envisioned process would be multilateral, and therefore would involve complex calculations of deterrence equations involving changing sets of multiple actors, international analysis and debate would be necessary. The 2010 report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) admirably advances this analysis and debate.

Building on the ICNND’s work, governments should commission their relevant defense research institutions to begin such studies now. There is no good reason not to, and commissioning such studies would be evidence that a state is taking its disarmament obligations seriously. Independent experts also should explore and model the “low numbers” problem.

Governments should commission their relevant defense research institutions to begin such studies now.

• What conditions would China, France, and the UK put on entering or completing multilateral negotiations? Would they, for example, bring in conventional military considerations? Doctrinal issues? Transparency requirements that France urges but that China finds unpalatable?
   
• Beyond the five recognized nuclear-weapon states, wouldn’t India and Pakistan, at least, have to be involved, given the connections between China and South Asia? How could this be squared with the refusal of some key states to include India, Pakistan, and Israel in official discussions of nuclear arms control and disarmament because they are not recognized as nuclear-weapon states under the NPT?
   
• Would the anomalous position of North Korea continue to be addressed through the Six-Party process? Would North Korea’s ongoing possession of a small number of nuclear weapons be reasonable cause to block the others from making reductions to low numbers?
   
• If multilateral discussions were focused on “nuclear weapons,” Israel presumably would not participate, given that it does not acknowledge possessing them. Could this problem be finessed if a forum were convened of states that possess unsafeguarded fissile materials, with the purpose of negotiating steps to bring materials and facilities under safeguards incrementally? This is essentially what a fissile material production cutoff would do, and it does not require declaring possession of nuclear weapons.
   
• Have American and Russian strategists actually thought about going below 1,000 nuclear weapons? How much of a numerical advantage does each state thinks it needs over the rest? (Many Americans, for example, believe the United States should have as many nuclear weapons as everyone beyond Russia combined.) How do they think about triangular deterrence requirements: United States–Russia–China? Does Russia think it needs nuclear deterrence against not only the United States and China, but also the UK and France? Pakistan? How about China: it thinks it needs deterrence against the United States, Russia, and India, but is that all?
   
• Some American strategists who have thought or opined about the subject worry that reductions to mid- to low-hundreds could invite China to race up to parity. Is it reasonable to think that any multilateral negotiations would have to provide assurance against this, and should that be recommended? Would China insist on parity at its numbers? And would India accept disparity in a formal agreement?
   
• If U.S.–Soviet parity after the 1970s was not destabilizing, why would parity at low numbers be destabilizing? If the problem is multiple actors and the possibility of two or more collaborating against one to create disparity, how could this be addressed?
   
• U.S. and some UK (and Russian?) analysts worry that low numbers (a few hundred) could invite nuclear use that would not be attempted when high numbers exist. Such assumptions have not been modeled and tested through international discussion. Shouldn’t this be done?
   
• Why would deterrence be weakened at low numbers? What sorts of scenarios would be presumed, and how justified would they be? Are deterrence and stability more sensitive to numbers or to the survivability of forces? How would ballistic missile defenses affect such calculations?
   
• Couldn’t confidence-building measures and arms control ameliorate concerns about instability? What would the elements be? (Ballistic missile defense would probably be important here.)
   
• The United States would be very sensitive to erosion of extended deterrence commitments, especially vis-à-vis Japan and South Korea (as would Tokyo, Seoul, and perhaps others). Presumably these states would be consulted thoroughly along the way, and the robustness of conventional deterrence would have to be assured.

These questions provide a rich and important agenda for international analysis and debate.